Reviewed by: Philosophy Examined: Metaphilosophy in Pragmatic Perspective by Nicholas Rescher Daniel Pierson RESCHER, Nicholas. Philosophy Examined: Metaphilosophy in Pragmatic Perspective. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021. xii + 216 pp. Cloth, $100.99 Nicholas Rescher's Philosophy Examined: Metaphilosophy in Pragmatic Perspective is a refreshing book. Rescher brings his decades of experience in the field to bear on the topic of metaphilosophy, which he describes as "the study of the nature and methodology of the discipline." The book provides an opportunity to reflect on basic philosophical commitments that might otherwise be sedimented over in the highly specialized environment of academic philosophy. His careful formulations along the way are both instructive and delightful; the reader finds himself in the presence of an original and systematic thinker. At the same time, the book is sometimes needlessly repetitious. It is episodic in the sense that no internal references are made to earlier parts of the book, even when the same topics arise or the same examples are used. At several points, paragraphs from earlier in the book are repeated verbatim in later chapters. (In addition, it should be noted that the present state of the text is marred by a distracting number of typographical errors: over 200 or so, in its 210 pages!) The book is divided into fourteen chapters of uneven length: Four are brief (4–8 pages), five are mid-length (11–14 pages), and five are relatively long (16+ pages). Whereas the shorter and mid-length chapters are somewhat matter-of-factly stated, along the lines of a textbook, the long chapters are more involved scholarly contributions, which have been published—sometimes in a less revised version—in other places. Chapter 1 is a brief chapter in which philosophy is distinguished from science. Whereas the latter deals with "the real world," the former profitably makes use of speculative thought maneuvers, such as "what-if" scenarios, paradox, and thought experiments. As Rescher states very nicely, the contemplation of what is not can lead us to understand and appreciate "the offerings and arrangements of the real." In a mid-length chapter 2, Rescher points to the inherent tension that he sees in philosophical claims, such that they aim for a likelihood of correctness that can be purchased only by sacrificing informativeness; that is, they demand "conjoint precision and generality." In the face of the "problems of getting it right" discussed in chapter 2, a brief chapter 3 advocates for a "rational contextualism" founded on [End Page 825] separate "zones of acceptability." Rescher proposes this as the best way of dealing with the "information glut" caused by the pragmatic shift from absolute truth as the standard of acceptability to the less rigid "warranted assertability." A mid-length chapter 4 notes that philosophy aims at the best available answer to its questions, not "the best possible answer (in some rarified sense of the term)." Ultimately, it is the task of philosophy to "impart systemic order into the manifold of relevant data." But the relevant data of the discipline comes from diverse sources (such as common sense, science, tradition, and so forth) that serve up mutually inconsistent statements, all of which have plausibility. Given the inherent inconsistencies of the data set, Rescher defends the coherentist approach as the most "natural" for the field. After chapter 4 begins a sequence of four long chapters. Chapter 5 is an insightful discussion of the role that aporias and strategic distinctions can play in the task of philosophy. In chapter 6, Rescher defends his philosophy against two sets of critics: those who claim that his metaphilosophical coherentism is ultimately a "crypto-relativism" and others who take it to be more consistent with an "evidentialist absolutism." In chapter 7, Rescher suggests that recasting the philosophical enterprise as a "quest for plausibility" rather than for truth would help to overcome a major obstacle to systematization, namely, treating philosophical claims as rival truth claims. Chapter 8 examines the nature, function, and ultimate justification for first principles. Rescher concludes that any given first principles are defeasible since they are ultimately justified pragmatically. A brief chapter 9 is an exhortation for intellectual modesty concerning our philosophical views, given certain cognitive limitations that we must acknowledge. A...
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Jul 29, 2024
Nelson M Ishengoma 
