Physician Dual Practice Research Articles

Public-private differentials in health care delivery: the case of cesarean deliveries in Algeria.

Akin to other developing countries, Algeria has witnessed an increasing role of the private health sector in the past twodecades. Our study sheds light on the public-private overlap and the phenomenon of physician dual practice in the provision of health care services using the particular case of cesarean deliveries in Algeria. Existing studies have reported that, compared to the public sector, delivering in a private health facility increases the risk of enduring a cesarean section. While confirming this result for the case of Algeria, our study also reveals the existence of public-private differentials in the effect of medical variables on the probability of cesarean delivery. After controlling for selection in both sectors, we show that cesarean deliveries in the private sector tend to be less medically justified compared with those taking place in the public sector, thus, potentially leading to maternal and neonatal health problems. As elsewhere, the contribution of the private health sector to the unmet need for health care in Algeria hinges on an appropriate legal framework that better coordinates the activities of the two sectors and reinforces their complementarity.

Growth and welfare in mixed health system financing with physician dual practice in a developing economy: a case of Indonesia

Based on Indonesia’s hybrid BPJS Kesehatan health system, we analyze for welfare-optimal government financing strategy in an economy with a mixed health system using an endogenous growth framework with physician dual practice. We find the model solution to produce two vastly different regimes in terms of policy implications: a “high” public-sector congestion regime as in the benchmark case of Indonesia, and a “low” public-sector congestion, high capacity regime. In the former, welfare-optimal health financing strategy appears to be promoting private health service. In contrast, in the low-congestion, high capacity regime, a welfare-optimal strategy is to do the opposite of increasing government physician wage at the expense of private health subsidy. These results highlight the importance of developing a benchmarking system that measures the actual degree of congestion faced by the public health service in a developing economy, as it ultimately would influence the optimal health financing strategy to be pursued.

Effect of public hospital managers\u2019 risk and gain perception on their attitude towards physician dual practice: a cross-national study in 31 provinces of China

BackgroundThis study aims to explore the effect of public hospital managers’ risk and gain perception on their attitude towards physician dual practice (PDP).MethodsA cross-sectional study enrolling 1513 managers from public hospitals in the East, Middle and West of China was conducted. Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) were used to identify the determinants of managers’ support for PDP.ResultsThe rate of managers’ support for allowing PDP or implementing PDP with restriction, was 94.3% (95% CI: 0.93, 0.95). The mean score of managers’ risk perception was 67.7 ± 14.46, and the mean score of managers’ gain perception was 24.0 ± 5.56. After controlling for individual and institutional characteristics, the GLMM presented the score for risk perception increased 1 score and the rate of managers’ support for PDP decreased by 5% (OR = 0.95, 95% CI: 0.93, 0.97); while the score for gain perception increased 1 score and the rate of managers’ support increased by 18% (OR = 1.18, 95% CI: 1.12, 1.24).ConclusionsOur data demonstrate that the majority of Chinese public hospital managers are in favor of allowing or implementing PDP with restrictions. Although gain perception is comparatively weaker than risk perception, a stronger influence in determining public hospital managers’ support for PDP is demonstrated.

Dual practice and multiple job holding among Iranian general practitioners: Rate and effective factors.

Physician's dual practice is a common phenomenon in both developing and developed countries. This study aimed to investigate the rate and factors affecting the dual practice of general practitioners (GPs) as the most important primary care providers in Iran. This cross-sectional study was conducted on the data of 666 Iranian GPs, derived from a national survey. In this work, a researcher-made checklist was used to collect the required information. Multinomial logistic regression was used to examine the factors affecting concurrent employment in both public and private sectors and the factors affecting employment in more than one place (either public or private). About 23.51% of the GPs were only working in the public sector, and 57.84% only in the private sectors. Also, 18.65% were working in both the private and public sectors. Results also indicated that 26.17% of the GPs were working in two or more places (whether public or private). Male GPs (p < .1) as well as the GPs with higher earnings expectations (p < .01) were more likely to have dual practice. Besides, the GPs working in small towns and villages (compared with Tehran, as capital of Iran; p < .05) were less likely to have dual practice. Gender (male) and earnings expectations had a significant effect on working in more than one place (p < .01). The most important and significant factor affecting GPs' dual practice in Iran was their financial expectations. Thus, appropriate policies to modify physicians' income expectations and reforms such as improving tariffs setting should be adopted in the health systems.

The Dynamics of Health Care and Growth: A Model with Physician in Dual Practice

We present a growth model with micro-foundations of a mixed health care system and physician dual-practice, to analyze for welfare-optimal government financing strategy for a mixed health system in developing countries. Calibrating the model for Indonesia, we find that a government subsidy to private health care is both growth- and welfare-enhancing, whereas it is more effective for the government to invest in health infrastructure instead of a public-sector rewarding policy in raising government physicians’ wage if its goal is to improve physician effort in public practice. Indeed, for the rewarding policy, a dynamic trade-off in growth is found, which is not previously documented in the literature. We also find the model to produce two regimes with different welfare-optimal health financing (a “normal” regime and a low public-sector congestion regime). In the former, welfare-optimal health financing strategy appears to be promoting private health subsidy at the expense of public-sector physician wages. In the latter, the opposite is welfare-optimal.

Prohibiting physicians' dual practice in Iran: Policy options for implementation.

In Iran, based on the recent national policy documents, physician dual practice (PDP) has been prohibited. This study aimed to develop policy options (POs) to implement physicians' dual practice prohibition law in Iran. International evidence published in English and local documents published in Persian about PDP analyzed and results (advantages, disadvantages, challenges and requirements to ban PDP, and applied policies to limit the dual practice) were extracted. Results discussed among the research team in 5 rounds of meetings. In each meeting, any possible PO to limit PDP in Iran was proposed based on brainstorming technique and 12 POs were developed. These 12 POs and their advantages and disadvantages were discussed in a focus group discussion attended by 14 informed policy makers, and 3 additional POs were added. Fifteen POs were developed. Each PO has its own advantages and disadvantages. It is worth to highlight that not only are the proposed POs not mutually exclusive but they are also mutually reinforcing; that is, each of these POs can be applied alone or they can be implemented alongside each other simultaneously. No single optimal PO exists for dealing with the dual practice in Iranian health system. Implementing a mix of POs could reduce possible complications of each PO and increase the chance of successful implementation of the law. It is advisable to follow a conservative and incremental approach and start with POs that will cause less resistance and political challenges.

Physicians' engagement in dual practices and the effects on labor supply in public hospitals: results from a register-based study.

BackgroundPhysician dual practice, a combination of public and private practice, has attracted attention due to fear of reduced work supply and a lack of key personnel in the public system, increase in low priority treatments, and conflicts of interest for physicians who may be competing for their own patients when working for private suppliers. In this article, we analyze both choice of dual practice among hospital physicians and the dual practices’ effect on work supply in public hospitals.MethodsThe sample consisted of 12,399 Norwegian hospital physicians working in public hospitals between 2001 and 2009. We linked hospital registry data on salaries and hospital working hours with data from national income and other registries covering non-hospital income, including income from dual work, cohabiting status, childbirths and socioeconomic characteristics. Our dataset also included hospital variables describing i.e. workload. We estimated odds ratio for choosing dual practice and the effects of dual practice on public working hours using different versions of mixed models.ResultsThe percentage of physicians engaged in dual practice fell from 35.1% for men and 17.6% for women in 2001 to 25.0% and 14.2%, respectively, in 2009. For both genders, financial debt and interest payments were positively correlated and having a newborn baby was negatively correlated with engaging in dual practice. Larger family size and being cohabitating increased the odds ratio of dual practice among men but reduced it for women. The most significant internal hospital factor for choosing dual practice was high wages for extended working hours, which significantly reduced the odds ratio for dual practice. The total working hours in public hospitals were similar for both those who did and did not engage in dual practice; however, dual practice reduced public working hours in some specialties.ConclusionEconomic factors followed by family variables are significant elements influencing dual practice. Although our findings indicate that engagement in dual practice by public hospital physicians in a well-regulated market may increase the total labor supply, this may vary significantly between medical specialties.

Public versus private health care in a national health service

This paper studies the interaction between public and private health care provision in a National Health Service (NHS), with free public care and costly private care. The health authority decides whether or not to allow private provision and sets the public sector remuneration. The physicians allocate their time (effort) in the public and (if allowed) in the private sector based on the public wage income and the private sector profits. We show that allowing physician dual practice 'crowds out' public provision, and results in lower overall health care provision. While the health authority can mitigate this effect by offering a higher wage, we find that a ban on dual practice is more efficient if private sector competition is weak and public and private care are sufficiently close substitutes. On the other hand, if private sector competition is sufficiently tough, a mixed system, with physician dual practice, is always preferable to a pure NHS system.

Public Versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service

This paper studies the interaction between public and private health care provision in a National Health Service (NHS), with free public care and costly private care. The health authority decides whether or not to allow private provision and sets the public sector remuneration. The physicians allocate their time (effort) in the public and (if allowed) in the private sector based on the public wage income and the private sector profits. We show that allowing physician dual practice crowds out public provision, and results in lower overall health care provision. While the health authority can mitigate this effect by offering a higher wage, we find that a ban on dual practice is more efficient if private sector competition is weak and public and private care are sufficiently close substitutes. On the other hand, if private sector competition is sufficiently hard, a mixed system, with physician dual practice, is always preferable to a pure NHS system.

Physician dual practice

Physicians employed in government clinics and hospitals also frequently have private practices. The economic theory of such dual practice is relatively limited and recent. We provide a summary and comparison of five models of dual practice, including one we have developed based on total compensation theory and contracting limitations. We also discuss whether theoretical predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from developed and developing countries. We argue that the social trade-off between the benefits and costs of dual practice hinge on the quality of a country's contracting institutions. The conclusion outlines a proposed research agenda for better understanding this widespread phenomenon in the health sector and in other segments of society.

Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach.

We develop a principal-agent model to analyze how the behavior of a physician in the public sector is affected by his activities in the private sector. We show that the physician will have incentives to over-provide medical services when he uses his public activity as a way of increasing his prestige as a private doctor. The health authority only benefits from the physician's dual practice when it is interested in ensuring a very accurate treatment for the patient. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework in which some actual policies implemented to regulate physicians' dual practice can be addressed. In particular, we focus on the possibility that the health authority offers exclusive contracts to physicians and on the implications of limiting physicians' private earnings.