This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance, fair value accounting, and debt contracts. It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting on debt contracts, while also exploring the influence of corporate governance on fair value accounting. The study emphasizes the importance of considering the interests and legal status of creditors in the context of debt contracts. The findings indicate that strong corporate governance can reduce the likelihood of debt default and that the company’s restructuring costs in the event of a default determine whether improved corporate governance will increase or decrease debt costs. Additionally, the study reveals that the strength of corporate governance affects the value relevance of fair value accounting. However, the impact of fair value accounting on debt contracts is not inherently positive or negative; for instance, companies may use fair value adjustments with manipulative intent to enhance performance. Ultimately, the research highlights that discussions about corporate governance should not prioritize shareholder interests exclusively but also consider the legitimate position of creditors.