Philosophical Constraints Research Articles

Promises and Perils of Big Data: Philosophical Constraints on Chemical Ontologies.

Chemistry is experiencing a paradigm shift in the way it interacts with data. So-called "big data" are collected and used at unprecedented scales with the idea that algorithms can be designed to aid in chemical discovery. As data-enabled practices become ever more ubiquitous, chemists must consider the organization and curation of their data, especially as it is presented to both humans and increasingly intelligent algorithms. One of the most promising organizational schemes for big data is a construct termed an ontology. In data science, ontologies are systems that represent relations among objects and properties in a domain of discourse. As chemistry encounters larger and larger data sets, the ontologies that support chemical research will likewise increase in complexity, and the future of chemistry will be shaped by the choices made in developing big data chemical ontologies. How such ontologies will work should therefore be a subject of significant attention in the chemical community. Now is the time for chemists to ask questions about ontology design and use: How should chemical data be organized? What can be reasonably expected from an organizational structure? Is a universal ontology tenable? As some of these questions may be new to chemists, we recommend an interdisciplinary approach that draws on the long history of philosophers of science asking questions about the organization of scientific concepts, constructs, models, and theories. This Perspective presents insights from these long-standing studies and initiates new conversations between chemists and philosophers.

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

The paper comprehensively highlights the contours of Judicial Review, along with historical evolution of doctrine in United States of America. It also attempts to discuss transformative tendencies of judiciary from being a reticent institution to an interventionist one. Furthermore, it extensively dilates upon the conceptual anomalies of judicial review along with its ever-expanding scope in executive and legislative realm. Lastly, it holistically examines the practical limitations as well as philosophical constraints of the concept.

An alternative conceptualisation of coach expertise

ABSTRACT The coaching industry has grown to become a multi-billion dollar business, yet there remain few barriers to entry and an absence of national governing bodies. Wide variation in quality of practice undermines the credibility of a field that has been found to be effective (Grover, S., & Furnham, A. (2016). Coaching as a developmental intervention in organisations: A systematic review of its effectiveness and the mechanisms underlying it. PLoS One, 11(7), e0159137. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0159137; Theeboom, T., Beersma, B., & van Vianen, A. E. (2014). Does coaching work? A meta-analysis on the effects of coaching on individual level outcomes in an organizational context. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 9(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2013.837499). Coaching stakeholders should therefore be motivated to understand what ‘good coaching’ looks like. However, it remains unclear what it means to be an outstanding, or expert, practitioner, or even whether the construct of expertise applies to the field of coaching. Within this paper, I critique literature that discusses coach expertise, and suggest the philosophical constraints embedded within current thinking imply the need for an alternative conceptualisation of expertise; adaptive expertise. Adaptive expertise is compatible with the complexity that characterises coaching, and prioritises coach decision-making (judgment and reasoning) over coaching outcomes. Many coaching texts largely ignore the construct of decision-making, with the exception of intuitive decision-making. Further research that seeks to understand coach judgment and decision-making will help coaches’ develop their practice, and may be a key to demystifying the central role of intuition in coaching.

Messias Jesus. Seine Geschichte, seine Botschaft und ihre Überlieferung

Messias Jesus. Seine Geschichte, seine Botschaft und ihre Überlieferung

Programming in Groups: developing industry-facing software development skills in the undergraduate mathematics curriculum

Programming is increasingly becoming an expected graduate skill for mathematics students. We argue in this article that programming should be given the same priority as any other graduate skill. Given the practical and philosophical constraints placed on undergraduate mathematics curricula, however, we acknowledge the difficulty in introducing, in a meaningful way, many of the core ideas of programming. We therefore present a case study of a second year course on an undergraduate mathematics programme that introduces Object Oriented Programming and aspects of software design, as well as key practical skill such as version control. We will argue that group assessment in this context is a more natural setting for students to be working and reflects more closely the experience of programming in industry; furthermore, it serves as a convenient platform to introduce students to aspects of software design and practical programming considerations. We will present an example of the type of assessment that can be used and how Version Control Systems like Git can be used to give students a more realistic experience of programming with the advantage of allowing tutors and other group members to track student work.

