Post-decision Wagering Research Articles

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) recognize that their guesses could be wrong and can pass a two-cup disjunctive syllogism task.

When chimpanzees search for hidden food, do they realize that their guesses may not be correct? We applied a post-decision wagering paradigm to a simple two-cup search task, varying whether we gave participants visual access to the baiting and then asking after they had chosen one of the cups whether they would prefer a smaller but certain reward instead of their original choice (experiment 1). Results showed that chimpanzees were more likely to accept the smaller reward in occluded than visible conditions. Experiment 2 found the same effect when we blocked visual access but manipulated the number of hiding locations for the food piece, showing that the effect is not owing to representation type. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that when given information about the contents of the unchosen cup, chimpanzees were able to flexibly update their choice behaviour accordingly. These results suggest that language is not a pre-requisite to solving the disjunctive syllogism and provides a valuable contribution to the debate on logical reasoning in non-human animals.

Consciousness influences the enhancement of visual statistical learning in Zipfian distributions.

It has been reported that visual statistical learning (VSL) is facilitated in skewed distributions. However, it remains unclear whether enhancement of VSL in Zipfian distributions is due to consciousness of the regularities presented at high frequency. This study addressed this issue. We measured participants' subjective confidence in regularities and awareness of regularities during familiarization by combining a previously reported procedure for VSL with a postdecision wagering task and posttest questionnaire. The results demonstrated that Zipfian distribution enhanced not only VSL but also metacognitive sensitivity, particularly for high-frequency regularities, as the effects of consciousness on VSL were limited to high-frequency regularities. Moreover, the results indicated that awareness during familiarization mediated VSL enhancement in the Zipfian distribution. These results suggest that VSL for events with high-frequency regularities plays an important role in the cognition of events with low-frequency regularities via awareness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Conversion of concept-specific decision confidence into integrative introspection in primates.

Introspection based on the integration of uncertain evidence is critical for acting upon abstract thinking and imagining future scenarios. However, it is unknown how confidence read-outs from multiple sources of different concepts are integrated, especially considering the relationships among the concepts. In this study, monkeys performed wagering based on an estimation of their performance in a preceding mnemonic decision. We found that the longer the response times for post-decision wagering, the more relieved the impairments having been caused by frontal disruption. This suggests the existence of a time-consuming compensatory metacognitive process. We found posterior inferior parietal lobe (pIPL) as its candidate, which was not coding the wagering per se (i.e., just high bet or low bet), but became more active when monkeys successfully chose the optimal bet option based on mnemonic decision performance. Thereafter, the pIPL prompts dorsal anterior cingulate cortex to carry the chosen wagering option. Our findings suggest a role for the pIPL in metacognitive concept integration.

Reverse-correlation reveals internal error-corrections during information-seeking

In the area of metacognition research, different methods have been used to study participants’ subjective sense of confidence in their choices. Among the most often used methods are explicit reports of subjective confidence, post-decision wagering and measuring additional info-seeking behavior. While all three methods are thought to measure confidence, they differ greatly in terms of practical execution and theoretical foundation. The method of reverse correlation has previously been used to determine which aspects of the stimulus influence decisions and confidence judgments. Here we compare the three methods of confidence assessment using reverse correlation analysis. Explicit reports and post-decision wagering revealed a positive association of stimulus information with choices and reduced decision weights for low-confidence trials. When confidence was assessed using the info-seeking method, low-confidence trials showed an inverted association with primary stimulus information. Using modelling of the behavioral data, we show how the reverse correlation results of all three methods can be explained by a simple model of confidence when internal error-corrections are allowed during seeking of additional information.

Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge explains perceptual confidence and its deviations from accuracy

In perceptual decisions, subjects infer hidden states of the environment based on noisy sensory information. Here we show that both choice and its associated confidence are explained by a Bayesian framework based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). We test our model on monkeys performing a direction-discrimination task with post-decision wagering, demonstrating that the model explains objective accuracy and predicts subjective confidence. Further, we show that the model replicates well-known discrepancies of confidence and accuracy, including the hard-easy effect, opposing effects of stimulus variability on confidence and accuracy, dependence of confidence ratings on simultaneous or sequential reports of choice and confidence, apparent difference between choice and confidence sensitivity, and seemingly disproportionate influence of choice-congruent evidence on confidence. These effects may not be signatures of sub-optimal inference or discrepant computational processes for choice and confidence. Rather, they arise in Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge of the environment.

Mindreading and metacognition patterns in patients with borderline personality disorder: experimental study

Current psychopathology attempts to understand personality disorders in relation to deficits in higher cognition such as mindreading and metacognition. Deficits in mindreading are usually related to limitations in or a complete lack of the capacity to understand and attribute mental states to others, while impairments in metacognition concern dysfunctional control and monitoring of one’s own processes. The present study investigated dysfunctional higher cognition in the population of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) by analyzing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in a mindreading task [reading the mind in the eyes Test (RMET)] and a subsequent metacognitive task based on self-report scales: a confidence rating scale (CR) versus a post-decision wagering scale (PDW). It turned out that people from the BPD group scored lower in the RMET. However, both groups had the same levels of confidence on the PDW scale when giving incorrect answers in the RMET test. As initially hypothesized, individuals with BPD overestimated their confidence in incorrect answers, regardless of the type of metacognitive scales used. The present findings indicate that BPD individuals show dysfunctional patterns between instances of mindreading and metacognition.

Monetary Incentives Increase Metacognitive Confidence in Source Memory Performance in Patients With Schizophrenia.

BackgroundContemporary psychiatric research focuses its attention on the patient’s dysfunction of metacognition in relation to the basic cognitive processes of mental activity. The current study investigated dysfunctional metacognition in relation to self-monitoring of memory in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. Dysfunctions in metacognition were examined by focusing on two types of metacognitive measures: post-decision wagering (PDW) scale and confidence ratings (CR) scale (CR).ObjectivesThe research employed an action-memory task that required patients with schizophrenia (N = 39) and healthy controls (N = 50) to evaluate their metacognition by categorizing self-monitoring actions (imagined vs. performed actions) either with PDW or CR. It was hypothesized that metacognition in self-monitoring activity in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia is improved by imaginary monetary incentives.Material and MethodsTo test this hypothesis, participants were asked to memorize actions either performed or imagined during the first phase of the experiment. The second phase was to identify previous actions as performed, imagined or new, and then to express confidence using two measures of metacognition (CR or PDW scales) that were randomly allocated to participants.ResultsOur study showed reduced performance in the action memory task for patients with schizophrenia, although there were no group differences in confidence measures when assessing self-monitoring actions. In particular, irrespective of the diagnosis, no differences in confidence measures for correct responses were found in the case of the PDW and CR scales. We also observed that metacognitive judgements were more accurate for incorrect responses when both groups used monetary incentives to reveal their metacognition.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that monetary incentives improve accuracy of metacognition among both patients and healthy controls. This accuracy-enhancing effect of monetary incentives on metacognition was possibly a result of motivational processes, including aversion to loss. The paper discusses the potential application of PDW in therapeutic metacognitive training for patients with schizophrenia.

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth is: Examining Metacognition in ASD Using Post-decision Wagering

It has been argued that metacognition and mindreading rely on the same cognitive processes (Carruthers in The opacity of mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). It is widely accepted that mindreading is diminished among individuals diagnosed with autism (Brunsdon and Happé in Autism 18(1):17–30, 2014), however, little is known about metacognition. This study examined metacognition in relation to mindreading and autism using post-decision wagering. Results from a student sample showed negative associations between autism traits and metacognitive accuracy, and metacognitive reaction times and mindreading. These findings were replicated in a general population sample, providing evidence of a reliable association between metacognition, mindreading and autism traits. However, adults diagnosed with autism showed equivalent levels of metacognitive accuracy to age- and IQ-matched comparison participants, albeit only with an overall increase in meta-level processing time.

Mnemonic Introspection in Macaques Is Dependent on Superior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex But Not Orbitofrontal Cortex.

The human PFC has been associated more with meta-perceptual as opposed to meta-memory decisions from correlational neuroimaging investigations. Recently, metacognitive abilities have also been shown to be causally dependent upon anterior and dorsal PFC in nonhuman primate lesion studies. Two studies, using postdecision wagering paradigms and reversible inactivation, challenged this meta-perceptual versus meta-memory notion and showed that dorsal and anterior prefrontal areas are associated with metamemory for experienced objects and awareness of ignorance, respectively. Causal investigations are important but scarce; nothing is known, for example, about the causal contributions of prefrontal subregions to spatial metamemory. Here, we investigated the effects of dorsal versus ventral PFC lesions on two-alternative forced-choice spatial discrimination tasks in male macaque monkeys. Importantly, we were rigorous in approach and applied three independent but complementary indices used to quantify individual animals' metacognitive ability (“Type II sensitivity”) by two variants of meta-d′/d′ and phi coefficient (φ). Our results were consistent across indices: while neither lesions to superior dorsolateral PFC nor orbitofrontal cortex impaired spatial recognition performance, only monkeys with superior dorsolateral PFC lesions were impaired in meta-accuracy. Together with the observation that the same orbitofrontal cortex lesioned monkeys were impaired in updating rule value in a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test analog, we therefore document a functional double-dissociation between these two PFC regions. Our study presents important causal evidence that other dimensions, namely, domain-specific processing (e.g., spatial vs nonspatial metamemory), also need considerations in understanding the functional specialization in the neural underpinnings of introspection.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study demonstrates macaque monkeys' metacognitive capability of introspecting its own memory success is causally dependent on intact superior dorsolateral prefrontal cortices but not the orbitofrontal cortices. Combining neurosurgical techniques on monkeys and state-of-the-art measures of metacognition, we affirm a critical role of the PFC in supporting spatial meta-recognition memory and delineate functional specificity within PFC for distinct elements of metacognition.

Putting post-decision wagering to the test: ameasure of self-perceived knowledge in basic sciences?

IntroductionStudents learn more effectively when they know what they do not know. Gaining insight into students’ metacognitive awareness is needed as misalignment between actual and self-perceived knowledge impedes their learning process. The optimal method of measuring self-perceived knowledge is still under debate. In this study, we evaluate the use of psychology-derived post-decision wagering for mapping students self-perceived knowledge.MethodsStudents (n = 71) performed a pre-test on medical physiology, followed by a teacher-moderated discussion and a post-test with isomorph questions. Half of the students rated their self-perceived knowledge on each question using post-decision wagering, i. e. betting 1–5 points on the correctness of their answer, whereas the other half used a 5-point Likert scale to rate their confidence.ResultsSelf-perceived knowledge scores were higher for post-decision wagering (pre: 3.75 ± 0.14, post: 4.60 ± 0.07) compared with Likert scales (pre: 3.13 ± 0.08, post: 3.92 ± 0.08) despite similar actual knowledge scores. Furthermore, Likert ratings showed a near-normal distribution, whereas wagers were placed preferentially using the outer ends of the scale. Correlations between mean actual and self-perceived knowledge scores were low in both groups. On average, 8.5% of responses were classified as misconceptions, defined as highly confident incorrect answers.DiscussionDespite the presumed reliability of post-decision wagering, our findings suggest that we should adhere to the use of Likert scales as a balanced measure for self-perceived knowledge in medical education. Moreover, the prevalence of misconceptions did not alter after instruction, indicating a need for instructional designs that enhance students’ conceptual understanding in basic sciences.

Experience-based knowledge increases confidence in discriminating our memories

The present study investigated the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in source monitoring with self-report scales engaging either information- or experienced-based knowledge. We expected that the source monitoring abilities may be affected by the origins of meta-knowledge that underlie post-decision wagering (PDW) based on economic categorizations (experience-based scale) and confidence ratings (CR) using a conventional taxonomy of confidence (information-based scale). To examine this hypothesis, healthy participants (N = 50) performed an action memory task, in which simple actions were presented in order to be performed or imagined. In the second phase of the task, participants were required to assess source monitoring by distinguishing whether the presented action was performed or imagined. Then, the participants randomly assigned into the PDW or CR group rated their confidence in responses related to source monitoring performance. It was found that source monitoring ability is resistant to manipulation of the type of knowledge used in the scales. However, measures of metacognition indicated that accuracy of the experienced-based judgments of PDW was higher as compared to the CR scale while source monitoring. These findings suggest the origin of knowledge whose justification rests more on empirical observations generates more accurate knowledge than self-evident direct intuition with respect to discriminations of one’s own memories.

Post-decision wagering after perceptual judgments reveals bi-directional certainty readouts

Humans and other animals constantly evaluate their decisions in order to learn and behave adaptively. Experimentally, such evaluation processes are accessed using metacognitive reports made after decisions, typically using verbally formulated confidence scales. When subjects report high confidence, it reflects a high certainty of being correct, but a low confidence might signify either low certainty about the outcome, or a high certainty of being incorrect. Hence, metacognitive reports might reflect not only different levels of decision certainty, but also two certainty directions (certainty of being correct and certainty of being incorrect). It is important to test if such bi-directional processing can be measured because, for decision-making under uncertainty, information about being incorrect is as important as information about being correct for guidance of subsequent behavior. We were able to capture implicit bi-directional certainty readouts by asking subjects to bet money on their perceptual decision accuracy using a six-grade wager scale (post-decision wagering, PDW). To isolate trial-specific aspects of metacognitive judgments, we used pre-decision wagering (wagering before the perceptual decision) to subtract, from PDW trials, influences resulting from non-trial-specific assessment of expected difficulty and psychological biases. This novel design allowed independent quantification of certainty of being correct and certainty of being incorrect, showing that subjects were able to read out certainty in a bi-directional manner. Certainty readouts about being incorrect were particularly associated with metacognitive sensitivity exceeding perceptual sensitivity (i.e. meta-d′ > d′), suggesting that such enhanced metacognitive efficiency is driven by information about incorrect decisions. Readouts of certainty in both directions increased on easier trials, and both certainty directions were also associated with faster metacognitive reaction times, indicating that certainty of being incorrect was not confounded with low certainty. Finally, both readouts influenced the amount of money subjects earned through PDW, suggesting that bi-directional readouts are important for planning future actions when feedback about previous decisions is unavailable.

Measuring Perceptual Consciousness.

Conscious perception is typically assessed with either objective or subjective measures (Seth et al., 2008). Measures are considered objective if conscious perception is estimated from performance in a discrimination task; inability to discriminate between stimuli is taken as evidence that participants had no conscious perception (Hannula et al., 2005). Measures are considered subjective if participants report their visual experience on each trial (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Del Cul et al., 2007). One type of subjective measures consists of metacognitive judgments; the relationship between metacognition and perceptual awareness is a matter of debate (Fleming and Lau, 2014; Jachs et al., 2015) and I will not discuss these measures further. Likewise, I will not discuss post-decision wagering approaches as they are affected by the participants' risk aversion (Schurger and Sher, 2008). Proponents of subjective measures stress that objective measures (discrimination) provide only task performance and are not suitable for capturing visual experience (Lau, 2008). The major objection against subjective measures is contamination by response bias. Because it has been argued that participants can perform discrimination in the absence of perceptual awareness, many researchers currently favor subjective measures. In this paper, I show that objective measures (discrimination) and subjective measures (detection) are similar and both measure task performance. I further propose that task performance can be used as a valid measure of conscious perception.

The effect of subjective awareness measures on performance in artificial grammar learning task.

Systematic research into implicit learning requires well-developed awareness-measurement techniques. Recently, trial-by-trial measures have been widely used. However, they can increase complexity of a study because they are an additional experimental variable. We tested the effects of these measures on performance in artificial grammar learning study. Four groups of participants were assigned to different awareness measures conditions: confidence ratings, post-decision wagering, decision strategy attribution or none. Decision-strategy-attribution participants demonstrated better grammar learning and longer response times compared to controls. They also exhibited a conservative bias. Grammaticality by itself was a stronger predictor of strings endorsement in decision-strategy-attribution group compared to other groups. Confidence ratings and post-decision wagering only affected the response times. These results were supported by an additional experiment that used a balanced chunk strength design. We conclude that a decision-strategy-attribution procedure may force participants to adopt an analytical decision-making strategy and rely mostly on conscious knowledge of artificial grammar.

Neuronal Network and Awareness Measures of Post-Decision Wagering Behavior in Detecting Masked Emotional Faces

Awareness can be measured by investigating the patterns of associations between discrimination performance (first-order decisions) and confidence judgments (knowledge). In a typical post-decision wagering (PDW) task, participants judge their performance by wagering on each decision made in a detection task. If participants are aware, they wager advantageously by betting high whenever decisions are correct and low for incorrect decisions. Thus, PDW—like other awareness measures with confidence ratings—quantifies if the knowledge upon which they make their decisions is conscious. The present study proposes a new method of assessing the association between advantageous wagering and awareness in the PDW task with a combination of log-linear (LLM) modeling and neural network simulation to reveal the computational patterns that establish this association. We applied the post-decision wagering measure to a backward masking experiment in which participants made first-order decisions about whether or not a masked emotional face was present, and then used imaginary or real monetary stakes to judge the correctness of their initial decisions. The LLM analysis was then used to examine whether advantageous wagering was aware by testing a hypothesis of partial associations between metacognitive judgments and accuracy of first-order decisions. The LLM outcomes were submitted into a feed-forward neural network. The network served as a general approximator that was trained to learn relationships between input wagers and the output of the corresponding log-linear function. The simulation resulted in a simple network architecture that successfully accounted for wagering behavior. This was a feed-forward network unit consisting of one hidden neuron layer with four inputs and one output. In addition, the study indicated no effect of the monetary incentive cues on wagering strategies, although we observed that only low-wager input weights of the neural network considerably contributed to advantageous wagering.

Post-Decision Wagering Affects Metacognitive Awareness of Emotional Stimuli: An Event Related Potential Study.

