One definition of the of the is that the professional loses over policy and value objectives in his or her work (Derber 1982b:17). Proletarianization is normally explained as resulting from workplace labor process control (ibid., p. 31). A compatible, but quite different, explanation relates proletarianization to changes in the social practices and ideological orientations of professional careers. In this research note, I present this different explanation and suggest avenues for empirical research. Changing labor process control subjects not to the traditional forms of industrial regimentation and constraint but to a system of control that allows for relative worker autonomy (ibid., p. 31). In short, are becoming like Burawoy's piece-rate workers, who exercise power and (Burawoy 1979:94), but do so in a process defines both the conditions of choice and the limits of [their] managerial discretion (ibid., p. 199). These changes are said to result from changing employment patterns, evidenced by declining rates of self-employment among and growing rates of employment in heteronomous organizations (Derber 1982a:3; Oppenheimer 1973). The difficulty with this explanation is that have always been sellers of labor power; Cravath never gave it away for free. As Freidson famously showed, employment, not self-employment, is the characteristic position of professionals (Freidson 1986:xii; chap. 6). As he emphasized, never worked as they please (ibid., p. 144). Furthermore, in many situations, clients have greater claims to control than professional practices have institutionalized (Rosenthal 1974; Sarat & Felstiner 1995). Changing labor process controls may bridge this gap, without resuiting in deprofessionalization, let alone proletarianization. Changing employment patterns, however, also have important effects on the life chances of professionals. Along with changing social and cultural norms, employment opportunities may be rearranging the structure and aspirations of professional careers (cf. Calhoun 1965). Changing careers may help explain how exercise or do not exercise over policy and value objectives (Derber 1982b:17) in their work. Consider two associates, one at a large corporate law firm and one at an office of a bureaucratized mass-market seller of legal services. Both work long hours, do not select the clients they serve, have little control over what they work on, must have their work approved by a hierarchy of colleagues, and often fill in the blanks in documents largely produced by others. Both can be described as cogs in a large division of labor, within both the firm and society. Although their compensation and status differ, neither earns under the poverty level. They both work at firms organized by the commercialization of the legal Both associates are subject to labor process control. Both are hard-working professionals. Yet there is a significant difference, is there not? One difference is in their careers. The corporate law firm associate can dream of a career that leads to a professional ideal, symbolized by an understanding of partnership. Promotion for the other, if possible, is only into management ranks, not to a different relation of control over legal work. For this reason, this associate might be described as deprofessionalized. Under changed market and cultural conditions, lawyers may be losing their ability to have careers of certain kinds, which is not only or primarily related to heteronomous employment. At private law firms there are different tiers of associates and part ners. Consider lawyers who work at a private law firm on a renew able yearly contract, with no expectation of advancement in the firm. If they stay with this position, they will never progress through the sequence of stages by which one matures within the profession. …