Philosophical Constraints on Normativity

Philosophical Constraints on Normativity

A proposed mechanism for mind-brain interaction using extended Bohmian quantum mechanics in Avicenna's monotheistic perspective

In quantum approaches to consciousness, the authors try to propose a model and mechanism for the mind-brain interaction using modern physics and some quantum concepts which do not exist in the classical physics. The independent effect of mind on the brain has been one of the challenging issues in the history of science and philosophy. In some recent mind-brain interaction models, the direct influence of mind on matter is either not accepted (as in Stapp's model) or not clear, and there have not been any clear mechanism for it (as in Penrose-Hameroff's model or in Eccles's model). In this manuscript we propose a model and mechanism for mind's effect on the matter using an extended Bohmian quantum mechanics and Avicenna's ideas. We show that mind and mental states can affect brain's activity without any violation of physical laws. This is a mathematical and descriptive model which shows the possibility of providing a causal model for mind's effect on matter. It is shown that this model guarantees the realistic philosophical constraints and respects the laws of nature. In addition, it is shown that it is in agreement with the Libet style experimental results and parapsychological data.To propose this model, we obtained a modified (non-unitary) Schrödinger equation via second quantization method which affects the particle through a modified quantum potential and a new term in the continuity equation. At the second quantized level, which is equivalent to quantum field theory level (QFT), we can use the path integral formalism of Feynman. We show that there are three methods to extend Bohmian QM via path integral formalism, which has different interpretations. By numerical simulation of trajectories in the two-slits experiment, we show their differences and choose one of these methods for our mind-brain model which can be the basis for explaining some phenomena which are not possible to explain in the standard Bohmian QM.

Beyond the third moment? Mapping the state of qualitative tourism research

ABSTRACTThis paper poses a central question: what is the present moment in qualitative tourism research? To answer this, the authors review the state of contemporary qualitative tourism research over the past decade (2007–2017), against current progress in the social sciences. Specifically, a systematic bibliometric analysis of tourism journals was undertaken to determine how tourism scholarship maps against Denzin and Lincoln’s social science ‘moments’. These moments prove useful in heuristically framing the development of qualitative social research and thinking; from early moments characterized by positivist ways of knowing, through to later moments where scholars struggle through and beyond the crisis of representation. Using an adapted moments-based framework, our analysis of 1541 qualitative papers across 51 tourism journals indicates that the majority of papers are emblematic of ‘early moment’ thinking. Despite clear evidence of a crisis of representation in some areas, and an increase in the number of qualitative papers published, there is a lack of ‘later moment’ thinking, methodology and/or approach. The political, social and philosophical constraints and opportunities presented by these findings are discussed.

Why are scientists so quiet? Cultural and philosophical constraints on the public voice of the scientist

Why are scientists so quiet? Cultural and philosophical constraints on the public voice of the scientist

INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY AND COASEAN INVARIANCE IN PROPERTY AFFAIRS

1. IntroductionLegal rules about bundles of rights (or property law) are answers to questions such as those raised by Cooter and Ulen (p. 71): How are ownership rights established? What can be privately owned? What may owners do with their property? What are remedies for violation of property rights? Answers (legal rules) are drafted subject to, primarily, various philosophical constraints as well as security and economic pragmatism.Property law is influenced by philosophical views. According to liberal philosopher John Rawls, as explained by Sen (p. 12), we ought to desire to establish institutions, firmly chosen for basic structure of society (which) would demand one specific resolution of principles of but he does not explain the difficulties in arriving at a unique set of principles to guide institutional choice. Sen questions this Rawlsian notion of transcendental institutionalism and he doubts that it is either possible or essential; in turn, he states that there is simply a plurality of philosophical principles (not only Rawls's liberal principles) that justify conflicting property claims.1 As stated by Cooter and Ulen (pp. 107-110), property has capability to advance, among other, utilitarianism, justice, liberty and selfexpression. More specifically,On utilitarian grounds, it can be taken from (a person) in principle if beneficiaries of expropriation gain more in utility than owner loses.On distributive justice grounds, in Aristotle's conception, aristocrats use (wealth) for more worthy ends than do others. (Therefore), redistribution of property would favor rich and penalize poor. ... Another school of philosophical thought ... emphasizes a just process for defining and enforcing property rights rather than a just outcome.On liberty grounds, private property has ... been viewed by some philosophers as a bulwark against dictatorial authority of governments ... The U.S. Constitution was probably drafted with this idea in mind.On self-expression grounds, artist transforms natural objects and makes them artist's own. ... Creators' rights of ownership ... (extend) beyond art to most of works of humans.On natural selection grounds, Eswaran and Neary (2014, p.206), demonstrate that, given evolutionarily stable preferences, producers value output more than interlopers do. In this way, natural selection hardwires attachment to fruits of one's own labor more than attachment to fruits of someone else's labor. The asymmetry in valuation arises because of asymmetric role of contesting individuals in production of output. Asymmetric valuation generates an innate enforcement mechanism whereby a producer would spend more effort in defense of his output than would an interloper in its attempted appropriation. As same authors state (p. 221), their setting provides an evolutionary basis for both doctrine of first possession and Locke's labor theory of property rights, which are crucial ingredients of philosophical and legal approaches to property rights.Property law violations (dubbed negative externalities) are present whenever well-being of consumers or production possibilities of firms are negatively affected by actions of other agents in society. Negative externalities give rise to market failure (which may be corrected through imposition of standards, taxation and bargaining between parties involved) and they may range from, among other, bilateral to multilateral and from intellectual to pollution (e.g., environmental, noise, and aesthetic) or from positional to those that involve informational asymmetry. Several specific case examples are instructive.The often-cited case of Pierson v. Post, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805) illustrates an archetypal bilateral dispute. There, Supreme Court of New York resolved that in order to own an animal, you must physically possess it. …