The present research investigated metacognitive awareness of emotional stimuli and its psychophysiological correlates. We used a backward masking task presenting participants with fearful or neutral faces. We asked participants for face discrimination and then probed their metacognitive awareness with confidence rating (CR) and post-decision wagering (PDW) scales. We also analysed psychophysiological correlates of awareness with event-related potential (ERP) components: P1, N170, early posterior negativity (EPN), and P3. We have not observed any differences between PDW and CR conditions in the emotion identification task. However, the "aware" ratings were associated with increased accuracy performance. This effect was more pronounced in PDW, especially for fearful faces, suggesting that emotional stimuli awareness may be enhanced by monetary incentives. EEG analysis showed larger N170, EPN and P3 amplitudes in aware compared to unaware trials. It also appeared that both EPN and P3 ERP components were more pronounced in the PDW condition, especially when emotional faces were presented. Taken together, our ERP findings suggest that metacognitive awareness of emotional stimuli depends on the effectiveness of both early and late visual information processing. Our study also indicates that awareness of emotional stimuli can be enhanced by the motivation induced by wagering.

Paradoxical Interaction between Ocular Activity, Perception, and Decision Confidence at the Threshold of Vision.

In humans and some other species perceptual decision-making is complemented by the ability to make confidence judgements about the certainty of sensory evidence. While both forms of decision process have been studied empirically, the precise relationship between them remains poorly understood. We performed an experiment that combined a perceptual decision-making task (identifying the category of a faint visual stimulus) with a confidence-judgement task (wagering on the accuracy of each perceptual decision). The visual stimulation paradigm required steady fixation, so we used eye-tracking to control for stray eye movements. Our data analyses revealed an unexpected and counterintuitive interaction between the steadiness of fixation (prior to and during stimulation), perceptual decision making, and post-decision wagering: greater variability in gaze direction during fixation was associated with significantly increased visual-perceptual sensitivity, but significantly decreased reliability of confidence judgements. The latter effect could not be explained by a simple change in overall confidence (i.e. a criterion artifact), but rather was tied to a change in the degree to which high wagers predicted correct decisions (i.e. the sensitivity of the confidence judgement). We found no evidence of a differential change in pupil diameter that could account for the effect and thus our results are consistent with fixational eye movements being the relevant covariate. However, we note that small changes in pupil diameter can sometimes cause artefactual fluctuations in measured gaze direction and this possibility could not be fully ruled out. In either case, our results suggest that perceptual decisions and confidence judgements can be processed independently and point toward a new avenue of research into the relationship between them.

A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness

In this paper, we study protocols that allow to discern conscious and unconscious decisions of human beings; i.e., protocols that measure awareness. Consciousness is a central research theme in Neuroscience and AI, which remains, to date, an obscure phenomenon of human brains. Our starting point is a recent experiment, called Post Decision Wagering (PDW) (Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey 2007), that attempts to align experimenters' and subjects' objectives by leveraging financial incentives. We note a similarity with mechanism design, a research area which aims at the design of protocols that reconcile often divergent objectives through incentive-compatibility. We look at the issue of measuring awareness from this perspective. We abstract the setting underlying the PDW experiment and identify three factors that could make it ineffective: rationality, risk attitude and bias of subjects. Using mechanism design tools, we study the barrier between possibility and impossibility of incentive compatibility with respect to the aforementioned characteristics of subjects. We complete this study by showing how to use our mechanisms to potentially get a better understanding of consciousness.

'Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!': Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task.

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial-by-trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial-by-trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post-decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Don't bet on it! Wagering as a measure of awareness in decision making under uncertainty.

Can our decisions be guided by unconscious or implicit influences? According to the somatic marker hypothesis, emotion-based signals can guide our decisions in uncertain environments outside awareness. Postdecision wagering, in which participants make wagers on the outcomes of their decisions, has been recently proposed as an objective and sensitive measure of conscious content. In 5 experiments we employed variations of a classic decision-making assessment, the Iowa Gambling Task, in combination with wagering in order to investigate the role played by unconscious influences. We examined the validity of postdecision wagering by comparing it with alternative measures of conscious knowledge, specifically confidence ratings and quantitative questions. Consistent with a putative role for unconscious influences, in Experiments 2 and 3 we observed a lag between choice accuracy and the onset of advantageous wagering. However, the lag was eliminated by a change in the wagering payoff matrix (Experiment 2) and by a switch from a binary wager response to either a binary or a 4-point confidence response (Experiment 3), and wagering underestimated awareness compared to explicit quantitative questions (Experiments 1 and 4). Our results demonstrate the insensitivity of postdecision wagering as a direct measure of conscious knowledge and challenge the claim that implicit processes influence decision making under uncertainty.