Philosophical Expertise Research Articles

A (moderate) skill-based defense of the expertise defense

ABSTRACT The expertise defense is the best-known response by armchair philosophers to the challenge posed by experimental philosophers regarding the trustworthiness of intuitions. In a series of recent experiments, Experimental philosophers have recently focused on professional philosophers, claiming that, contrary to what the expertise defense assumes, philosophers’ intuitions are no less susceptible to the influence of irrelevant factors (the direct strategy). Additionally, drawing from literature on expertise, they contend that, unlike other domains of expertise, practice does not improve philosophers’ intuitions (the indirect strategy). In this paper, adopting a skill-based perspective on expertise, my primary objective is to defend the expertise defense against both direct and indirect strategies. Based on the skill-based account, I present three arguments against the direct strategy by challenging its power, scope and methodology. Furthermore, borrowing empirical findings from recent literature on expertise, I argue against the indirect strategy that four skills that constitute philosophical expertise regarding thought experiments can be improved through various forms of practice, including deliberate practice. However, my moderate defense departs from typical versions of the expertise defense since I argue that while recent experiments by experimental philosophers cannot undermine the expertise defense, they provide valuable insights into philosophical expertise.

Philosophical Intuitions about Socially Significant Language

Abstract As we theorize about philosophy of language that bears on social and political issues, it is worth revisiting the methodological question of how we as theorists rely on our philosophical and linguistic intuitions, and what assumptions underlie our justification of such a reliance. Two threads in the philosophical literature are relevant to this question: the discussion of situatedness in feminist epistemology and the debate about philosophical expertise and philosophical intuitions. I argue that philosophers examining social and political philosophy of language should be careful—perhaps more careful than we have been—when we rely on our intuitions to draw conclusions about socially significant language, such as racist, sexist, homophobic, and other derogatory speech. I don’t claim we should give up relying on our intuitions. Instead, I argue that we should be more explicit that our intuitions are limited, and open to the possibility that they might not align with the intuitions of those who have more experience with the kinds of speech we are analyzing. As a result, we might find that the conclusions we draw from our intuitions have to be revised or qualified.

The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will

This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines.

Ο Ιάκωβος Αργείος (ca 1660-1736) στην Πατριαρχική Σχολή

Iakovos Argeios (ca 1660-1736) at the Patriarchal Academy of Constantinople. New evidence and answers for an old riddle
 Research into the history of the Patriarchal Academy at the beginning of the 18th century has been primarily based on the works of Manuel Gedeon and Tasos Gritsopoulos. These two historians have recorded and reconstructed all the testimonies and information they had gathered about the operation of the Academy. However, the sources at their disposal were extremely scarce for this period in terms of teachers, such as Iakovos Argeios (1660-1736), on whom the present study focuses, and their teaching activities at the School. The aim of this article is to present the new data which emerged from the identification and study of unknown manuscripts as well as from the study of the scholar’s personal correspondence. These facts militate against Tasos Gritsopoulos’ dominant view that Iakovos was exclusively a home teacher of the Mavrokordatos’family and that his teaching career at the Patriarchal Academy was limited in time (i.e. confined in the years 1707-1715).In this study I examine and reconstruct all the existing testimonies and evidence that I found on the life and work of Iakovos Argeios, “the supreme of the Great Church philosophers”. Through these new data it becomes possible to study and trace the career of Iakovos Argeios at the Patriarchal Academy from the mid-1680s until his death (1736). Iakovos was initially a student in the philosophy course of the Academy (1684), when Antonios Spantones was a professor of philosophy. He completed his studies around 1686/87 and he attracted the interest of his teachers and of the Grand Dragoman Alexandros Mavrokordatos. He subsequently served as tutor to the Mavrokordatos’ family (since the beginning of the 1690s) for at least 20-25 years, while almost at the same time he was appointed professor of rhetoric at the Academy. As a prominent professor he delivered two encomiastic addresses to the Ecumenical Patriarchs Kallinikos II (1698) and Gabriel II (1703).Then, probably in 1702, he was appointed Academy’s headmaster and professor of philosophy. He taught rhetoric theory and practise and Aristotelian philosophy from the textbooks of Theophilos Korydalleus, as evidenced by the manuscripts of his students presented in this article, mainly Antonios Byzantios, Nikolaos Kritias and Azarias Tzigalas: Physics, Logic, On the Soul, On generation and corruption. He also received from the Patriarchate the highly-esteemed office of the “supreme of thephilosophers” (around 1707-1709), through Mavrokordatos’ intervention, as a recognition of his philosophical expertise. He retained this title and remained head of the Academy until the end of his life. From his letters we know that Iakovos was present in Methodios Anthrakites’ conviction (1723). He supported in deeds and words the efforts of Silvestros, the Patriarch of Antioch, to establish a Greek and Christian seminary in Aleppo (1724-1726). Unfortunately, the last years of his life were painful due to health problems and the ingratitude of his old friends. Iakovos found solace only in teaching at the Academy and in correspondence with his dear friends and old students, such as Makarios Kalogeras, who had founded a school on the island of Patmos. For the teachers and students of the School of Patmos, Iakovos was their mentor and spiritual guide. In conclusion, Iakovos Argeios had an important influence on the course of the Patriarchal Academy with his long lasting and constant teaching activity. In his time the Patriarchal Academy became a true “Faculty of Philosophy”.

STUDI HALAL BERDASARKAN PENDEKATAN EPISTEMOLOGI


 
 
 This research aims to conduct a study of the halal concept based on an epistemological approach. An epistemological approach is used to analyze the ways humans gain knowledge about the concept of halal in Islam, including through experience, religious authority, and scientific methods. This research will examine literature from main sources related to the concept of halal in Islam, as well as analyze various epistemological approaches used in understanding the concept of halal. It is hoped that the results of this research will provide a deeper understanding of the concept of halal and how humans gain knowledge about halal in the context of the Islamic religion. The research method used is literature study and qualitative analysis, as well as a compilation of literature from religious and philosophical experts. The conclusion of this research is that halal epistemology is the basis that explains how halal processes are applied both in the legal and social realms. This concept is understood from the results of studies conducted by Muslim scholars.
 
 

Why the Heck Would You Do Philosophy?

Philosophy plausibly aims at knowledge; it would thus be tempting to hold that much of the value of doing philosophy turns on securing knowledge. Enter the agnostic challenge: suppose that a philosophical agnostic (named 'Betsy‘) wants to discover only fundamental philosophical truths. However, the intractable disagreement among philosophical experts gives her pause. After reflecting on expert disagreement, she decides that doing philosophy, for her truth-seeking error-avoiding purposes, is irrational. In this paper, I argue that the agnostic challenge isn‘t easily overcome. Although there are many reasons to do philosophy, the agnostic challenge implies there is less value to doing philosophy than many philosophers may have believed.

Understanding philosophy

ABSTRACT What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or falsity of a candidate’s philosophical views? We argue that philosophy does not aim at discovering true answers to philosophical questions. Instead, its primary intellectual aim is understanding. We argue that many familiar aspects of philosophy become intelligible once we accept this hypothesis.

Identification and Prioritization of Factors Affecting Knowledge Concealment By Managers in Guilan University of Medical Sciences by AHP Hierarchical Method

Background and Aim Hiding knowledge in the organization is a new topic in the field of knowledge management. The purpose of this study is to identify and prioritize the factors affecting knowledge concealment by managers in Guilan University of Medical Sciences by AHP hierarchical method. Methods & Materials The research is applied in terms of purpose and based on a qualitative-quantitative approach. The statistical population of the study included philosophical experts in the field of management and experimental experts of the University of Medical Sciences who were selected as a sample by purposive sampling method and snowball technique until the theoretical saturation was reached. The data collection tool was a semi-structured interview. After enumerating the indicators affecting knowledge concealment and then by hierarchical analysis (AHP) method and using Expert Choice11 software, the identified factors were prioritized. Ethical Considerations In this research, prior to interviewing the experts, written consent was received from them regarding the confidentiality of the research (Code: IR.IAU.LIAU.REC.1401.002). Results The research findings showed that among the 7 effective factors considered by experts, the power-seeking factor has the greatest impact on knowledge concealment by managers in the University of Medical Sciences and emotional intelligence has the least weight or importance. Conclusion Accordingly, by reducing power-seeking, in addition to creating a transparent and reliable atmosphere, it is possible to establish knowledge sharing in the University of Medical Sciences.

Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test

ABSTRACT The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary ‘immune experts’ version of the expertise defence and an ‘informed experts’ version. On the informed expertise defence, we argue, philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments could be preferable to those by the folk even if it were true that philosophers’ judgments are no less immune to confounders than judgments by the folk are. We present results from an experimental study comparing philosophers and non-philosophers (n = 484), which support this version of the expertise defence.

Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments

ABSTRACT According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well-known biases of judgment and decision-making among expert ethicists and laypeople. We found that even expert ethicists are affected by some of these biases, but also that they enjoy a slight advantage over laypeople in some cases. We discuss the implications of these results for the expertise defence, and conclude that they still do not support the defence as it is typically presented in (moral) philosophy.

