PiS Government Research Articles

MPS from the West Pomeranian Province on Polish migration policy. Analysis based on submitted interpellations in the 9th term of the Parliament of the Republic of Poland

The statutory right of a deputy to submit interpellations is provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Polish Parliament as well as in the Act on the Exercise of the Mandate of a Depute and Senator. The aim of the paper is to analyse Poland’s migration policy in 2019–2023 in the context of interpellations submitted by MPs. In substance, they covered three areas of migration policy: the creeping refugee crisis in the EU and its consequences for Poland, the conflict on the external border of the European Union, which is the Polish-Belarusian border, and Russian aggression against Ukraine and the resulting mass presence of Ukrainians as war refugees in Poland. The analysis showed that in the period in question, Poland does not have a comprehensive migration strategy. In situations of inflow of large numbers of foreigners, decisions of the Polish government are made ad hoc and confirm the thesis that the PiS government is unable to cope with new migration challenges. The source basis of the analysis are interpellations submitted by MPs from the West Pomeranian Province addressed to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration and the Minister of Education and Science. They are supplemented by laws and extensive literature on the subject.

Acting Alone Together: Reconfiguration of the Pro-Migrant and Refugee Activists’ Arena in Poland

The sphere of grassroots and civil activism became highly politicized before the 2015 elections. The introduction of the new policies has resulted in higher levels of mobilizations, both supporting and resisting the new policies of the PiS government. For instance, Poland has switched from a country with the highest acceptance rate for refugees in the EU to the one with the lowest rate within around a year sparking a number of anti-migrant and anti-refugee mobilizations and at the same time fueled the growth of initiatives opposing the trend. The narrative about masses of refugees in Poland and at its borders threatening various aspects of Polish culture, civilization, and identity started to keep heat in the bed and have provoked numerous intended and unintended consequences, political and social, so as further campaigns against LGBT community. In this paper I reflect on the development of the anti-fascist and anti-racist movements in Poland in the face of structural changes that are a result of the political shift initiated in 2015.

Law and Justice and its allies: Clientelistic links in Poland after 2015

Linkages between political parties and society have been considered weak from the very beginning of the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Poland. One result has been the employment of clientelistic strategies by political parties across the region. Clientelism in Polish politics has been present for three decades, however, the way it manifests itself today varies significantly from how it appeared in the past in terms of its scale but also because it has “thickened” by incorporating Catholic, national, and patriotic symbols. Furthermore, the number of contracting parties is not limited to the patron (PiS) and their clients (voters); a crucial role seems to be played by the organisations supported financially by the PiS government whose task may be to entice citizens to vote for the party. It can be argued that the financial standing of these organisations was built with support from the state budget and that their operations are highly dependent on these resources. We conclude that PiS has created a clientelistic machine formed by populist, nationalist, and religious ideological discourses.

The varying effect of court-curbing: evidence from Hungary and Poland

ABSTRACT With the rise of populism, we frequently witness how elected governments try to limit judicial power by using different means. Comparing the court-curbing policies used by the Fidesz government in Hungary and the PiS government in Poland, this study has two objectives. First, it aims to explain whether different court-curbing policies effect judicial independence differently. Using synthetic control method, I find that the predominant use of informal court-curbing policies erodes judicial independence much more extensively compared to the predominant use of formal court-curbing policies. The second objective is to provide and empirically test the causal explanation for this effect. I argue that when the incumbent tries to weaken the judiciary mostly through informal court-curbing, this might instigate public discontent and jeopardize the judiciary's legitimacy in the short run. However, when the government tries to restructure the judiciary via constitutional reforms, the legitimacy of the ‘new’ judicial system might not be questioned by the public. Supporting these hypotheses, the empirical results show that while the court-curbing attempts of the PiS government reduced public confidence in the judiciary by almost 15 percent, we do not see a significant decline in the Hungarian case where mostly formal court-curbing was used.

Niemieckie reparacje wojenne za II wojnę światową (polskie kontrowersje)

German war reparations were imposed arbitrarily by the victorious powers, because no peace conference was convened. They were estimated at $20 million at the 1938 exchange rate, half of which went to the USSR (the Polish People’s Republic was to receive 15% of its pool). In addition, they were imported by the great powers themselves. Western powers abandoned their importation in the late 1940s, and the USSR, including the Polish People’s Republic, abandoned it in 1953. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the four superpowers signed the so-called the two plus four agreement in 1990 considered the end of World War II. Poland received only part of the reparations due to it as part of Russian reparations. And so far, financial compensation from the Federal Republic of Germany has not satisfied her. During the PiS government, President Jarosław Kaczyński considered demands for such reparations to be a political issue aimed at weakening the international position of Germany, including the EU, and for his own election campaigns.

Enforcing the Rule of Law in the EU: The Case of Poland and Hungary

The Commission’s 2022 Report on the Rule of Law highlights serious concerns about the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, particularly in Poland and Hungary. The ongoing consolidation of illiberal democracies in these countries has led not only to a stagnation but also to an erosion of the fundamental principles of the rule of law. In Poland, the ruling PiS government’s judicial reforms have sparked controversy and pose a threat to the rule of law. Forced retirements, disciplinary proceedings and political appointments of judges have exposed the judiciary to legislative and governmental control. The decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to declare EU primary law unconstitutional testifies to the Polish institutions’ departure from the common values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU. The Union’s regular control and sanction mechanisms have proved inadequate in the face of this crisis. Budgetary sanctions, such as those applied to Hungary under the Conditionality Regulation to protect the EU budget and to Poland and Hungary by withholding funds under the Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, provide a means of pressuring those countries to halt further erosion of the fundamental guarantees and institutions of the rule of law. However, given the systemic deficits evident in both countries, doubts remain about the effectiveness of such measures.

Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism

Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism

Poland’s Foreign Policy Under the Rule of the Law and Justice Party

Poland was the first country in Central Europe to start dismantling the political system of ‘real socialism’ in 1989 and has become a pioneer of democratic and market reforms. After 10 years it was admitted to NATO and after 15 years to the European Union. Then, gradually, populism, nationalism and Euro-skepticism began to grow in Poland, which was evident in the years 2005-2007, during the first edition of rules of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party. After the next eight years of the pragmatic approach of the Polish governments towards European integration, the PiS assumed full power in the country in 2015. The new president and the PiS government began systematic changes in domestic and foreign policy. Populism, illiberalism and authoritarianism began dominating in Polish internal politics, and nationalism and Euro-skepticism in foreign policy. The most important new phenomena in the foreign policy of the PiS government are: (a) the bi-lateralization and militarization of security policy based on the strategic partnership with the US; (b) Euroskepticism: anti-Brussels posturing and disputes with Germany and France; (c) Poland’s nationalistic and great-power approach to Russia; and (d) Three Seas Initiative as a dream of Poland’s greatness. The consequences of this Poland’s politics are detrimental to itself and to the international environment. It has reduced the importance of Poland as a state in Europe and the world. The world’s perception of Poland is increasingly unfavorable among democratic countries, and more favorable among other illiberal countries. But it is not favorable with all illiberal countries, because the nationalism that accompanies Polish illiberalism makes it impossible to improve relations with other not fully democratic or downright undemocratic countries, especially Poland’s eastern neighbors. Poland’s foreign policy is facing serious challenges, some of which Poland created on its own and is unable to address effectively. This means that there is a growing problem of incompatibility between Poland’s policies and the changing international order.

The change of the media system as the goal of the media policy of the Law and Justice (PiS) government from 2015

This article is an attempt to demonstrate that the media policy of the PiS government after 2015 has had a systemic quality. It is aimed at altering the principles of how the media in Poland is organised and how it is functioning, which will facilitate the media’s instrumental exploitation in the government’s information policy. These findings emerge from a structured comparison based on the management theory of a classifier of goals with the concepts of public interest as a guideline of media policy as accepted in various forms of democracy and the corresponding media doctrines.

Populism meets EU Foreign policy: the de-Europeanization of Poland´s Foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

ABSTRACT This article bridges between the de-Europeanization framework and works on populism to theorize about de-Europeanization dynamics and their potential drivers. Empirically, the article explores Polish foreign policy under the PiS government for the case of EU-foreign policy cooperation toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a highly Europeanized foreign policy issue and longstanding EU priority, the Israeli Palestinian conflict constitutes an interesting case for the emerging research agenda on foreign policy de-Europeanization. Whilst Poland’s traditional support for the EU’s common approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been part of its wider Europeanization experience, we argue that under PiS government Poland’s foreign policy has changed in important ways, showing signs of de-Europeanization. These changes have been driven by both, ideologically informed preferences of the Law and Justice led government as well as external expectations and pressures.

Polish Catholic Bishops, Nationalism and Liberal Democracy

The alliance of the Polish Catholic Church with the Law and Justice (PiS) government has been widely reported and resulted in significant benefits for the Church. However, beginning in mid-2016, the top church leadership, including the Episcopal Conference, has distanced itself from the government and condemned its use of National Catholicism as legitimation rhetoric for the government’s malpractices in the fields of human rights and democracy. How to account for this behavior? The article proposes two explanations. The first is that the alliance of the PiS with the nationalist wing of the Church, while legitimating its illiberal refugee policy and attacks on democratic institutions of the government, further radicalized the National Catholic faction of the Polish Church and motivated a reaction of the liberal and mainstream conservative prelates. The leaders of the Episcopate, facing an empowered and radical National Catholic faction, pushed back with a doctrinal clarification of Catholic orthodoxy. The second explanatory path considers the transnational influence of Catholicism, in particular of Pope Francis’ intervention in favor of refugee rights as prompting the mainstream bishops to reestablish the Catholic orthodoxy. The article starts by tracing the opposition of the Bishops Conference and liberal prelates to the government’s refugee and autocratizing policies. Second, it describes the dynamics of the Church’s internal polarization during the PiS government. Third, it traces and contextualizes the intervention of Pope Francis during the asylum political crisis (2015–2016). Fourth, it portrays their respective impact: while the Pope’s intervention triggered the bishops’ response, the deepening rifts between liberal and nationalist factions of Polish Catholicism are the ground cause for the reaction.

Sharp needles

Cartoons are a form of expression of public debate that gain particular significance in times of suppression and a lack of political freedom. Poland, which has experienced many such episodes throughout its history, already began developing diverse versions of this genre from the 19th century onwards. One first high point came between the two world wars. In socialist Poland, political cartoonists turned to indirect criticism in order to escape the censors, and developed highly refined ways of doing so. When censorship fell away in 1989, new freedoms suddenly became possible, while at the same time, the number of satirical magazines declined. With the growing political pressure under the PiS government, cartoons have gained in importance once again - a fact that is reflected in the huge popularity of the well-known cartoonists on social media.

Populism, historical discourse and foreign policy: the case of Poland’s Law and Justice government

This article analyses how, in Poland, the populist political orientation of the ruling party (Law and Justice—PiS) has coloured the historical discourse of the government and has affected, in turn, its foreign policy and diplomatic relations. We argue that the historical discourse of the PiS government is a reflection of the party’s reliance on populism as a political mode of articulation in that it seeks to promote a Manichean, dichotomic and totalizing re-definition of the categories of victim, hero and perpetrator—and of Poland’s roles in this trinity. The article details the direct and indirect repercussions of PiS populist-inspired historical posture on Poland’s foreign policy by analysing its policies towards—and relations with—Ukraine and Germany. As such, the article sheds light on the under-explored links between populism and historical memory and makes a contribution to the nascent scholarship on the foreign policy of populist governments.

Perspectives for German-Polish Relations in the EU-27

In recent years the seemingly firm historical ties between Warsaw and Berlin have become increasingly strained. This results from a growing political asymmetry between the two countries. Germany moved into a semi-hegemonial position under the conditions of the triple crisis of banking, economy and sovereign debt in the eurozone. Consequently, German chancellor Angela Merkel was in a strong enough position to implement ordoliberal reforms of the eurozone’s governance architecture, which were promoted as an approach without alternatives. Merkel maintained her uncompromising stance during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, when she demanded implementation of compulsory migrant distribution quotas across the EU. Poland and the Visegrád countries had initially strongly supported German leadership in resolving the eurozone crisis. The alienation from Germany’s European agenda however became significant under the conditions of the migration crisis. Here the firm opposition of Poland and the rest of the Visegrád Group towards Germany’s preferences shows a strategic mismatch between the EU’s liberal core, which is spearheaded by Germany, and the concept of the “illiberal” state, which Poland has embraced under the PiS government. The willingness to resolve these differences will be crucial in determining the future shape of Polish-German relations.

Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015

Since the 2015 elections, Poland has ‘enjoyed’ the attention of social sciences—political science in particular—to an extent greater than at any time since the period of “Solidarity” in the early 1980s. In contrast to that period, Poland’s idiosyncratic development over the last two and a half years can hardly be said to play the function of a normative role model. Political developments in Poland in recent times devolve into two stories: one of profound civilizational, economic and social development prior to the 2015 elections; the other of an unexpected and sudden shift toward the dismantling of the liberal democratic system after the Law and Justice (PiS) party came to power in late 2015. The first part of this article describes the most important features of pre-2015 political developments in Poland and identifies key determinants of vote choice in the 2015 parliamentary election in Poland. In brief, this analysis shows two things: that there was no ‘demand’ for systemic change at these elections, and that support for the winning party was mainly determined by socio-cultural factors rather than economic ones. The second part of the article aims to answer the question of why the PiS government has embarked on a course of political action that violates both the abstract principles of liberal democracy and concrete, binding provisions of Poland’s 1997 Constitution. Several theoretical and speculative ideas are offered in answer to this question.

Університет як чинник консолідації польського суспільства та держави (1907–2007)

The school strikes in the Polish part of Russia and Germany that took place in 1907 forced young Poles to educational emigration. In Galicia, Polish-language academic institutions have developed a new elite. Together with Polish graduates of Western European universities turned out to be the main factor consolidating society around the idea of rebuilding the state. In the revived Second Republic of Poland, academic circles proved a counterbalance to autocratic rule in 1926–1939. The more so because the number of universities increased from 8 to 32 and they represented a high, world class level of education. After 1945, the rapid reconstruction of Polish universities and the consolidation of the academic community prevented the communists from taking over higher education. In addition, after the turn of 1956, the autonomy of Polish universities was expanded despite the riots in 1968. Martial law and the breakdown of Solidarnośc resulted in taking over the function of socio-political opposition by academic circles up to 1989. In turn, the breakthrough made at that time was also thank to Polish elites, but at the same time led to a rapid development of the number of universities and the birth of academic capitalism. An attempt to violate the autonomy of universities in 2005–2007 has stimulated the academic community and contributed to the collapse of the PiS government in 2007. The University and the elites educated in them are in the long run more important for society than the institution of the state, material or economic resources, or armed forces. From this perspective, the Polish case confirms the proposed thesis and the visibility of the third function: supporting democratization processes in the state of society.

Constitutional Conflicts in the European Union: Court Packing in Poland versus the United States

Court packing greatly threatens democracy. This paper examines, compares and draws conclusions from two attempts: The PiS government is near to packing Polish courts; President Roosevelt tried but ...