Philosophy Of Mathematical Practice Research Articles

Wittgenstein's critical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice

AbstractOn the one hand, I show that the later Wittgenstein's practice‐based approach to meaning, including the idea that the meaningfulness of mathematics ultimately is rooted in the everyday ‘applications’ it emerged from, as well as his insistence on the variability in and contingency of mathematical and mathematics‐like practices, foreshadows more recent work in Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (PMP), although Wittgenstein's approach was more radically practice‐based than what is prevalent in present‐day PMP. On the other hand, I also show that Wittgenstein's work on mathematics is driven by a pervasive critical attitude towards some key characteristics (monism, foundationalism and exceptionalism) of mainstream philosophical discourse about mathematics (then and now), which is mostly absent from present‐day PMP, and I argue that this aspect of Wittgenstein's work on mathematics could inspire present‐day practitioners of PMP to rethink the identity of their discipline.

Wittgenstein in Cantor's paradise

AbstractThis paper offers an evaluation of Wittgenstein's critique of Cantorian set theory, illustrating his broader philosophical stance on mathematics. By emphasizing the constructed nature of mathematical theories, Wittgenstein encourages a reflective approach to mathematics that acknowledges human agency in its development. His engagement with Cantorian set theory provides valuable insights into the philosophical and practical dimensions of mathematics, urging a reconsideration of its foundations and the nature of mathematical proofs. This perspective aligns closely with the philosophy of mathematical practice, which emphasizes the human side of mathematics by its focus on mathematical practice.

Definitions in practice: An interview study

In the philosophy of mathematical practice, the aim is to understand the various aspects of this practice. Even though definitions are a central element of mathematical practice, the study of this aspect of mathematical practice is still in its infancy. In particular, there is little empirical evidence to substantiate claims about definitions in practice. In this article, we address this gap by reporting on an empirical investigation on how mathematicians create definitions and which roles and properties they attribute to them. On the basis of interviews with thirteen research mathematicians, we provide a broad range of relevant aspects of definitions. In particular, we address various roles of definitions and show that definitions are not just a product of mathematical factors, but also of social and contingent factors. Furthermore, we provide concrete examples of how mathematicians interact and think about definition. This broad empirical basis with a variety of examples provides an optimal starting point for future investigations into definitions in mathematical practice.

A First Step Toward Ontic Pluralism in Mathematical Explanation

Although discussions about the nature of mathematical explanation are scarce in the philosophy literature, mathematical explanation plays an integral role in the philosophy of mathematical practice and has important consequences in other branches of philosophy. Various proposals are given to describe the criteria that make certain mathematical proofs more explanatory than others; however, none has been free from objections. These proposals also differ in important ways, which leads to the divergence of the two approaches to mathematical explanation: the ontic approach and the epistemic approach. This paper analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the popular proposals, defends the ontic approach, and proposes the ontic pluralism account. This new account addresses a significant problem of previous ontic proposals.

Understanding mathematical texts: a hermeneutical approach

The work done so far on the understanding of mathematical (proof) texts focuses mostly on logical and heuristical aspects; a proof text is considered to be understood when the reader is able to justify inferential steps occurring in it, to defend it against objections, to give an account of the “main ideas”, to transfer the proof idea to other contexts etc. (see, e.g., Avigad in The philosophy of mathematical practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). In contrast, there is a rich philosophical tradition dealing with the concept of understanding and interpreting texts, namely philosophical hermeneutics, represented, e.g., by Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger or Gadamer. In this tradition, “understanding” generally refers to the integration in a comprehensive (historical, existential, life-worldly, ...) context. In this article, we take some first steps towards exploring the question how the ideas from philosophical hermeneutics presented in Gadamer’s “Truth and Method” apply to mathematical texts and what (if anything) can be learned from these for the didactics and presentation of mathematics.

Between Pathology and Well-Behaviour – A Possible Foundation for Tame Mathematics

"An in-depth examination of the foundations of mathematics reveals how its treatment is centered around the topic of “unique foundation vs. no need for a foundation” in a traditional setting. In this paper, I show that by applying Shelah’s stability procedures to mathematics, we confine ourselves to a certain section that manages to escape the Gödel phenomenon and can be classified. We concentrate our attention on this mainly because of its tame nature. This result makes way for a new approach in foundations through model-theoretic methods. We then cover Penelope Maddy’s “foundational virtues” and what it means for a theory to be foundational. Having explored what a tame foundation can amount to, we argue that it can fulfil some of Maddy’s foundational qualities. In the last part, we will examine the consequences of this new paradigm – some philosophical in nature – on topics like philosophy of mathematical practice, the incompleteness theorems and others. Keywords: foundations of mathematics, tame mathematics, clarity-based knowledge, philosophy of mathematical practice, incompleteness theorems "

On the centenary of Zygmunt Janiszewski (1888-1920): ideals of mathematical practice and the constitution of continuum theory

This paper shows the importance of applying a certain approach to the history and philosophy of mathematical practice to the study of Zygmunt Janiszewski's contribution to the topological foundations of Continuum theory. In the first part, a biography of Janiszewski is presented. It emphasizes his role as one of the founders of the Polish School of Mathematics, and the social, political and military facets in which his intellectual character was revealed, as well as the values that guided his academic and scientific life. Kitcher's view of mathematical practice is then adopted to examine the philosophical conceptions and epistemological style of Janiszewski in relation to the construction of the formal axiomatic system of knowledge about the continua. Finally, it is shown the convenience of differentiating in Kitcher's approach, the methods, procedures, techniques and strategies of practice, and the aesthetic values of mathematics. Keywords: Zygmunt Janiszewski; Continuum theory; Philosophy of mathematical practice; Polish school of mathematics.

Philosophy of mathematical practice: a primer for mathematics educators

In recent years, philosophical work directly concerned with the practice of mathematics has intensified, giving rise to a movement known as the philosophy of mathematical practice. In this paper we offer a survey of this movement aimed at mathematics educators. We first describe the core questions philosophers of mathematical practice investigate as well as the philosophical methods they use to tackle them. We then provide a selective overview of work in the philosophy of mathematical practice covering topics including the distinction between formal and informal proofs, visualization and artefacts, mathematical explanation and understanding, value judgments, and mathematical design. We conclude with some remarks on the potential connections between the philosophy of mathematical practice and mathematics education.

John T. Baldwin, "Model Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice: Formalization without Foundationalism."

John T. Baldwin, "Model Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice: Formalization without Foundationalism."

Model Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice: Formalization without Foundationalism by John T. Baldwin

Model Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice: Formalization without Foundationalism by John T. Baldwin

Logic of imagination. Echoes of Cartesian epistemology in contemporary philosophy of mathematics and beyond

Descartes’ Rules for the direction of the mind presents us with a theory of knowledge in which imagination, considered as an “aid” for the intellect, plays a key role. This function of schematization, which strongly resembles key features of Proclus’ philosophy of mathematics, is in full accordance with Descartes’ mathematical practice in later works such as La Geometrie from 1637. Although due to its reliance on a form of geometric intuition, it may sound obsolete, I would like to show that this has strong echoes in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, in particular in the trend of the so called “philosophy of mathematical practice”. Indeed Ken Manders’ study on the Euclidean practice, along with Reviel Netz’s historical studies on ancient Greek Geometry, indicate that mathematical imagination can play a central role in mathematical knowledge as bearing specific forms of inference. Moreover, this role can be formalized into sound logical systems. One question of general epistemology is thus to understand this mysterious role of the imagination in reasoning and to assess its relevance for other mathematical practices. Drawing from Edwin Hutchins’ study of “material anchors” in human reasoning, I would like to show that Descartes’ epistemology of mathematics may prove to be a helpful resource in the analysis of mathematical knowledge.

The Practical Turn in Philosophy of Mathematics: A Portrait of a Young Discipline

In the present article, the current situation of the so-called philosophy of mathematical practice is discussed. First, its emergence is evaluated in relation to the “practical” turn in philosophy of science and in philosophy of mathematics. Second, the variety of approaches concerned with the practice of mathematics and the new topics being now object of research are introduced. Third, the possible replies to the question about what counts as mathematical practice are taken into account. Finally, some of the problems that are still open in the philosophy of mathematical practice are presented and some possible new directions of research considered.

Conceptual Metaphors and Mathematical Practice: On Cognitive Studies of Historical Developments in Mathematics

This article looks at recent work in cognitive science on mathematical cognition from the perspective of history and philosophy of mathematical practice. The discussion is focused on the work of Lakoff and Núñez, because this is the first comprehensive account of mathematical cognition that also addresses advanced mathematics and its history. Building on a distinction between mathematics as it is presented in textbooks and as it presents itself to the researcher, it is argued that the focus of cognitive analyses of historical developments of mathematics has been primarily on the former, even if they claim to be about the latter.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Philosophy of Mathematics

The philosophy of mathematics of the last few decades is commonly distinguished into mainstream and maverick, to which a ‘third way’ has been recently added, the philosophy of mathematical practice. In this paper the limitations of these trends in the philosophy of mathematics are pointed out, and it is argued that they are due to the fact that all of them are based on a top-down approach, that is, an approach which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of some general unproven assumption. As an alternative, a bottom-up approach is proposed, which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of the activity of real individuals and interactions between them. This involves distinguishing between mathematics as a discipline and the mathematics embodied in organisms as a result of biological evolution, which however, while being distinguished, are not opposed. Moreover, it requires a view of mathematical proof, mathematical definition and mathematical objects which is alternative to the top-down approach.

Mathematical Intuition (Poincaré, Polya, Dewey)

Practical calculation of the limit of a sequence often violates the definition of convergence to a limit as taught in calculus. Together with examples from Euler, Polya and Poincare, this fact shows that in mathematics, as in science and in everyday life, we are often obligated to use knowledge that is derived, not rigorously or deductively, but simply by making the best use of available information— plausible reasoning. The “philosophy of mathematical practice” fits into the general framework of “warranted assertibility,” the pragmatist view of the logic of inquiry developed by John Dewey.

Structuralism as a philosophy of mathematical practice

This paper compares the statement ‘Mathematics is the study of structure’ with the actual practice of mathematics. We present two examples from contemporary mathematical practice where the notion of structure plays different roles. In the first case a structure is defined over a certain set. It is argued firstly that this set may not be regarded as a structure and secondly that what is important to mathematical practice is the relation that exists between the structure and the set. In the second case, from algebraic topology, one point is that an object can be a place in different structures. Which structure one chooses to place the object in depends on what one wishes to do with it. Overall the paper argues that mathematics certainly deals with structures, but that structures may not be all there is to mathematics.