ABSTRACT The Georgian police reforms of 2004–2006 provide a rare case of rapid, large-scale, successful security reform. Lessons from Georgia challenge mainstream approaches to democratic police reform, security-sector reform, and elements of prominent critiques. These often emphasise democratisation of police and security sectors to include multiple actors in policing and reform. By contrast, the Georgian process was top-down and state-led. Failure to democratise the police has meant the reforms have not curtailed political interference in policing and have only partially reduced police impunity but the reforms vastly reduced corruption, improved security and trust in the police and have been sustained. This was achieved by the government strengthening executive power, consolidating its control over the security sector, firing corrupt police, and cracking down on organised crime. The Georgian case indicates that successful democratic police reform and security-sector reform depend on a concentration of state power to tackle such domestic spoilers and institutionalising before democratising control of the police, factors that are largely absent from policy and academic debates on these topics.