Fear is regularly cited as a typical example of a ‘negative emotion’. The present article considers alternative perspectives, seeking to develop a theoretical framework that takes into account the possibility of perceiving fear as an emotion that can carry ‘positivity’. As a test case of a possible positive function of fear, I analyse the religious discourse surrounding fear in Israeli ultra-Orthodox society, where fear is often regarded as a positive emotion. I argue that the ‘positive’ traits that the ultra-Orthodox ascribe to fear can be employed as a model for elucidating the ‘positive’ functions of fear in other contexts as well. The article’s first two parts are devoted to clarifying the relativist stance regarding the essence of fear and presenting the test case of religious fear. In the following parts I isolate three perspectives offered by the religious approach that may also shed light on a general understanding of how fear operates as a ‘positive’ emotion: (1) broadening the range of reactions to fear beyond the ‘fight or flight’ response; (2) the epistemological function of fear in constructing truth and knowledge; (3) the possibility that the very experience of fear can be framed and felt as positive. In conclusion, I will argue that the case of fear shows that the broad categorisation into ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ within the emotional realm may impair the theoretical and scholarly understanding of emotions, and I will propose an alternative approach to this categorisation.
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