Political Property Rights Research Articles

The Peace of God

Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.

The Peace of God

Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics – residual claimancy and sovereignty – imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly-delineated and stabile boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.

The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe

Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty arise in Western Europe? An answer to this question must be sought at the constitutional level. Within the medieval constitutional order, traditions of representative and limited government developed through patterns of constitutional bargaining. The politically fragmented landscape that emerged following the decline of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian migrations was conducive to those patterns. In particular, that landscape was characterized by polycentric and hierarchical governance structures; within those structures, political property rights holders were sovereign and residual claimants to governance returns. I elaborate on why this environment of polycentric sovereignty promoted constitutional bargaining in the direction of good governance and greater liberty.

The fundamental Coase of development: property rights foundations of the effective state

AbstractThis paper identifiespolitical property rightsandjurisdictional rivalryas two important mechanisms that drive political and economic development. After developing a general framework to explain relative performance in the ‘market for governance’, we argue that Western Europe during the High Middle Ages presented initial conditions conducive to the development of effective states. We extend the framework by analyzing city-state governance in Renaissance Italy, as well as public finance practices in early modern Germany. We conclude by discussing the implications of our argument for the literature on state capacity and economic development. The takeaway is that well-aligned political property rights and competition in the provision of governance services can promote the protective and productive state while forestalling the predatory state.

The Political Economy of Feudalism in Medieval Europe

Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty arise in Western Europe? An answer to this question must be sought at the constitutional level. Within the medieval constitutional order, traditions of representative and limited government developed through patterns of constitutional bargaining. The politically fragmented landscape that emerged following the decline of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian migrations was conducive to those patterns. In particular, that landscape was characterized by polycentric and hierarchical governance structures; within those structures, political property rights holders were sovereign and residual claimants to governance returns. I elaborate on why this environment of polycentric sovereignty promoted constitutional bargaining in the direction of good governance and greater liberty.

OPTIONS TO THE REALM: A COST NEUTRAL PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES

In this article, we draw on the literature on political property rights, political accountability, and strategic management and entrepreneurship to propose a cost neutral reform aimed at promoting long‐run economic prosperity. We propose replacing politicians' defined benefit pensions with a financial contract that is tied to economic performance. In particular, we propose a contract that pays out a lump sum to a politician 30 years after their election if real gross domestic product per capita is above some preset benchmark. Furthermore, we show that the contract can be priced such that it is cost neutral in terms of present value with a defined‐benefit pension. We argue that this contract provides a net benefit to society. (JEL D70, D72)

A theory of self-governance: de facto constitutions as filters

What is self-governance, and under what sets of institutions is it possible? This article explores this question from the perspective of informal (de facto) constitutionalism. The dominant approach, grounded in formal constitutionalism, overlooks crucial institutional features that determine whether governance is something done by individuals to themselves, as opposed to something done by some individuals to others. Understanding self-governance requires not only identifying the durable procedures for public decision-making, but also appreciating how these procedures act as filters that select for the acquisition of political power by individuals with specific and predictable characteristics. The article develops a novel constitutional typology based on the structure of political property rights, on the one hand, and the kinds of individuals that govern, on the other, and use this typology to discover the types of polities most likely to be self-governing.

The Fundamental Coase of Development: Property Rights Foundations of the Effective State

This paper identifies political property rights and jurisdictional rivalry as the fundamental dimensions to understand comparative economic and political development. After developing a general framework for the study of relative performance in the ‘market for governance’, we argue that Medieval western Europe was characterized by initial conditions conducive to the development of the effective state. Then, we extend the framework to the case of the development of public finance thought and practices in early modern Germany.

Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations

ObjectiveIt is widely accepted that good institutions caused modern economic prosperity. But what caused good institutions? In this article we challenge recent explanations that favor state capacity, pointing instead to the polycentric governance structures of medieval Europe.MethodsWe develop a novel theory of constitutions, which we call “polycentric sovereignty,” based on political property rights. We use this theory to reinterpret the historical evidence concerning the relationship between the medieval patrimony and good governance.ResultsOur analysis suggests the de facto balance of power among the “owners of the realm” in medieval Europe are crucial in explaining the rise of pro‐growth institutions, especially those that respect and uphold the rule of law.ConclusionMedieval institutions set the background conditions for good governance. We cannot understand the bounty of economic modernity without reference to the received political‐economic traditions from medieval Europe.

Political Property Rights and Entangled Political Economy

I contribute to the theory of entangled political economy by showing how entanglement can be characterized in terms of political property rights. A political property right grants its holder a share of decision-making power in a specific context, as well as specifies to whom the costs and benefits from those decisions accrue. Because entangled political economy focuses on the complex relationships that exist between market and political enterprises, theorizing about these relationships as exchanges of political property rights can give us meaningful information about what entanglement is, when it exists, and how it can be expected to develop. I briefly survey the theory of political property rights, show how political property rights within a broader entanglement perspective helps understand constitutions, and discuss several applications of political property rights that can advance entangled political economy scholarship.

Sovereign entrepreneurship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of sovereign entrepreneurship, which is a special kind of political entrepreneurship. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses qualitative methods/historical survey. Findings Sovereignty is rooted in self-enforced exchange of political property rights. Sovereign entrepreneurship is the creative employment of political property rights to advance a plan. Research limitations/implications Because a polity’s constitution is determined by its distribution of political property rights, sovereign entrepreneurship and constitutional change are necessarily linked. The author illustrated how sovereign entrepreneurship can be applied by using it to explain the rise of modern states. Practical implications In addition to studying instances of sovereign entrepreneurship in distant history, scholars can apply it to recent history. Sovereign entrepreneurship can be especially helpful as a tool for doing analytic narratives of low-n cases of political-economic development, especially when those polities attract interests for being “development miracles.” Originality/value This paper uses treats sovereignty as a political property right.

A Theory of Self-Governance: De Facto Constitutions as Filters

What is self-governance, and under what sets of institutions is it possible? We explore this question from the perspective of informal (de facto) constitutionalism. The dominant approach, grounded in formal constitutionalism, overlooks crucial institutional features that determine whether governance is something done by individuals to themselves, as opposed to something done by some individuals to others. Understanding self-governance requires not only identifying the durable procedures for public decision-making, but also appreciating how these procedures act as filters, which select for the acquisition of political power by individuals with specific and predictable characteristics. We develop a novel constitutional typology based on the structure of political property rights on the one hand, and the kinds of individuals that govern on the other, and use this typology to discover the types of polities most likely to be self-governing.

Options to the Realm: A Cost Neutral Proposal to Improve Political Incentives

In this paper we draw on the literature on political property rights, political accountability, and strategic management and entrepreneurship to propose a cost neutral reform aimed at promoting long-run economic prosperity. We propose replacing politicians' defined benefit pensions with a financial contract that is tied to economic performance. In particular, we propose a contract that pays out a lump sum to a politician 30 years after their election if real GDP per capita is above some preset benchmark. Furthermore, we show that the contract can be priced such that it is cost neutral in terms of present value with a defined-benefit pension. We argue that this contract provides a net benefit to society.

Alternative Indexes of Political Freedoms, Property Rights, and Political Instability for Zambia

AbstractThis article presents a new data set of institutional indicators for Zambia covering the period 1947–2007. Coverage is of political rights and freedoms, property rights, and political instability. The new data set can be usefully employed to explore the interactions of different institutional dimensions and their linkage with economic growth in the long run. Such an analysis would help explore the question of whether, in the case of Zambia, institutional factors are key drivers of economic growth in accordance with the new institutional economics view. An additional advantage is that the new indicators are comparable to the similar data sets for Zimbabwe and Malawi, which can facilitate cross-country analysis.

Market-Preserving Federalism as Polycentric Sovereignty

We extend the theory of market-preserving federalism by ascertaining under what conditions it is likely to prevail. We argue that political-economic systems characterized by polycentric sovereignty — a self-enforcing structure of political property rights that links governance rights with governance revenues, and affords holders of political property rights a check on potentially predatory behavior — will promote market-preserving federalism. We show how the estates system of Medieval Europe was an example of polycentric sovereignty. We also show how the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution represented a degradation of polycentric sovereignty. We conclude by discussing the relationship between governance systems characterized by polycentric sovereignty and social wealth creation, arguing that the structure of political property rights in a governance system is an important characteristic that has hitherto been neglected.

Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development

I explore how political property rights to revenues from governance relate to generality norms in governance. I do so by examining the rise of Western constitutional liberalism from the perspective of property rights economics and political economy. While it is true that Western political development has been the result of bargains between political elites (Congleton 2011), the implications of the fact that parties to these bargains historically were “owners of the realm” have been underappreciated. I argue the unintended consequence of these political bargains among “owners of the realm” was ade factosupermajority rule, approaching conceptual unanimity for those party to the bargains. In developing this argument I elaborate on the relationship between political and economic property rights, noting that while they were and will continue to be intertwined, there was a hierarchy of rights that became inverted over the course of elites’ constitutional bargains.

Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights

I develop a positive theory of sovereignty that is rooted in political exchange. The key concept I use to characterize sovereignty is self-enforcing exchange of political rights. I conclude that a sovereign is an individual or body party to political exchange that does not rest on third-party enforcement. Importantly, sovereignty is an emergent phenomenon, defined in the process of bargains between holders of political power. I describe how political bargains within and across polities influences the distribution of political rights characterized by sovereignty, and I conclude by showing how my conception of sovereignty is compatible with theoretical understanding, and practical existence, of polycentric governance.

Prices, Politics, and Predation: A Theory of the Corporate Polity

I present a theory of political property rights that serves as a complement to familiar Tiebout mechanisms in explaining governance outcomes. I argue that when the structure of political property rights is such that the polity most closely resembles a business corporation, governance will be largely productive. In contrast, when the structure of political property rights is such that the polity is characterized by a tragedy of the commons, governance will be largely predatory and will promote rent seeking. I illustrate my theory with reference to two corporate-like polities, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the literature on private city planning on urban development. I also discuss the assumptions to which my analysis is sensitive, and conclude by exploring possible future trends in governance in light of my theory.

Governance and Residual Claimancy: Property Rights and Non-Discrimination in Western Political Development

I explore how political property rights to revenues from governance relate to generality norms in governance. I do so by examining the rise of Western constitutional liberalism from the perspective of property rights economics and political economy. While it is true that Western political development has been the result of bargains between political elites (Congleton 2011), the implications of the fact that parties to these bargains historically were “owners of the realm” have been underappreciated. I argue the unintended consequence of these political bargains among “owners of the realm” was a de facto supermajority rule, approaching conceptual unanimity for those party to the bargains. In developing this argument I elaborate on the relationship between political and economic property rights, noting that while they were and will continue to be intertwined, there was a hierarchy of rights that became inverted over the course of elites’ constitutional bargains.

The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights Regimes

This study examines interactions between political processes and intellectual property rights regimes that can influence the propensity of early-stage entrepreneurs to employ the latest available t...