Possession Of Concepts Research Articles

Art Appreciation in Sulaiman Esa Paintings through Malay Aesthetics Theory

This research explains the appreciation of art in the paintings titled Garden of Mystery (1992) by Sulaiman Esa. The beauty of the paintings and motifs is analyzed using the approach of the Malay aesthetic theory presented by Sulaiman Esa. The problem that arises is how to detect and identify the Malay aesthetic in the motif through the forms, content and philosophies that tend to be with the possession of refinement, flexibility, balance, unity, functionality and symbolism concepts. Research is carried out qualitatively through document analysis, where data is collected and screened from sources such as books, theses, journals, articles, websites and so on by searching for references relevant to the problem. The research findings show that the use of the motif has a link between the philosophy of the beauty of Malay culture and Islamic art. An understanding of the form, content, philosophy, concept and purpose of the application of motif design should be applied in the artwork to form an Islamic image and identity. To enlighten the principles of Malay aesthetics, to provide an understanding of the concept of beauty in the context of the Malay ideology of visual arts and to guide and stimulate the artist to produce new expressions in modern painting.

工業系学校初年次における科学的概念の修得状況に関する調査と分析

In this paper, we analyzed the survey and results on basic knowledge and elementary concepts of chemistry in an institute of technology and clarified the actual condition of students’ misconception. The difference of the mastery situation of the basic knowledge may prevent the right mastery of the basic knowledge by the accumulation of scientifically wrong recognition. Such scientifically wrong recognition is called “Naive Concept” , and it may become a hindrance in learning the advanced special subject. Therefore, we investigated the status of possession of simple concepts and acquisition of basic knowledge on chemistry by first and third-year students in an institute of technology. As a result, the following conclusions were obtained:(i) In both the first and third-year students, many incorrect answers suggesting the possession of naive concepts are found in the low percentage of correct answers to the survey questions. (ii) The percentage of correct answers in the third-year students is almost the same as in the first-year students. Furthermore, the tendency of errors in the free response columns is also similar. This indicates that the naive concepts of third-year students have not been corrected despite having taken chemistry in the first and second-year students.

How a Minimal Learning Agent can Infer the Existence of Unobserved Variables in a Complex Environment

According to a mainstream position in contemporary cognitive science and philosophy, the use of abstract compositional concepts is amongst the most characteristic indicators of meaningful deliberative thought in an organism or agent. In this article, we show how the ability to develop and utilise abstract conceptual structures can be achieved by a particular kind of learning agent. More specifically, we provide and motivate a concrete operational definition of what it means for these agents to be in possession of abstract concepts, before presenting an explicit example of a minimal architecture that supports this capability. We then proceed to demonstrate how the existence of abstract conceptual structures can be operationally useful in the process of employing previously acquired knowledge in the face of new experiences, thereby vindicating the natural conjecture that the cognitive functions of abstraction and generalisation are closely related.

Mathematical literacy as an important component of preparing a future teacher

The article analyzes the concept of mathematical literacy. The formation of mathematical literacy among members of modern society is a fundamental basis for the formation of functional literacy. Currently, there is no single approach to the interpretation of the concept of "mathematical literacy", the article provides several different approaches to the definition. Based on the analysis of the points of view of different scientists, the authors of the article highlight the main components of the concept of "mathematical literacy". These include: literacy of mathematical speech; possession of mathematical concepts; the ability to correctly formulate definitions and statements; the ability to apply mathematics to research. The paper provides a characteristic of the listed components of mathematical literacy. In addition, in this work, for the first time, an attempt was made to formulate the levels of mathematical literacy – speech, terminological, critical and operational. The article presents the results of testing students in pedagogic areas of training of two universities – Kostroma State University and Yaroslavl State Pedagogic University. The test was aimed at assessing the level of mathematical literacy of future teachers, for whom teaching mathematics will be a part of their professional activities. The test tested not only the knowledge of terms and the ability to give definitions, but also the ability to correctly apply mathematics to solve practical problems with subsequent interpretation, as well as the ability to see errors and inaccuracies in the texts of students' works, Internet sources and teaching aids. The authors identified criteria for assessing the test results and for each criterion; a quantitative indicator was determined equal to the number of correctly completed tasks. The low results of even third-year students show topicality of specific activities that could help improve the mathematical literacy of pedagogues.

Against Schmought

Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory arises when we consider the possibility of "normative counterparts"—normative concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT (for instance), but with different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a solution: when we attend to the attitudinal commitments involved in the possession and application of some normative concepts, we find that tolerance for the possibility of normative counterparts is rationally ruled out.

ПРЕДМЕТНАЯ ТЕРМИНОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ГРАМОТНОСТЬ УЧИТЕЛЕЙ ОБЖ КАК УСЛОВИЕ УСПЕШНОСТИ ИХ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОЙ СОЦИАЛИЗАЦИИ

In article features of subject conceptual and terminological training of teachers in the field of life safety as important condition of their professional socialization are discussed. Professional socialization of students is a complex process of their integration into professional assemblage on the basis of mastering of professional experience and professional culture. The important role in this process is played by professional communications, to master which without knowledge of «professional language» it is impossible. Free possession of professional concepts and technical terms is real professional skill and an obligatory condition of personal and professional growth, that allows to react confidently in professional environment. Thus success of professional socialization of students during higher school training is largely defined by their readiness for using effective professional communications. The content of concrete vocational training of teachers of life safety is introduced by three «thematic lines» — safety in extreme situations, medical and biologic bases of life safety, extreme situations of social character and protection against them. Each thematic line forms, uses and enriches own terminological field. These terminological fields are sated by flock of various concepts and consequently require the enhanced training on their mastering. In the modular undergraduate program students form their terminological literacy, while the Master program is directed on developing the students’ terminological competence. The selection of methods and relevant educational technologies in the field of learning professional terminology was carried out in the course of studying of subject matters taking into account their specificity and academic semester.

Objectivity and Perspectival Content

What is objectivity? What would it take to have objective representations and do we (humans) have what it takes? This paper aims to contribute to answering these questions. To this end, it isolates one relevant sense of objectivity and proposes a generalization of standard frameworks of representational content in order to engage with the question in a way that is rhetorically fair. Armed with a general conception of perspectival content, taken from the literature on centred or de se content, the paper articulates one necessary condition for objective representation: the possession of objective concepts and therefore objective contents. Two ways of meeting (or approximately meeting) this condition are discussed in an exploratory way.

The World is Not Enough*

AbstractThroughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the “Normativity Objection,” that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non‐reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the package of semantic commitments that reductivists have typically embraced since the Kripkean revolution.

درجة امتلاک طلبة الریاضیات بکلیة العلوم والآداب بمحافظة الرس للمفاهیم الهندسیة والجبریة وعلاقتها ببعض المتغیرات The Degree of Mathematics Students Possession at the College of Arts and Sciences in Rass for Geometric and Algebraic Concepts and its Relationship with Some Variables

هدف هذا البحث إلى معرفة درجة امتلاک طلبة الرياضيات بکلية العلوم والآداب بمحافظة الرس للمفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية. کما هدف إلى معرفة العلاقة بين درجة امتلاکهم للمفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية وکل من المتغيرات التالية: المسار (تربوي، وغير تربوي)، النوع، والمستوى الدراسي. استخدم الباحث المنهج شبه التجريبي والمنهج الوصفي التحليلي، من خلال تطبيق أداة البحث (اختبار المفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية) على أفراد عينة البحث، ومن ثم تصحيح الاختبار واستخدام برنامج (SPSS) لحساب المتوسطات والانحرافات المعيارية لاستجابات أفراد العينة واستخدام اختبار ت للوقوف على دلالة أثر المتغيرات المستقلة. وأظهرت النتائج أن درجة امتلاک الطلبة للمفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية بشکل عام جاءت متدنية. کما أظهرت عدم وجود فروق ذات دلالة إحصائية عند مستوى (0.05 ≥α) بالنسبة لمتغير المسار (تربوي، وغير تربوي) في مجال الهندسة والمجال الکلي من حيث درجة امتلاکهمللمفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية. بينما أظهرت النتائج وجود فروق ذات دلالة إحصائية عند مستوى (0.05 ≥α) بالنسبة لمتغير المسار في مجال الجبر لصالح المسار غير التربوي. وأظهرت وجود فروق ذات دلالة إحصائية عند مستوى (0.05 ≥α) بالنسبة لمتغير النوع لصالح الاناث من حيث درجة امتلاکهم لبعض المفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية في مجال الجبر والمجال الکلي. وأخيرا أظهرت وجود فروق ذات دلالة إحصائية عند مستوى (0.05 ≥α) بالنسبة لمتغير المستوى الدراسي لصالح طلبة السنتين الثالثة والرابعة من حيث درجة امتلاکهم للمفاهيم الهندسية والجبرية في مجالي الهندسة والجبر والمجال الکلي. Abstract: The aim of this research is to find out the degree of possession of geometric and algebraic concepts by the students of mathematics at the Faculty of Science and Arts in Ar Rass Province. It aimed also to find out the relationship between their degree of possession for geometric and algebraic concepts, and each of the following variables: path (educational, non-educational), gender, and academic level. The researcher used the semi-experimental approach and the analytical descriptive approach by applying the research tool (geometric and algebraic concepts test) to the study sample. Then he corrected the test and he used the SPSS program to calculate the averages and standard deviations of the responses of the sample. He used the T test to determine the significance of independent variables. The results showed that students' degree of possession of geometric and algebraic concepts in general was low. In addition, there were no statistically significant differences at the level of (α≤0.05) for the path variable (educational and non-educational) in the field of geometric and the total field in terms of degree of possession of geometric and algebraic concepts. The results showed that: there were statistically significant differences at the level of (α≤0.05) for the path variable, in the field of algebra in favor of non-educational path. In addition, there were statistically significant differences at the level of (α≤0.05) for the gender variable, in favor of females in terms of degree of possession of some geometric and algebraic concepts in the area of ​​algebra and the total field. Finally, there were statistically significant differences at the level of (α≤0.05) for the variable of the academic level in favor of the third and fourth year students in terms of their degree of possession of geometric and algebraic concepts in the fields of geometry, algebra and the total field.

Fully Understanding Concept Possession

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.

Appearances and Illusions

This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective relational properties of external objects. In perceptual experience, we are acquainted with such appearances. These are not sense data, as usually understood, and they are not identical to the properties we attribute to external objects through the usage of qualitative concepts such as ‘red’, ‘square’ and ‘sweet.’ We use such concepts in order to describe properties that are manifest in perception, not in order to describe appearances. One and the same property, such as the bent shape of a stick, can appear in different ways in different contexts. None of those ways is more or less appropriate, because things simply appear the way they do. The choice of a certain context determines the normal conditions for the possession of qualitative concepts. Standard perceptual illusions are perceptual experiences. They mislead us, not because they are incorrect, but because they prompt us to use concepts that are not appropriate under the obtaining conditions.

The personal and the subpersonal in the theory of mind debate

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition (e.g., Gallagher 2001, 2005, 2007, 2012; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Zahavi 2005, 2011) and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible (e.g., Bermudez 2003; Apperly and Butterfill 2009). In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question (e.g., Herschbach 2008; Spaulding 2010, 2015). In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed (Drayson 2014). I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants.

Cidadania eTICs: uma relação anacrônica?

This article's initial proposal to perform a conceptual survey of citizenship, as well as an analysis of the evolution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their potential uses with regard to optimize the process of appropriation of this citizenship by living individuals in the polis. Through a survey led by the literature review method has teamed up classic and modern concepts on the subject in question, plotting them in today's reality in which technology has a strong presence in the processes of meaning and redefinition of citizen's status and citizenship itself , theme of this research. Possession of concepts and contextual analysis of the ICT - Citizenship is reached, in this study, a depression of perspective between them, where the anachronism is present and requires measures to be able to correct such asynchronicity. Finally this text reinforces the need to rethink the current educational process in this society, so that individuals are prepared to master the technology in search of reaching the citizen condition.

Innatism, Concept Formation, Concept Mastery and Formal Education

This article will consider the claim that the possession of concepts is innate rather than learned. Innatism about concept learning is explained through consideration of the work of Fodor and Chomsky. First, an account of concept formation is developed. Second the argument against the claim that concepts are learned through the construction of a learning paradox developed by Fodor is considered. It is argued that, despite initial plausibility, the learning paradox is not, in fact, a paradox at all as it rests on eliding the distinction between recognising something and recognising it as a something. The plausibility of eliding this distinction rests, in turn, on begging the question as to whether concept possession is a necessary condition for recognition of objects, events, properties etc. Fodor's positive arguments for innatism, as set out in LOT2 are considered and parallels with his account of stereotype formation and associationist accounts of concept formation are considered. The explanatory persuasiveness of this revised account of concept activation through the generation of stereotypes is weak. The article then examines the distinction between concept possession and concept mastery in greater detail, arguing that innatists have difficulty in accounting for the phenomenon of concept mastery, including within the contexts of formal and professional education.

Neoclassical Concepts

Linguistic theories of lexical semantics support a Neoclassical Theory of concepts, where entities like CAUSE, STATE, and MANNER serve as necessary conditions for the possession of individual event concepts. Not all concepts have a neoclassical structure, and whether or not words participate in regular linguistic patterns such as verbal alternations will be proposed as a probe for identifying whether their corresponding concepts do indeed have such structure. I show how the Neoclassical Theory supplements existing theories of concepts and supports a version of analyticity and conceptual analysis.

Incomplete understanding of complex numbers Girolamo Cardano: a case study in the acquisition of mathematical concepts

In this paper, I present the case of the discovery of complex numbers by Girolamo Cardano. Cardano acquires the concepts of (specific) complex numbers, complex addition, and complex multiplication. His understanding of these concepts is incomplete. I show that his acquisition of these concepts cannot be explained on the basis of Christopher Peacocke’s Conceptual Role Theory of concept possession. I argue that Strong Conceptual Role Theories that are committed to specifying a set of transitions that is both necessary and sufficient for possession of mathematical concepts will always face counterexamples of the kind illustrated by Cardano. I close by suggesting that we should rely more heavily on resources of Anti-Individualism as a framework for understanding the acquisition and possession of concepts of abstract subject matters.

Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?

AbstractA recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be that a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate—roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances.

Music, Metaphor, and Aesthetic Concepts

The aesthetic realist interprets many descriptions of music as metaphorical descriptions of aesthetic properties of music. I argue that aesthetic realism requires that nonaesthetic words are used to express both aesthetic and nonaesthetic concepts. But having distinguished the concepts, some plausible account must be given of their relation. A causal account of the relation between the possession of aesthetic and nonaesthetic concepts provides this, since the concepts are distinct but connected. I explore and defend this account. I consider the conditions of aesthetic concept possession and also the appropriation of nonaesthetic words in aesthetic descriptions.

Training, Training, Training

Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and techniques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an end to philosophical work. I argue that Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice is much closer to Dewey’s. The argument arises out of difficulties with Wittgenstein’s concept of training. Wittgenstein’s concept of training is inadequate for bridging the trajectory from initial training to the acquisition of skills that are second nature. The latter seems required for his appeal to practice and the way that grasp of concepts is embedded our practices of going on. The inadequacy of Wittgenstein’s concept of training renders the idea of such a trajectory incoherent, for it manifests a real dilemma about how to understand the transition from rote repetitive training to mastery of skillful activity. I show how we can make sense of the role that training plays in developing skillful activity and how by repetitive training we acquire new skills. The solution to the dilemma comes from acknowledging a point that Wittgenstein shares with Dewey concerning the role of selective attention. By acknowledging the role that attention plays in extending the operation of skills, we can make sense of the acquisition of new skills and provide a granularity to the concept of practice that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice more akin to Dewey’s: a programmatic concept rather than a primitive. Practice is, for Wittgenstein, something to be studied and described in a detail that does explanatory work. Furthermore, the account has a number of points of contact with Dewey.

Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?

1. Are phenomenal concepts perspectival? That is to say, is it the case that a subject can possess or acquire a phenomenal concept only if the subject has previously experienced that to which the concept refers? In this essay, I have a two-fold objective. First, I examine what follows if phenomenal concepts are assumed to be non-perspectival. Specifically, I consider what consequences such a view concerning the possession or acquisition conditions of phenomenal concepts has for a particular defense of physicalism against the Knowledge Argument. Second, I evaluate whether the linguistic phenomenon of underor over-extension shows that phenomenal concepts are non-perspectival. 2. Concepts, I shall assume, are psychological entities: they are structured mental representations that are the constituents of propositional attitudes. Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to types of phenomenal experiences and they do so from an introspective perspective. Phenomenal concepts are assumed to be perspectival. That is, the following thesis regarding their possession or acquisition conditions is typically granted: