Pocket Veto Research Articles

The Unusual Story of the Pocket Veto Case, 1926–1929 by Jonathan Lurie

This meticulously researched and engaging book unravels the complex skein of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have interpreted the scope of the so-called “pocket veto,” which permits the president to disapprove a bill by not signing it or by returning it when Congress is not in session. Lurie uses these cases as a prism through which to explore “ongoing legal issues concerning separation of powers—a never-ending source of constitutional friction” (151–152). The book’s title is unduly modest because nearly one-third of the book explores cases between 1936 and 1987.Lurie focuses on Okanogan Tribe et al. v. United States (1929), in which the Court held that a bill does not become law if a president is unable to return it to Congress because Congress is not in session, even if a Congress has not permanently adjourned. Although the Court’s decision addressed only the pocket-veto issue, the case itself involved claims against the federal government for more than $13 million by six indigenous tribes in the Northwest. After Congress voted by acclamation in 1926 to authorize the tribes to sue the government in the U.S. Court of Claims, the ever-frugal President Coolidge exercised his pocket veto to kill the legislation. The attorney for the tribes, William S. Lewis, contended that the bill had become law because there had been no final adjournment of Congress. Lewis insisted that it was unfair to allow the president to veto legislation in a way that prevented Congress from overturning his veto, an argument echoed in an amicus brief by Rep. Hatton W. Sumners, the powerful chair of the House Judiciary Committee. In his decision for the Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes relied heavily upon precedent; presidents since James Madison in 1812 had killed legislation by refusing to sign it during intra-session recesses. One of Lurie’s themes is the broader question of the extent to which courts should elevate precedent at the relative expense of an analysis of the text and structure of the Constitution and consideration of public policy.Lurie also provides a detailed account of a later decision, Wright v. United States (1938), in which the Supreme Court modified Okanogan Tribe by holding that the president cannot kill a bill during a congressional recess if the house in which the bill originated has appointed an officer to receive his veto message. He carries the story forward into the 1970s and 1980s, when lower-court decisions further delineated the circumstances under which presidents could issue pocket vetoes.In telling his story, Lurie deftly leads readers through mazes of primary sources—including committee hearings, motions before various courts, hearings, re-hearings, briefs, memoranda, and judicial decisions—which culminated in various judicial decisions, particularly Okanogan Tribe. Even though the Court never adjudicated the claims of the tribes, the book provides an interesting and extended discussion of their grievances and laments the irony that these grievances ultimately were never addressed, much less remedied, in the morass of litigation about the pocket veto.To place the pocket veto cases in context, Lurie also provides a comprehensive history, almost a book within a book, about the creation of the Court of Claims, which was designed to replace haphazard congressional review of claims against the federal government. Lurie explores the Court’s formation in 1855 and the subsequent expansion of its jurisdiction, including 1881 legislation permitting it to adjudicate claims by indigenous tribes if Congress authorized such litigation.Lurie’s book is particularly important because Okanogan Tribe and other pocket veto cases have received virtually no other attention from scholars. This crisp, concise, and comprehensive book should become the standard authority for any historical study of the pocket veto. It also makes a significant contribution to the literature about the separation of powers.

ПАРЛАМЕНТ В СТРАНАХ БЛИЖНЕГО ЗАРУБЕЖЬЯ

Introduction: the article studies the structure, formation procedures, and powers of parliaments in the CIS countries. These are considered through the prism of the theory of separation of powers. We also carried out a comparative study of the status of parliamentarians in the countries of the ormer Soviet Union – their rights, duties, restrictions, and responsibilities. The purpose of our research is to trace the mutual penetration of all the branches of power into the functions of one another, which has an impact on the powers of legislative bodies in the CIS countries and the way they perform their functions. Methods: apart from general scientific methods, we employed specific scientific methods, including comparative legal and systemic ones. Results: the study has shown that many ex-USSR countries tend to adopt so called rationalized parliamentarism, a system borrowed from the constitutional practice of France and some other foreign countries. There are noted two major trends in the CIS countries: the strengthening of the powers of heads of state in some countries and their weakening in others, which cannot but affect the structures and powers of the parliaments. In countries such as Kazakhstan, the powers of the parliament are expanding and the influence of the head of state on the formation of the parliament and its autonomous activities is reducing. However, in Belarus and Turkmenistan, an opposite trend has been observed. Conclusions: in some states, the methods mostly typical for the parliamentary practices of Anglo-Saxon countries are applied, namely the parliamentary shuttle method and pocket veto. Thus, parliamentarism in the CIS countries turned out to be open to adopting various legal institutions and norms that cannot be found within the framework of a single national legal system in other foreign countries. The article describes the structure of parliamentary immunity in the CIS and Baltic countries, including parliamentarians’ immunity and indemnity (non-responsibility and witness immunity as well as the right to remuneration).

Legislating the Landscape: The Battle for a Federal Wilderness Bill for Montana, 1979-1988

Federally owned lands in the western United States have long been a source of legal and political conflict. Clashes between development interests, environmentalists, legislators, and indigenous groups throughout the 1980s defined federal land policy in Montana as well. In 1988, after nearly a decade of effort, S.2751 – the Montana National Resources Protection and Utilization Act – was poised to designate over 7 million acres of federal land in Montana as wilderness, recreation areas, or for development,ending years of legal limbo. Despite broad support from both houses of Congress, President Reagan killed the bill with a pocket veto, and those lands remain undesignated today. This paper examines the political actors and processes behind S. 2751, and investigates the bill’s place in the changing political climate of 1980s American politics, particularly on issues of environment in the west.

Reviving the Pocket Veto in New York State

Reviving the Pocket Veto in New York State

The Historical Presidency: Growing Executive Power: The Strange Case of the “Protective Return” Pocket Veto

In his first three-plus years in office, President Barack Obama exercised the presidential power only twice. Both vetoes involved relatively minor legislative matters and received little public attention. That Obama would only two bills during this time is hardly unexceptional, as vetoes are uncommon when the president's political party also controls Congress (Spitzer 1988, 76-78; the Democrats controlled both houses in 2009-11, and the Senate in 2011-13). An observer would scarcely guess that these two otherwise obscure vetoes were but the most recent instances of an ongoing constitutional struggle over what some view as an executive power grab extending back five decades. Two Vetoes for the Price of One Obama's first was of a defense appropriations spending bill that duplicated another he had signed into law earlier that month. The vetoed bill was a stop-gap spending bill that became unnecessary when the regular annual Pentagon appropriations bill was passed in time. On December 30, 2009, during Congress's Christmas recess, the president announced that he was pocket vetoing H.J. Res 64. Yet in pocket vetoing the bill, he also did something that, under the terms of the pocket power described in the Constitution, is impossible: he returned the pocket vetoed bill the clerk of the House of Representatives. Obama (Woolley and Peters n.d.) explained his action in his message this way: To leave no doubt that the bill is being vetoed as unnecessary legislation, in addition withholding my signature, I am also returning H.J. Res. 64 the Clerk of the House of Representatives, along with this Memorandum of Disapproval. Despite the fact that Congress agreed with the substance of Obama's action--that is, the stop-gap spending bill was indeed unnecessary--the Democratic-controlled House nevertheless held a vote override the veto, in order demonstrate that it disagreed with Obama's tactic, dubbed a pocket veto. As fellow Democrat and Obama loyalist Rep. David Obey (WI) said, we do not consider it a pocket veto because the House had designated the clerk receive messages (as Obama noted in his message). An (unsuccessful) override vote was held, in Obey's (Grim 2010) words, to demonstrate that in our judgment a pocket is not appropriate, that the president exercised [an] irregular and it should be treated as such. And in a rare moment of bipartisanship, Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Republican Minority Leader John Boehner (Pelosi and Boehner 2010) signed a joint letter Obama objecting his use of this procedure. Obama's second veto, on October 8, 2010, was also a protective return pocket veto. This time, the garnered more public attention--although news reports were laced with inaccuracies (1)--as H.R. 3808 was a bill that would have allowed mortgage foreclosure documents be accepted across state lines. Obama opposed the bill on the grounds that the measure would make foreclosures too easy at a time when the home mortgage market and the economy were struggling revive. The portion of Obama's message explaining his method was identical that of his earlier message. Obama press spokesman Dan Pfeiffer (Pfeiffer 2010; see also Calmes 2010) offered this further explanation for Obama's action: The longstanding view of the Executive Branch is that a pocket is appropriate in circumstances such as these, where the House is in recess.... the House's recess prevents the President from returning it there.... To avoid any doubt, however, and in keeping with past practice, the President made a protective return of the bill the Clerk of the House of Representatives, so even if the House disagrees on the pocket issue, the House will treat the return of the bill with a statement of objections as a regular veto. Again, the House held an override vote (the was sustained) challenge the protective return procedure. …

The President and the Autopen: It is Unconstitutional for Someone or Something to Sign a Bill Outside of the President's Presence

On May 26, 2011, only hours before three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act were scheduled to expire, Congress passed an extension. For days, the White House had someone ready to fly to Europe with the legislation in hand for the President to sign, but Congress had been tardy. It seemed quite important to the White House that none of these provisions lapse for any length of time, even the relatively short time it would take to fly from Washington to France. With this urgency as a backdrop, the President was awakened at 5:45 a.m. Central European Time so he could authorize a first: phone a White House staffer in Washington, D.C., and instruct him to use an auto-pen to sign the bill. No President had ever had anyone else sign on his behalf, and certainly no President had ever ordered the use of an auto-pen to inscribe his signature on a bill when away from the White House. This Article explores multiple facets of the President’s use of a proxy signature to sign legislation. The state of the law surrounding proxy signatures has remained amazingly constant through both English and American history. The proxy and the principal must be present together when a proxy signature is utilized for a high-value transaction. This was the rock-solid law when the constitution was written.No one seems focused on the presence requirement: not the President, nor the Republican House members who complained to the President, nor the numerous legal commentators and scholars that we have heard from since the auto-pen signing occurred. The use of the auto-pen, itself unproblematic, seems to have eclipsed the more important issue of whether the president was present when it was used.By definition, if a non-presence proxy signature is affixed to a bill, then time is of the essence. When time is of the essence, the consequences of a voided signature are never greater. Since the President has roughly twelve days to sign a bill, a non-presence proxy signature could produce one of two unintended consequences. At best, it would produce a twelve-day period during which the new legislation would not be in effect. At worst, if Congress is not in session at the end of the twelve-day period, it would amount to a pocket veto. Neither case is consistent with well-ordered government.In sum, the President’s use of the auto-pen (or even a human being) to sign a bill outside of the President’s presence is unconstitutional. This establishes a dangerous precedent, one which every thinking lawyer in Washington politics seemed to have overlooked. Let the auto-pen episode not be a precedent for this or any other President to follow. The Constitution does not allow for shortcuts.

Growing Executive Power: The Strange Case of the 'Protective Return' Pocket Veto

Recent presidents have carved out a presidential power by asserted constitutional right allegedly adhering to the presidency in the form of the so-called protective pocket veto, by which presidents claim to pocket veto a bill - a circumstance where, by definition, bill return to Congress is not possible - yet proceed to do the impossible by returning the bill to Congress. This obscure yet portentous power grab 1) arose, ironically, from adverse court rulings and a repudiation of the procedure, 2) illustrates the accretion of presidential power by the claiming of constitutional (as opposed to Neustadtian political) powers by presidents, and 3) exemplifies the ability of presidents to autonomously define, consolidate, and expand power over time. This paper excavates and examines the genesis of this obscure power claim and argue that it is incompatible with that which can be gleaned from textual construction, original intent, court rulings, and separation of powers principles.

The Last One Hundred Days

A lame duck President might look at his authority to govern in the transition period as if it were large balloon with slow leak.... The balloon is ineluctably shrinking with each passing week.... By the end of the year, he will have the attention of the permanent government and can accomplish very little. --James Pfiffner (1996, 5) As his long goodbye in 2000-2001, Clinton was a whirling dervish of President who appointed judges, signed treaties, gave campaign-style speeches, issued scads of executive orders, rescinded ethics regulations he had penned in his first term, raised political money, gave dozens of interviews, granted 234 pardons and clemencies, fired an enemy from her government job, negotiated his own plea-bargain agreement, cast aspersions on his successor, installed crony as head of the Democratic Party, and gave an entire series of farewell addresses in which he essentially said he wasn't leaving at all. --Carl Cannon (2001, 274) A curious thing happens during the last one hundred days of presidential administration: political uncertainty shifts to political certitude. The president knows exactly who will succeed him--his policy positions, his legislative priorities, and the level of partisan support he will enjoy within the new Congress. And if the sitting president (or his party) the election, he has every reason to hurry through last-minute public policies, doing whatever possible to tie his successor's hands. Can he succeed? If James Pfiffner's quote above is any indication, prospects are dim. Defeated at the polls in November and guaranteed political retirement in January, an outgoing president has little ground upon which to advocate for his (someday her) policy agenda. During his final months in office, his public prestige and professional reputation--the ingredients of persuasion, and the purported foundations of presidential power--run empty. Members of Congress have little cause to do defeated president's bidding; and without them, presidents cannot hope to accomplish anything of consequence. As such, outgoing presidents have little choice but to recognize their plight, gather their belongings, and close the door on their administration. In our estimation, this misconstrues things. By ignoring important policy options outside of the legislative process, scholars have exaggerated the frailty of outgoing presidents and underestimated the influence they continue to wield. Presidential power does not reduce to bargaining, negotiating, and convincing members of Congress to do things that the president cannot accomplish on his own. Presidents can (and regularly do) act alone, setting public policy without having to rally Congress's attention, nor even its support (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). With executive orders, proclamations, executive agreements, national security directives, and memoranda, presidents have ample resources to effectuate policy changes that stand little chance of overcoming the collective action problems and multiple veto points that plague the legislative process. And having lost the attention of the permanent government, outgoing presidents have every reason to strike out on their own, set new policy, and leave it to the incoming administration to try and steer an alternative course. Examples of last-minute presidential actions abound. It was President John Adams's Midnight appointments, which Jefferson refused to honor, that prompted the landmark Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court decision. Grover created twenty-one-million-acre forest reserve to prevent logging, an act that led to an unsuccessful impeachment attempt and the passage of legislation annulling the action. Then, in response to the congressional uprising, Cleveland issued pocket veto and left (Combs 2001, 331). Jimmy Carter negotiated for the release of Americans held hostage in Tehran, implementing an agreement on his last day in office with ten separate executive orders, many of which sharply restricted the rights of private parties to sue the Iranian government for expropriation of their property. …

The Law: The “Protective Return” Pocket Veto: Presidential Aggrandizement of Constitutional Power

This article discusses the all‐but‐unknown practice of recent presidents to exercise a so‐called “protective return” veto, whereby presidents simultaneously exercise both a return veto and a pocket veto for individual bills. Defended by recent administrations as a defense of the existing pocket veto power, this article argues that it is in fact an attempt to create a practical absolute veto, a power rejected by the Constitution's founders. Veto history and evolution are examined to explain and analyze this effort to redefine the president's constitutional veto authority.

Constitutional conflicts between Congress and the President

Nearly three decades after its initial publication, Louis Fisher's durable classic remains at the head of its class - a book that Congressional Quarterly called close to being indispensable as anything published in this field. This newly revised and updated fifth edition emphatically reinforces that sterling reputation. Fisher dissects the crucial constitutional disputes between the executive and legislative branches of government from the Constitutional Convention through President Clinton's impeachment battles to the recent controversies over President Bush's conduct as commander in chief. He ventures beyond traditional discussions of Supreme Court decisions to examine the day-to-day working relationships between the president and Congress. To scholars, this book offers a comprehensive examination of the institutions and issues of public law. For practitioners, general readers, and students of American government, it demonstrates how constitutional issues shape and define current events. New material in this edition includes: post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; military tribunals and NSA eavesdropping; Kosovo war in 1999; impeachment of President Clinton; termination of ABM treaty; controversies over appointments and removals; disputes over executive orders and proclamations; presidential signing statements; developments with item veto and pocket veto; public access to intelligence budgets; FBI search warrant of congressman's office; state secrets privilege; and, presidential and vice-presidential immunity.

The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality

The general constitutional authority of the President to veto legislation passed by Congress has recently received renewed scholarly attention. However, few studies have focused on the pocket veto—the power to negate proposed laws sent for approval without the possibility of reconsideration—and its ramifications for presidential effectiveness. This research comprehensively investigates the creation, development, and employment of the pocket veto. First, this article will trace the history of this form of executive prerogative from colonial times through its establishment in the Constitution. Second, it will review the use of the pocket veto in the nineteenth century. Third, it will undertake a seminal empirical probe of influences on public-bill pocket-veto frequency from 1889 to 1989. Fourth, I will delineate congressional and court challenges to the use of this executive device. In the final section, I will assess the consequences of heightened consternation over pocket-veto use.

Ins v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto

Previous articleNext article No AccessIns v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative VetoE. Donald ElliottE. Donald Elliott Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Supreme Court Review Volume 19831983 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/scr.1983.3109476 Views: 37Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1984 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov Temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance: An empirical study, Regulation & Governance 12, no.22 (May 2017): 192–219.https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12148Jasmine Farrier The Contemporary Presidency : Judicial Restraint and the New War Powers, Presidential Studies Quarterly 46, no.22 (May 2016): 387–410.https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12275Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Paul M. Collins Presidential Rhetoric and Supreme Court Decisions, Presidential Studies Quarterly 45, no.44 (Oct 2015): 633–652.https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12222Michael Kaeding, Kevin M. Stack Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice of Legislative Vetoes in the European Union, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no.66 (May 2015): 1268–1284.https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12252Andrew Coan, Nicholas Bullard Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2558177ROBERT J. SPITZER The Historical Presidency: Growing Executive Power: The Strange Case of the “Protective Return” Pocket Veto, Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no.33 (Jul 2012): 637–655.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03996.xKEVIN A. EVANS The Historical Presidency: Looking before Watergate: Foundations in the Development of the Constitutional Challenges within Signing Statements, FDR-Nixon, Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no.22 (Apr 2012): 390–405.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03972.x

The Shortage of Nurses in the United States

tions for the future. The question of the nation's supply of nurses has been widely discussed since World War II. Initial governmental intervention to encourage expansion of the nursing supply occurred in mental health in 1946 and in general nurse training in the mid-195os. The Health Professions Education Assistance Act of 1963 was a major step by the federal government to commit funds to health professions training. This act was the result of numerous studies conducted in the late 1940S and 1950S stressing the inadequate supply of health manpower. Following the report of the Surgeon General's Consultant Group on Nursing, which recommended increased support to nursing education, the Nurse Training Act of 1964 was passed. During the subsequent decade, a significant increase in both the nation's supply of nurses and in nurses' educational preparation occurred. From 1971 to the present the question of federal support to nursing has been debated in the executive and legislative branches of government. The Nixon administration's attempt to impound nursing appropriations was followed by President Ford's pocket veto of the Nurse Training Act, followed again by President Carter's pocket veto in 1978 and his proposal to rescind monies already approved. In early 1980 President Carter and his

Congress, the President, and the Pocket Veto

Congress, the President, and the Pocket Veto

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 24Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 841–862.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.xDean Keith Simonton Presidential Inflexibility and Veto Behavior: Two Individual-Situational Interactions, Journal of Personality 55, no.11 (Mar 1987): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00425.xDean Keith Simonton The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?, Political Behavior 7, no.11 (Jan 1985): 79–99.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987263 Gary W. Copeland When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, The Journal of Politics 45, no.33 (Oct 2015): 696–710.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130711

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 28Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. 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The Executive Veto in Arizona: Its Use and Limitations

HE MOST WIDELY discussed weapon in the legislative arsenal of the governor is the executive veto. The veto is actually not a native American practice, but rather is one passed down through the centuries from various contributors in Western civilization. The veto accompanied the transplant of the royal governor to this country, and it became his most resented tool of authority. When the constitutions of the new states were drafted, only Massachusetts and South Carolina conferred the veto power upon the governor. States soon started changing their negative attitude toward their chief executives, however, and by 1815 over half the states had restored the veto power to their governors.' During the nineteenth century the balance of power, originally so weighted in favor of the legislature, began to shift. By the turn of the century virtually all state governors possessed the veto. Today North Carolina is the only state withholding this power from the governor. The executive veto was originally intended as a safeguard against legislative encroachment on the executive. The trend in the twentieth century has been to strengthen this tool and redesign it to achieve positive purposes. The states of Alabama, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia for example, allow the governor not only the veto, but also the power of amendment. These amendments are then resubmitted for legislative concurrence.2 One-quarter of the states provide the governor a pocket veto, whereby a bill fails to become law if the governor does not sign it before a specified time has elapsed after the adjournment of the legislature. The legislative vote necessary to override the governor's veto varies from state to state. Requirements range from a simple majority to a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of each house. Most states follow the national pattern, which calls for a two-thirds vote of the members present and voting in each house. By the time Arizona's constitution was written in 1911, it was taken for granted that the governor should possess the veto. The executive article was patterned after those found in the constitutions of California, Oregon, and Wisconsin, each of which included a veto provision. Also, Arizonans were accustomed to the veto, since the territorial governor had been allowed this power since 1863. Arizona has been classified as a state having a strong executive veto. This classification is based in part on the time-leniency granted the governor to consider

Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction (review)

Book Reviews455 manned a cannon and displayed such valor in die face of danger that he became the youngest Congressional Medal of Honor recipient in die nation's history. Yet, the artillery arm was continually hampered by a lack of high-ranking officers. Moreover, denied independence of action and placed under die control of infantry officers who knew little and cared less for the problems of cannon dispositions, Federal cannon werenever used to full effect until Gettysburg . But, ironically, gunners never again had die opportunity to flex their muscles as fully, for die struggle in Pennsylvania marked die end of fighting in open country; thenceforth, cannon were used sparingly in die Wilderness campaign and as siege pieces before Petersburg and in neither instance were able to develop their full firepower. In a work as detailed as diis, it is almost natural that a few proofreading slips would and do exist. On page 73 die text is repeated almost verbatim in die accompanying footnote, and die closing paragraph of die book is a repetition of material found on page 135. Illustrations of die various types of cannon, as well as of some of die outstanding gunners in die Eastern army, would have greatiy enhanced die book. But die work is a first-rate product of scholarship and writing, and it jusdy belongs on die shelf of every student who follows die army of McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade. James I. Robertson, Jr. State University of Iowa Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction. By William B. Hesseltine. (Tuscaloosa , Alabama: Confederate Publishing Co., 1960. Pp. 154. $4.00.) this fine little paperback volume is No. 13 of die Confederate Centennial Studies under die editorship of William Stanley Hoole. All of diese monographs are issued in a limited edition of 450 copies, and collectors should place dieir orders quickly. The address is P.O. Box Southside 9067, Tuscaloosa , Alabama. Twenty tides are scheduled for publication in this series. Dr. Hesseltine, professor of history at die University of Wisconsin, prepared Uns study from die lectures which he delivered at Memphis State University. He asks the question: "If Lincoln had lived to complete his second term," would Reconstruction have been different in the defeated Soudiern states? In partial answer Professor Hesseltine remarks diat Reconstruction "might indeed have been different had Lincoln lived," but one must look at Lincoln's plans of Reconstruction which were already operating (or had operated) before his tragic assassination in 1865. Lincoln's first attempts took place in the border states and were political in nature; he tried to keep diese regions loyal by appointing Union men to office. The President was somewhat successful in diis venture. Then, on December 8, 1863, he proclaimed his Amnesty and Reconstruction policy. If 10 per cent of those voting in 1860 would take die oadi of allegiance, loyal governments could be established by election. Louisiana, already controlled 456civil war history by Federal forces, held elections and chose Michael Hahn as governor. But this plan was not much of a success in eiuSer Louisiana or Arkansas, and Congress quickly developed its own scheme. The Wade-Davis Bill was promulgated and finally passed by bodi houses. It declared, among odier tilings, diat Reconstruction could not begin until armed resistance and rebellion had ended. And Congress was to be die agency to preside over die various steps. Naturally, Lincoln resented diis slap by die "Radicals"—who disagreed diat die President was die one to administer Reconstruction—and refused to sign die bill Wade and Davis issued a manifesto against Lincoln's "pocket veto" of dieir measure, but by utilizing die soldiers' votes, Lincoln's government in die North was re-elected by a slim majority of USe popular votes in 1864. WiuSin a few weeks before die war's end, Lincoln seems to have revised again his plans for Reconstruction. He counseled Grant, Sherman, and Porter to give conciliation and forgiveness to the Rebels. He hinted diat legislatures in die SoutiSem states might be allowed to continue tiSeir operations if diey swore fealty to the Union. Aldiough his several plans for Reconstruction never worked on a large scale, Lincoln remolded die United States into a stronger federal system...

The Veto Record of Franklin D. Roosevelt

In two administrations over a period of approximately eight years, President Franklin D. Roosevelt has established a record in his exercise of the veto power—not a record in quantity of measures disapproved, but a record in the wide range of subjects drawing his attention and his adverse action. President Cleveland, in his two non-consecutive administrations, retains the record for total number of measures disapproved, although President Roosevelt has run ahead of him in the use of the pocket veto. It should be noted, however, that most of the Cleveland vetoes were applied to individual pension or military relief bills. The practice of Congress in more recent administrations has been to combine pension and relief measures into one omnibus bill, to be consistently, although not always successfully, disapproved by successive presidents.

Approval of Bills after Adjournment of Congress

The constitutional clause governing the approval of bills after the adjournment of Congress is as follows: “If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.” The power of the President to sign after adjournment was not specifically established until 1932, in the case of Edwards v. United States (286 U. S. 482), and the failure of a bill unless signed within ten days after adjournment was not finally passed upon until 1929, in the Pocket Veto Case (279 U. S. 655).