The brittleness of expertise and why it matters

Expertise has become a topic of increased interest to philosophers. Fascinating in its own right, expertise also plays a crucial role in several philosophical debates. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important, and hitherto unappreciated feature of expertise: its brittleness. Experts are often unable to transfer their proficiency in one domain to other, even intuitively similar domains. Experts are often unable to flexibly respond to changes within their domains. And, even more surprisingly, experts will occasionally be outperformed by novices when confronted with novel circumstances within their domains of expertise. In section 1, I marshal the evidence in favour of brittleness. In section 2, I argue that appeals to brittleness can advance the dialectic in debates on skilled action and provide reasons to reject a powerful recent argument offered by Christensen et al. (Philos Psychol 32(5): 693–719, 2019). In section 3, I appeal to brittleness to argue against a common conception of philosophical expertise, according to which philosophers possess a domain-general set of reasoning skills. Although my argument in this section is largely negative, there is a twist. Recalibrating our understanding of philosophical expertise opens new avenues of research for defenders of the so-called ‘expertise defence’ against the findings of experimental philosophy.

A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem

ABSTRACT Champions of the methodological movement of experimental philosophy have challenged the long-standing practice of relying on intuitive verdicts on cases in philosophical inquiry. They argue that their findings show that the verdicts of experts in philosophy are affected by factors not normally thought to be relevant to the truth of those verdicts. This paper offers an emended version of the expertise reply and explains why the new findings of experimental philosophers do not undermine philosophical expertise and the probative force of verdicts from the method of cases..

Philosophical Expertise

TheoriaVolume 86, Issue 2 p. 139-144 Editorial Philosophical Expertise Sven Ove Hansson, Corresponding Author Sven Ove Hansson soh@kth.se soh@kth.seSearch for more papers by this author Sven Ove Hansson, Corresponding Author Sven Ove Hansson soh@kth.se soh@kth.seSearch for more papers by this author First published: 16 April 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12239Citations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume86, Issue2April 2020Pages 139-144 RelatedInformation

Moral-Philosophical Expertise as a Tool of Evolution of Law (A Case Study of Program-Strategic Documents)

The article deals with the balance between morality and law. The author raises the issue of the need to increase the authority of law by means of moral and philosophical expertise. The paper focuses on the question of the need to develop the technology of moral and philosophical expertise. An attempt is made to conduct a moral and philosophical expertise on the basis of program and strategic documents, namely: «Strategy for action in t he interests of senior citizens in the Russian Federation 2025» and «The Concept of Implementation of the State Policy on Reduction of Alcohol Abuse and Prevention of Alcoholism among the Population of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020.» On the basis of the analysis of these documents the conclusion is made about the necessity of carrying out moral and philosophical examination in order to increase the efficiency of implementation of program-strategic documents. In addition, the author highlights the lack of the definition of the legal status of program and strategic documents at the legislative level, as well as the order and consistent system of adoption of such documents, which results in their ineffectiveness.

In Defence of Armchair Expertise

AbstractIn domains like stock brokerage, clinical psychiatry, and long‐term political forecasting, experts generally fail to outperform novices. Empirical researchers agree on why this is: experts must receive direct or environmental learning feedback during training to develop reliable expertise, and these domains are deficient in this type of feedback. A growing number of philosophers resource this consensus view to argue that, given the absence of direct or environmental philosophical feedback, we should not give the philosophical intuitions or theories of expert philosophers greater credence than those of novice philosophers. This article has three objectives. The first is to explore several overlooked issues concerning the strategy of generalizing from empirical studies of non‐philosophical expertise to the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. The second is to explain why empirical research into a causal relationship between direct learning feedback and enhanced expert performance does not provide good grounds for abandoning a default optimism about the epistemic superiority of expert philosophical theories. The third is to sketch a positive characterization of learning feedback that addresses developmental concerns made salient by the empirical literature on expert performance for specifically theory‐driven or “armchair” domains like philosophy.

On the Edge of Bultmann’s Demythologisation

This study explores Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s (d. 1905) attitude towards interpreting the Qur’an as a source of scientific knowledge through analysing the fruitful phase of his intellectual project in which he wrote a commentary on some chapters of the Qur’an. Relying on three arguments, the study concludes that ‘Abduh rejects the notion that the Qur’an is a source of scientific knowledge since he claims such scientific phenomena are mentioned in the Qur’an for the sake of reasoning only and knowing God’s blessings. The three arguments are: first, ‘Abduh’s hermeneutics in which he stands with the philosophers’ ones against the scholars’ polemics. Second, applying the rule “al-dāl ‘ala al-wuqū’ dāl ‘ala al-imkān” (Its existence is a proof for its possibility to exist) on his commentary and thus a clear statement shall prove his attitude. Third, reading ‘Abduh’s project as an attempt to revive Avicenna’s hermeneutics through modern science. In addition, the study compares ‘Abduh with Bultmann’s demythologisation and concludes that ‘Abduh’s medieval philosophical expertise – Kalām – in addition to the nature of the language of the Qur’an prevented him from fully rejecting the worldview of scripture as what Bultmann did. Lastly, I have argued that the Qur’anic concept of God in addition to the cosmographical one could be demythologised in accordance with ‘Abduh’s hermeneutics.

