Phenomenal Awareness Research Articles

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention.

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

EEG Microstate Dynamics Associated with Dream-Like Experiences During the Transition to Sleep

Consciousness always requires some representational content; that is, one can only be conscious about something. However, the presence of conscious experience (awareness) alone does not determine whether its content is in line with the external and physical world. Dreams, apart from certain forms of hallucinations, typically consist of non-veridical percepts, which are not recognized as false, but rather considered real. This type of experiences have been described as a state of dissociation between phenomenal and reflective awareness. Interestingly, during the transition to sleep, reflective awareness seems to break down before phenomenal awareness as conscious experience does not immediately fade with reduced wakefulness but is rather characterized by the occurrence of uncontrolled thinking and perceptual images, together with a reduced ability to recognize the internal origin of the experience. Relative deactivation of the frontoparietal and preserved activity in parieto-occipital networks has been suggested to account for dream-like experiences during the transition to sleep. We tested this hypothesis by investigating subjective reports of conscious experience and large-scale brain networks using EEG microstates in 45 healthy young subjects during the transition to sleep. We observed an inverse relationship between cognitive effects and physiological activation; dream-like experiences were associated with an increased presence of a microstate with sources in the superior and middle frontal gyrus and precuneus. Additionally, the presence of a microstate associated with higher-order visual areas was decreased. The observed inverse relationship might therefore indicate a disengagement of cognitive control systems that is mediated by specific, inhibitory EEG microstates.

Ensemble perception without phenomenal awareness of elements

Humans efficiently recognize complex scenes by grouping multiple features and objects into ensembles. It has been suggested that ensemble processing does not require, or even impairs, conscious discrimination of individual element properties. The present study examined whether ensemble perception requires phenomenal awareness of elements. We asked observers to judge the mean orientation of a line-based texture pattern whose central region was made invisible by backward masks. Masks were composed of either a Mondrian pattern (Exp. 1) or of an annular contour (Exp. 2) which, unlike the Mondrian, did not overlap spatially with elements in the central region. In the Mondrian-mask experiment, perceived mean orientation was determined only by visible elements outside the central region. However, in the annular-mask experiment, perceived mean orientation matched the mean orientation of all elements, including invisible elements within the central region. Results suggest that the visual system can compute spatial ensembles even without phenomenal awareness of stimuli.

What Can Poetry Do?

What Can Poetry Do? John McGowan (bio) Review of Charles Altieri, Modernist Poetry and the Limitations of Materialist Theory: The Importance of Constructivist Values, Albuquerque U of New Mexico P 2021. viii + 280 pp. What can modernist art offer the present? Over the past thirty years, many readers have sought to mine that art for insights into the conditions of modernity and the forces that shape those conditions. Art represents or reflects the society in which it is produced—and thus enhances our understanding of the world and (perhaps) offers alternatives to taken-for-granted prevailing modes of existence. More recently, this brand of political materialism has morphed into a "new materialism" that purports to replace sociology with ontology. The world is replete with active forces whose interaction produces specific situations. Capacious artworks capture the constant flows and surprises of the dynamic scenes we all inhabit. In both cases, critics look to the descriptive power of the arts to deliver insights into the world. In his new book, Charles Altieri sees this "descriptive, epiphanic" mode as dominant within contemporary poetry specifically and in what literary studies generally looks to the arts to impart. Altieri's goal is to offer a strong alternative, one that depends on an allegiance to the non-representational work done by the modernist artists (Braque, Picasso, Malevich, Pound, Moore, Stevens, Eliot, Ashbery, and Geoffrey O'Brien) he calls "constructivists." These artists explore how "objects and persons might be able to display the force of their presence, and they establish a range of subject positions for which finding the appropriate concepts was less important than imagining how a responding consciousness might cooperate in making those modes of presence emerge. This imagining had to orient itself toward a questioning of who members of the audience might become by virtue of participating in what the making elaborates as possible distributions of subjectivity" (22). What is important is what the arts can create, the possibilities they can open up, rather than any report about the way things are. Not all artists are constructivists; it would be foolish to deny that many works of art do aspire to some version of realism, to tell us something about the world. (In what follows, then, take every statement about "art" [End Page 335] to only apply to constructivist art.) But Altieri thinks we lose perhaps the most valuable and distinctive thing the arts can do if we neglect how the arts can exemplify and celebrate the creative powers of the imagination. In addition, the arts display the various subtle ways that self-consciousness registers its encounter with the world and its experience of its own capacities. Political materialism, he believes, is mired in an inescapable ironic dissociation from a world identified as cruel and unjust, thus missing the affirmations that art can offer. Here is Altieri at his most exalted and most inspiring: "Poetry as a theory of life involves demonstrations that the imagination is not an evasion of the real but a way of complementing it by aligning it with our most intimate structures of desire. Such demonstration has to replace interpretation by celebration, or, more accurately, by the performance of celebration that aligns our capacities for affirmation to the world of fact" (150). Against the world-weariness and despair generated by our political obsessions, Altieri wants to offer the triumphs of art's engagement with its materials and its successes in constructing those materials into works that astound and delight us even as they invite us to join in the creative process. The new materialism, with its focus on activity, might seem more aligned with Altieri's constructivists. Certainly, in the current debates about "critique," writers like Bruno Latour and Rita Felski mobilize the new materialism to distance themselves from the kinds of political criticism that Altieri also wants to decenter from prevailing critical modes. But Altieri argues that the new materialism is reductive. It simply has no vocabulary or theoretical armature to handle the intricacies of consciousness and self-consciousness. No third-person scientific account can capture "the phenomenal awareness of what it is like to be in a given state" (231); "what is known [on the basis of that...

The early but not the late neural correlate of auditory awareness reflects lateralized experiences

Theories disagree as to whether it is the early or the late neural correlate of awareness that plays a critical role in phenomenal awareness. According to recurrent processing theory, early activity in primary sensory areas corresponds closely to phenomenal awareness. In support, research with electroencephalography found that in the visual and somatosensory modality, an early neural correlate of awareness is contralateral to the perceived side of stimulation. Thus, early activity is sensitive to the perceived side of visual and somatosensory stimulation. Critically, it is unresolved whether this is true also for hearing. In the present study (N = 26 students), Bayesian analyses showed that the early neural correlate of awareness (auditory awareness negativity, AAN) was stronger for contralateral than ipsilateral electrodes whereas the late correlate of auditory awareness (late positivity, LP) was not lateralized. These findings demonstrate that the early but not the late neural correlate of auditory awareness reflects lateralized experiences. Thus, these findings imply that AAN is a more suitable NCC than LP because it correlates more closely with lateralized experiences.

The Common Basis of Memory and Consciousness: Understanding the Brain as a Write-Read Head Interacting With an Omnipresent Background Field.

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write–read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write–read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions.

The motivational unconscious

AbstractMotives may be said to be unconscious in a variety of ways. They may be automatically and unconsciously elicited by consciously perceptible situational cues; they may be instigated by cues that are themselves excluded from conscious awareness, as expressions of implicit perception or memory; or the person may be consciously unaware of his or her actual motivational state. The paper reviews the evidence pertaining to all three aspects of unconscious motivation, with emphasis on conceptual and methodological questions that arise in the study of motives which are not accessible to phenomenal awareness or voluntary control but nonetheless influence the individual's experience, thought, and action.

The Role of the Brain in Conscious Processes: A New Way of Looking at the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.

This article presents a new interpretation of the consciousness-related neuroscientific findings using the framework of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that sheds light on the basic principles underlying quantum systems. It is propounded that SED supplemented by two well-founded hypotheses leads to a satisfying explanation of the neural correlates of consciousness. The theoretical framework thus defined is based on the notion that all conceivable shades of phenomenal awareness are woven into the frequency spectrum of a universal background field, called zero-point field (ZPF), implying that the fundamental mechanism underlying conscious systems rests upon the access to information available in the ZPF. The body of evidence can be interpreted such that in the extroverted, stimulus-oriented operating mode the brain produces streams of consciousness by periodically writing persistent information states into the ZPF (theta cycle). In the introspective operating mode, which goes along with activations of the default mode network, the brain is receptive to the flow of ZPF information states that constitutes the record of conscious experiences, suggesting that the sense of self and the retrieval of memories is accomplished by periodically reading (filtering) persistent information states from the ZPF (alpha cycle). Moreover, the data support the conclusion that meditative practices and psychedelics detune the filter, thus preventing the instantiation of self-referential conscious states, which leads to the dissolution of the ego. Instead, the brain taps into a wider spectrum of ZPF modes and, hence, gains access to an extended phenomenal color palette, resulting in expanded consciousness.

Visual processing: conscious until proven otherwise.

Unconscious perception, or perception without awareness, describes a situation where an observer's behaviour is influenced by a stimulus of which they have no phenomenal awareness. Perception without awareness is often claimed on the basis of a difference in thresholds for tasks that do and do not require awareness, for example, detecting the stimulus (requiring awareness) and making accurate judgements about the stimulus (based on unconscious processing). Although a difference in thresholds would be expected if perceptual evidence were processed without awareness, such a difference does not necessitate that this is actually occurring: a difference in thresholds can also arise from response bias, or through task differences. Here we ask instead whether the pattern of performance could be obtained if the observer were aware of the evidence used in making their decisions. A backwards masking paradigm was designed using digits as target stimuli, with difficulty controlled by the time between target and mask. Performance was measured over three tasks: detection, graphic discrimination and semantic discrimination. Despite finding significant differences in thresholds measured using proportion correct, and in observer sensitivity, modelling suggests that these differences were not the result of perception without awareness. That is, the observer was not relying solely on unconscious information to make decisions.

