Polish Forces Research Articles

General Myron Tarnavsky in the Polish captivity (1918–1921)

This article attempts to characterize the fate of the general Myron Tarnavsky during his Polish captivity in the camps of Dąbie and Tuchola. He was interned on two occasions: the first time was at the end of 1918, and the second time was in July of 1920. First internment was connected with the end of the First World War. In the November 1918 Tarnavsky was stationed on the Greater Ukraine, where he commanded the 16 Mazur Infantry Regiment of Austro-Hungarian army. He successfully relocated the regiment to Krakow, but upon his return to Lviv, he was discovered and sent to the camp of Dąbie, located on the outskirts of Krakow. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of information regarding his sojourn in that locale. Conversely, there are numerous sources that cover the period of his second sojourn in the Tuchola camp, where he was imprisoned from July 1920 until February 1921. After he had returned from Greater Ukraine to Eastern Galicia in July, 1920, he was immediately arrested by Polish gendarmerie and sent again to the prisoners-of-war camp, this time to Tuchola. Mentioned camp was located in Pomorze, far away from Eastern Galicia, and was established by Polish authorities in March 1920. In May and June 1920 2,5 thousands of officers and soldiers from the ranks of Red Ukrainian Halych Army were imprisoned in the camp. They were disarmed by the Polish forces during Kyiv Offensive of 1920. General Tarnavsky arrived to the Tuchola camp on July 22, 1920. All officers gathered and honored him as their commander for an extended period. During his imprisonment, all interned officers of UHA at the camp paid respect to him as he was the highest rank Ukrainian officer imprisoned there, although he rarely participated in the camp’s activities. The only case in which Tarnavsky was involved that was of a greater magnitude was the case of Major Wilhelm Lobkowitz. General Tarnavsky was released from captivity in February 1921.

Anti-Jewish Violence of Polish Troops, 1918–1920: The Case of Bobruisk

ABSTRACT An examination of anti-Jewish violence on the part of Polish troops stationed in Bobruisk (Bel: Babruǐsk; Pol: Bobrujsk) between 1919 and 1920 puts into relief the interconnectedness of antisemitism and Polish nationalist discourse at the time of the consolidation of the Polish state. The relationship between Polish forces and the town's majority — Jews — reflects both Poland's colonial ambitions in the East and the emerging political vision of the future Polish state, in which ethnic minorities were to be second-class citizens. This article analyzes Jewish, Soviet, and Polish sources from the period, discussing both symbolic and actual violence against the Jews. Placing the events in Bobruisk in the wider perspective of the wave of pogroms that accompanied the advance of Polish troops in the so-called Kresy, Poland's eastern borderlands, it uses the micro-scale of one town to shed light on the factors that triggered the antisemitic violence.

Siły polskie pod Zbarażem 10 lipca 1649 roku

The article presents the size and composition of the Polish forces near Zbaraż, with a breakdown into individual regiments and banners, at the beginning of the fights that began on 10 July 1649. In addition to repeating and arranging what was already known, many new findings have been introduced and errors contained in older literature have been corrected.

The Historical Memory of the 1812 War in Lithuania in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries: A Complex Process

In historiography, significant attention to the memory culture of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe focuses on issues relating to the memory culture of the Franco-Russian War of 1812; however, the case of Lithuania is not commonly analysed separately, thus this article discusses how assessments of the 1812 war were maintained in the historical memory in Lithuania. The Russian government offered the population in the lands of the former GDL its official version of the historical memory of the 1812 war (of a heroic battle against an invader), which contradicted the version this population considered as ‘its own’, experienced as their support for Napoleon and the new political and social prospects they believed he would bring. The Russian government’s censorship of written literature suppressed the spread of the people’s ‘own’ local historical memory, yet it did not prove to be so effective due to the population’s very limited opportunities to use the printed word. Communicative memory dominated in the land in the first half of the 19th century, becoming the main source testifying to and passing on to subsequent generations the actual multifaceted experiences of the 1812 war, including the chance of liberation from the yoke of the Russian Empire. In the second half of the 19th century, representatives of local Russian imperial government structures and the local Russian intelligentsia, responding to the 1812 war as a Polish struggle for freedom and a symbol of political independence, explained in academic, educational and popular literature that the hopes of the Poles related to Napoleon were actually unfounded: the French emperor had no intentions of restoring the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its historical boundaries, but simply wanted to fill his army units with Polish forces. It was highlighted that this expression of Polish support for Napoleon stopped the Russian imperial government’s potential plans to restore the Poles’ former statehood. This so-called regional narrative which appeared in history textbooks and was used by exacting emotional and visual impact in order to influence the political and cultural provisions of the younger generation had a dual purpose. First, to justify the discriminatory policies against individuals of ‘Polish origins’. Second, to ‘block’ the path for using the 1812 war as a historical argument testifying not just to the common historical past and struggle of Poles and Lithuanians but also their possible political future, which was openly expressed in the Polish national discourse of the early 20th century. Over the course of a hundred years, despite the government’s actions, Poles managed to uphold ‘their own’ historical memory about the 1812 war; its meanings were spread in various forms of media such as fictional literature, museum exhibitions and history textbooks, and were used to shape the political and cultural position of the younger generation. In the Lithuanian national discourse on the other hand, the 1812 war, along with the 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 uprisings, was viewed as a matter concerning the Poles and the Polonised nobility, and it was thus a foreign place of historical memory. The 1812 war and assessments of its potential importance to Lithuanians in the Lithuanian national discourse of the early 20th century were one-off cases and fragmented, while their spread among broader layers of society was limited.

Российские планы на сейме Речи Посполитой 1744 г.

At the Diet in 1744 and 1746, the Polish authorities tried to obtain a permit to enlarge the army, reduced at the request of Russia in 1717. For the first time since then, these intentions were viewed favourably in St. Petersburg. These actions were caused by the efforts of the government-appointed by Tsar Elizabeth Petrovna to create a bloc of states directed against the rapidly developing Prussia. To this end, Russia was ready to change its policy. However, as a result of a survey conducted on the possibilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its development prospects, St. Petersburg decided not to rely on Polish forces in the fight against Prussia and returned to the previous policy.

A copper alloy light cannon from Grodno: an example of early firearms from Eastern Europe

The paper discusses a recent find of a copper alloy light cannon discovered at the Old Castle in Grodno, Belarus. The research aim was to analyse the artefact in all its possible aspects, including archaeological and historical contexts, possible analogies, and the gun’s technology of manufacture. This latter was done against a broad comparative background of what is known on manufacturing technologies of late medieval and modern period copper alloy firearms. First, the archaeological and historical contexts of the discovery are dealt with. Then, the morphology and typochronology of the cannon are discussed and relevant analogies are proposed. Next, the technology of manufacture of the cannon is studied on the basis of metallographic examinations and EDS analyses of the metal’s elemental composition. It was found out that the artefact had been made of leaded copper. The cannon can be dated with reasonable certainty to the late 14th c., as implied both by the find context, the morphology and the chemical composition of the artefact. Its deposition can be related to fights over the Old Castle in Grodno in this period, waged by Teutonic, Polish and Lithuanian forces. It can tentatively be proposed that the cannon was manufactured in a Teutonic Order’s workshop, but further research is necessary to verify this supposition.

UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS IN THE POLISH SOCIO-POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE FIRST THIRD OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE UKRAINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Summary. The purpose of the study is to show the achievements of Ukrainian historiography in studying the attitude of Polish politics in the early twentieth century and the interwar period to the Ukrainian question, to personify the scientific achievements of Ukrainian scientists, to predict the prospects for further scientific research. Research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systemicity, and objectivity. In solving specific problems, methods of historiographical analysis and synthesis were applied. The scientific novelty is that on the basis of a wide range of historiographical sources created by Ukrainian researchers, the process of accumulation and dissemination in time of historical knowledge about the essence of national programs of Polish political circles of the first third of the twentieth century and ways to solve the Ukrainian question. Conclusions. The analyzed problem began to be studied at the scientific level in 1960–80’s. If the representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora only outlined its contours, the historians of Soviet Ukraine (referring primarily to Yu. Slyvka) made an attempt of a professional approach to the subject of research. Modern Ukrainian researchers, applying the latest research practices and Ukraine-centric approach, have made significant progress in the study of the topic. Through the efforts of L. Zashkilnyak, Y. Mykhalsky, V. Repryntsev, M. Zelinsky, Y. Vyalova, V. Komar, Y. Kramar, O. Yurchuk, M. Kucherepa and others, there has been an increase in scientific historical knowledge about the essence of national programs of the main Polish forces politicum in the early twentieth century and in the 1920s and 1930s, in particular, their attitude to the Ukrainian question. It is proved that two concepts concerning Ukrainians were leading – assimilation of national and state. Supporters of the first were representatives of the Polish National Democracy, and the second – supporters of J. Pilsudski. Attempts by Polish Ukrainophiles to impose the idea of territorial autonomy on Ukrainians in Galicia have failed. Theorists of Polish conservatives substantiated the eternal affiliation of "peripheral territories" to the Polish state, and therefore considered the Ukrainian question exclusively as a domestic political problem of a local nature. Among the government programs developed for certain regions of Poland, the most famous is the "Volyn program" of Governor G. Yuzewski. Despite the great achievements in studying the positions of Polish political groups on the Ukrainian issue, there is a need for in-depth study of the ideology and practice of the centre-left and far-left movements. It is necessary to continue consideration of the principles of national policy of small Polish political parties, groups and blocs of liberal and conservative orientations. In addition, this scientific problem has the prospect of research through the prism of biography.

"ЖИДІВСЬКА МІЛІЦІЯ" ЛЬВОВА ЯК ТРЕТЯ СТОРОНА "ЛЬВІВСЬКИХ БОЇВ" 1-21 ЛИСТОПАДА 1918 РОКУ МІЖ УКРАЇНСЬКИМИ ВІЙСЬКАМИ І ПОЛЬСЬКИМИ ФОРМУВАННЯМИ

The article is devoted to the activities of the militia created by the Jewish community of Lviv on November 1, 1918 after the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state in this city. The aim of the militia, initiated by supporters of the Zionist movement, was to protect the Jewish community in Lviv from possible pogroms. Particular attention is paid to the military-political situation in Lviv in November 1918 and in the Eastern European region in general, which had a decisive influence on the establishment of the Jewish militia. Emphasised is also placed on the positive attitude of the Jewish community to the armed conflict between the army of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic and Polish formations who denied the right of Ukrainians to their independent nation-state and who expressed their claims to Western Ukraine. It is emphasized that de jure declaring its neutrality in this conflict, the de facto Jewish militia were forced to take a direct part in this confrontation. This Jewish militia formation controlled a very large part of Lviv's quarters, which was objectively beneficial for both participants in the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. Militioners patrolled the streets, fought crime, and ensured public order. The article describes in detail the three groups that existed at that time in the Lviv Jewish community – Zionists, Orthodox and assimilators, and the main differences in their policies. In particular, in relation to other nations that lived in the western Ukrainian region – Ukrainians and Poles. Special emphasis is placed on the positive attitude of a large part of Lviv Jews to the Ukrainian government and the negative reaction to this commitment of chauvinistic Polish politicians and soldiers, who did not hide their anti-Semitism and demanded from Jews non-alternative loyalty to Poland. It is noted that the more favorable attitude of Lviv Jews to the Ukrainian authorities was the cause of the terrible Jewish pogrom committed by Polish forces after the Ukrainian army left Lviv on November 22, 1918.

Zapomniany kurier do Delegatury Rządu. Ppor. Napoleon Segieda „Wera” (1908–1991)

The article presents Second Lieutenant Napoleon Segieda, alias Gustav Molin “Wera” or Jerzy Salski (after the war), born in the Zamość region, a resident of Pomerania, and a political courier to the government of the Polish Underground State (during the war), parachuted to the country on the night of 7th November 1941. The paper is the first attempt to show his biography and military achievements. He was a participant in the war of 1939 (the defense of Warsaw), and then, a prisoner of war in the German camps, whence, after many trials and tribulations, he arrived at the Polish Forces base in Great Britain. On completing his mission in the country (summer 1942), Segieda set off to London again with the first comprehensive report of the Polish Underground State to the Polish government-in-exile, London. As early as in 1942, being a witness to the extermination, he alerted the world to the Holocaust, to practically no effect, since the West was not particularly interested in the problem. From spring to summer 1942, Napoleon Segieda stayed in the city of Oświęcim where he collected information about the Concentration Camp Auschwitz. On 8th August 1942, he left Warsaw and, via Cracow and Vienna, reached Switzerland where, for unknown reasons, he got stuck on the way to London for a few months. His report was later distributed among many important and influential politicians of the allied community in Great Britain and the USA. It is worth mentioning that the messages on the Holocaust by Stefan Karboński (the head of the leadership of civil combat) also arrived in London during the summer 1942. After the war, Napoleon Segieda settled down in London, under the surname of Jerzy Salski, where he died completely forgotten.

Sermons of Dominican Marcin Bronisław Chrostowski Delivered during World War II

The aim of the article is to familiarize the reader with sermons delivered during World War II by Marcin Chrostowski OP, chaplain of the Polish Armed Forces in the West. Father Chrostowski’s legacy of sermons, stored in the Archive of the Polish Province of the Dominican Order, is an interesting supplement to information we currently hold on his service as chaplain of the Polish Armed Forces. The sermons reflect the spirit of his times and also present the morale of the military. Studying them allows us to capture moral attitudes preached to soldiers. This edition contains sermons delivered in Great Britain (Scotland), the USSR (where Fr. Chrostowski accompanied the field bishop during his official visit with the Polish forces), Iraq, the Holy Land, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Reich. To date, these sermons have not been commonly known, although selected passages were published in Chrostowski’s printed biography (see H. Gallus, E. Mikołajczak, Ojciec Marcin Chrostowski, Poznań 2001). The remaining texts have yet not been analyzed by researchers. Father Marcin Chrostowski volunteered for the army in France, where he was staying at the outbreak of the war. Later, he became chaplain of the Polish Armed Forces in the West – in France and Great Britain, secretary of Field Bishop Gawlina, with whom he travelled to the USSR. After his service in the Holy Land, he was transferred to Great Britain, where he joined the ranks of General Maczek’s 1st Armored Division. As chaplain of the 9th Rifle Battalion, he followed the battle trail from “Maczuga” to Wilhelmshaven. Notably, he was rewarded for his heroism during the hostilities at Baarle Nassan with the War Order of Virtuti Militari.

Generał brygady Kazimierz Rumsza – z armii carskiej do polskiej

Since its inception, the 5th Siberian Rifle Division was led by Colonel [płk.] Rumsza who operated under the orders of Colonel [płk.] Czuma, the commander of Polish forces in Siberia. In the light of the examined documents, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza appears to be a man with two faces. On the one hand, he was an excellent commander, proving his worth in the extreme war conditions. On the other, a violent officer who humiliated his personnel and got involved in shady financial ventures. He was never proven guilty of embezzlement. However, his very presence in the group of suspects stigmatised him among the officers. He won back some favour after the lost September Campaign. During World War II, Rumsza did not play any significant role in the Polish Armed Forces. After demobilisation, he settled down in London. On 1 January 1964, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general [gen. brygady]. Kazimierz Rumsza died on 28 January 1970.

Polish Theatre in the Time of War (1939–1945). Fight—Will to Survive—Losses—Legacy

During World War II Polish theatre people took an active part in the fight with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Several of them fought with a weapon inhand as officers and soldiers of Polish armies in the September 1939 campaign, later as combatants of the Home Army (AK), and also within Polish armed forces fighting abroad. Many more fought with a weapon of the word. While boycotting German sponsored stages in the General Government, they created the whole network of small underground theatre groups. Two major centers of this activity were Warsaw, where the Clandestine Theatre Council (Bohdan Korzeniewski, Leon Schiller, Edmund Wiercinski and others) organized and sponsored underground theatre productions and acting studios, and Krakow with The Rhapsodic Theatre (led by Mieczyslaw Kotlarczyk), The Independent Theatre (led by Tadeusz Kantor), and a circle of artists and apprentices gathered around Juliusz Osterwa, who frequently gave one-man shows. Productions were also prepared in German oflags and concentration camps. The great actor Stefan Jaracz performed for fellow inmates in Auschwitz, Zofia Rysiowna in Ravensbruck, and Roman Niewiarowicz in Dachau. Such productions were recorded also in Soviet camps (gulag system). Soldier theatres were organized at the Gen. Anders Second Corp, then also at the Polish forces underSoviet command. Losses of Polish theatre due to the war were staggering. In terms of material losses, The National Theatre in Warsaw was bombed by the Lufwaffe on September 19, 1939, and eventually Poland lost about 70% of theatre buildings standing in August 1939, plus their libraries, sets and costumes magazines, etc. In terms of human losses, about 300 theatre professionals died (out of about 2000 in 1939). Some were killed in military actions, some murdered in either German or Soviet camps. The losses in the spiritual domain were uncountable. Theatre artistswere deprived of the possibility to perform, thus executing their profession and vocation. Theatre spectators were left without their artistic nourishment. The struggles, sacrifices, and deeds of the war-time Polish theatre had a profound influence on the history of Polish theatre of the second half of the 20th century. They were not only an important element of the nation’s war-effort, but—indirectly— contributed to the restoration of Poland’s freedom at the end of the 20th century.

F-16 turbofan engine monitoring system

The multirole F-16 is the most advanced aircraft in the Polish Air Forces. It has been equipped with the very modern, sophisticated and advanced turbofan engine F100-PW-229. Due to the fact, that there is only one engine, its reliability, durability, efficiency and performance are the crucial factors for the safety reasons. In the article author researched maintenance system of the F100 turbofan engines, to describe Engine Monitoring System features. Engine Monitoring System (EMS) is the key element in the engine prognostic and health monitoring. The EMS provides engine fault indicators to the pilots and technicians and with the engine performance trending affects the F-16 flight safety risk and enhanced engine maintenance management concept. The main goal of this article was to provide information on the F-16 Engine Monitoring System and its impact on the aircraft airworthiness and F-16 fleet readiness resulting from the engine reliability. It is also an introduction to the F-16 Engine Health Management concept.

Jack J Kanski

There can be very few ophthalmologists and other ophthalmic professionals across the globe who at one time or another will not have delved into a book by Jack Kanski. Anybody...

Multinational cooperation: building capabilities in small air forces

ABSTRACTEuropean air power is represented by a variety of air forces, each equipped with different capabilities and facing different limitations. Developing the former and making up for the latter requires resources and finances and is not always possible within a national capacity. It may be particularly problematic for smaller air forces, especially with the trend of shrinking defence budgets and increasing costs of the newest technological achievements. This article investigates the idea of multinational cooperation in Europe as a way to make up for these shortfalls and build collective European capabilities. In doing so, it focuses on two states, namely Poland and Sweden as examples of small air forces. By choosing these countries as case studies it also provides an opportunity to investigate the different forms of multinational involvement existing within and outside a major military alliance, namely NATO. The article explores the participation of the Polish and Swedish Air Forces in several multinational initiatives and investigates how such involvement increases (or not) their capabilities.

Modernization of the Missile Forces and Artillery

The article analyses and assesses current capabilities of the Missile and Forces Artillery of the Polish Armed Forces as well as a role which should be played by artillery in conditions of a contempo-rary battlefield. By addressing a current state and modernization programs, the most principal areas of indispensable adaptations and directions for modernization aiming at significant increasing of artillery’s combat capabilities have been indicated. The analysis is based on conclusions and expertise gained during resent armed conflicts, particularly from the war in eastern Ukraine, where artillery played a crucial role in fire support. Artillery remains a relatively inexpensive, highly efficient and the most available means of fire support in the Polish Armed Forces, and its modernization and adaptation to NATO standards will con-siderably increase the combat potential the Polish Land Forces.

Skład sił polskich pod Piławcami

The article is an attempt to determine the composition of Polish forces that fought at Piławce on 21–23 September 1648 against the Cossack army of Chmielnicki supported by Tatar reinforcements. In total, the Polish army commanded by the Sandomierz voivode Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski consisted of nearly 30 000 troops. After deducting blind portions, it only exceeded 20 000 soldiers to battle. However, together with the camp service, it can be estimated at as much as 60 000 people, although only 5000 of the servicemen had firearms. As far as the composition of full-time units is concerned, it was possible to confirm the participation of 2706 hussars, 2800 arquebusiers, 4118 Cossacks, 4570 foot soldiers, 2680 dragoons in units – banners (chorągiew) – of a known composition. This is only 16 874 out of nearly 30 000 positions. It is known that at least 7 additional hussar banners, 5 Wallachian and Tatar ones, 3 dragoon banners and more than 12 Cossack ones took part in the battle. They were accompanied by 1050 horses in banners of unknown cavalry type (mainly Cossacks and arquebusiers) and the infantry of the crown ensign (chorąży koronny) Aleksander Koniecpolski and the Russian voivode Prince Jeremi Michał Korybut Wisniowiecki. Many positive remarks can be made about the quality of the troops, but unfortunately they were commanded by a man without war experience. A deeper look into these findings shall require a lot more research.

The defense of Glukhov against the Polish army of king John Casimir in 1664

The decisive event of the military campaign of the Commonwealth at the final stage of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667 became the unsuccessful siege of Glukhov. It ended in a heavy defeat for the Polish forces, which meant the failure of the last attempt by the Polish-Lithuanian state to regain the lands of the Left-bank Ukraine. Despite the considerable number of researches devoted to the campaign of King John Casimir, on the whole this campaign has been studied quite insufficiently. The source of the article were the materials of the Razryadny prikaz , which were fairly well preserved in the Russian State Archives of Ancient Acts (RGADA). A considerable part of the sources used for the first time were introduced into scientific circulation. Their comprehensive use made it possible to reconstruct the detailed course of the defense of Glukhov against the troops the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and to dispel a number of established misconceptions. In particular, those about the presence of the Russian garrison in the city. The actions of the Polish troops and the Ukrainian Cossacks in the struggle for this strategically important city of the Left-bank Ukraine are analyzed. The results of the research showed that the choice of defenders of Glukhov in favor of Moscow was an expression of the will not only of part of the Ukrainian Cossacks of the Left Bank, but also a reflection of the general mood of the Ukrainian masses.

The Individual Security of Polish Police Officers in the Context of the Usage of a Stun Gun as a Means of Physical Coercion. A Study Report

The increasing brutalisation of society results in Polish police officers becoming increasingly exposed to threats to their lives and health. In 2016, 311 assaults on police officers took place. A secure police officer equals a secure state and its citizens. This is why it is so important for Polish police forces to be in possession of proper means of physical coercion which ensure their safety while on duty. The Act on means of physical coercion and firearms of 5 June 2013 specifies the range of the means of physical coercion permissible for use by police officers. However, the most important of these are individual means with which a police officer is equipped. Research conducted among Polish police officers demonstrates which individual means of physical coercion available to them are used most frequently for the purpose of ensuring safety on duty. Undoubtedly, the key measure is the object designated by the said law to incapacitate people using electricity, colloquially referred to as an electric stun gun, a stunner or a taser. This measure of direct coercion, present in the equipment of the Polish Police since 2007, is gaining in importance, as evidenced by the conducted research and the data on the use of electric stunner by police officers.

Kwatermistrzowskie zabezpieczenie oraz materiałowo-techniczne zaopatrzenie oddziałów polskich na Syberii (1918–1920)

Latem 1918 r. w czasie walk toczonych na Powołżu i Syberii przez oddziały Korpusu Czechosłowackiego i „białych” Rosjan z bolszewikami zostały tam utworzone polskie formacje zbrojne. W październiku 1918 r. miejscem stałej dyslokacji wojsk polskich stał się Nowonikołajewsk nad rzeką Ob. Na przełomie 1918 i 1919 r. zdołano sformować oddział w sile dywizji. Pod koniec 1918 r. w początkowym okresie formowania oddziałów wojska polskiego, zaopatrzenie w prowiant, furaż i umundurowanie zgodnie z zawartym porozumieniem z Filią Czesko-Słowackiej Rady Narodowej (FCz-SRN) odbywało się za pośrednictwem komórki kwatermistrzowskiej Korpusu Czechosłowackiego. W celu usprawnienia rozdziału przekazywanych dla wojsk polskich materiałów zaopatrzeniowych zorganizowano przy Dowództwie Wojsk Polskich we wschodniej Rosji polską służbę kwatermistrzowską. Założono składy żywności i materiałowe, warsztaty krawieckie, szewskie, wydzierżawiono też piekarnię parową. Odrębnym problemem było stworzenie od podstaw służby zdrowia.W czerwcu 1919 r. polskie oddziały wzięły udział w walkach w obronie magistrali transsyberyjskiej. Wobec stale pogarszającej się sytuacji wojska sprzymierzonych rozpoczęły ewakuację na wschód, 5 Dywizja Strzelców Polskich (DSP) otrzymała rolę straży tylnej. Największą bitwę z regularnymi bolszewickimi oddziałami dywizja ta stoczyła 23 grudnia 1919 r. o węzłową stację Tajga. 10 stycznia 1920 r. dowództwo polskie wbrew opinii części oficerów zdecydowało o kapitulacji oddziałów polskich.Część oficerów i żołnierzy, która nie pogodziła się z kapitulacją, przebiła się do Harbinu. Z ocalałych żołnierzy sformowano tu batalion. Dzięki staraniom Polskiej Wojskowej Misji z gen. Antonim Baranowskim na czele, która w lutym 1920 r. przybyła z Polski na Daleki Wschód, zorganizowano powrót batalionu do kraju na statku „Yaroslavl”.