Why the Empirical Study of Non-philosophical Expertise Does not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise

In some domains (meteorology, live-stock judging, chess, etc.) experts perform better than novices, and in other domains (clinical psychiatry, long-term political forecasting, financial advising, etc.) experts do not generally perform better than novices. According to empirical studies of expert performance, this is because the former but not the latter domains make available to training practitioners a direct form of learning feedback. Several philosophers resource this empirical literature to cast doubt on the quality of philosophical expertise. They claim that philosophy is like the dubious domains in that it does not make available the good, direct kind of learning feedback, and thus there are empirical grounds for doubting the epistemic quality of philosophical expertise. I examine the empirical studies that are purportedly bad news for professional philosophers. On the basis of that examination, I provide three reasons why the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise does not undermine the status of philosophical expertise. First, the non-philosophical task-types from which the critics generalize are unrepresentative of relevant philosophical task-types. Second, empirical critiques of non-philosophical experts are often made relative to the performance of linear models—a comparison that is inapt in a philosophical context. Third, the critics fail to discuss findings from the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise that have more favorable implications for the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. In addition to discussing implications for philosophical expertise, this article makes progress in the philosophical analysis of the science of expertise and expert development.

TECHNOLOGIZATION OF THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES THE VALUES DIMENTION

One of the key trends in modern society is globalization. The necessary feature of globalization processes is technologization. It undoubtedly influences the formation and translation of values, but the question arises to what extent this effect is positive. The purpose of the research is to reveal the value aspect of the technologization in the context of globalization processes. Economic, political and social globalization has different peculiarities of the transformation of values, which requires an individual approach during a humanitarian and philosophical examination. It is proved that the analysis of value changes under the influence of technologization and globalization is necessary for the control and regulation of processes taking place in society. So, social globalization indirectly uses technology, the exchange of values that is now possible through technology, when the Internet serves as a platform for international interaction and communication, promotes a better understanding of other cultures, and thus fosters respect for them. It is substantiated that processes of social globalization are long-term and require strict control in order to exclude the probability of loss of certain basic values such as identity, cultural peculiarity. It is determined that technologization in the conditions of economic and political globalization is a catalyst for the creation of new values, or replacement of the old ones. The democratization of the world and civil society are the new values through the spread of technological advances, but they present a threat to the national state and fragmented society, which defines national identity. The consequences of the transformation of values in economic and political globalization are analyzed. The results are not unambiguous, since there is a risk of loss of the core values, so this process should be controlled by humanitarian and philosophical expertise, consultation and assessment of economic and political processes.

Teaching police ethics: analysis of an increasingly complex teaching context

ABSTRACTThe importance of ethics in policing and, therefore, in police education and training, is widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, disagreement often exists about the ways in which police ethics subjects should be taught and who should teach them. In this paper, three areas of debate will be critiqued, with the aim of arriving at principled responses to the underlying issues. The first issue will be whether police ethics subjects should include any ethical theory and, if so, to what extent. Related to this, but also a distinct issue in itself, is the question of whether standalone police ethics subjects should be valued over dispersing ethics learning throughout a police curriculum (e.g. as a ‘golden thread‘ running through every subject). Finally, the question of who should teach police ethics subjects will be considered. Here, the issues largely revolve around the relevant significance of philosophical expertise, knowledge and critical analysis as compared to policing expertise. Importantly, the principled responses developed in the paper will not only be theoretically sound. They will also take account of the real-world conditions in which many police ethics subjects are delivered, particularly situations where agreements in place require police ethics subjects to be taught by both police officers and academics.

Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson Journal of Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard Philosophy Compass 3, 93–118, 2008a, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 147–90 2008b, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, 439–67 2009, 2011) hold, contra Ryle (1946, 1949), that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why (e.g., Salmon 1984; Lipton 2004; Woodward 2003; Grimm The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 515–35, 2006; Greco 2009; Kelp 2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g., Carter and Pritchard Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 181–99, 2015a, Noûs 49, 440–53, 2015b, Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93, 799–816, 2015c) according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success that is primarily creditable to cognitive ability). We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment.