post-Soviet De Facto States Research Articles

Displays of Statehood

Drawing on a qualitative analysis of primary sources and interviews with members of representative offices, this article shows how five post-Soviet de facto states—Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (“DPR”), and Luhansk People’s Republic (“LPR”)—engage in activities of international representation by borrowing from diverse repertoires of diplomatic practices, generating hybrid practices of their own. On the one hand, they are attentive to looking like bona fide states and to displaying material and symbolic attributes of statehood through mimicking state-led diplomacy. On the other, they resort to creativity and innovation to partially compensate for the constraints intrinsic to their ambivalent status and complete their repertoire with practices similar to those of transnational advocacy networks, especially regarding information politics and public diplomacy. Overall, the article aims to contribute to the field of contested statehood, as well as to the study of the international engagement of non-state actors in situations of liminality in the international system.

Post-Soviet De Facto States in the Theory of Small States

With their geographic and economic dimensions, post-Soviet de facto states are very small structures, yet they have existed for over a quarter of a century. This means that they have already had a generation that has no connection with the mother state from which they have separated. However, because the patron of their independence is (or, in the case of Artsakh, indirectly) Russia, which even officially recognized two of them (Abkhazia and South Ossetia-Alania), many authors keep observing their development. Their geopolitical importance significantly increased after the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Unrecognized states cannot be open economies, even if they wanted. In addition, in the case of post-Soviet de facto states, these are underdeveloped economies with high import costs and whose products are characterized by low competitiveness. The submitted contribution focuses on these structures from the point of view of the theory of small states. Based on geographic, demographic, economic and historical indicators, as well as the ability to resist reintegration, they suggest their theoretical possibilities of defending factual independence and gaining wider international recognition. The theory of small states shows in practice that the benefits of "smallness" cannot be used by de facto states to strengthen their political and economic prestige precisely because of the absence of international recognition and the rivalry of large states over geopolitical influence.

Энергетическая безопасность постсоветских де-факто государств: вызовы, конфликты и взаимозависимость

The article represents an effort to conceptualize energy security issues of the four post-Soviet de facto states: Republic of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, and Republic of South Ossetia. The author considers: relevant conceptual issues; the structure of post-Soviet de facto states’ energy consumption; the role of energy security issues in the context of post-Soviet de facto states’ relations of conflict and interdependence with their parent states; issues of development of these states’ energy sectors to enhance their energy security; societal and environmental aspects of de facto states’ energy security. The author concludes that the energy security agendas of these four polities are largely similar. Unlike major economies, they do not face a primary threat to their oil supplies, while the issue of supplying residential consumers with electricity and natural gas is of utmost importance to them. The energy security agenda plays an ambiguous role in the context of the relationships between these four de facto states and their parent states. In some cases, it exacerbates existing contradictions, while in other cases, it facilitates peaceful and constructive resolution. At present, the majority of post-Soviet de facto states are unable to fully meet their gas and electricity needs, with only Transnistria being capable of exporting electricity, provided that it receives a sufficient volume of gas from external sources. Energy problems play an ambiguous role in the conflicts between post-Soviet de facto states and their parent states. Sometimes the parties use these problems as leverage for pressure. However, in other cases, finding mutually acceptable solution for energy issues becomes an incentive for constructive cooperation. Sometimes parent states even bear the burden of debts and other expenses because they still claim sovereignty over their “breakaway territories”. Overall, due to extremely limited economic potentials and nonrecognition, post-Soviet de facto states have achieved, at best, limited results in safeguarding their energy security.

Internal and external sovereignty of post-Soviet unrecognized states

The article studies internal and external sovereignty of unrecognized or partially recognized post-Soviet states through the use of empirical analysis of quantitative data and critical analysis of subjective factors. It analyzes statistical and other information that reflects the demographic and socio-economic situation, foreign economic relations of such entities, and their impact on neighboring countries and regions. This is combined with the critical study of public opinions and popular identities based on surveys and 13 focus groups conducted in the fall of 2020 in Transnistria and Abkhazia. In all post-Soviet de facto states, the population has noticeably decreased (except for Nagorno-Karabakh before the 2020 war). The reason for the outflow of residents was the inability of such entities to provide citizens with decent incomes and their poor performance in economic competition with neighboring countries and regions, reflected in the dynamics of the key indicators per capita in terms of purchasing power parity. However, the economic and demographic situation cannot explain the sustainability of such entities. Strong political identity of citizens and their loyalty to the ruling regimes serve as the main basis for, and essential elements of, internal sovereignty. Participants of surveys highly value independence. They believe that it presumes economic independence, improved well-being, and the development of full-fledged international relations that helps to strengthen external sovereignty. Some respondents expressed disappointment with the fact that these goals have not been achieved in the course of 30 years. The geopolitical vision of the world by residents of post-Soviet de facto states is “Russia-centric”, although Russia is far from being idealized. In conclusion, the risks that Russia faces in connection with post-Soviet de facto states and with Moscow's involvement in the respective conflicts are assessed.

Patriotic Education in Post-Soviet De Facto States: Identities and Practices

The article considers specific features of official patriotism and patriotic education in post-Soviet de facto (unrecognized) stated. It discusses the question of how the official patriotic discourse reflects the issues of international recognition deficit and of scarcity of available resources. The author attempts to conceptualize patriotic upbringing in the light of de facto statehood, analyzes specific features of those identities that underlie the patriotic education in the context of de facto statehood as well as some aspects of implementation of patriotic education concepts in post-Soviet de facto states. The author concludes that the deficit of international recognition, scarcity of resources and uncertain prospects for future development make propagation of patriotic values more complicated while strong influence of a patron state and prevalence of double citizenships erode patriotic loyalties to some extent. Among specific features of patriotic education in post-Soviet de facto states are also the enhanced role of militarized practices and commemoration of “wars for independence”.

Pandemic Borders of Post-Soviet De Facto States

ABSTRACT The article focuses on the phenomenon of post-Soviet de facto borders (viz. the borders of Abkhazia, the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Lugansk People’s Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The author outlines similarities and differences of these de facto borders in comparison with internationally recognized ones and compares border policies implemented by individual post-Soviet de facto states. While de facto states utilized their borders to combat the pandemic largely in the same ways as recognized states did, their pandemic border regimes were less legitimate for the international community and thus de facto states were more dependent on cross-border relations with their “patrons,” having no other viable options. The author also argues that even de facto states with similar geographical and political conditions chose partially different policies for managing pandemic bordered restrictions.

The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet De Facto States: A Paired Comparison of Transnistria and the Donetsk People’s Republic

ABSTRACT What explains the economic endurance of the post-Soviet unrecognized states? Drawing insights from the scholarship on economic institutions, rentier states, and patron–client relations, this article explores the resource-extraction strategies of the post-Soviet de facto states via a paired comparison of Transnistria (PMR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The authors conceptualize the post-Soviet de facto states as rentier clients and discuss the defining characteristics of PMR’s oligarchic model and DPR’s provisional dirigiste system. The two secessionist regions manage production, trade, tax, construct budgets, and shape property rights regimes, while receiving vital aid from the patron-state.

The diplomacy of post-Soviet de facto states: ontological security under stigma

Why do post-Soviet de facto states (such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia) regularly interact with remote Pacific islands or Latin American countries, even though they are not bound by any meaningful political, economic or military ties? This article argues that the diplomatic relationship management amounts to a strategy of external legitimacy-building through stigma rejection and ontological security-attainment. This diplomatic practice creates positively tinged social affiliations, whereby the unrecognized entities aim to have their identity as ‘normal’ states affirmed. It renders the international society’s stigma ineffective, thus facilitating a potential exit from the stigma. By illuminating the performative aspects behind the de facto states’ quest for recognition, this article uncovers the de facto states’ agency and analytically emancipates them from the structural factor of ‘Russia-as-a-great-power’. It also contributes to the literature of ontological security by highlighting how positive (rather than conflictual) relationships, and how transformed (rather than stable) identities can be conducive to its attainment. This article generally highlights the need to analyse de facto states’ foreign relations more holistically than previously done.

