Phenomenological Account Research Articles

When the past becomes future-like: A phenomenological study of memory, time, and self-familiarity

AbstractThis paper sets out a phenomenological account of how the autobiographical past can, on occasion, assume certain future-like qualities. I begin by reflecting on the analogy of a bore wave, as employed in a novel by Julian Barnes. Building on this, I turn to Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre in order to address how our memories are revised in light of our current concerns and vice versa. Then, by adapting Edmund Husserl’s conception of temporal “protention,” I show how acts of remembering are integral to a process of ongoing reconciliation between our current orientation towards the future and the autobiographical past. They sustain, disrupt, and reconsolidate a non-localized, dynamic sense of who we are, in ways that are inseparable from how we experience time.

Existential feelings as a phenomenological framework for psychedelic therapy

ABSTRACT This article provides a phenomenological account of the role of existential feelings in the acute and lasting effects of psychedelic therapy and attempts to elucidate phenomenologically why certain psychedelic experiences in specific contexts have the potential of providing long-term relief from mental suffering. First, we explain Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings and use it to highlight shared phenomenological characteristics between various mental disorders. Next, we discuss the phenomenology of oceanic feelings to specify the kind of existential feeling that is involved in acute psychedelic experiences and connect this to the existential reorientation that may occur after the use of psychedelics. Following this, we show how this framework of existential feelings allows us to (1) characterize the phenomenological process that takes during therapeutic use of psychedelics, and (2) describe various conditions required for a successful therapeutic psychedelic experience.

Phenomenology and the status quo: Adorno’s mediation argument

In this paper, I discuss a well-known challenge against phenomenology as a viable form of social criticism. According to this challenge—the Mediation Argument—phenomenology falls short of the requirement that any kind of critique needs a suitable medium of representation because the phenomenological account of experience prioritizes immediacy or directness. I aim to show through a reconstruction of Adorno’s version of the Mediation Argument against Husserl that this challenge fails: it distorts the phenomenological account of meaning by misattributing problematic ontological commitments as well as an overly simplistic idea of normativity to phenomenology; and it systematically underplays critical aspects of the transcendental methodology of phenomenology by ignoring crucial contrasts between phenomenology and commonsense philosophy. Contrary to what the Mediation Argument suggests, I conclude, phenomenology is well-placed to confront the ontological commitments and normative assumptions that commonly lend ideological support to the status quo.

Sensescapes in multilingual environments

Abstract Sensescapes refer to the complex multimodal and semiotic assemblages that confer meaning to space as experienced by individuals and groups. The study of sensescapes seeks to understand the nature of these assemblages, how they shape meaning, and with them, individual and collective experiences. This article unpacks sensescapes as an expansive lens to meaning in space, underscoring its potential to investigate the nexus between language and culture. To that end, it integrates existing proposals in linguistic landscapes and translanguaging, and connects them to a working definition of sensescapes drawn from various social sciences and humanities fields. To illustrate the study of sensescapes and their relevance to applied linguistics, the article reports on a case study conducted in the Al-Kissaria district of Nador, Morocco through participatory ethnography. The study provides a phenomenological account of the experiences of two multilingual sisters from neighboring Melilla, Spain, as they navigate a market area. The data illustrate how the sisters’ sensory interactions with the environment interplay with their linguistic and broader semiotic repertoires, activating their previous experiences and shaping their conceptualizations and negotiation of language and culture in this space.

Violence in mass-mediated images and memory. Phenomenological account of prosthetic memories

AbstractIn this paper, I analyse Alison Landsberg’s concept of prosthetic memories from a phenomenological perspective. Prosthetic memory, while sharing similarities with both personal and collective memory, is neither exclusively personal nor strictly collective, emerging as a product of new media in mass communication. According to Landsberg, prosthetic memories have four main characteristics: the recaller experiences them as firsthand accounts despite not personally living through the events, these memories often revolve around traumatic events, have a commodified form, and are ethically useful. Using Husserl’s theories on memory consciousness and image consciousness, and contemporary phenomenological research on violence, I provide a phenomenological account for the first three characteristics of prosthetic memory. The key factors contributing to their quasi-personal and quasi-collective nature lie, on the one hand, in the presence of imagistic violence and, on the other hand, in their mass-mediated image character.

Collaborative Inhibition: A Phenomenological Perspective

AbstractThe tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one’s potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co-determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other’s perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past.

Open-mindedness and phenomenological psychopathology: an intellectual virtue account of phenomenology and three educational recommendations

ABSTRACT In his account of phenomenological psychopathology, Karl Jaspers advocates for the central role of subjective experience, something which he maintains cannot be accessed through intellectual effort, but through “empathic understanding” alone. In contradistinction to Jaspers’ account, I propose that phenomenology, as a process of inquiry and investigation, is fundamentally epistemological. Accordingly, I offer an intellectual virtue characterization of phenomenological psychopathology, using open-mindedness to illustrate the close conceptual links between the phenomenological endeavor and the intellectual virtues. By introducing the intellectual virtue lexicon into the phenomenological psychopathology discourse, I then offer three preliminary recommendations for the training and education of phenomenological clinicians. Centering the educational recommendations on the psychiatric interview, I suggest that good questioning, listening, and reflecting necessarily require cultivation for intellectually virtuous phenomenological inquiry.

Corporeity and the Eurocentric Community: Recasting Husserl’s Crisis in Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology of the Flesh

Abstract This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl’s phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl’s phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl’s Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria, which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity.

The Politics of Vulnerability and the School for Peace

This paper uses the School for Peace in Israel-Palestine as an example of what it might look like to develop a global community rooted in a recognition of shared human vulnerability. Part I offers a phenomenological account of vulnerability, putting Butler’s work into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “intercorporeality” and phenomenology of perception. Part II argues that family systems theory offers a framework through which to articulate the nature of our shared vulnerability, allowing us to see the manners in which problems reside not “in” individuals, but within the dynamic systems of which they are a part. Part III analyzes School for Peace “encounters” in order to explore the ways in which liberatory political change occurs through shifts in the behavioral dynamics at play in the political status quo. I conclude by arguing that our political identities are most fully realized through, rather than in spite of, our inherent vulnerability.

Merleau-Ponty's Cézanne as Misfit Artist

This paper explores Cézanne’s art through the lens of disability gain. Disability gain defies the ability-disability binary, which defines disability as a lack of ability, by emphasizing what is gained through different disabilities. Central to my discussion are (1) Tobin Siebers’s description of modern art as vitally and thematically disabled and (2) Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s concept of misfitting, which allows for a phenomenological account of disability that emphasizes the depth of awareness and creative world-making possibilities that are gained through disability. By bringing Siebers’s approach to disability aesthetics and Garland-Thomson’s concept of misfitting into conversation with Merleau-Ponty’s “Cézanne’s Doubt” and “Eye and Mind,” I will explain how Cézanne’s unique way of perceiving the world and capturing it in paint helps Merleau-Ponty to dismantle abstract, disembodied concepts of visual perception and trace the nuanced contours of lived perspective. In other words, what is gained through Cézanne’s disabilities is a revolutionary optics that overcomes the limitations of Cartesian optics.

“Minimal self” locked into a model: exploring the prospect of formalizing intentionality in schizophrenia

ABSTRACT Computational psychiatry is a quickly evolving discipline that aims to understand psychopathology in terms of computational, hence algorithmic processes. While cognitive phenomena, especially beliefs or ways of “reasoning”, can more easily be formalized, meaning re-described in mathematical terms and then entered computational models, there is speculation as to whether phenomenology might be formalizable too. In other words, there are speculations in terms of what aspects of the human experience, rather than specific cognitive processes alone, can enter computational models. Here, we explore the possibility of formalizing and modeling a phenomenological account of schizophrenia, using the concepts of “minimal self” and “intentionality”. To test the applicability of these concepts for formalization and modeling, we first aim to clarify some misunderstandings around the very nature of minimal self and intentionality, namely: whether these concepts entail a “minimal” sense of self, or might be better described in “transparent” sensory-integration and information processing terms. We then try to apply the concepts to a computational logic based on Marr’s levels of description, a fundamental account for understanding the rationale of computational psychiatry. Overall, we are asking via what conditions phenomenology can enter a computational logic.

The perceived object in media-based empathy: applying Edith Stein’s concept of Wortleib

The question of how other consciousnesses appear via media has forced us to re-think the classical phenomenological accounts of sociality. However, as the phenomenological account of empathy is very much centred around the perception of the other’s living body, it has faced challenges in discussing the empathic experience in media-based contexts, where we cannot perceive the other’s body, but something else, such as a screen or a text. In this article, I provide the concept for describing the perceived object in media-based empathy: a living textual body, based on Edith Stein’s concept of Wortleib (a living word body) referring to words as “living,” as bearers of meaning in her early work On the Problem of Empathy [Zum Problem der Einfühlung]. I divide the term Wortleib in two different cases—the empathic and non-empathic object—and thereby argue that, while the object of media-based empathic experience cannot be the other’s body, it is an empathic Wortleib, a communicative empathic object. While Stein herself discussed media-based empathy merely in paper media, I demonstrate the unique usefulness of these concepts in analysing any media-based communication and thus the timeliness of her work in this respect.

On feeling unable to continue as oneself

AbstractThis paper sets out a phenomenological account of what it is to feel unable to continue as oneself. I distinguish the feeling that a particular identity has become unsustainable from a sense that the world has ceased to offer the kinds of possibilities required to sustain any such identity. In feeling unable to continue as oneself, possibilities may remain for carrying on in practically meaningful ways but not as who one is or was. I reflect on the kinds of self and feeling involved in such experiences, emphasizing the essential openness of self‐experience to transformative possibilities and the dynamic structure of feeling. To illustrate and further develop my approach, I turn to experiences of grief.

A phenomenological account for causality in terms of elementary actions

Abstract Discussions on causal relations in real life often consider variables for which the definition of causality is unclear since the notion of interventions on the respective variables is obscure. Asking “what qualifies an action for being an intervention on the variable X X ” raises the question whether the action impacted all other variables only through X or directly, which implicitly refers to a causal model. To avoid this known circularity, we instead suggest a notion of “phenomenological causality” whose basic concept is a set of elementary actions. Then the causal structure is defined such that elementary actions change only the causal mechanism at one node (e.g. one of the causal conditionals in the Markov factorization). This way, the principle of independent mechanisms becomes the defining property of causal structure in domains where causality is a more abstract phenomenon rather than being an objective fact relying on hard-wired causal links between tangible objects. In other words, causal relations between variables get defined by the interface between the system and an external agent (who is able to perform the elementary actions), rather than being an internal property of links between the variables. We describe this phenomenological approach to causality for toy and hypothetical real-world examples and argue that it is consistent with the causal Markov condition when the system under consideration interacts with other variables that control the elementary actions.

Belonging to No One, to Everyone, and for Whom? Learnings from the Disputes about the Public Dimension of Education in Chile's Constitutional Convention

The public dimension of education is a key issue in democratic countries. However, in a time of conspicuous privatisation and pluralism, the value and meaning of the public sphere in education are in dispute with other value preferences. This paper offers a phenomenological account of the discussion that took place in Chile's Constitutional Convention, which represents an interesting case study due to the country's background of extensive privatisation of education. The main themes that revealed the spheres of values in dispute in this respect revolved around: the public function of the State, the public arena and its relationship with freedom of education and the diversity of educational projects, and finally the relationship between the public arena and the preferences of families. The paper describes the value controversies implicit in this debate and explains the philosophical foundations that enable us to continue questioning what constitutes the public dimension of education.

The Phenomenology of Pain and Pleasure: Henry and Levinas

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain.

“What do I stand for?” - A phenomenological account of an identity crisis in the climate classroom

This single-participant idiographic study examines the implications of a student’s identity crisis in the climate classroom through the lens of existential phenomenology. The study analyses the ontological sense-making process of a mixed-race, bisexual female student reckoning with the racial dimensions of climate change during an environmental course in a liberal arts college in the Netherlands. By delving into the ontological implications of the participant’s experience of the course, the analysis shows that environmental education can meaningfully impact the mind-body relationship and self-identification of students with marginalized identities. The findings challenge some of the assumptions of popular frameworks for understanding marginalization in environmental education, like intersectionality, and post-humanist perspectives. The authors conclude that attending to human sense-making in environmental education can benefit students with marginalized identities by grounding environmental education in practices that make space for these identities.

Narrative Medicine and Empathy: A Phenomenological Perspective

ABSTRACT In Rita Charon's account of narrative medicine, empathy seems to be an essential element of the clinical relationship. However, empathy has not received much attention, which I believe is problematic. First, I show that not only is there no clear definition of what empathy is, but that this conceptual gap creates ambiguity about its role in the practice of narrative medicine. Second, I argue that certain passages in Charon's work seem to implicitly characterize empathy as a combination of cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and sympathy, and that its inclusion in the practice of narrative medicine can be problematic. Third, following Dan Zahavi, I argue that a phenomenological account of empathy not only seems most compatible with the practices, values, and theoretical framework of narrative medicine, but is also capable of resolving the problems posed by alternative definitions of empathy and the ambiguity about the role of empathy in narrative medicine.

Re-imagining Neoliberal Ideologies in Social Work Education Using Critical Feminist and Disability Theories: A Phenomenological Autoethnographic Account

Re-imagining Neoliberal Ideologies in Social Work Education Using Critical Feminist and Disability Theories: A Phenomenological Autoethnographic Account

Minding the Gap

Grounded in and influenced by the work of thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Frantz Fanon, Iris Marion Young, and Lewis Gordon, critical phenomenologists such as Lisa Guenther, Linda Martín Alcoff, George Yancy, and Sara Ahmed have recently provided accounts of whiteness through a phenomenological lens. In these analyses, whiteness is often figured as a "transcendental norm," a "background to experience," a "natural attitude," and a "sociogenic force," which remains invisible while structuring the world. In this article I suggest that such accounts ultimately collapse whiteness and the white subject, imagining the latter simply as an embodiment of the former. Consequently, these approaches to whiteness lack explanatory power. I argue that a critical phenomenological account of whiteness must examine more closely the relationship between white subjects and whiteness, and specifically point to the tensions, gaps, and contradictions between them, as these are not accidental but central to the very constitution of whiteness and to the power it wields over its subjects.