Purpose Recent debates in library and information science have cast neutrality and social justice as irreconcilable–like oil and water. This paper challenges that view, advocating for balanced librarianship, where diverse values are negotiated through an ongoing democratic process. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on political philosophy, it warns that treating values as absolute, enforcing rigid definitions and overemphasizing incompatibility risk sliding toward authoritarian forms of librarianship. Findings This viewpoint highlights three principles of democratic librarianship. First, it should be acknowledged that librarianship as a concept is open to multiple interpretations. Second, democratic librarianship should be grounded in more than one core value. Third, democratic librarianship is an ongoing negotiation between library professionals, politicians and citizens, because democracy is an unfinished project. Originality/value By situating the neutrality–social justice debate within broader political theory, this paper reveals its parallels with the tension between liberalism (neutrality) and state perfectionism (social justice). It further grounds the case for balance in the work of Karl Popper, Chantal Mouffe, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida offering a philosophical framework for resisting authoritarian tendencies while embracing diversity.

ABSTRACT Future generations face a precarious political, economic, and environmental outlook that follows from decision making systems organized to reward short term gains while deferring their costs into the future. This article argues that the failure is primarily institutional rather than moral. Adults are accountable only to other adults, and there is no systematic mechanism of transgenerational accountability. This absence is guaranteed by a culture of generational segregation, within which children are confined to age stratified institutions while adults dominate the sites where economic and political norms are negotiated, producing a democratic deficit that conflicts with the principle that those affected by norms ought to participate in their formation. Youth encounter this exclusion as a kind of generational apartheid and often withdraw from democratic life, turn toward nihilism, or embrace reactionary politics. The exclusion of children is commonly justified through a definition of politics as rational deliberation over scarce resources, yet the most vital resources are materially abundant. Scarcity is instead produced through adult rent-seeking practices that restrict access and concentrate advantage, shaping the self-imposed problems addressed by political science and the assumptions of political philosophy. Across these literatures, accountability remains confined to contemporaneous adults, while appeals to future generations rely on moral commitments that are easily overridden by short-term interests. The article argues for an unadulterated democracy centered on a strong interpretation of the principle of affected interest, requiring institutions to treat children as political contemporaries to whom adults are accountable.

Abstract When I am unable to drive due to a road blockade, there seems to be a morally relevant difference between a case in which the road is blocked by workers and a case in which the road is blocked by a landslide. Many political philosophers tried to capture this pretheoretical judgment at a more abstract level through the formulation of a concept of freedom. They argue that one is unfree when one's inability is casually or morally brought about by others but merely unable when one's inability is brought about by oneself or nature. The causality view of freedom holds that I am unfree to drive because the workers are causally responsible for the blockade, whereas the responsibility view of freedom holds that to determine whether I am unfree, we should ask whether the workers are morally responsible for the blockade. Each view has some strengths and weaknesses. I capture their strengths and avoid their weaknesses by suggesting a novel interpretation of moral responsibility as answerability , according to which we are answerable for all our actions in virtue of the fact that our actions reflect our evaluative judgments. This interpretation allows for a plausible resolution of the disagreement between these views.

Edward Said’s Orientalism revolutionized Western scholarship by exposing its deep-seated biases in studying non-Western societies, particularly the Arab-Islamic world. His critique revealed how Western narratives dehumanized the "Orient" through exaggerated differences, exoticization and imperialist assumptions. This intellectual framework, Said argued, distorted objective scholarship, allowing Western scholars to claim superior knowledge over the very societies they studied. This paper examines Said’s arguments and their enduring impact on Political Science, Political Philosophy and International Relations. It explores how Orientalist discourse persists in shaping Western narratives, particularly in the post-Cold War era through scholars like Fukuyama and Huntington, as well as in studies on terrorism and democratization efforts in the Arab-Islamic world. Finally, it analyzes the evolution of Orientalism in its modern, neo-Orientalist configuration, which continues to influence global politics and academic discourse.

The evolution of human rights discourse in modern political philosophy

John Locke and Thomas Paine represent two distinct yet related efforts to respond to the theological-political problem. Though the thought of Thomas Paine has often been juxtaposed against John Locke with respect to issues such as limited government, democratic ideals, and constitutional principles, the theological-political thought of these two early modern political thinkers has not often been connected. This essay argues that, while Paine and Locke essentially agree about the inadequacy of traditional and orthodox forms of Christianity to accommodate the needs of a modern and liberal political order, Paine deepens and radicalizes Locke’s critique of Christianity by calling not for its redefinition in accordance with Enlightenment precepts but for its complete abolition. While Locke believed that Christianity, if stripped of its dogmas and liberalized, could be made to coexist with his vision of political order, Paine insisted that any such compromises with Christianity endangered fundamental democratic and liberal principles. Deism, as Paine understood it, represented the only acceptable political theology for a modern, liberal, and democratic society. By comparing the theological and political ideas of John Locke and Thomas Paine, this essay reveals important points of continuity within the thought of these two very different early modern political theorists. And yet, by outlining Paine’s challenge not only to traditional Christianity but even to Locke’s “enlightened” conception of Christianity, this essay also raises important questions about the internal consistency of Locke’s approach to the theological-political problem. Paine’s radical critique of Christianity in all its forms—orthodox or “enlightened”—suggests the presence within early modern political thought of influential voices whose liberal political philosophy required more than merely freedom of religion but instead demanded freedom from religion itself.

This article attempts an innovative approach to the work of Bartolome de Las Casas. It is argued that such work should be approached as a work of theory and political philosophy beyond its importance as a work ethic or historical. It is argued that this approach allows us to observe and criticize the changes in the discourse of Las Casas, this enables to study in depth their connections and bridges with modern political thought. Then, some possible research lines are plotted.

ABSTRACT According to Susan Moller Okin, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism leads to a matriarchal dystopia: mothers own their children and may dispose of them as they please. This challenge rests on the claim that Nozick does not extend rights to infants. In this paper, to respond to Okin, we examine Nozick’s account of rights possession; explore Nozick’s work beyond Anarchy, State, and Utopia; and link children’s rights and animals’ rights. We propose three possible responses to Okin, grounded in Nozick’s own words. First, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their membership in the human species. Second, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their potentiality. Third, Nozick could grant rights to both infants and animals. We suggest that the third option is the most promising.

What Does it Mean to “Make Kin”? A Neo-Phenomenological Critique of the Social Philosophy of the New Materialism

ABSTRACT This paper revisits the conservative thought of Shirley Robin Letwin, a key intellectual of the New Right and the LSE Right, as well as a prominent defender of Thatcherism. It situates Letwin within the intellectual milieu of the New Right, emphasising both her contributions to Thatcherite ideas and her broader defence of Thatcherite conservatism. Letwin’s political philosophy rests on a sceptical outlook shaped by Hume, Oakeshott, and Hobbes, rejecting rationalist and liberal universalism in favour of tradition, authority, and historical practice. Central to her work is the concept of “conservative individualism”: a moral individualism embodied in the English gentleman as the exemplar of liberty in character. The paper examines her thought in relation to scepticism – exemplified in her critique of liberal rationalism – her defence of individuality, law and civil association, and her interpretation of Thatcherism as a project of moral restoration through the revival of the “vigorous virtues”. While acknowledging the limits of Letwin’s conservatism, the article argues that her account of conservative individualism not only illuminates the intellectual defence of Thatcherism but also retains contemporary resonance for understanding the enduring dilemmas of modern conservatism.

This study examines the historical evolution of Indian political tradition from the normative doctrine of Rajadharma to the modern constitutional principle of constitutional morality. It challenges the widely held assumption that Indian democracy is merely a colonial transplant by arguing that ethical governance traditions embedded in ancient and medieval political thought shaped India's democratic imagination. Using a qualitative historical-analative methodology, the study draws upon classical political treatises, ancient political traditions, epics, medieval statecraft practices, colonial constitutional developments, and Constituent Assembly debates. The paper demonstrates that while constitutional morality marks a decisive institutional transformation-particularly in its commitment to egalitarian citizenship and popular sovereignty-it also retains core normative continuities with Rajadharma, including ethical restraint, welfare orientation, and accountability. However, it simultaneously rejects hierarchical social ordering inherent in earlier traditions. The study concludes that Indian democratic ethos is historically layered rather than civilizationally ruptured, representing a complex synthesis of indigenous political ethics and modern constitutional liberalism. The findings contribute to interdisciplinary debates in political theory, history, constitutional studies, and democratic ethics.

This article argues that the current configuration of digital platform governance constitutes an online state of nature, marked by provisional rights, the absence of public guarantees, and unilateral control over speech. Drawing on Kant’s political philosophy, we examine how concentration of power within digital platforms, exercised without subjection to public rights, alters the conditions under which civil freedom and meaningful public discourse can flourish. We link this structure to the dynamics of information disorder and argue that freedom of expression in the digital age requires rethinking through public norms grounded in principles that are shared by all.

Introduction. The article addresses a relevant sociological problem concerning the transformation of the foundations of mass society under the influence of digital platformization. Although the phenomenon of mass society continues to be widely studied in the social sciences, the problem of its qualitative changes resulting from the development of platform capitalism and algorithmic management remains insufficiently developed. Methodology and sources. The research presents a theoretical analysis of the mass phenomenon, drawing on an interdisciplinary approach that integrates insights from social philosophy, cultural studies, media studies, and the economics of digital platforms. Basic concepts of the mass are drawn from the works of H. Blumer, E. Fromm, and J. Baudrillard; the analysis of mass society's evolution is conducted through the works of K. Mannheim, K. Jaspers, G. Ritzer, V.I. Ilyin, and other Russian and foreign scholars; the digital transformation of mass society is examined through N. Srnicek's platform capitalism concept and A. Hepp and N. Couldry's theory of deep mediatization. Results and discussion. The research demonstrates that the mechanisms of mass integration and control through attention management persist into the new digital era but undergo technological optimization. The three basic components of mass society – production, consumption, and culture-have been restructured on a platform basis. In production, post-Fordist flexibility and automation combine with algorithmic surveillance of a precarious workforce. Digital-era consumption is structured so that while maintaining a mass scale, it creates an impression of individualized service, simultaneously transforming user attention into the most important economic resource. The demassification of culture reproduces the logic of mass society at a new level, where atomized units become not only individuals but also niche communities that form a “mass” of parallel cultures. Conclusion. Mass society in the digital era creates a paradoxical combination of massification and personalization, where the sense of freedom of choice masks new forms of control through recommendation algorithms and platform dependence. Platform mass society represents the evolution of industrial mass society under conditions of deep mediatization and digital algorithmic governance.

Abstract Recently, social philosophers have argued for a practice-based social ontology that can furnish a robustly social account of oppression and, in turn, illuminate the obstacles to and possibilities for social change. This paper argues for an intersubjective approach to oppressive social practices. Oppressive meanings constitute relationships between agents in ways they neither choose nor decide on; agents uphold those meanings through their relationships to others. This approach, I argue, can illuminate a critical case of an oppressive social practice that revolves around struggles for recognition and the dynamics of social change.

Human Resource Development (HRD) is of key importance to respond to the issues raised in financial instability, labor precarity, and the crisis of welfare states that have brought the reconsideration of social policy. The given research has the purpose of investigating the correlation between HRD and social justice with reference to the modern social security systems (SSS). Research focuses on two prevailing models, namely, (neo)liberal, so-called activation policies, in which HRD is identified as a market integration instrument, and the social investment model, which regards HRD as a mechanism of broadening human capacities. As a qualitative study using a documentary methodology, the research question of the study is how these models understand social justice. Overall, the main conclusions are that both models fail to talk about social justice in a complex way, particularly the recognition and representation of marginalized populations. Although the (neo)liberal approach facilitates employability, it introduces a punitive structure, and the social investment approach highlights the acquisition of skills, but overlooks the social inequalities in general. The paper ends with the prescription of a more democratic HRD pattern, buttressed by an unconditional social security floor, to make the social policy focus on human emancipation instead of coercive employability. Such a model would not be concerned with the profit agendas, but instead, the welfare of people would be highly valued, resulting in a fairer and balanced society. The suggested solution involves re-conceptualizing social policy whereby all people will have access to opportunities of personal and social development without being bound by the dictates of economic necessity.

This essay presents the first systematic application of the Racial Subjugated Male Thesis (RSMT) to Canadian institutions and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. While RSMT has been developed in the U.S. context, Canadian political philosophy has not yet engaged this framework to understand how Canadian multiculturalism produces Black male disposability. I argue that despite Canada’s reputation for multicultural tolerance, Black males are ontologically constructed as disposable subjects whose cultural norms are pathologized as incompatible with Canadian civic life. They are not simply misrecognized – they are rendered unrecognizable within the Canadian state. Through analysis of child welfare, education, employment, and criminal justice, I demonstrate that multiculturalism paradoxically produces Black male disposability as a constitutive feature rather than a policy failure. This challenges liberal frameworks of minority rights and argues that addressing this disposability requires philosophical rupture.

From an early stage of research on the subject, the question of the religious origins of the French Revolution has been focused on the influence exerted by Jansenism on the transformation that political doctrines, social practices, and popular emotions underwent, particularly between 1710 and 1770. This influence is even said to have extended till the time of the adoption of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), although this timeframe remains greatly controverted. Within this explanatory outline, one of the points still to be clarified is that of continuity between 18th-century Jansenism and that of the preceding century, a question which in turn relates to the nature and channels of the movement’s impact in pre-revolutionary France. After reviewing the theoretical and methodological issues related to the question addressed here, this contribution attempts to reinterpret the role played by the Port-Royal circle, which, it suggests, was a matrix of the type of sociability manifested much later in the “philosophical society” whose importance was emphasized by Augustin Cochin and then François Furet. The demonstration is based on a threefold analysis: that of the epistemic changes that took shape around Port-Royal; that of the discursive positioning operated by this circle; and that of the type of sociability that its thought and practices helped to establish.

The study of the theory of justice has long been a central focus in legal and political philosophy. However, modern academic discourse is often dominated by Western thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick, who emphasize utilitarian, egalitarian, and libertarian perspectives on justice, respectively. This paper seeks to broaden these perspectives by presenting perspectives on justice from Asian philosophical traditions, particularly China, through the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. This approach aims to demonstrate that justice can be understood not only structurally and institutionally, but also morally and relationally. In Confucius's view, justice is rooted in benevolence (ren), moral fairness (yi), and social order (li), where harmony between individuals is the ultimate goal of society. Mencius reinforced this view by asserting that justice arises from human innate goodness and empathy for the suffering of others, while Xunzi emphasized the importance of moral education and a strict social order to curb human evil tendencies. All three-position justice as the result of character formation and moral responsibility, not simply the application of formal law. When compared with Rawls, it is clear that Confucian theory of justice places greater emphasis on the formation of just individuals, rather than simply a just system. Rawls emphasizes procedural justice and equality of rights, while Confucius emphasizes social harmony and personal virtue. Thus, this paper asserts that there is no single and perfect theory of justice; justice must be understood as a cross-cultural dialogue between structure and morality, between the rational West and the ethical East. A synthesis of the two can serve as the basis for developing a more humane, contextual, and relevant concept of justice for contemporary global society.

In this practitioner article, the authors explain how to foster political thinking in high school students by using three activities examining political artifacts from the Log Cabin Campaign used by the Whigs in the 1840 presidential election. A historical overview of the 1840 presidential election is provided offering historical context for the activities. A literature review describing the best practices advocated for in the C3 Framework, published by the National Council for the Social Studies, is included. The authors also share a review of Wayne Journell’s scholarship on political thinking and how it can be used to teach civics using the ideas highlighted in the C3 Framework. Each of the three activities described in the article focuses on different political artifacts from the Log Cabin Campaign used in the 1840 presidential election. A summative assessment allows students to use their political thinking skills by drawing on their analysis of the political artifacts. The authors provided the steps and resources needed to implement the activities.

This article examines the concept of political character in the thought of Muhammad ‘Imarah, emphasizing its role as the ethical foundation of political legitimacy in Islam. Responding to modern political reductionism that separates power from morality, the study argues that ‘Imarah conceptualizes Islamic politics not as an ideology of power or merely a legal-formal system, but as an ethical praxis grounded in tawhid, trust (amanah),justice, and human moral responsibility as khal?fah. Employing a qualitative library research method with a normative-philosophical approach and intellectual history, this study analyzes ‘Imarah’s major works in dialogue with classical and contemporary Islamic political thinkers, particularly al-Mawardi, Fazlur Rahman, and Alija Izetbegovi?. The findings demonstrate that ‘Im?rah advances Islamic political thought beyond prevailing normative discourses by reorienting fiqh al-siyasah from an institutional and stability-centered paradigm toward a critical political ethics in which moral character constitutes the primary source of political legitimacy. By articulating the concept of al-dawlah al-madaniyyah bi marja‘iyyah islamiyyah, ‘Imarah offers a mediating framework that challenges both normative secularism and Islamic political formalism, thereby enriching contemporary debates on the ethical foundations of governance in Muslim societies. While his framework remains largely normative-philosophical and lacks detailed institutional elaboration for modern political systems, this limitation underscores the article’s contribution in repositioning Islamic political ethics as a dynamic field of moral critique rather than a fixed legal or ideological project. Ultimately, this study contributes to contemporary Islamic political ethics by proposing a character-based, humanistic, and justice-oriented model of political legitimacy that responds to ongoing ethical crises in modern Muslim politics.