Comment on Andreas von Hirsch: The Roles of Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory

Whereas liberals tend to emphasize harm as the decisive criterion for legitimizing criminalisation, moralists take a qualified notion of wrongfulness as sufficient even when no harm is at hand. This comment takes up Andreas von Hirsch’s “dual element approach” requiring both harm and wrongfulness as necessary conditions for criminalisation and argues that Joel Feinberg’s account of harming as violation of moral rights is perfectly compatible with it. Subsequently, two issues from the liberalism-moralism debate on criminalisation are examined: The difficulty of how to determine wrongfulness beyond the scope of harming, and the so far disregarded question of whether the democratic legislator is free within the framework of constitution to criminalise whatever conduct he wants to prevent irrespective of philosophical constraints.

The Death Masque of Socrates: Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading

To all appearances, Vladimir Nabokov is as unlikely a student of classical literature as one might imagine. A fierce modernist, possessed of even less knowledge of Greek and Latin than Shakespeare, and steeped in a profound hatred for Plato, how could he possibly have written a virtual roman a clef based on a consistent set of intertextual allusions to a classical author in any of his works of fiction? But this is precisely what we have in Invitation to a Beheading, one of Nabokov’s earliest novels (first published in Russian in 1935-6 and later translated into English in 1959). Invitation’s protagonist Cincinnatus finds himself in prison awaiting his execution. His crime: “gnoseological turpitude,” evidently a crime against reality itself. From the beginning, his identity slowly stands revealed in all its spelaean clarity, while he just as slowly detaches himself from the metaphysical distortions of the fictional universe that would shape his world. The novel is many things. But it is above all a reflection on the philosophical constraints of fiction itself, and a vivid object lesson in the uses of classical reception in literature.

History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche

Reviewed by: History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche Kamakshi P. Murti History of Islam in German Thought: From Leibniz to Nietzsche. By Ian Almond. New York: Routledge, 2009. vii + 199 pages. $95.00. The number of studies about the history of Islam in Europe is legion, most of them promising balanced approaches. However, seldom has this reader encountered a writer who has not fallen into the same monolithic trap. Ian Almond voices a similar concern and promises to attempt "neither to judge, nor to defend, but merely to dissect" (5). Contrary to all expectations he opens up "discursive spaces" that resound with a polyphony of voices that refuse to reduce a thinker to a monolithic approach to Islam. Almond discusses eight key German thinkers, beginning with Leibniz's plan to invade Egypt (1671) and ending with Nietzsche's praise of Islam in The Antichrist (1888). Each chapter title encapsulates the ambiguities resulting from the sexual, political, territorial, and philosophical constraints of the time. Almond compellingly argues for the need to recognize the multiple porous identities complicating the thought processes of each thinker. He asks: "[W]hat voices did Herder use when he wrote about the Muslim Orient?" (56), a question that captures the essence of his methodology. For example, depending on whether we see Leibniz the political thinker, or Leibniz the Christian thinker, or perhaps Leibniz the seeker of causes, we encounter differentiated accounts of Islam. Through meticulously close reading, Almond provides a wealth of textual evidence to show that although Leibniz ultimately uses Islam to further his own search for origins, he never ceases to traverse the entire spectrum between grudging respect for and hatred of Islam. From seeing the Arab as "the noblest man in the Orient" to someone who "has no concept of the morally beautiful," Kant similarly runs the gamut of ambivalences regarding Islam. Almond shows how political expediency conditions Kant's approach to Islam. For example, Russian imperial advances make him conflate the Russian and [End Page 602] the Turk, "both of largely Asiatic stock." Interestingly, Kant's non-representation, not misrepresentation, of Islam, is what allows him to dismiss Islam most effectively, as Almond very perceptively notes. Whereas Leibniz footnotes Islam, Kant erases even this trace. Almond's inclusion of Herder in a discussion of how Islam is both demonized and praised seems at first to be problematic since scholarship has documented Herder's abhorrence of "all forms of chauvinism." However, Almond shows how even in Herder's case the range of references to Islam is not unequivocal. Herder the Anti-Papist sees Islam against the backdrop of Catholicism and his own Christian faith (59). Then again, when Herder the Poet takes over, "the Arabs lose the rings in their noses and begin to speak in couplets" (62). Finally, Herder the Nationalist sees Islam as both a model for German identity and a threat to it. Almond's account thus creates a fascinatingly multifaceted figure of Herder, in no way belittling the latter's open expressions of contempt for European imperialism, but making sure that the reader does not ignore the ambiguity that underlies his discourse. Almond now directs our attention to Goethe's distinction between an "'evil,' actual, threatening Ottoman-Islam and the safe, aesthetic, idealized Arab-Persian Islam of the Divan" (72). This is in tune with the thinking of the times, especially Friedrich Schlegel's insistence on an 'Aryan' kinship of blood that united Persia and Germany. Like Herder, Goethe seems to stand above any accusation of Orientalist arrogance. But his separation of the real threat that the Turk represented from the more aesthetically distanced Persian of his Divan introduces, as Almond explains, an element of uncertainty into what is widely believed to be Goethe's unambiguous praise of the Muslim world. Almond continues his project of unsettling beliefs about stable identities, persuasively arguing that the Schlegel who worshipped the Orient as redemptive and vital constructed his Orient "at the expense of the adjacent one" (89). We are shown how Friedrich Schlegel keeps his linguistic sphere of inquiry distinct from a political one. In other words, language affinity does not necessarily imply membership in the West-European...

A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception

This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking reflexive dispositions--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory.

Beyond experience: metaphysical theories and philosophical constraints

Grappling with issues that are both inherently interesting and unavoidably controversial is the lifeblood of philosophy. A good introduction to the subject must convey the sense of excitement that characterizes lively controversies. Doing this well - avoiding the mock combat of straw men and artificial opponents - is far from easy, which is why relatively few good introductions are the work of one single writer. The present book is an exception to this rule. For Norman Swartz has managed to combine a good sense of the complexities that always lurk behind the surface of philosophical issues with an easy, nontechnical mode of exposition accessible to the interested nonspecialist. His book is at once readable, informative, and stimulating. One can learn about philosophy by reading, but one can learn to philosophize only by thinking about the issues. But philosophical thinking requires recourse to problems, concepts, and methods, and these are obtained most efficiently and effectively via the printed page. What a book can do is to extend a congenial invitation to learning. The difficulty is finding books with the right combination of accessibility-with-profundity and of breadth-with-depth. In this regard, the interests of the beginner - student or interested reader alike - are well served by Beyond Experience which, I have found, provides constantly stimulating discussion of a wide range of challenging questions. The very nature of philosophy is such that it is easier to pose problems than to enforce conclusions. Even the plausible data of the field - the deliverances of `plain logic', of ordinary common sense, and of science - are not of so fixed a character that they always resist the corrosive impact of critical scrutiny. Moreover the `data' of philosophy (whatever they are) underdetermine the conclusions: there are always alternatives that must be weighed by standards that we bring to our philosophizing rather than extract from it. To present philosophy in a dogmatic way is accordingly to betray the enterprise by impoverishing it - by putting out of sight concepts, issues, and problems that deserve and need to have their place in philosophy's complex terrain. In this connection, what is particularly appealing about this book is its undogmatic approach. Its author is more concerned that readers should appreciate the many-sidedness and complexity of the issues than that they take away a predilection for one particular answer. This insistence on readers thinking for themselves rather than pressing for the endorsement of one particular view is certainly one of the book's most attractive features. Those who give Beyond Experience an attentive reading are in for a treat. They will come away not only with a better sense of what philosophy is all about, but will also experience the enjoyable stimulus of thinking philosophically. Nicholas Rescher University Professor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh