Philosophical Investigations Research Articles

Fallacy as Foundation of Post-Truth Knowledge and Knowing in LIS

How can library and information science (LIS) better promote epistemic vigilance and critical ethics toward post-truth (i.e., harmful; false; mis/dis/mal) information? This preliminary critical philosophical investigation argues LIS must go beyond considering mis/dis/mal information, and instead examine how post-truth shapes the process of producing mis/dis/mal epistemology through fallacies. Drawing from insights related to epistemicide and epistemic injustice in LIS, we reconsider post-truth and the modes of justification validating false beliefs as knowledge. We operationalize Fallacy 1 (“deceptively bad arguments”) and Fallacy 2 (“false popular belief”) to consider post-truth knowledge production. LIS faces an immediate pedagogical imperative of preparing information professionals to equitably mitigate fallacious harms inflicted by fake news proliferation, wavering information literacy, and the largely uncritical popularization of AI systems and tools which forcefully facilitate knower interactions with post-truth information. The evolving notions of post-truth information requires a critical ethical revolution for LIS.

What Socrates Learned From Parmenides. Part 1. Parmenides’ Gymnasia and Socrates’ Intellectual Virtues

This is the first of two studies in which I examine Plato’s account of Parmenides’ contribution to Socrates’ education. This account suggests, I argue, that Socrates became a virtuoso of the elenchos and the embodiment of fundamental intellectual virtues thanks to the gymnasia depicted in the Parmenides. I show how Parmenides’ eightfold routine is not a method of philosophical investigation strictly speaking; rather, it is a skill-building exercise that relies on memory and whose virtue is partly defensive. My demonstration is based on three sets of distinctions required to do justice to the preparatory character of Parmenides’ gymnasia. The first differentiates three types of intellectual virtues, the second two kinds of training methods, and the third, three telic modes.

Addendum to ‘Elements of the Philosophy of “Right”’

AbstractIn a paper called ‘Elements of the Philosophy of “Right”’ (Philosophical Investigations (2022):1–8), I gave an account of what ‘right’ means, both ethically and generally. I was surprised to find little or no previous work on this topic. I came to the conclusion that the word means the same thing in ethical uses as it does in other non‐ethical uses. However, I have since come to see that there is a seemingly convincing objection to my account, though I stand by the account as given. The objection itself turns out to be a confusion.

Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Bildungsroman literature: a guidebook for journeying home, seeing places anew, and encountering Land-based education

Abstract Guarding against reliance on his own biography and romantic tendencies in Bildungsroman literature, I draw parallels to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of the journey trope and place-based inquiry in the Philosophical Investigations, as an exploration of concept development and confusion that exhorts and guides readers in traversing the borderlands of their own cultural–linguistic practices. l recall Wittgenstein’s journey in search of himself: his retreat from Cambridge to a remote hut in Norway, leading him on a philosophical search for meaning. This self-transformative (Bildung) process of writing the Philosophical Investigations offers new ways for thinking the concept of ‘place’: not the bounding limit of things/beings; rather, working through the linguistic turn in philosophy, as potentially meaningful ‘sites’ in conceptually familiar/unfamiliar landscapes of native languages. The Investigations also carries ancient Heraclitian and Homeric tropes of homecoming and authenticity: ‘searching ourselves’ and ‘becoming who we are’, as found in Wittgenstein’s call to ‘know our way about’—rediscovering the grammatical order operating out of view but pervading the world as we see and know it, as well as setting its limits. Awareness of different languages of place is crucial to appreciating Indigenous discourses of Land-based education—a topic central to discussions of incorporating Indigenous knowledge while decolonizing education. Rethinking Bildungsroman literature in postcolonial terms—through the lens of reconciliation, renaissance, and resurgence —I call for careful listening to Indigenous peoples’ storied landscapes instead of fact-checking them: recognizing their sovereign right to self-govern their own education and resources. The goal is not to assess the truths of Land-based education, as in some epistemological inquiries, nor to make them accessible as pedagogical resources or instruments for non-Indigenous educators. The aim rather is to promote respect for its deep, nearly inaccessible context within Indigenous grammars and ways of life.

