AbstractQuantum key distribution (QKD) offers information‐theoretic security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This means the security is independent of all future advances in algorithm or computational power. However, due to the non‐availability of single‐photon sources, most traditional QKD protocols are vulnerable to various attacks, such as photon number‐splitting (PNS) attacks. Also, the imperfections in the measuring devices open a loophole for side channels that an eavesdropper may exploit to launch attacks such as large‐pulse attacks. As a result, this compromises the security of transmitted information. To address these challenges, the authors present a QKD protocol that is secure against both large‐pulse attacks and PNS attacks at zero‐error, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still, the legitimate users of the system cannot distil a secure key. A notable feature of the proposed protocol is that it promotes greater robustness against both attacks than the Bennett‐Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol or the Scarani‐Acin‐Ribordy‐Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol.