Phenomenal Contrast Research Articles

Environmental Lighting Conditions, Phenomenal Contrast, and the Conscious Perception of Near and Far.

Recent evidence in systems neuroscience suggests that lighting conditions affect the whole chain of brain processing, from retina to high-level cortical networks, for perceptual and cognitive function. Here, visual adaptation levels to three different environmental lighting conditions, (1) darkness, (2) daylight, and (3) prolonged exposure to very bright light akin to sunlight, were simulated in lab to investigate the effects of light adaptation levels on classic cases of subjective contrast, assimilation, and contrast-induced relative depth in achromatic, i.e., ON-OFF pathway mediated visual configurations. After adaptation/exposure to a given lighting condition, configurations were shown in grouped and ungrouped conditions in random order to healthy young humans in computer-controlled two-alternative forced-choice procedures that consisted of deciding, as quickly as possible, which of two background patterns in a given configuration of achromatic contrast appeared lighter, or which of two foreground patterns appeared to stand out in front, as if it were nearer to the observer. We found a statistically significant effect of the adaptation levels on the consciously perceived subjective contrast (F(2,23) = 20.73; p < 0.001) and the relative depth (F(2,23) = 12.67; p < 0.001), a statistically significant interaction between the adaptation levels and the grouping factor (F(2,23) = 4.73; p < 0.05) on subjective contrast, and a statistically significant effect of the grouping factor on the relative depth (F(2,23) = 13.71; p < 0.01). Visual adaption to different lighting conditions significantly alters the conscious perception of contrast and assimilation, classically linked to non-linear functional synergies between ON and OFF processing channels in the visual brain, and modulates the repeatedly demonstrated effectiveness of luminance contrast as a depth cue; the physically brighter pattern regions in the configurations are no longer consistently perceived as nearer to a conscious observer under daylight and extreme bright light adapted (rod-saturated) conditions.

The role of imagination and recollection in the method of phenomenal contrast

AbstractThe method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well‐functioning tool to study the contents of perception.

Cognitive Phenomenology Neuroscience and Computation

AbstractPhenomenology is concerned with the first-person experience of or about some object, and is generally related to sensory experience, for example, auditory or visual. Cognitive phenomenology refers to an element of phenomenological experience that does not have a sensory character. Experiences of thought, understanding, and appreciation of meaning are less figurative than the sensory kind and therefore suggest a treatment separate from that related to sensory experience. Where sensory phenomenology is discussed as there being something, it is like to be in a sensory state (of color or some object like a banana), and it is less evident that there is something it is like to think, understand, or recognize meaning. As Strawson [1] puts it: “It’s strange that the existence of cognitive phenomenology is a matter of dispute.” But dispute there is, this paper examines this The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology and Its Denial and suggests instances from neurology and logical argumentation that CP does exist. In this paper, while the existence phenomenal consciousness is a matter of philosophical debate, the CP of understanding is seen as important to those who work on language understanding in a computational domain. The salient method is a critical examination and comparison of relevant literature in different disciplines. Specifically, one instance of cognitive phenomenology is addressed: the understanding experience. However, the very existence of cognitive phenomenology is a controversial issue in philosophical discourse. Accordingly, in addition to a presentation of cognitive phenomenology, the controversy over its necessity as a concept is examined: a study dismissing CP is presented, and an example (a phenomenal contrast argument) is introduced. New arguments based on formal examples of “understanding” are proposed to further corroborate the existence of CP. Then, in the light of existing work on event-related potentials that measure changes in brain activity patterns under linguistic input, a neural support for cognitive phenomenology is elicited as an additional proof of its existence. The key result is that arguments from neurology and linguistics provide support for the existence of at least one facet of cognitive phenomenology (understanding) with the possibility that such presence could be measurable and extended to other modes. The arguments presented in the paper provide a grounding for using the CP concept in computing, as a complement to synthetic phenomenology.

Temporal experience as metaphysically lightweight

AbstractExperience is the most primitive kind of intentional contact with reality. Metaphysical inquiry is one of the heights of human thought. It would not be surprising if experience was often silent on metaphysics, failing to offer support to one metaphysical disputant over the other, forcing them to fall back on nonexperiential considerations. I argue that the dispute between A‐ and B‐theorists about time is a dispute about which experience is silent. B‐theorists have typically conceded that the manifest image of time conflicts with how time turns out to be, on their own view of time. They have offered an array of accounts of why that conflict should not worry us. I argue here that these accounts are unconvincing. I also argue that they are unnecessary. Nothing about how time is experienced conflicts with B‐theory. An independently plausible method for discovering what properties experience represents—the method of phenomenal contrast—implies that experience does not favor A‐theory over B‐theory.

Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism

According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content.

How Judgments of Visual Resemblance are Induced by Visual Experience

Judgments of visual resemblance ('A looks like B'), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the 'phenomenal contrast' method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience that induces the judgment that A looks like B, and a visual experience that does not induce this judgment, is best explained by the fact that the former visually represents B, whereas the latter does not.

Dialogue and Cognitive Phenomenology

Traditionally, phenomenal consciousness has been restricted to the realm of perceptual and otherwise sensory experiences. If there is a kind of phenomenology altogether unlike sensory phenomenology, then this was a mistake, and requires an accounting. I argue such cognitive phenomenology exists by appealing to a phenomenal contrast case that relies on meaningful and relatively meaningless dialogue. I explain why previous phenomenal contrast arguments are less likely to be effective on even neutral parties to the debate: these arguments rely on a ‘hard-to-understand’ sentence, which may elicit sensory crutches that one focuses on, thereby obscuring cognitive phenomenology. I argue for a positive characterization of the phenomenal contrast in terms of seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions in a dialogue. This paves the way for arguing that what it’s like to entertain a cognitive content that p differs from that of q in their cognitive phenomenology.

Seeing the forest for the trees: Scene perception and the admissible contents of perceptual Experience

Debates surrounding the high-level contents of perceptual experience focus on whether weperceive the high-level properties of visual objects, such as the property of being a pine tree. Thispaper considers instead whether we perceive the high-level properties of visual scenes, such asthe property of being a forest. Liberals about the contents of perceptual experience have offered avariety of phenomenal contrast cases designed to reveal how the high-level properties of objectsfigure in our visual experience. I offer a series of equivalent phenomenal contrast cases intendedto show how the high-level properties of visual scenes also figure in visual experience. Thisfirst-person evidence of high-level scene perception is combined with third-person evidence fromthe extensive empirical literature on scene categorisation. Critics of liberalism have attempted todeflate existing phenomenal contrast cases by explaining the contrasts in terms of non-perceptualcontents or in terms of attentional changes. I show that neither response is applicable to mycontrast cases and conclude that we do indeed perceptually experience the high-level propertiesof visual scenes.

An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology

Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel’s phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.

Modeling Mental Qualities

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution the article proposes is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. The article explains how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables one to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a probabilistic model of the phenomenal sorites, and deploy a new theoretical tool in the empirical investigation of consciousness. A noteworthy consequence of this new framework is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects.

Another Look at Mode Intentionalism

A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.

What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

AbstractIn a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival.

Twofold Pictorial Experience

Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. Even though Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness has been very influential, a number of philosophers have put forward powerful arguments against it. In this paper, I defend the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense. My argument has two parts. In the first part, I provide a phenomenal contrast argument in favor of twofoldness. In the second part, I respond to what I take to be the most important objections against twofoldness. I believe that both parts together provide strong support for the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense.

First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence

While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject’s experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal judgement about the target experience of the investigation. I examine historical and contemporary examples of first-person experiments: Mariotte’s demonstration of the visual blind spot, Kanizsa’s subjective contours, the Tse Illusion, and investigations of the non-uniform resolution of the visual field. I discuss the role that phenomenal contrast plays in these methods, and how they overcome typical introspective errors. I argue that their intersubjective repeatability is an important factor in their scientific status, however, it is not the only factor. That they control for extraneous factors and confounds is another factor which sets them apart from pseudoscience (e.g., the perception of auras), and hence another reason for classifying them as genuine experiments. Furthermore, by systematically mapping out the structure of visual experience, these methods make scientific progress. Praises of such first-person experimental approaches may not always be sung by philosophers and psychologists, but they continue to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless.

Argumentos de contraste fenoménico a favor de la fenomenología cognitiva

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson’s Jack/Jacques argument —hypothetical— represented by Kriegel’s Zoe argument —and glossed— first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.

Perception of High-Level Content and the Argument from Associative Agnosia

Visual Associative agnosia is a rare perceptual impairment generally resulting from lesions in the infero temporal cortex. Patients suffering from associative agnosia are able to make accurate copies of line drawings, but they are unable to visually recognize objects - including those represented in line drawings - as belonging to familiar high-level kinds. The Rich Content View claims that visual experience can represent high-level kind properties. The phenomenon of associative agnosia appears to present us with a strong case for the Rich Content View. There are reasons for thinking that the experiences of an agnosic patient differ from those of a healthy subject. Given that there is a phenomenal contrast between the experiences of an associative agnosic and those of a healthy perceiver, one may argue that this contrast is due to differences in abilities to represent high-level kinds. I claim that there is indeed a phenomenal contrast between the visual experiences of an agnosic and those of a healthy perceiver. However, the explanation of this contrast that best fits the empirical data is compatible with the view that visual experience does not represent high-level kinds.

Fears as Conscious Perceivings

Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology (IPE), but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a kind of immediate, or “full”, experience of an object or some of its aspects. In the case of visual perception, suppose you are looking at an apple. If you turn it around, you will find yourself in full view of its back side, which was previously anticipated “emptily”, fulfilling or disappointing (confirming or disconfirming) some of your anticipations in regard to it. On the Husserlian view, the success or failure of a visual perceptual experience consists in such fulfillments and disappointments. If we can provide an account of the intentionality of emotions along similar lines, it will necessarily involve the phenomenal contrast between fullness and emptiness, enabling us to support IPE.

On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast

ABSTRACT:The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate aboutcognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method's dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech

Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend both the existence of cognitive phenomenology and the phenomenal contrast method, as each concerns the case presented here.

Recent issues in high‐level perception

AbstractRecently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high‐level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high‐level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception‐based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high‐level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high‐level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach.