Abstract How do the professional backgrounds of senior bureaucrats affect their competence and political responsiveness? This article fills a gap by examining these questions in a meritocratic context that accommodates nuanced but potentially consequential variations in the recruitment of senior bureaucrats. Using a paired survey experiment with citizens, representatives, and administrators in Norway, the article demonstrates that agency heads are perceived as less competent and – to a lesser extent – more politically responsive if their profile deviates from the meritocratic ideal of the career civil servant with mission-specific expertise. The article also compares perceptions between groups of stakeholders, filling another gap in the literature. Treatment effects go in the same direction across groups, but the results reveal a mismatch between popular and insider perceptions of bureaucracy: whereas citizens are practically indifferent, administrators are deeply concerned about the competence of an agency head who is a former politician rather than a career bureaucrat. Perceptions of substantive expertise are more aligned: all stakeholder groups view agency heads with mission-specific expertise as more competent and less politically responsive than generalists. Overall, the results demonstrate that variations in who is recruited to senior bureaucrat positions may either strengthen or undermine stakeholders’ views on good governance.
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