Pieces Of Property Research Articles

Land and Landscape; Linking Use, Experience and Property Development in Urban Areas

This article brings together the concepts of land and landscape, tightly linked in urban transformative situations, but rarely used for the purpose to strengthen strategic planning for sustainability. They are investigated as a combined base for land use deliberations, in early phases of planning processes, in practices of different scale, especially in a European context, drawing on planning and landscape policies generally agreed upon, as well as the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This article argues for taking into consideration the landscape as experienced human habitat, in relation to the understanding of land as both a common resource, and as pieces of property. This is motivated partly by the more or less global political trend and the turn from state interventions to individualistic capitalism (calling for new methods to solve common challenges), but also by a changing planning profession, increased collaborative planning processes, increased significance of public space as a scarce resource in densified cities, the need for holistic perspectives in sustainable urban development and the need for unifying concepts for urban and rural land at a local and regional scale. A new concept “around-scape” is suggested, in order to make visible the subjective binding between available perceived resources and spatial transformation.

Brownfields in Historical Context

The notion of a brownfield brings to mind sites littered with the remains of past industrial activity: crumbling buildings, frozen machinery, and railroad tracks overgrown with weeds. To anybody interested in an area's history and cultural heritage, such sites can be potential treasures (Brown, 2001; Quivik, 2001). But to others, especially city officials struggling to maintain a solid tax base and neighbors worried about safety and property values, these sites are more likely to be seen as blights on the landscape, pieces of industrial property that have been used, discarded, and left for another generation to deal with (Jakle and Wilson, 1992). Unlike “greenfields,” vacant pieces of property that have never been developed, brownfields come with the risk of contamination and the costs of demolition and cleanup.

Sentencing Federal Sex Crimes

US Sentencing Commission Federal sex offenses can be divided into three groups: criminal sexual abuse, pornography, and prostitution. In the past few years Congress has shown increasing interest in legislating against (i) the production and trafficking of child pornography and (2) the enticement of minors to engage in prostitution or other illicit sexual activity. The Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995 (SCAPA) created new prohibitions against child pornography and other sex crimes against children. Additionally, Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 created the new offense of prohibiting the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a minor to engage in prostitution or other prohib ited sexual activity. These latest legislative initiatives by the federal government join several other statutes prohibiting such crimes as aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, and transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. Along with these new prohibitions came directives to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to increase punishments. The Commission responded in 1996 with guideline amendments that: Increased most pornography sentences by at least 25%; Increased all pornography production sentences by an additional 25% if computers were used to solicit sexually explicit conduct by or with a minor for the production of pornography; and Increased sentences for the most dangerous repeat offenders by broadening the definition of pattern of activity of sexual exploitation of a minor in the pornography trafficking guideline. While the federal government continues to enact sex crime legislation, state governments prosecute the vast majority of sex offenders. Federal authority over sex crimes, as with all types of crime, is limited by the Constitution. Federal jurisdiction is generally based on (1) specific constitutional grants of author ity, such as Congress's authority to regulate interstate or foreign commerce or (2) federal interests in specified pieces of property, such as military posts, national parks, or Native American reservations. This limited scope of federal jurisdiction is reflected in the small number of cases prosecuted and the type of cases prosecuted. This article will look at several of the federal sex crime statutes and the federal sentencing guidelines used to sentence offenders convicted of violating them. I. Criminal Sexual Abuse

Judge's words inspire push for amendment

ROSEMONT, Ill. — When Connecticut Superior Court Judge Charles Gill talks, people than just listen. They hang on every word, cringe, smile, give standing ovations, and finally — if they were pediatricians attending September9s AAP Annual Chapter Forum — they make an unprecedented recommendation for a constitutional amendment recognizing children9s rights. During an emotionally driven speech full of heartbreaking stories about children wronged by adult-oriented policies and laws, Gill urged AAP chapter officials to do more to stop the nation9s youngest citizens from being treated like pieces of property.

Users' Guides to the Medical Literature

CLINICAL SCENARIO You are about to see a 76-year-old retired schoolteacher for the second time. You first saw her in the clinic a month ago because of cognitive problems. Your evaluation at that time included a Standardized Mini-Mental State Examination,1on which she scored 18 out of a possible 30 points, and a physical examination that was normal including no focal neurological signs. You arranged investigations for the treatable causes of dementia that were negative, and you thus feel she has probable Alzheimer's disease. The patient has lived with her son since her husband died 6 years ago. Her son thinks that she first developed significant problems with her memory about 3 years ago. However, she has become increasingly agitated and paranoid during the last year. She has refused to allow him to look after her financial affairs, despite the fact that she owns three pieces of property and

Cicero's Villas in the Phlegraean Fields: The Development of a Historical and Cultural Myth

"Cicero's Villas in the Phlegraean Fields: The Development of a Historical and Cultural Myth." Cicero probably owned two pieces of property in the volcanic area known as the Phlegraean Fields northwest of Naples. In one piece of property, which was identified with his famous Academia, a medicinal spring salubrious for eye diseases sprang forth shortly after the orator's death. The study traces, from antiquity to modern investigations, the convoluted history of this property and its medicinal spring, along with that of the other property in which Hadrian allegedly died and was rendered immortal by a commemorative temple. Cicero's properties were confused with other sites in the area, particularly a well-known medicinal bath called Trituli located near the popular ancient resort town of Baiae. This confusion, and surrounding legends, reflect medieval legends concerning both Cicero and the shadowy figure of Hippocrates, which were generated largely through a misinterpretation by the Renaissance humanist Flavio Biondo.

At Law: Parenthood and Frozen Embryos More Than Property and Privacy

It is time, Lori Andrews once announced in these pages, start acknowledging that people's parts are their personal property.[1] Her suggestion was prompted by the case John Moore brought against the University of California at Los Angeles and others for using his blood to develop a patented (and commercially valuable) cell line without informing him of what was going on. The California Supreme Court eventually rejected Andrews's suggestion, holding that Moore might have a case of fiduciary breach but not of property conversion.[2] Another test for the body-as-property theory came on 1 June 1992, when the Supreme Court of Tennessee handed down its decision in Davis v. Davis. This case began as a dispute between a divorcing couple who--during the course of six failed attempts at reproducing through in fertilization (IVF)--had left seven frozen in a liquid nitrogen tank at a fertility clinic. Mary Sue Davis wanted to have the pre-embryos implanted in her uterus in a further attempt to become pregnant, while Junior Davis wanted them left frozen. In a divorce proceeding, property is typically divided evenly between the parties: from a set of eight Chippendale chairs each would get four, unless one wanted the whole set and the other accepted some other property of equal value. In awarding custody of children, however, a court exercises its parens patriae authority to find an arrangement that would serve the children's interests. Extending Andrew's analysis, the pre-embryos in the Davis case were not my body for either Mr. or Mrs. Davis, but rather our body--seven pieces of property. The trial court declined, however, to treat the pre-embryos like Chippendale chairs. Instead it declared them to be in vitro and concluded that their best interests would be served by awarding their custody to Ms. Davis, since she offered the greatest hope the embryos would be carried to term. In 1990 the Tennessee Court of Appeal reversed, giving the parties joint control and an equal voice over the embryos' disposition.[3] The court based its holding on Mr. Davis's constitutional right of privacy, which protected his choice not to beget a child. The state has no compelling interest, the appellate court found, that would allow it to order implantation against the will of one of the parties. Although largely affirming the appellate decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court focused on what is really at issue: choice about relationships. The need to think in such terms--rather than in terms of property or privacy, to cite two competing paradigms--is underscored by another recent and perhaps even more bizarre case, the fraud and perjury trial of Dr. Cecil Jacobson in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia. The Overeager Inseminator In March, Dr. Jacobson was sentenced to five years in prison for using his own semen in artificial insemination (AID) of patients who thought the semen had come from anonymous donors or, in at least one case, from the woman's husband. The evidence presented at trial showed that Dr. Jacobson had fathered fifteen children, but the prosecutors speculated that the true total exceeded seventy. Plainly, these women and their husbands wanted children through AID and presumably cherish the children that Dr. Jacobson helped them to bear. Yet the fact that Dr. Jacobson made himself the father of these children angered the couples and led to his prosecution. Their anger and his conviction were justified because his actions radically altered the relationship his patients had with him without their knowledge or consent. Dr. Jacobson's wrong is not well captured within the rubric of (if anything remains of that concept after the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Casey decision)[4] because Roe v. Wade had defined the unit for privacy analysis as the-physician-and-his-patient. …

De inquilinos a propietarios. Derecho y política en el Programa de Renovación Habitacional Popular

El trabajo ofrece un análisis del papel de las instituciones jurídicas en la transformación de las relaciones de propiedad en el centro de la Ciudad de México a partir del sismo de 1985, es decir, en el cambio de estatus de inquilinos a propietarios que ha traído consigo el Programa de Renovación Habitacional Popular. Se examinan, en primer lugar, los antecedentes y las implicaciones jurídicas y políticas del decreto expropiatorio de más de cuatro mil predios con que se fijó el calce del programa. En segundo lugar, se describe el Convenio de Concertación Democrática para la Reconstrucción de Vivienda del Programa de Renovación Habitacional, destacando el contraste entre su importancia política y su invalidez jurídica. Asimismo, se examina el régimen de propiedad en condominio “de carácter vecinal” contenido en el nuevo capítulo de la ley de la materia, destacando los debates ideológicos que tuvieron lugar en el proceso de su discusión en la cámara de diputados. Finalmente, se incluye una breve referencia a los juicios de amparo promovidos por numerosos propietarios afectados por la expropiación y se señala su importancia como obstáculo a la ejecución del Programa de Renovación Habitacional.

WOLVES, CHIMPS AND DEMSETZ

Harold Demsetz has argued that when an externality can be internalized through the existence of property rights such that societal benefits exceed costs, property rights will emerge. This paper shows that property rights exist in some animal systems with respect to specific pieces of property and for reasons similar to those postulated by Demsetz. Two cases are considered: wolves, where the property right is in land; and chimpanzees, where the property right exists for meat. The external costs or benefits that produce the property rights are examined and comparisons are drawn with situations in which no externalities exist and no property rights emerge.