Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material Research Articles

Правовые вопросы безопасности АЭС в зоне военных действий

The article discusses the legal aspects of physical protection and nuclear safety of nuclear power plants located in a combat zone. The existing multilateral international treaties in this area, namely, the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 Amendment to the 2005 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, do not regulate the physical protection of nuclear facilities located in areas of active combat using conventional weapons. Moreover, the IAEA soft law provisions do not regulate the issues of physical protection of nuclear power plants located in areas of full-scale combat operations. The situation with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has made the international community and the IAEA face the issue of legal regulation and development of recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear facilities in a war zone. Currently, a new concept for the physical protection of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is being discussed under the auspices of the IAEA and efforts to prepare a new international treaty on the physical security of nuclear facilities in a war zone are underway.

International Nuclear Security Law: The Use of ‘Soft Law’

Abstract International nuclear security law includes treaties such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment (A/CPPNM), as well as a series of soft law instruments, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series (NSS). These treaties and law instruments function as guidelines providing policy direction and ensuring that the various nuclear facilities are properly protected. Traditionally, soft law has been typified by its flexibility and normativity. However, within the field of nuclear security law, nuclear security is mainly assessed using instruments that are properly implemented by relevant regulatory authorities or operators (in the case of soft law instruments), and regulatory bodies are given the authority to order operators to comply with mandatory instruction on the level of municipal law. This delegation of authority is necessitated by the potentially serious consequences of nuclear and radioactive material, as well as the associated facilities and activities. When the provisions of such instruments are transposed into municipal law, they somewhat function as hard laws despite having originated in international soft law. This is because nuclear security is a sensitive topic intimately related to national security. In conclusion, this unique combination of legally binding instruments and non-legally binding ones, which are often converted into legally binding documents as per municipal law in the case of Japan, enables robust control over nuclear security while also providing sufficient flexibility to ensure that a variety of nuclear facilities can fully adapt to the conditions required to protect these facilities.

Systemic crisis of modern international environmental law

The article examines the issue of a complex crisis situation in the field of international legal mediation of environmental protection activities, caused by the treacherous attack of the aggressor country on the territory of Ukraine, which showed the complete inability of the established model of international law, including its organizational and institutional component, to oppose the aggressor's plans due to the forced cessation of hostilities , which follows from the direct functional purpose of the United Nations as the main world peacemaker. First of all, a terminological excursion was made into the formation of the name of the field of international law, which provides legal protection of the environment, which is characterized by the absence of a unified conceptual and categorical apparatus, where, along with international environmental law, the names of international ecological, international nature protection and international environmental law are used. The author's conclusion is made about the expediency of finally stopping at the universal name of international environmental law. The conducted analysis made it possible to establish that the aggressor violated almost all existing branch principles of international environmental law, except for the principle of inadmissibility of radioactive contamination of the environment, which is also under constant threat of violation. The lack of an effective mechanism for the protection of the rights and interests of subjects of international environmental law is illustrated by the example of a number of international documents, in particular the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means of Impact on the Natural Environment, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations, the Convention on nuclear safety and the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The role of the IAEA in establishing international standards for the use of atomic energy (retrospective analysis)

Paradoxically, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and all the prospects it opens up for humanity often coexist with the prospect of nuclear proliferation and nuclear war. This difficult perception is understandable: the materials, knowledge, and expertise needed to produce nuclear weapons are generally no different from those needed to produce nuclear energy and conduct nuclear research.Therefore, ensuring the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy has always been in the center of attention of the international community. The approach is determined by a complex of national and international measures. It is generally accepted that the primary responsibility for regulating the use of nuclear energy rests with national authorities, but it is also clear that other countries may also be affected. Thus, like many other human activities with potentially transboundary consequences, nuclear energy regulation requires a residual, and in some cases joint, responsibility on the part of the international community to ensure the harmonization of standards, coordination and pooling of resources and services, and regulatory cooperation this activity.In this regard, the IAEA and other international and regional organizations play the role of coordination centers. Article II of the IAEA Statute states that the organization shall seek to accelerate and increase the contribution of atomic energy to world peace, health and prosperity and shall provide, as far as possible, assistance upon request. IAEA supervision or control shall not be used to achieve any military objective.International peration in the field of nuclear energy over the past six decades has resulted in legally binding norms and advisory standards and regulations. This article outlines this global legal framework for the safe and peaceful development of nuclear energy. In particular, it concerns nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, transportation of radioactive materials, emergency assistance and planning, civil liability for nuclear damage, physical protection of nuclear material, armed attack on nuclear facilities, safeguards and controls carried out and provided by the IAEA.

Legal analysis regarding nuclear power plant and its relation to the protection of environment and society

The need for energy in Indonesia is increasing every year because Indonesia is a country with 742.308 square miles from east to west and the population in 2020 is estimated at 273.523.600 people. The Government of Indonesia has already planned to build Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) since the year 2000, but some people think that nuclear is very dangerous for man and the environment. So, the question is how are the regulations that already exist can protect humans and the environment in Indonesia from the operation of NPP. The goal of this research is to explore all regulations nationally and internationally regarding nuclear activity especially about NPP, and whether these regulations can protect humans and the environment in Indonesia. From the law perspective, Indonesia has Law Number 10 the Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy, Government Regulation (GR) Number 54 the Year 2012 on Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations, and GR Number 2 the Year 2014 on the Licensing of Nuclear Installations and Use of Nuclear Materials. Indonesia also ratified some international conventions such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Indonesia has to follow IAEA rules and standards to protect humans and the environment from nuclear activity. The conclusion is that from a law perspective, it is safe to build NPP since these regulations are enough to protect the society and the environment of Indonesia.

Countering the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Arising from Malicious Insiders

Nuclear theft from malicious insiders is a significant threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan is a member of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which is an international agreement that adheres to the protection of nuclear materials and the recovery of stolen nuclear materials. However, this agreement does not specifically take into account the risk of security breaches arising from malicious insiders due to Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The purpose of this paper is to examine the heightened risk of insider threats in conjunction with Pakistan’s increasing nuclear force structure. The first section of the paper examines the history of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and discusses Pakistan’s current nuclear force structure. The second section examines the international and domestic policies that Pakistan follows to address the issue of insider threats to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The final section proposes two policy alternatives to address Pakistan’s growing insider threat risks and outlines how the Design Basis Threat assessment is the most effective solution for Pakistan’s growing insider threat.

Legal Regulation of Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine on the Way to European Integration

The article is devoted to the analysis of legal regulation of the sphere of nuclear safety and security of Ukraine on the way to European integration. The authors drew attention to the importance of Ukraine achieving the necessary level of and nuclear sefaty and security adopted in the EU member states. The emphasis was placed on the fact that the prospects for fulfilling national obligations in the field of nuclear safety in accordance with European standards directly depend on solving the problems of ensuring the functioning of nuclear facilities, the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations as well as radioactive waste management. The main directions of ensuring the nuclear safety and secutiry in the world within the international law are considered. The role and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in setting up a regulatory framework for nuclear safety and security are analyzed. The international legal framework for nuclear safety and security was discused.The legislative basis for nuclear safety and secutiry in the EU IS characterized. The issue of legal norms unification in the field of nuclear safety regulation of EU member states was considered. The principles of legal regulation of nuclear a safety and security in Ukraine are characterized.
 Key words: nuclear safety, nuclear security, public administration of nuclear safety and security, legal regulation of nuclear safety and security, European integration, sustainable development in the field of ensuring nuclear safety and security. 
 UDC 35:574:339.9:349.6 JEL Classification: K 23, K 32, K 33, Q 5

Categorization methods of nuclear materials used in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for physical protection systems

The physical protection of nuclear materials is a significant regulatory requirement to prevent and impede the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives. These materials need to be systematically categorized based on their characteristics and risk. The categorization methods are evolving to reflect new issues. One of which is new types of materials from new technologies. We first reviews existing categorization methods for degrees of attractiveness, category levels, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, and radiological barriers. This paper tests the categorization methods for nuclear materials from pyroprocessing which converts spent oxide fuels to metallic forms and separates transuranic elements from fission products. TRU ingots from pyroprocessing are classified into Category I by all methods. However, several inconsistencies of categorization methods were found. The attractiveness level of TRU ingots can be differently interpreted as two different levels for some methods. For some materials, the application of radiological barriers results in different categories. Some approaches adopt multiple levels of radiological barriers for different capabilities of terrorists. Many methods evaluate materials as the current forms without considering the difficulty of separation, but a few methods consider chemical separation. Some methods exempt U ingots, but the others do not.

Good practices in provision of nuclear safeguards and security training courses at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

More than five years have passed since the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) was established under the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in December 2010 and started its activities, in response to the commitment of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.. The ISCN has been vigorously involved in capacity building assistance on nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards) and nuclear security, mainly in the Asian region. It has provided 105 training courses to 2901 participants in total as of August 2016. The ISCN plays a major role in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in the region, and this can be considered one of the great results of the Nuclear Security Summit process. The ISCN has cooperated with the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to establish a base of instructors, particularly for the Center's flagship two-week courses, the Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (RTC on PP) and the Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (RTC on SSAC). Furthermore, the ISCN has provided training courses for experts in Japan, making the best use of the Center's knowledge and experience of organizing international courses. The ISCN has also started joint synchronized training with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (EC JRC) on nuclear safeguards. This paper describes the good practices at the ISCN through its five years of activities, focusing on its progress in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security training.

Simulation of the effectiveness evaluation process of security systems

The paper is devoted to issues of creation of cross-functional analytical complex for simulation of the process of operation of the security system elements. Basic objectives, a design concept and an interrelation of main elements of the complex are described. The proposed conception of the analytical complex provides an opportunity to simulate processes for evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection system of a nuclear facility. The complex uses models, that take into account features of the object, parameters of technical means and tactics of adversaries. Recommendations were made for applying of this conception for training specialists in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials.

Reforma systemu zabezpieczeń i weryfikacji materiałów jądrowych jako warunek bezpieczeństwa nuklearnego w XXI w.

The reform of the nuclear safeguards and verification of nuclear materials as a condition of nuclear safety in the 21 Century
 The condition of maintaining nuclear safety in the twentieth century is to ensure a global system of nuclear materials safeguards. In practice, this means the need for a global system of verification of compliance with non‑proliferation requirements equipped with mechanisms of international control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as means of preventing the usage of nuclear dual‑use technology for non‑peaceful purposes (construction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices). The track record of non‑proliferation regime discovered the weakness of the nuclear safeguards and verification system, in particular, limits of the IAEA control functions. Maintaining the “Nuclear Peace” can be assured only by a global system of physical protection, accounting, and security of nuclear materials, which means the need to improve the internationally comprehensive system of verification of compliance with non‑proliferation. The aim of the article is to present the principles of the international system of nuclear safeguards and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in maintaining nuclear peace and nuclear challenges of non‑proliferation regime reform. The analysis leads, among others, to the conclusion that the Agency should develop a procedure to standardize the rules, structure, and terminology of reporting non‑compliance, promote the internationalization of the fuel cycle while the UN Security Council should react faster in the case of non‑compliance detection.

C. Turkey

An amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was approved by the Council of Ministers with a reservation and published in Resmi Gazete on 24 April. The reservation clause is as follows: It is the understanding of the Republic of Turkey that the term international humanitarian law in paragraph (a) and (b) of Article 2(4) of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material refers to the legal instruments to which Turkey is already party. The article should not be interpreted as giving a different status to the armed forces and groups other than the armed forces of a state as currently understood and applied in international law and thereby creating new obligations for Turkey. The agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) Concerning the Granting of the Status of Associate Member at CERN was approved by the Council of Ministers and published in Resmi Gazete on 28 April. It was accepted as a subsequent step of Turkey’s application to become a member state of CERN, which was expressed in 2009, as well as the relevant resolution of the CERN Council of 2010.

Facilitating the entry into force and implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

While the responsibility for nuclear security at the national level rests entirely with each state, international co-operation can be crucial in helping states to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities and obligations. The central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in strengthening the nuclear security framework and leading the co-ordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security is now widely recognised.1 Although much has been done to help states in improving nuclear security, by and under the auspices of the IAEA and other intergovernmental organisations, nuclear terrorism has gained a global recognition as one of the most challenging threats to global security in the 21st century.

Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licen...

核物質防護に関わる機微情報管理の現状と課題に関する考察

The confidentiality system concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was enacted by revision of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law in 2005. We made a comparative analysis with the information security in governmental agencies or financial sectors, in order to consider the way the sensitive information management concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities should be. The considerations in this paper are as follows. (1) In order to secure a suitable level of security, close cooperation should be achieved among related governmental agencies. (2) A cycle that continuously evaluates whether suitable management is performed should be established. (3) Excessive secretiveness should be eliminated. (4) An information-sharing system among the related persons beyond the frame of governmental agencies and electricity companies should be established. (5) Improvement in the social acceptability of the sensitive information management is important. (6) Although it is important to perform evaluation by the consideration of suitable balance with information disclosure, it is also important that it is positively shown to society.

Criminal nuclear law: international obligations and their implementation in the EU

In this paper, 'criminal nuclear law' is understood as the group of rules adopted at the national, regional or international level which criminalises or makes it mandatory for states to criminalise the practices associated with nuclear energy or radioactivity and which can be distinguished from other provisions relating to similar practices on the basis of the inherent ultra-hazardous nature of nuclear energy or radioactivity. The paper presents the current rules of criminal nuclear law at the international (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material or CPPNM, Nuclear Terrorism Convention (NTC) and UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 (2004)), European and national levels, referring to France and Portugal as case studies. It then analyses the extent to which the European and national rules comply with international obligations. Finally, some thoughts on the possible future of international criminal nuclear law are presented.

Consideration on the Evaluation of the Two-Man Rule for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

Consideration on the Evaluation of the Two-Man Rule for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

The International Regime on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

On 8 July 2005, States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (the convention), adopted by consensus an amendment to the convention.

The Development of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and a Future Prospect

核防護措置は, 原子力施設や核燃料物質を, テロ組織などの非合法組織の襲撃, 盗取から防護する措置であり, 2001年9月11日の米国同時多発テロの発生以降, その強化は, 原子力における最重要課題の一つとなっている。核防護は, 歴史的な流れの中で改善を重ねて発展してきた制度であり, 現行の制度を理解し, 今後の課題を考察するためには, 歴史的な経緯を知ることが重要である。 本稿では, 核防護制度発展の経緯を振り返りつつ, 核防護を取りまく現状と今後の課題について概観する。

Establishing international standards for physical protection of nuclear material

Establishing international standards for physical protection of nuclear material