Political Party Identification Research Articles

Climate emotions, thoughts, and plans among US adolescents and young adults: a cross-sectional descriptive survey and analysis by political party identification and self-reported exposure to severe weather events

Climate change has adverse effects on youth mental health and wellbeing, but limited large-scale data exist globally or in the USA. Understanding the patterns and consequences of climate-related distress among US youth can inform necessary responses at the individual, community, and policy level. A cross-sectional descriptive online survey was done of US youth aged 16-25 years from all 50 states and Washington, DC, between July 20 and Nov 7, 2023, via the Cint digital survey marketplace. The survey assessed: climate-related emotions and thoughts, including indicators of mental health; relational aspects of climate-related emotions; beliefs about who or what has responsibility for causing and responding to climate change; desired and planned actions in response to climate change; and emotions and thoughts about the US Government response to climate change. Respondents were asked whether they had been affected by various severe weather events linked to climate change and for their political party identification. Sample percentages were weighted according to 2022 US census age, sex, and race estimates. To test the effects of political party identification and self-reported exposure to severe weather events on climate-related thoughts and beliefs we used linear and logistic regression models, which included terms for political party identification, the number of self-reported severe weather event types in respondents' area of residence in the past year, and demographic control variables. We evaluated survey responses from 15 793 individuals (weighted proportions: 80·5% aged 18-25 years and 19·5% aged 16-17 years; 48·8% female and 51·2% male). Overall, 85·0% of respondents endorsed being at least moderately worried, and 57·9% very or extremely worried, about climate change and its impacts on people and the planet. 42·8% indicated an impact of climate change on self-reported mental health, and 38·3% indicated that their feelings about climate change negatively affect their daily life. Respondents reported negative thoughts about the future due to climate change and actions planned in response, including being likely to vote for political candidates who support aggressive climate policy (72·8%). In regression models, self-reported exposure to more types of severe weather events was significantly associated with stronger endorsement of climate-related distress and desire and plans for action. Political party identification as Democrat or as Independent or Other (vs Republican) was also significantly associated with stronger endorsement of distress and desire and plans for action, although a majority of self-identified Republicans reported at least moderate distress. For all survey outcomes assessed in the models, the effect of experiencing more types of severe weather events did not significantly differ by political party identification. Climate change is causing widespread distress among US youth and affecting their beliefs and plans for the future. These effects may intensify, across the political spectrum, as exposure to climate-related severe weather events increases. Avaaz Foundation.

The Impacts of Political Internet Memes on Opinions: The Moderating Role of Political Party Identification

ABSTRACT Using memes on two political issues, an online experiment was conducted among a convenience sample of American adults to explore people’s reactions to political internet memes and the memes’ impacts on political opinions while considering the moderating role of political party identification. It found that memes on immigration had a significant main effect on opinions but those on gun control did not. Nonetheless, the memes on both issues produced more meme-consistent thoughts among partisans whose party shares the memes’ views than among those whose party opposes the memes’ views. Moreover, the memes supporting one’s party’s views had significant positive impacts on political opinions; but those challenging one’s party’s views had little impact. The political implications of these findings are discussed.

Predictors of U.S. public support for climate aid to developing countries

Effectively responding to global warming requires mitigation and adaptation efforts worldwide. Although developed countries have pledged substantial financial support to help developing countries respond to climate change, these pledges have yet to be fulfilled. A majority of American voters support providing aid to developing nations, however, levels of support differ sharply between Democrats and Republicans. To investigate the predictors of support for climate aid among registered voters in the United States and to assess the effect of political party identification, we conducted hierarchical regression and relative weight analysis on a nationally representative sample of U.S. registered voters (n = 898) surveyed in 2021. Among all voters, the predictors of support for climate aid were: party identification (with more support among Democrats), perceived risk to developing countries, worry about global warming, injunctive beliefs that the U.S. should do more, and global warming belief certainty. Among Democrats, the predictors were: perceived risk to the U.S., worry, injunctive beliefs the U.S. should do more, education, and income. Among Republicans, the predictors were: perceived risk to developing countries, and injunctive beliefs the U.S. should do more. These findings have both theoretical and practical relevance for efforts to build public support for development assistance aimed at reducing climate change.

Perceptions of COVID-19 vaccine side effects by political affiliation.

We sought to assess the extent to which subjective experiences of COVID-19 vaccine side effects among US adults are associated with political party identification. An online survey was conducted of a national sample of US adults (N=1259) identifying as either Republican or Democrat. There was no significant difference by party identification in the perceived severity of vaccination side effects; however, Republicans were significantly less likely to recommend the vaccine to others in light of their experience (OR=0.40; 95% CI, 0.31-0.51; P<0.001). Republicans also reported having a larger share of COVID-19-vaccinated friends and family who experienced notable side effects (OR=1.31; 95% CI, 1.02-1.68; P<0.05). There was a positive association between respondents' perceived side-effect severity and the proportion of peers who also reported notable side effects (r=0.43; P<0.001). Subjective appraisals of the vaccinated may affect broader vaccine acceptability.

A step to the left? Gender ideologies and political party identification in Germany

Abstract After decades in which gender relations, as anchored in work-family policies and egalitarian gender ideologies, moved towards greater equality, the status quo is currently being challenged. Gender-ambivalent ideologies have spread in both the political and private realms. It is unclear how the rise in gender-ambivalence documented in current research relates to party identification. On the one hand, gender ambivalence may represent a variation of post-materialist liberal values corresponding with support for centre-left parties in Germany. On the other, ambivalence may reflect a modified form of traditionalism and thus, a step to the left among voters leaning towards right-wing and conservative parties. This paper uses the Leitbild Survey 2012 to provide empirical evidence to fill this research gap. In line with cross-national research, latent class analyses reveal four main gender ideologies among young Germans: unidimensional ‘egalitarian’ and ‘moderate traditional’, as well as ambivalent, multidimensional ‘secondary earner’, and ‘intensive parenting’. Multinomial regression models show that egalitarian class members identify with centre-left parties while members of the ambivalent, multidimensional secondary earner, and intensive parenting classes as well as those of the moderate traditional class identify more strongly with centre-right parties. In light of the broader literature on gender ideology change, which documents a steep decline in traditionalism, our cross-sectional findings may be interpreted as capturing a step to the left among voters leaning towards right-wing and conservative parties in Germany, who now accept new mothers combining care-giving and part-time-work.

From male dominance to sharing: partner’s class and female political party identification 1964–2010

ABSTRACT Has the dominating influence of husband’s/male partner’s class position on his wife’s/partners’ political party identification declined in Britain? Contrary to predictions, previous research did not reveal a decline in male dominance. We claim a more accurate test by using a theoretical-based cohort design and more appropriate models. To investigate the relative impact of women’s and their men’s class position, we analyse married and partnered women in the British Election Surveys and distinguish four cohorts with a 1888–1991-birth range and model the relative impact of spouse’s class positions with adjusted logistic diagonal reference models allowing the absolute association to change over time. The results show that in case the husband is self-employed, a skilled labourer/foreman or an unskilled/semiskilled labourer, there are no cohort changes in the relative association and women weight their own class position equal to that of husband’s class position. However, there is a substantial cohort effect in case the husband has a salariat or lower white-collar class position. In such cases, there is a male dominance class association, but this disappeared for the most recent (i.e. 1961–1991) birth-cohort. For most classes, a sharing-model (both partners equally important) is for the youngest cohort the most appropriate description.

The potential role of descriptive and dynamic norms in promoting climate change advocacy

AbstractPolitical advocacy is arguably the most powerful form of action that citizens concerned about climate change can take. One motivator for political advocacy is the perception that there is a social norm (i.e. inherently understood social rules and standards that serve to guide social behaviors) for doing so. Using nationally representative survey data (N = 1303), we examined the association of three types of social norms—descriptive norms (i.e. perceptions about how many other people perform a behavior), retrospective and prospective dynamic norms (i.e. perceptions that a behavior has become more or less common in the past or will in the future)—with intentions to engage in political advocacy in the upcoming year and past advocacy. We found that descriptive norms and prospective dynamic norms were positively related to advocacy intentions, while only prospective dynamic norms were positively related to past advocacy (retrospective dynamic norms were negatively related to both outcomes, contrary to our theorized direction). Furthermore, we examined whether the relationship between norms and intentions/behaviors differed based on political party identification and four potential mediators of this relationship: identification with climate activists; collective efficacy (i.e. the belief that people can engage in climate advocacy and that it will make a difference); collective response efficacy (i.e. beliefs about the results of advocacy); and injunctive norms (i.e. perceptions of others’ approval of advocacy). In the moderated mediation models, we found that party identification moderated the relationships between descriptive norms and prospective dynamic norms and advocacy intention, while retrospective dynamic norms were not related as theorized. These relationships were mediated by identification with climate activists and collective efficacy as well as by injunctive norms in the case of descriptive norms. Party identification also moderated the relationship between descriptive norms and past advocacy; this relationship was mediated by identification with climate activists and injunctive norms. Taken together, these findings underscore the potential importance of perceived descriptive norms and prospective dynamic norms on political advocacy to address climate change, extending both well-established and emerging research and providing insights useful for academics and practitioners alike.

"I feel it in my gut:" Epistemic Motivations, Political Beliefs, and Misperceptions of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election.

This project examines the intersection of political constructs and epistemic motivations as they relate to belief in misinformation. How we value the origins of knowledge - through feelings and intuition or evidence and data - has important implications for our susceptibility to misinformation. This project explores how these epistemic motivations correlate with political ideology, party identification, and favorability towards President Trump, and how epistemic and political constructs predict belief in misinformation about COVID and the 2020 election. Results from a US national survey from Nov-Dec 2020 illustrate that Republicans, conservatives, and those favorable towards President Trump held greater misperceptions about COVID and the 2020 election. Additionally, epistemic motivations were associated with political preferences; Republicans and conservatives were more likely to reject evidence, and Trump supporters more likely to value feelings and intuition. Mediation analyses support the proposition that Trump favorability, Republicanism, and conservatism may help account for the relationships between epistemic motivations and misperceptions. Results are discussed in terms of the messaging strategies of right-wing populist movements, and the implications for democracy and public health.

The Role of Nature in Human Healing

In musing on what Freud would have thought about the contributions of social dysfunction to psychological pathology Paul Goodman (1991) concluded that “it would become increasingly evident to him, would it not, that cure could not depend merely on talk, revival of affect, and reconsideration, but must also pass over into practical behavior, and therefore must involve a change of the social rules so as to make such curative behavior possible” (40). One can find similar references to the importance Goodman placed on the crucial role of sociopolitical functioning in all areas of the human condition throughout his vast array of political essays, educational theories, poetry, and in the 1951 tome, Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality. And it was through such a search that I eventually provided myself with sufficient theoretical support for including social and political issues into the therapeutic process.The Gestalt perspective that seemed most relevant in this regard had to do with Goodman’s concept of self-formation, a psychologically dynamic process in which the momentary creations of self at any given time, are formed “OF” rather than “AT” the organism/environment boundary. To form “AT” the boundary would imply an additive dynamic in which individual entities join together. To form “OF” the organism/environmental field implies a more holistic fusing: one in which more novel, and existential gestalten are formed, ones that contain elements and interactions determining lively wholes; as such, they are capable of including social and political variables which, similar to other aspects of self-functioning, can qualify as legitimate grist for the psychotherapeutic mill.When employing such a paradigm in therapy, I will often find it important to redefine the term “political” to facilitate its integration into the treatment. I present political functioning in Gestalt-based process terminology rather than through the more formal nomenclature typically applied to political party identification. When successful, the therapy becomes free to explore inquiries such as the following: What type of sociopolitical processes do you feel would be helpful and supportive to you with respect to the work you have done here? Are there ways in which you can imagine yourself becoming active in movements or organizations that support such principles and practices?I often find this sort of inquiry most effective toward the end of therapy, in that it adds a welcomed complexity to a lot of the psychological work already accomplished. In addition, it sends off the important, yet implicit, message that indeed it is difficult if not impossible to maintain one’s sanity in an insane environment. In addition, I often find that this type of closure instills a spontaneous and comprehensive understanding of more global environmental concerns. And here again, Gestalt therapy can be useful; a factor highlighted by Theodore Roszak (1992) who, in assessing various schools of psychology that attempt to incorporate environmental awareness into their theoretical structure, believed that: “Only the Gestalt school has introduced a larger, more fully biological context for therapy that seeks to unite figure with ground, organism with environment; it is the only school that uses the concept of ecology in its theories” (304).

The Role of Nature in Human Healing

In musing on what Freud would have thought about the contributions of social dysfunction to psychological pathology Paul Goodman (1991) concluded that “it would become increasingly evident to him, would it not, that cure could not depend merely on talk, revival of affect, and reconsideration, but must also pass over into practical behavior, and therefore must involve a change of the social rules so as to make such curative behavior possible” (40). One can find similar references to the importance Goodman placed on the crucial role of sociopolitical functioning in all areas of the human condition throughout his vast array of political essays, educational theories, poetry, and in the 1951 tome, Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality. And it was through such a search that I eventually provided myself with sufficient theoretical support for including social and political issues into the therapeutic process.The Gestalt perspective that seemed most relevant in this regard had to do with Goodman’s concept of self-formation, a psychologically dynamic process in which the momentary creations of self at any given time, are formed “OF” rather than “AT” the organism/environment boundary. To form “AT” the boundary would imply an additive dynamic in which individual entities join together. To form “OF” the organism/environmental field implies a more holistic fusing: one in which more novel, and existential gestalten are formed, ones that contain elements and interactions determining lively wholes; as such, they are capable of including social and political variables which, similar to other aspects of self-functioning, can qualify as legitimate grist for the psychotherapeutic mill.When employing such a paradigm in therapy, I will often find it important to redefine the term “political” to facilitate its integration into the treatment. I present political functioning in Gestalt-based process terminology rather than through the more formal nomenclature typically applied to political party identification. When successful, the therapy becomes free to explore inquiries such as the following: What type of sociopolitical processes do you feel would be helpful and supportive to you with respect to the work you have done here? Are there ways in which you can imagine yourself becoming active in movements or organizations that support such principles and practices?I often find this sort of inquiry most effective toward the end of therapy, in that it adds a welcomed complexity to a lot of the psychological work already accomplished. In addition, it sends off the important, yet implicit, message that indeed it is difficult if not impossible to maintain one’s sanity in an insane environment. In addition, I often find that this type of closure instills a spontaneous and comprehensive understanding of more global environmental concerns. And here again, Gestalt therapy can be useful; a factor highlighted by Theodore Roszak (1992) who, in assessing various schools of psychology that attempt to incorporate environmental awareness into their theoretical structure, believed that: “Only the Gestalt school has introduced a larger, more fully biological context for therapy that seeks to unite figure with ground, organism with environment; it is the only school that uses the concept of ecology in its theories” (304).

The effect of social approval on perceptions following social media message sharing applied to fake news

Abstract A field experiment examined social approval in the form of Twitter “Likes” on individuals’ perceptions after retweeting a fictitious news story about a politician. The study incorporated research about feedback effects on self-perception online, partisan bias, and negativity principles. Participants read or retweeted a (verifiably false) news story via social media, and researchers appended systematic increments of Likes to the retweets. A baseline hypothesis test found no effect on perceptions due to retweeting versus simply reading a news story. Results supported a predicted three-way interaction effect between positive versus negative news story, political congruence with participants’ political party identification, and the reception of 0–22 Likes on perceptions of the politician. More Likes magnified negative perceptions of politicians, from fictitious news, when news stories were negative and focused on politicians from one’s opposite political party.

Ideology, Party, and Opinions of Taxes on the Rich and Middle Class in the United States: Evidence from the 2016 General Social Survey

This paper examines attitudes toward taxes on the rich and middle class in the United States with emphasis on the impacts of political ideology and party identification. Using the 2016 General Social Survey, we estimate bivariate ordered probit models for a full cross-sectional sample, and subsamples stratified by party. Results suggest that proposals to reduce income and wealth inequalities and/or fund large federal expenditure increases by raising taxes on the rich will have difficulty in gaining the political traction necessary for success. Any proposal to raise taxes on both the rich and middle class has almost no chance of passage. Findings also indicate that party affiliation moderates ideological impacts on opinions of taxes on the rich and middle class, in some cases substantially.

Extreme party animals: Effects of political identification and ideological extremity

AbstractMany Americans’ political identity is more relevant, salient, and central than their American identity. Political parties provide party members with an identity and belief system. Political identities influence identity‐based ideologies which increase affective polarization and potential anti‐social intergroup conflict between political parties. The purpose of the current research is to determine how political party identification and ideological extremity influences affective polarization for Republicans and Democrats across two studies. Participants in both studies completed a survey which measured political identification, ideological extremity, and uniquely operationalized measures of affective polarization, including support for co‐partisans, attitudes about political rivals, emotions towards political rivals, action tendencies towards political rivals, and perceived threat from political rivals. Study 1 (N = 530) used responses to the survey from a convenience sample crowdsourced by Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in 2018. Study 1 showed that higher political party identification is associated with significantly higher affective polarization for members of both parties and that ideological extremity partially mediates this effect. Study 2 (N = 260) used a 2020 AMT sample to replicate Study 1’s results. Findings extend our understanding of identity‐based ideological extremity and suggest that affective polarization could be driven by political party identification and partisans’ ideological extremity.

Maternal Factors Associated with Family Social Distancing Practices During the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Pandemic.

ObjectivesDespite social distancing being an effective method for mitigating community transmission of viruses, little is known about factors associated with social distancing practices among children and their families. The current study assessed maternal socio-demographic characteristics and political party identifications associated with family social distancing practices during the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsParticipants in this study were 1266 mothers (mean age = 39.92 years; 84.9% white) of children ages 17 years and younger from across the United States. They were recruited online through social media platforms and completed questionnaires on Qualtrics about their family’s social distancing practices and socio-demographic characteristics.ResultsWomen with a Doctorate (mean = 35.37; SD = 4.24) and Master’s (mean = 34.26; SD = 5.70) degree reported higher levels of family social distancing compared to women with some college (mean = 31.11; SD = 8.11) or a college degree (mean = 32.62; SD = 6.91; p’s = .00). Women who identified as Democrat (mean = 35.92; SD = 3.30) or Independent (mean 34.13; SD = 5.63), or indicated not identifying with a political party (mean = 34.19; SD = 5.69), reported higher levels of family social distancing compared to women who identified as Republican (mean = 29.70; SD = 8.12; p’s = .00). The largest effect was found between women who identified as Democrat and Republican (effect size = 1.00). After controlling for relevant predictor variables, maternal education (standardized beta coefficient = .116; p = .000), race (standardized beta coefficient = .072; p = .007), and political party identification (standardized beta coefficient = − .348; p = .000) were significantly correlated with the Social Distancing Total Score.Conclusions for PracticeThe current findings suggest there may be a benefit to COVID-19 public health campaigns targeting families with lower educational attainment and more conservative regions in the United States.

Predictors of COVID-19 Preventive Perceptions and Behaviors Among Millennials: Two Cross-sectional Survey Studies.

BackgroundCOVID-19 preventive perceptions and behaviors, especially among US millennials, are an important means by which the pandemic can be slowed and negative health outcomes can be averted.ObjectiveThis manuscript aims to advance knowledge on COVID-19 preventive perceptions and behaviors and their main predictors, including digital health information–seeking behavior (HISB), political party identification, and COVID-19 testing status.MethodsTwo cross-sectional online surveys of US millennials were conducted from April 10 to 14, 2020 (N=274) (ie, Study 1), and from April 27 to May 7, 2020 (N=1037) (ie, Study 2). In the regression models, dependent variables included preventive behaviors (eg, wearing a face mask and social distancing) as well as four preventive perceptions: severity (ie, a person’s conception of the seriousness of COVID-19), susceptibility (ie, a person’s conception of the likelihood of being infected with COVID-19), self-efficacy (ie, a person’s perception that he or she can wear a face mask and perform social distancing to prevent COVID-19 infection), and response efficacy (ie, a person’s perception of whether wearing a face mask and social distancing can prevent COVID-19 infection). Key independent variables included digital HISB for self, digital HISB for another person, political party identification, and COVID-19 testing status.ResultsMillennials reported lower levels of perceived susceptibility than the other three preventive perceptions (ie, severity, self-efficacy, and response efficacy), as well as fairly high levels of preventive behaviors. Unlike HISB for another person, digital HISB for self was positively associated with preventive perceptions and behaviors. In Study 1, respondents with higher levels of digital HISB for self had significantly higher perceptions of severity (β=.22, P<.001), self-efficacy (β=.15, P=.02), and response efficacy (β=.25, P<.001) as well as, at nearing significance, higher perceptions of susceptibility (β=.11, P=.07). In Study 2, respondents with higher levels of digital HISB for self had significantly higher perceptions of severity (β=.25, P<.001), susceptibility (β=.14, P<.001), and preventive behaviors (β=.24, P<.001). Preventive behaviors did not vary significantly according to political party identification, but preventive perceptions did. In Study 1, respondents who identified as being more Republican had significantly lower perceptions of self-efficacy (β=−.14, P=.02) and response efficacy (β=−.13, P=.03) and, at nearing significance, lower perceptions of severity (β=−.10, P=.08) and susceptibility (β=−.12, P=.06). In Study 2, respondents who identified as being more Republican had significantly lower perceptions of severity (β=−.08, P=.009). There were mixed effects of COVID-19 testing status on preventive perceptions, with respondents who had tested positive for COVID-19 having significantly higher perceptions of susceptibility in Study 1 (β=.17, P=.006) and significantly lower perceptions of severity in Study 2 (β=−.012, P<.001).ConclusionsAs the largest and most digitally savvy generation, US millennials saw COVID-19 as a severe threat, but one that they were less susceptible to. For millennials, digital HISB for self, but not for another person, was critical to the development of preventive perceptions and behaviors.

Climate Change Knowledge and Political Identity in Australia

National data from the 2018 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes show that knowledge of climate change is positively associated with the scientific consensus position on anthropogenic climate change. Responses to factual quiz questions that include climate trigger terms such as “greenhouse gas” or reference to increased ocean temperature and acidification are influenced by one’s political party identification, with Liberal and National party identifiers tending to score lower than Labor partisans on climate knowledge scales. Yet, responses to climate-related factual questions sans trigger terms are not influenced by political partisanship. Climate skeptics tend to score lower on climate knowledge scales than those who accept anthropogenic climate change, although skeptics also tend to have inflated confidence in their factual knowledge of climate change.

Redistribution Preferences, Inequality Information, and Partisan Motivated Reasoning in the United States

In an era of rising inequality, the U.S. public’s relatively modest support for redistributive policies has been a puzzle for scholars. Deepening the paradox is recent evidence that presenting information about inequality increases subjects’ support for redistributive policies by only a small amount. What explains inequality information’s limited effects? We extend partisan motivated reasoning scholarship to investigate whether political party identification confounds individuals’ processing of inequality information. Our study considers a much larger number of redistribution preference measures (12) than past scholarship. We offer a second novelty by bringing the dimension of historical time into hypothesis testing. Analyzing high-quality data from four American National Election Studies surveys, we find new evidence that partisanship confounds the interrelationship of inequality information and redistribution preferences. Further, our analyses find the effects of partisanship on redistribution preferences grew in magnitude from 2004 through 2016. We discuss implications for scholarship on information, motivated reasoning, and attitudes towards redistribution.

Memes, scenes and #ELXN2019s: How partisans make memes during elections

Our article analyses partisan, user-generated Facebook pages and groups to understand the articulation of political identity and party identification. Adapting the concept of scenes usually found in music studies, these Facebook pages and groups act as partisan scenes that maintain identities and sentiments through participatory practices, principally by making and sharing memes. Using a mixed methods approach that combines social media data and interviews during the 2019 Canadian federal election, we find that these partisan scenes are an active part of elections and the overall political information cycle in Canada but endure beyond election cycles. Rather than trying to sway voters of different political affiliation and influence the election outcome, Facebook users employ memes to hang-out and build community, thereby reinforcing partisanship.

Does corporate political party ideology matter? Evidence from bank loan contracts

Purpose This paper aims to examine how a firm’s political party orientation (Republican or Democratic), which is measured as the composite index based on the political party leanings of top managers, affects bank loan contracts. This study also investigates how the political culture of local states has a significant impact on loan contracts. Design/methodology/approach This research uses various databases including the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, financial covenant violation indicators based on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, firm bankruptcy filings and political culture index data to examine the impact of political orientation on the cost of debt. This paper also includes the state level of gun ownership and bachelor’s degrees to investigate how local political culture affects the loan contract. To control endogenous concerns, this paper uses an instrumental variable analysis. Findings Firms that have Republican-oriented political identities pay lower yield spreads for the main costs of debt including all-in-spread-drawn and all-in-spread-undrawn. This pattern is consistent with other fees of bank loans. This paper finds that an increase in conservative political policies toward Republican orientations is negatively associated with the cost of debt. The main findings also show that the political culture in the state where the headquarters of the borrowing firm are located plays an important role in bank loan contracts. Originality/value The findings in this paper provide evidence that a firm’s political party orientation significantly affects the loan contract terms in both pricing and non-pricing terms. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that shows the importance of political party identification on loan contracts by separating the sample into Republican, neutral and Democratic.

Individual and social determinants of COVID-19 vaccine uptake

BackgroundCOVID-19 has had a devastating impact and efforts are being made to speed up vaccinations. The growing problem of vaccine hesitancy may affect the uptake of COVID-19 vaccine. We examined the individual, communication and social determinants associated with vaccines uptake.MethodsData come from a nationwide online probability-based panel of 1012 representative adults in the United States and the survey was conducted before the vaccines were available. People under the federal poverty level and racial and ethnic minorities were oversampled. Our outcome variables of interest were likelihood of vaccinating self and likelihood of vaccinating people under one’s care (such as children) measuring behavioral intentions. Independent variables included perceptions of risk, exposure to different media for COVID-19 news, political party identification, confidence in scientists and social determinants of health. Logistic regression analysis was used to ascertain the effects of independent variables on the two outcome variables.ResultsThe results indicated that 68 and 65% agreed to get the vaccine for themselves and people under their care, respectively. Risk perceptions (severity of and susceptibility to COVID-19) were significantly associated with vaccine uptake. People who relied on “conservative” news outlets, Republicans, and who had low confidence in scientists are least likely to vaccinate self or children. Non-Hispanic Blacks and those with least schooling were also less likely to receive vaccine for themselves or people in their care.ConclusionsOur study identified race/ethnicity, risk perceptions, exposure to different media for COVID-19 news, party identification and confidence in scientists as factors that would be affecting COVID-19 vaccine uptake. The good news is that these are addressable through strategic public health communications, but a lot of work remains to be done with some urgency.