Deconstructing the Politics of Linguistic Mutation in Tom Stoppard’s Dogg’s Hamlet, Cahoot’s Macbeth

Tom Stoppard’s theatrical works, Dogg’s Hamlet, Cahoot’s Macbeth, serve as a significant exemplification of linguistic and political power dynamics. These plays represent a transformative shift that depicts the workings of hegemony in Czechoslovakia during the Cold War era. Stoppard, a Czechoslovakian native, crafted these satirical works in response to the brutal persecution of critical intellectuals and censorship of their dissident works. The plays voice the intellectual restlessness of the time, resisting the status quo, and illustrating the tensions that led to the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Stoppard’s innovative linguistic experimentation transforms Shakespeare’s plays, Hamlet and Macbeth, into an entirely novel linguistic system, named “Doggspeak,” which derives inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. This new linguistic transformation acts as a catalyst for social and political change, resisting surveillance and censorship of free speech. Stoppard’s plays, therefore, use language to alter power relations, creating space for political defiance. This paper delves into two key questions: How does Stoppard modify language in the dramatic setting, and how does this linguistic transformation shift power relations within the plays? By creating a new linguistic system, Stoppard outmanoeuvres oppressors and wittingly turns language into an instrument for political rebellion. He stages a truncated, mutant version of Shakespeare’s plays where they are banned, giving voice to the intellectual restlessness of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. Stoppard’s plays posit that language is not merely a tool for communication, but also a vehicle for social and political transformation. Through linguistic mutation, Stoppard subverts the existing power structures and challenges the hegemony of the oppressors. This essay argues that Stoppard’s plays showcase the crucial significance of language in the struggle for political and social change, emphasizing the crucial role that language plays in shaping our perceptions and understanding of the world.

It Starts With a Story: A Four-Step Narrative-Based Framework for Serious Illness Conversations.

Background: As a key component of advance care planning, serious illness conversations form a core intervention in palliative care. To achieve effective serious illness conversations, acknowledgment and inclusion of patient sense of self and identity are critical. However, no framework exists to describe how goals, values, and choices relate to patient identity. This conceptual gap hinders the advancement of palliative care education and practice. Objective: This philosophical investigation aimed to explicate two items: first, a novel conceptual framework for serious illness conversations; second, a structured approach to optimize these conversations within the palliative care clinical context. Methods: A philosophical and theoretical analysis was performed within an interdisciplinary context, by scholars in palliative care, medical humanities, philosophy, and bioethics. Key literature in psychology, qualitative research on the experience of serious illness, medical ethics, and choice architecture in medical decision-making were reviewed, and a structured conceptual and narrative analysis was performed. Results: An original and innovative identity-centered conceptual framework for serious illness conversations was developed. The framework consists of a four-step, reproducible approach: (1) attend to patient narrative identity, (2) identify values, (3) cocreate goals, and (4) actively promote choices. In short: attend, identify, create, and promote (AICP). Discussion: By using this conceptual framework and four-step approach, clinicians can accomplish goal-concordant serious illness care and build rich clinical relationships that foster trust and goodwill.

Wittgenstein on mathematics

AbstractThe mature Wittgenstein's groundbreaking analyses of sense and the logical must—and the powerful new method that made them possible—were the result of a multi‐year process of writing, re‐arranging, re‐writing and one large‐scale revision that eventually produced the Philosophical Investigations and RFM I. In contrast, his struggles during the same period with questions of arithmetic and higher mathematics remained largely in first‐draft form, and he drops the topic entirely after 1945. In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's new method can be applied to the cases of arithmetic and set theory and that the result is innovative, recognizably Wittgensteinian, and independently appealing. I conclude by acknowledging the reasons Wittgenstein himself might have had to resist applying his own proven method to the case of mathematics—particularly to set theory—and by indicating why I think those reasons are ultimately unsound.

A Philosophical Analysis of the Legitimacy of Political Power in Tanzania from a Lockean Perspective

This article conducts a philosophical analysis of the legitimacy of political power in Tanzania using John Locke’s political theory as a framework. It evolved from researcher’s observation and empirical studies that concerned political legitimacy in Tanzania. The lack of philosophical approach opened away for philosophical investigations and the necessity of involving philosophical views like that of the John Locke, in addressing of the shaking political legitimacy in Tanzania. The factors such as; allegations of corruption, restricted freedom of expression and limited access to justice, stimulated the author into philosophical inquiring, in accordance to John Locke’s political philosophy on the theory of legitimacy of political power. The Article examines how Locke’s principles of consent, protection of individual rights, and limited government apply within Tanzania’s socio-political context. The study highlights significant challenges to political legitimacy, including allegations of electoral manipulation, constraints on political freedoms, and governance issues such as corruption and lack of transparency. Recommendations are proposed to enhance democratic governance and accountability in Tanzania, emphasizing the critical need to strengthen electoral integrity, protect fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and assembly, and bolster institutional frameworks for transparency and judicial independence. By applying Locke’s principles, this analysis aims to contribute insights into the dynamics of political authority in Tanzania and suggest pathways for fostering a more inclusive, accountable, and legitimate governance framework aligned with the aspirations of its citizens.

