Set Of Players Research Articles

The nursing ethnographic research into complex societies

Introduction: Multicultural societies of the postmodern world are characterized by the complexity of their structure, organization, and operation. In such societies, there is a heterogeneous set of social players who experience a variety of phenomena in their daily lives in cities. Within this context, nursing care has developed and nurses in recent years have turned to ethnography as a tool in understanding socio-cultural reality and experience from the perspective of those living these experiences. This is a theoretical study seeking to reflect upon the application of an ethnographic approach in Brazilian nursing research in complex societies.Ethnography in Brazilian nursing research in complex societies: Brazilian nurses have appropriated the methodological tools and theories of nursing and anthropological studies to investigate the experiences and meanings attributed to health-disease process, cultural influence on health-related behaviors, as well as to evaluate and manage work processes. Further studies are emphasized to attempt to theorize and reflect upon the methodological construction of this research. This move highlights a shift in focus on nursing research and practice for a more integrative and complex view of human beings and reality. Ethnography helps us learn about a given reality and, as a result, we obtain new insights for understanding the phenomena.Reflection: It is considered that anthropological knowledge extends the nurses’ views on the subject about which they devote their practice, refining it. Being closer to the lives and experience of subjects, permits the perception of phenomena from the perspective of the players involved, offering professionals a different view on the needs and outcomes of nursing care.

Distributed GNE Seeking under Global-Decision and Partial-Decision Information over Douglas-Rachford Splitting Method

This paper develops an algorithm for solving the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) in non-cooperative games. The problem involves a set of players, each with a cost function that depends on their own decision as well as the decisions of other players. The goal is to find a decision vector that minimizes the cost for each player. Unlike most of the existing algorithms for GNEP, which require full information exchange among all players, this paper considers a more realistic scenario where players can only communicate with a subset of players through a connectivity graph. The proposed algorithm enables each player to estimate the decisions of other players and update their own and others’ estimates through local communication with their neighbors. By introducing a network Lagrangian function and applying the Douglas-Rachford splitting method (DR), the GNEP is reformulated as a zero-finding problem. It is shown that the DR method can find the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the original problem under some mild conditions.

Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability Mapping for Analyzing Topology Design of Communication Networks

The goal of game theory is to model actions among players or users in a common space who deal with various situations and face various outcomes. The study of game theory is widely applied to a wide range of economic fields, including auctions, renewable energy, wireless sensor networks, and software defined networks. Resource allocation and cooperation between networks or terminals are important in the field of game theory networking. In order to infer concrete solutions for the players, game formulas are used. A solution is determined by classifying players and calculating the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) in order to determine Nash equilibrium and evaluate efficiency. Using the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layer as a lens, this study examines a variety of applications of game theory in non-cooperative environments and communication systems. This study focuses on the 'presence of governing' or participation nodes in a set of players in a network. Also, a comparison of different research fields in game theory is made.

Values of games over Boolean player sets

In this paper, we study new classes of value operators for coalitional games with players organized into a boolean algebra. Coalitional games are cooperative models in which players can form coalitions to maximize profit. The basic solution concepts in such game scenarios are value operators, which assign a unique real value to every player, reflecting thus selected principles of economic rationality. Some value concepts were extended beyond the classic coalitional model where every coalition of players can form. In particular, the extension of Shapley value exists for coalitional games in which players are partially ordered, and the feasible coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. Interestingly, this game-theoretic framework was employed in the method called Information Attribution. This method aims to solve the information decomposition problem, which asks for a particular additive decomposition of the mutual information between the input and target random variables. In such information-theoretic games, the players are predictors, and their set has the natural structure of a boolean algebra. Motivated by the original problem, we consider coalitional games where the players form a boolean algebra, and the coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. This more general approach enables us to study various value solution concepts in detail. Namely, we focus on the classes of values that can represent alternatives to the solution of the information decomposition problem, such as random-order values or sharing values. We extend the axiomatic characterization of some classes of values that were known only for the standard coalitional games.

Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set

Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set

On opportunities to achieve market equilibrium in the global oil market

Subject. The global oil market has experienced qualitative changes caused by the introduction of non-market methods into its regulation system, like the use of embargo, setting a price ceiling, stiffening sanctions. These changes require new approaches to studying the oil market and identifying the opportunities for its development. Objectives. The study aims to develop tools enabling to analyze the latest trends in the market transformation and identify possible ways of its development, to determine stable market conditions, and analyze possibilities of achieving market equilibrium. Methods. The main method of research is mathematical modeling. The methodology involves typification of object, taking into account its latest changes, building an appropriate research model, and verifying its adequacy by applying to the analysis of previous stages of market development. Results. I constructed a game model reflecting the main features of the oligopolistic market of goods with saturated demand. The model helped determine the main features of possible stable agreements in the oil market. The paper establishes the correspondence of the results of model experiments and real stable conditions of the world market. Conclusions. The model is suitable to examine the current state of the world oil market. The study of recent non-market methods is possible by including consumer countries in the set of players in the model.

$$\varepsilon $$-Nash Equilibria of a Multi-player Nonzero-Sum Dynkin Game in Discrete Time

We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ( $$N\ge 2$$ ) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $$\varepsilon $$ -Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a constructive algorithm. One of the main features is that the payoffs of the players depend on the set of players that stop at the termination stage which is the minimal stage in which at least one player stops. The existence result is extended to the case of a nonzero-sum game with finite horizon. Finally, the algorithm is illustrated by two explicit examples in the specific case of finite horizon.

Upscaling agroforestry in the tropics through actor-networks: a comparative case study of cacao farming systems in two regions of Colombia

Agroforestry systems (AFS) upscaling has the potential to integrate sustainability and resilience objectives into agriculture. However, this is a daunting task requiring multi-actor collaboration across public and private sectors at multiple governance levels, coupled with innovative approaches to jointly managing AFS knowledge. Understanding such multi-actor interactions from a network perspective may help to unravel how social structures, created by relational patterns enhance or hinder AFS upscaling. Our paper aims to comparatively explore the role of regional actor-networks on AFS upscaling for a selected farming system. By conducting semi-structured interviews, we collected information about the ties of 86 actors supporting cacao agroforestry systems (CAFS) across two regions of Colombia. We use social network analysis (SNA) to comparatively visualize and understand the general structure of these networks, find relational patterns between the diverse categories of actors involved, and identify a set of key players bridging the majority of the actors within these networks. We find highly centralized networks that connect multiple actors by a low number of mostly non-reciprocal ties. Within these networks, we identify a predominance of bridging ties over bonding ties, homophily patterns among research and education institutions, and heterophily configurations among farmer-based organizations. We also find that the composition of the sets of key actors and the platforms where they converge varies substantially from region to region due to decentralized agricultural policies and differing characteristics across regions. Our approach provides key entry points for promoting multi-actor coalitions that can effectively expand the benefits of AFS in tropical agricultural systems.

The Negro Leagues Newly Incorporated into Major League Baseball: An Examination of Their Strength and an Evaluation of the Unification

The Negro Leagues Newly Incorporated into Major League BaseballAn Examination of Their Strength and an Evaluation of the Unification William Wise (bio) 1. introduction In December 2020 Major League Baseball (MLB) acknowledged that seven of the Negro Leagues were, indeed, major leagues. The seven specific leagues and their active years are as follows: 1. Negro National League I (NNLI) 1920– 31 2. Eastern Colored League (ECL) 1923– 28 3. American Negro League (ANL) 1929 4. Negro Southern League (NSL) 1932 season 5. Negro East- West League (NEWL) 1932 6. Negro National League II (NNLII) 1933– 48 7. Negro American League (NAL) 1937– 48 This study explores the strength of the Negro Leagues incorporated into MLB versus that of the National League (NL) and the American League (AL). To this end two methods are employed: (1) a statistical comparison of eleven seasons between the two sets of leagues and (2) an examination of one hundred and three specific games played between teams from the two sets of leagues. Though nonnumeric evidence is scrutinized the aforementioned points show that Negro Leagues were justifiably incorporated into MLB. 2. a multiyear statistical comparison of negro leagues versus the national league and the american league Based on the idea of Puerzer (2020)1 this section compares the overall records of the Negro Leagues that played between 1920 and 1948 to the National League [End Page 60] (NL) and the American League (AL).2,3 Statistics are pulled from eleven of the most significant seasons of Negro League Baseball between the years of 1920 and 1948. The years examined in the study are 1920, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1929, 1932, 1937, 1938, 1943, and 1947. The years 1920 and 1932 have significant data for them, so high- level “independent” teams are also included in the analyses. 2.1 Batting Statistics Nineteen twenty- four is the first season explored without considering independent teams. The Seamheads website has statistics for 967 games played by teams in the Negro National League I (NNLI) and the Eastern Colored League (ECL), which is 39.3 percent of the total number of the 2,462 NL and AL games played that season. Following Puerzer (2020) the batting averages (BAs) of the players with at least forty plate appearances are first inspected. In the NNLI and ECL in 1924 there were a total of 217 such players while in the NL and AL the total was 328 players.4 For the 217 NNLI/ECL players the average BA was .262875, and the equivalent average for the NL/AL was .263649. The standard deviations (SDs), a measure of the spread of the data, of the two sets of BAs are 0.058566 and 0.057854, respectively. The t-distribution is used to compare the two BA averages. See the appendix for a short description of statistical tests and those used in this paper. Welch’s t-test results conclude that there is no significant difference (at a 10 percent level) between the two averages of BAs. Another way of thinking of the outcome is that if one decides that there is a difference between the two BA averages there is a greater than 10 percent chance of being wrong.5 Thus the conclusion is that there is no such difference. See tables 1 and 2 for the results for all years and tests performed for batting statistics. To further compare the NNLI and ECL with the NL and AL the slugging percentages (SLGs) for the 217 and 328 players are investigated next. The averages of the two sets of SLGs are .353521 and .354217, respectively, whereas the two SDs are 0.108773 and 0.100458, respectively. As with the BAs, the outcome of Welch’s t-test shows there is no significant difference (at a 10 percent level) between the two averages of SLGs. The t-distribution is not the only statistical test that can be utilized. A two- tailed Z-test can be employed to compare BAs because they are proportions. For this test, rather than the average of the 217 and 328 BAs, the test considers the total overall BA of each set of players. For the 217 players in the...

Properties of Solutions for Games on Union-Closed Systems

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature, various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found where, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper, we consider games on a union-closed system where the set of feasible coalitions is closed under the union, i.e., for any two feasible coalitions also, their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, and the prekernel) are discussed for games on a union-closed system.

Clustering of variables methods and measurement models for soccer players’ performances

In sports, studying player performances is a key issue since it provides a guideline for strategic choices and helps teams in the complex procedure of buying and selling of players. In this paper we aim at investigating the ability of various composite indicators to define a measurement structure for the global soccer performance. We rely on data provided by the EA Sports experts, who are the ultimate authority on soccer performance measurement: they periodically produce a set of players’ attributes that make up the broader, theoretical performance dimensions. Considering the potential of clustering techniques to confirm or disconfirm the experts’ assumptions in terms of aggregations between indicators, 29 players’ performance attributes or variables (from the FIFA19 version of the videogame, that is, sofifa) have been considered and processed with three different techniques: the Cluster of variables around latent variables (CLV), the Principal covariates regression (PCovR) and Bayesian model-based clustering (B-MBC). The three procedures yielded clusters that differed from experts’ classification. In order to identify the most appropriate measurement structure, the resulting clusters have been embedded into Structural equation models with partial least squares (PLS-SEMs) with a Higher-Order Component (that is, the overall soccer performance). The statistically derived composite indicators have been compared with those of experts’ classification. Results support the concurrent validity of composite indicators derived through the statistical methods: overall, they show that, in the lack of expert judgement, composite indicators, as well as the resulting PLS-SEM models, are a viable alternative given their greater correlation to players’ economic value and salary.

CNKSR2, a downstream mediator of retinoic acid signaling, modulates the Ras/Raf/MEK pathway to regulate patterning and invagination of the chick forebrain roof plate.

During embryonic development, the forebrain roof plate undergoes invagination, leading to separation of the cerebral hemispheres. Any defects in this process, in humans, lead to middle interhemispheric holoprosencephaly (MIH-HPE). In this study, we have identified a previously unreported downstream mediator of retinoic acid (RA) signaling, CNKSR2, which is expressed in the forebrain roof plate in the chick embryo. Knockdown of CNKSR2 affects invagination, cell proliferation and patterning of the roof plate, similar to the phenotypes observed upon inhibition of RA signaling. We further demonstrate that CNKSR2 functions by modulating the Ras/Raf/MEK signaling. This appears to be crucial for patterning of the forebrain roof plate and its subsequent invagination, leading to the formation of the cerebral hemispheres. Thus, a set of novel molecular players have been identified that regulate the morphogenesis of the avian forebrain.

Democratizing corruption: a role structure analysis of Indonesia’s “Big Bang” decentralization

The study investigates to what degree Indonesia’s large-scale decentralization and democratization changed corruption networks. A role structure approach is developed to move current analysis of dyad-level structures to the network level. This approach is empirically tested by comparing the relational content and third-party structures of 96 corruption networks operating in the first phase of decentralization (2001–2004), characterized by a powerful local council, with 94 corruption networks detected in the second phase (2005–2013), when direct local elections were introduced, and the power of the local council declined. Building on Fiske’s relational model theory, it is argued and found that the local executive’s reduced dependence on the local council provided the opportunity to initiate corrupt exchanges with a broader set of players both inside and outside the bureaucracy. Whereas deep dependence power relations (i.e. formal authority) remained important, an increasing proportion of corruption networks involved compound role structures characterized by both shallow (non-embedded profit and work relations) and deep interdependence (kin- and friendship). Furthermore, third party intermediaries became more important. Implications for the study of networks of corruption are discussed.

On Stackelberg equilibrium in the sense of program strategies in Volterra functional operator games

For a nonlinear Volterra functional operator equation controlled by two players with the help of finite dimensional program controls with integral objective functionals we prove existence of Stackelberg equilibrium (in the style of M.S.Nikol'skiy). On this way we use our formerly proved results on continuous dependence of the state and functionals on finite dimensional controls and also classical Weierstrass theorem. The property of being singleton for the minimizer set of the first player is proved by the scheme of M.S. Nikol'skiy applied earlier for a linear ordinary differential equation.

Partially constrained group variable selection to adjust for complementary unit performance in American college football

Given the importance of accurate team rankings in American college football (CFB) – due to heavy title and playoff implications – strides have been made to improve metrics for team performance evaluation, going from basic averages (e.g. points scored per game) to metrics that adjust for a team's strength of schedule, but one aspect that's yet to be accounted for is the ability of team's offense and defense to complement one another, termed ‘complementary football’. American football is unique because the same team's offensive and defensive units typically consist of separate player sets that don't share the field simultaneously, which tempts one to evaluate them independently. Yet, some aspects of your team's defensive (offensive) performance may directly impact the complementary unit, e.g. turnovers forced by your defense could lead to easier scoring chances for your offense. Our main goal is to identify the most consistently influential features of complementary football in a data-driven way, subsequently adjusting each team's offensive (defensive) performance for that of their complementary unit. To achieve that, for the 2009–2019 CFB seasons, we incorporate natural splines with group penalty approaches, conducting partially constrained optimization to guarantee the full adjustment for the strength of schedule and home-field factor.

A multiplayer multiteam nonlocal game for the toric code

Nonlocal games yield an unusual perspective on entangled quantum states. The defining property of such games is that a set of players in joint possession of an entangled state can win the game with higher probability than is allowed by classical physics. Here we construct a nonlocal game that can be won with certainty by $2N$ players if they have access to the ground state of the toric code on as many qubits. By contrast, the game cannot be won by classical players more than half the time in the large $N$ limit. Our game differs from previous examples because it arranges the players on a lattice and allows them to carry out quantum operations in teams, whose composition is dynamically specified. This is natural when seeking to characterize the degree of quantumness of nontrivial many-body states, which potentially include states in much more varied phases of matter than the toric code. We present generalizations of the toric code game to states with ${\mathbb{Z}}_{M}$ topological order.

Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core

In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus created. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. Hence the core, which coincides with the set of stable payoffs, may be empty. We introduce the idea of tradewise-stable (t-stable) outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where all trades are stable; that is, no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We propose the set of constrained-optimal (optimal) t-stable outcomes, the set of the maximal elements of the set of t-stable outcomes, as a natural solution concept for this game. We prove that this set is non-empty, it coincides with the set of stable outcomes when the core is non-empty, and it satisfies similar properties to the set of stable outcomes even when the core is empty. We propose a partnership formation process that starts with the outcome where every player stands alone, goes through steps where the set of active players expands, always forming t-stable outcomes, and ends in an (in any) optimal t-stable outcome. Finally, we also use the new concept to establish conditions under which the core is non-empty.

A Game Theoretical Chassis Domain Approach to Trajectory Tracking for Automated Vehicles

Trajectory tracking which is performed by multiple chassis actuators remains a significant-yet-challenging issue in automated vehicles. The high nonlinearity of chassis dynamics and multi-actuator integrated control underlying this task is intractable, and this paper aims to address this crucial issue. We propose a chassis domain method of trajectory tracking based on the game-theoretical paradigm for automated vehicles. Unlike most prevailing studies which mainly focused on lateral control for path tracking, the proposed approach develops a unified control architecture to provide optimal tracking commands to longitudinal and lateral dynamic motions. Global chassis execution with fully adjustable chassis actuators called chassis domain control in this paper has dramatic potential to handle complex mobility situations in an efficient and flexible manner. This work develops a game-theoretical chassis domain approach to track both longitudinal and lateral trajectory profiles. The approach defines all chassis actuators as a set of players with associated objectives. Then it formulates a game-theoretical optimal problem to optimize multiple objectives including longitudinal tracking, lateral tracking, and vehicle handling dynamics. Various experimental tests are carried out, and the results suggest the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed chassis domain approach.

Improving supply quality in distribution power networks: A game-theoretic planning approach

Electric companies need to plan carefully the updates in their distribution power networks, assessing not only the expected impact on supply quality indicators, but also the cost of the different possibilities considered. To this end, we propose a planning method to improve the quality of supply in distribution power networks by upgrading devices so that they can be remotely operated. In the first place, our method identifies the lines with the lowest performance in an area of interest. Then, in each of these lines, the set of devices that can be upgraded is used to define the set of players of a cooperative game whose characteristic function provides a measure of the expected performance and economic impact of the updates in the infrastructure. Finally, the best locations to install remote control devices are determined by computing the Shapley value of this cooperative game, which, in addition, offers very valuable insight regarding each location considered. A case study based on a real substation in Spain is used to illustrate our approach and compare its performance with respect to the greedy-based method. • Design of a planning method to improve supply quality in distribution power networks. • Performance analysis of distribution lines based on a Spanish reliability index. • Use of game theory to find a trade-off between supply continuity and network updates. • Selection of the best locations to upgrade devices in the worst performance lines. • Assessment by a Spanish substation case study, outperforming greedy-based methods.

On ambiguity-averse market equilibrium

We develop a Nash equilibrium problem representing a perfectly competitive market wherein all players are subject to the same source of uncertainty with an unknown probability distribution. Each player—depending on her individual access to and confidence over empirical data—builds an ambiguity set containing a family of potential probability distributions describing the uncertain event. The ambiguity set of different players is not necessarily identical, yielding a market with potentially heterogeneous ambiguity aversion. Built upon recent developments in the field of Wasserstein distributionally robust chance-constrained optimization, each ambiguity-averse player maximizes her own expected payoff under the worst-case probability distribution within her ambiguity set. Using an affine policy and a conditional value-at-risk approximation of chance constraints, we define a tractable Nash game. We prove that under certain conditions a unique Nash equilibrium point exists, which coincides with the solution of a single optimization problem. Numerical results indicate that players with comparatively lower consumption utility are highly exposed to rival ambiguity aversion.