Quest for Survival and Recognition: Insights into the Foreign Policy Endeavours of the Post-Soviet de facto States

There is lack of proper accounts of the foreign policy practices of de facto state authorities. There is no common understanding for whether de facto states have their own agency, or if these fledgling states are used as pawns within the context of wider strategic manoeuvring. This work proceeds from the assumption that de facto states are ‘states’ which, above all, seek to secure their physical survival, as well as to gain the status of legal subjectivity. For de facto states that depend on the effects of ‘smallness’; patron–client relations; and the opportunities provided by the engagement without recognition policy framework, this should ideally be the backbone of their foreign policy strategies. This comparative study on post-Soviet de facto states reveals that there are more opportunities to conduct an independent foreign policy than de facto states are able and willing to utilize. Once these entities have ensured their survival, this study demonstrates that the next steps towards gaining additional recognition might be perceived as no longer necessary.

Building identities in post-Soviet “de facto states”: cultural and political icons in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and Abkhazia

For states that have recently declared their independence but remained unrecognized “de facto states,” building a national identity is critical in the face of international rejection of their political status. Key elements of this new or re-animated national identity are political and cultural icons symbolizing the new political entity but with historical antecedents. Following Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism approach to the study of nationalism and motivated by Jean Gottmann’s research on iconographies in political geography, the article reports the results of nationally representative samples in four post-Soviet de facto states, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and Abkhazia. Respondents were asked to name up to five political and cultural figures that they admired. The collated results show a great array of local and Russian names in the four republics. Categorizing the names by historical era and by provenance allows a clarification of the extent to which nation building can rely on local heroes. Among the four republics, Nagorno-Karabakh stands out for its ethno-symbolic local character, while Transdniestrian respondents identified few iconic figures. South Ossetia shows a mix of local and Russian names while the respondents in Abkhazia were divided by nationality in their choices.

Conceptualising Post-Soviet de facto States as Small Dependent Jurisdictions

De facto states, according to the most established elaborations of the concept, by definition strive towards full-fledged, internationally recognised independence. However, in many cases, independence may actually be perceived as a second best option. This article argues that in seeking further integration with a patron post-Soviet de facto states are behaving similarly to small-sized dependent jurisdictions in other parts of the world. Conceptualising post-Soviet de facto states as small dependent jurisdictions contributes to a more nuanced understanding of their state-building project, their relationship with the patron state, their political economy, as well as their long-term path of development.

Dynamics of state-building after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states

Post-war state-building is fraught with challenges as “war-makers” pivot to become “state-makers.” Citizen assessments of public good provision and physical security provide a measure of how state-building is perceived internally. State-building may also necessitate external dependence (Russia, for example, provides significant financial and military assistance to the post-Soviet de facto states), yet new state authorities want to be seen as more than puppets. We study the relationship between internal and external state-building dynamics in fostering citizen confidence in the post-war state. We use original population surveys to analyze public opinion and geographically disaggregated data on local violence from four post-Soviet de facto states—Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria—born of war. We examine the scalar relationships—from the individual embedded in the local context, to the regional (de facto territory) and supra-national (patron state and legitimacy in the international community)—that characterize them. We find that distrust of the patron state reduces trust in the de facto state president and translates into a lack of confidence in the prevailing order. As fears of conflict recurrence increase and disappointments about the economy worsen, these relationships are maintained across the pathways defined by the scale of patron trust-distrust.

Western academic discourse on the post-Soviet de facto state phenomenon

This article examines how the so-called post-Soviet de facto states are conceptualized and discussed within the wider context of Western English-language social and political sciences, including inter-disciplinary Russian, Slavonic, East European and Eurasian area studies. It outlines the main theoretical models and methodologies utilized in the analysis of this phenomenon, and identifies their respective benefits and shortcomings. The article posits that there is considerable unevenness between various theoretical paradigms in terms of their explanatory clarity and their relationship with empirical reality. I argue that Western academic discourse on the post-Soviet de facto states, and on post-Soviet politics more generally, has been increasingly shaped by mono-theoretical determinist models with heavy reliance on deductive quantitative research methods and secondary sources in English language and non-academic analytical reports. A corollary has been a considerable deterioration in the epistemological quality of the discourse on de facto states, and on occasion its politicization.

Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria

In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013–2014, renewed attention has been given to the earlier so-called “frozen conflicts” of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, national conflicts of the early 1990s resulted in establishment of four breakaway regions, the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorny Karabakh. While the first three are supported by Russia, the latter is supported by Armenia. Such support as well as growing internal legitimacy has enabled these republics to retain separate status for almost 25 years. Though appearing quite similar from an external perspective, the populations of the de facto states are quite diverse in composition, geopolitical preferences, and support for political institutions and persons. Large representative public opinion surveys conducted by the authors in 2010–2011 in the four de facto states allow a deeper comprehension of internal political and social dynamics. Three main dimensions of their current status and orientation (relations with Russia, support for local institutions, and possibilities of post-war reconciliation) are examined using nine key comparative questions. Nationality is the main predictor of divergent opinions within the republics, and results are reported along this dimension. Close relations with the external patron, support for the legitimacy and identity of the respective de facto republics, and little interest in returning to the parent state testify to the longevity and successful promotion of state and nation in the de facto republics in the Caucasus-Black Sea Region.

Yielding to the sons of the soil: Abkhazian democracy and the marginalization of the Armenian vote

Among the post-Soviet de facto states, Abkhazia is unique in that the secessionists pursued self-determination in the name of a minority group. Today the ethnic Abkhaz enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Simultaneously, Abkhazia has developed a reasonably democratic political system. How has it been possible for the ethnic Abkhaz to monopolize power within a political system that exhibits most of the trappings of democratic rule? We discuss four alternative theories of ethnic marginalization to explain why the Armenians, the largest minority community in Abkhazia, have abstained from translating numerical strength into political influence. We argue that it is essential to examine sentiments and behaviour not only among the dominant group, but just as much among the marginalized group. Particularly relevant is the pervasive perception that rights in and ‘ownership’ of a territory are linked to ‘rootedness’.

Post-Soviet de facto states in search of internal and external legitimacy. Introduction.

The four state-like entities on the territory of the former Soviet Union that emerged about twenty years ago have successfully defended their precarious independence until today. However, we still know very little about the internal political developments in these de facto states, because so far most research has focused on the regional and international dimensions of the now “frozen” secessionist conflicts which brought them into being. The authors of this issue argue that it is high time to have a closer look at the developments inside these de facto states for several reasons. First, in order to understand whether there is mutual dependence between internal political structures and processes and the chances of international recognition. Second, the post-Soviet de facto states are model cases for internal transformation or even democratization efforts as a strategy of internal and/or external legitimacy building. Finally, the issue proves that the reluctance of academia to analyze the political systems of these entities for fear of legitimizing regimes that do not deserve it is not reasonable: the post-Soviet de facto states are fully grown states for all but international recognition – they are not supposed to disappear because we refuse to admit this fact.

The dynamics of electoral politics in Abkhazia

Presidential and parliamentary elections in Abkhazia are pluralistic and competitive. They have led to the transfer of power from government to opposition forces. This in itself is a remarkable fact in the post-Soviet context, where the outcome of elections very often is determined in advance by the ruling elite. The article explains how and why this form of electoral democracy could occur in Abkhazia, arguably the most ethnically heterogeneous of all post-Soviet de facto states. Drawing on a wide variety of primary sources and data from within Abkhazia, particularly interviews with key players, the author describes the remarkable willingness of the main political actors to compromise and assesses to what extent Abkhazia's democratic credentials are sustainable

Secession and hybrid regime politics in transnistria

Post-Soviet de facto states are presented in the social science literature, first of all, as a by-product of research on secession, nationalism, and conflict resolution. The paper focuses instead on issues of institution-building and governance in de facto states. It examines the construction of a hybrid political regime in the most populous of post-Soviet de facto states, Transnistra. The paper analyzes secessionist elites' strategies of maintaining power and sources of domestic pressures to democratize political institutions of the de facto state. The evolution of the Transnistrian regime, it is argued, provides interesting ground for exploring the mechanisms of democratization under an unfavorable choice of institutions and problematic external environment.