Nature's value and biodiversity ethics in a changing world: Insights from a special issue and questions for the future

Motivated by philosophical quandaries arising from environmental ethics and the moral philosophy of biodiversity, we convened a special issue of Biological Conservation entitled “Ethics and practice of biodiversity science: how hidden moral assumptions impact conservation research and policy,” inviting a range of expert voices to examine these questions from a variety of perspectives, backgrounds, and traditions. We sought to discover how many of the founding value statements of conservation biology were still current, and if new any ones had supplemented or replaced them. Broad initial momentum from a wide range of contributors soon met with the headwinds of the COVID-19 pandemic, but we eventually emerged with 34 global contributors representing a diverse array of viewpoints. The contributed pieces range from philosophical investigations of value in Nature, applied conservation ethics for endangered species, the rights and roles of Indigenous peoples, macroevolutionary processes of mass extinction, human well-being and social justice, the history of colonialism in conservation, and subtle cultural differences between global powers with respect to Nature. All speak to often unstated values in conservation science. Finally, we offer some questions of our own stemming from these contributions that might provide new or expanded avenues for investigation.

Deep disagreement across moral revolutions

Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral revolution adopt different standards for assessing the merits of a moral argument, and according to the standards they adopt, agents on neither side of the revolution ought to accept the arguments being put forward by those on the other. This threatens to undermine the progressive status of many of our most celebrated historical examples of moral revolutions: if a moral revolution only looks progressive in light of a change in evaluative standards it itself brought about, then moral progress seems relative to a particular historical perspective; if prior to a moral revolution taking place the moral arguments in its favour fall short of the relevant standards, moral revolutions can never be the outcome of rational argumentation. This apparent relativism and irrationality sits uncomfortably alongside our common-sense intuition that the moral revolutions upon which our contemporary moral worldview rests count as genuine moral progress. In this paper, I deepen currently popular Kuhnian-inspired accounts of moral revolution by incorporating Wittgensteinian ideas from Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. The result is an original way of thinking about deep moral disagreements, moral revolutions, and moral progress.

Ryle’s Conceptual Cartography A Brief Introduction

Conceptual Cartography is a style of philosophical investigation, named and championed by Gilbert Ryle and somewhat akin to, but independent from, Wittgenstein’s examination of ‘language games’ in Philosophical Investigations. This study examines the impetus for this method which includes difficulties with the traditional approaches to conceptual analysis initiated by Plato’s Socrates and encouraged by later work in formal logic.

A Note on “Philosophical Investigations into AI Alignment: A Wittgensteinean Framework” by J.A. Pérez-Escobar and D. Sarikaya

A Note on “Philosophical Investigations into AI Alignment: A Wittgensteinean Framework” by J.A. Pérez-Escobar and D. Sarikaya

Purposiveness, transcendental ideas, andphilosophical history. Notes on the Idea for aUniversal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, in lightof the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique ofPure Reason

This paper aims to point to relationship between Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) and Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (IaG). Specifically, it seeks to show the theoretical and methodological foundation that the principle of purposiveness and the systematicity of reason, as presented in the KrV, offer to Kant’s philosophical conception of history in the IaG. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents – as problematic – the premises that, in the introduction to the IaG, Kant adopts in his philosophical investigation of history. The second section focuses on the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, examining the legitimate use of transcendental ideas, as well as their indeterminate objective necessity. Finally, the third section examines some propositions of the IaG, suggesting that the repercussion of the Transcendental Dialectic on the IaG allows us to understand Kant’s distinctive investigative method in philosophical history.

Francis Bacon and the Scientific Revolution: a new interpretation of nature?

This article examines the interpretation of nature from the perspective of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), highlighting how his ideas influenced the development of modern science. Francis Bacon proposed a revolutionary approach to scientific and philosophical investigation, emphasizing empirical observation and controlled experimentation. His main work, Novum Organum, published in 1620, introduced the inductive method as a means of discovering truths about nature, criticizing the Aristotelian deductive approach. Furthermore, Bacon emphasized the importance of experimentation as a way to avoid biases and distortions in human thought, introducing the theory of idols to explain the pitfalls of thinking. His contributions to modern science include the promotion of the scientific method and the valuing of experimentation as pathways to seeking truth. It is concluded that the philosopher left an indelible mark on the history of science, reminding us of the importance of empirical observation, experimentation, and the systematization of knowledge, which ultimately influenced the development of science in the following centuries.

Philosophical Underpinnings of Counselling Psychology

Because I have so little time in which to tackle such a basic and important issue I shall limit myself to sketching the fundamental contradictions and pitfalls that are to be found underneath the smooth presentations of this new discipline of counselling psychology. It seems to me all the more important to take this opportunity to ask some pertinent questions and challenge some of the preconceptions around the aims and objectives of counselling psychology as it will be tempting for most of us to launch headlong into the professionalization of the field in order to achieve credibility. In making these few remarks I shall therefore speak from the perspective of the philosopher as defined by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, where he declares that “the work of a philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (Wittgenstein, 1953). My purpose will be clear in a minute.

Philosophical Investigations into AI Alignment: A Wittgensteinian Framework

We argue that the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and mathematics, substantially focused on rule-following, is relevant to understand and improve on the Artificial Intelligence (AI) alignment problem: his discussions on the categories that influence alignment between humans can inform about the categories that should be controlled to improve on the alignment problem when creating large data sets to be used by supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms, as well as when introducing hard coded guardrails for AI models. We cast these considerations in a model of human–human and human–machine alignment and sketch basic alignment strategies based on these categories and further reflections on rule-following like the notion of meaning as use. To sustain the validity of these considerations, we also show that successful techniques employed by AI safety researchers to better align new AI systems with our human goals are congruent with the stipulations that we derive from the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, their application may benefit from the added specificities and stipulations of our framework: it extends on the current efforts and provides further, specific AI alignment techniques. Thus, we argue that the categories of the model and the core alignment strategies presented in this work can inform further AI alignment techniques.

Fanon’s Postcolonial Critique of Hegelian Recognition and Buck-Morss’ Haiti Thesis

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.F.W. Hegel’s concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel’s original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss’ seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel’s possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I conclude that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss’ insights are unable to fully vindicate Hegel from the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel’s phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims.

Theology, Religious Studies, and Philosophy of Religion as Humanistic Disciplines: Critical Reflections on Realism

This metaphilosophical paper discusses the nature of the philosophy of religion as an academic discipline. It may seem self-evident that the philosophy of religion is one of the humanities – along with neighboring fields of research within theology and religious studies – but it may also be argued that this is not obvious at all, as philosophical investigation can study the way the world is at the fundamental metaphysical level. Philosophers of religion, in particular, may claim to “directly” discuss the question of God’s existence vs. non-existence. The paper argues that settling the metaphilosophical question about the nature of the philosophy of religion presupposes considering the underlying issue of realism. From a transcendental-pragmatist perspective, the philosophy of religion is a humanistic discipline, but this cannot be non-circularly demonstrated to those presupposing metaphysical realism.

God, Philosophers and Theologians in Africa

There is renewed interest in philosophical and theological investigations about God, religions and the implications of religious beliefs among philosophers and theologians in Africa. This development is itself profitable because the question or the problem of God is a relevant discourse in Africa where the majority of people are theists. However, unlike the exploration of the first-generation African scholars—philosophers and theologians—whose primary objective was to show the symmetry between Christianity and African Traditional Religions (ATR), contemporary discourses arise within the clamour for decoloniality. The investigations, with varied emphasis, advocate the decolonisation of the concept of God, epistemic decolonisation, decolonisation of Christianity and African Christian theology, etc. In this essay, I critically examine the contemporary decolonial discourse about God, divine attributes, religious belief, and the relationship between African Christian theology and ATR. I argue that most of the contemporary literature is entangled in conceptual convolution and as such, there is a lack of clarity about what needs to be decolonised. Put differently, most works do not clearly distinguish between reality (the person or phenomenon “God”), thought (the concept “God”), and conceptions of God (language, that is, the terms and images used in making assertions about God). Further, I argue that when conceptual clarifications are adequately attended to, there is no need for decolonisation of discourses about God, divine nature, divine attributes, and the relationship between Christianity and ATR.

From the Ordinary to the Everyday

Abstract This is a new English translation of “De l’ordinaire au quotidien,” originally published in French in 2023. In paragraph 116 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein seems to outline the fundamental goal of his philosophy: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” The everyday use to which Wittgenstein constantly refers is far from self-evident: it is just as elusive and indeterminate as our forms of life. The project of Philosophical Investigations is not to replace disqualified logic with the study of use, finding therein a new foundation or new convictions, even purely practical ones. The study of everyday language use presents new problems, arduous in a different way from those of logical analysis, as J. L. Austin and the Oxford School later showed—the same school that, in coining the term Ordinary language philosophy, formalized the Ordinary rather than the Everyday as a central concept. The present article considers several reasons for returning to the concept of the Everyday, Wittgenstein’s point of departure, in the philosophy of language.