On the “blindness” of blindsight: What is the evidence for phenomenal awareness in the absence of primary visual cortex (V1)?

Blindsight has been central to theories of phenomenal awareness; that a lesion to primary visual cortex (V1) abolishes all phenomenal awareness while unconscious visual functions can remain has led to the view that this region plays a crucial role in generating visual consciousness. However, since the early 20th century, there have been reports, many of which controversial, of phenomenal awareness in patients with V1 lesions. These reports include selective sparing of motion awareness, hemianopic completion and visual aftereffects. More recently, there have been successful attempts of inducing visual qualia with noninvasive brain stimulation. Here we critically review this evidence and discuss their implications to theoretical understanding of phenomenal awareness.

Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering

Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering.

The ergonomics of virtual reality: human factors in developing clinical-oriented virtual environments.

Virtual Reality (VR) is usually described as a collection of technological hardware: a computer capable of 3D real-time animation, a head-mounted display, data gloves equipped with one or more position trackers. However, this focus on technology is disappointing for clinicians interested in developing virtual environments to be used in assessment and therapy. To overcome this limitation this chapter describes VR as an advanced communication tool: a communication medium in the case of multi-user VR and a communication interface in single-user VR. Two are the core characteristics of VR as communication tool: the perceptual illusion of nonmediation and the sense of community. The first characteristic of a satisfying virtual environment is the disappearance of mediation, a level of experience where both the VR system and the physical environment disappear from the user's phenomenal awareness. The second characteristic is the sense of community developed by interaction. Through interaction made possible by multi-user VR, individuals find or form groups that share interests. So, information exchange becomes the carrier for expressing self-concept and eliciting emotional support. Within this view, experiencing presence and telepresence does not depend so much on the faithfulness of the reproduction of 'physical' aspects of 'external reality'--which is also a social production, and not a primitive or 'natural' fact--as on the capacity of simulation to produce a context in which social actors may communicate and cooperate. The consequences of this approach for the design and the development of clinical oriented VR systems are presented, together with the methodological and technical implications for the study of advanced human-computer interaction.

Psychophysical "blinding" methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing.

Numerous non-invasive experimental "blinding" methods exist for suppressing the phenomenal awareness of visual stimuli. Not all of these suppressive methods occur at, and thus index, the same level of unconscious visual processing. This suggests that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can in principle be established. The empirical results of extant studies that have used a number of different methods and additional reasonable theoretical considerations suggest the following tentative hierarchy. At the highest levels in this hierarchy is unconscious processing indexed by object-substitution masking. The functional levels indexed by crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich masking, and single-flash interocular suppression, fall at progressively lower levels, while unconscious processing at the lowest levels is indexed by eye-based binocular-rivalry suppression. Although unconscious processing levels indexed by additional blinding methods is yet to be determined, a tentative placement at lower levels in the hierarchy is also given for unconscious processing indexed by Troxler fading and adaptation-induced blindness, and at higher levels in the hierarchy indexed by attentional blinding effects in addition to the level indexed by the attentional blink. The full mapping of levels in the functional hierarchy onto cortical activation sites and levels is yet to be determined. The existence of such a hierarchy bears importantly on the search for, and the distinctions between, neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision.

Awareness is the key to attraction: dissociating the tilt illusions via conscious perception.

The tilt illusion is a compelling example of contextual influence exerted by an oriented surround on a target's perceived orientation. A vertical target appears to be tilted away from a 15° oriented surround but appears to be tilted toward a 75° tilted surround. We tested the claim that these biases result from distinct sensory processes: a low-level repulsive process and a higher-level attractive process. If this claim were correct, then surround visibility would be a requirement for attraction, but it would not necessarily be a requirement for repulsion. Indeed, Motoyoshi and Hayakawa (2010) have demonstrated that repulsion can survive removal of the surround from phenomenal awareness using adaptation-induced blindness. Here we sought to test this prediction by measuring the orientation biases in a parafoveally presented Gabor patch surrounded by tilted gratings after 20-s adaptation. The adapting stimulus was an annularly windowed plaid composed of vertical and horizontal jittering gratings. Observers were instructed to maintain fixation throughout the trial and report whether the Gabor appeared to be tilted clockwise or anticlockwise of vertical. They also had to indicate whether the surround was visible after adaptation. Postadaptation biases were then compared with those obtained in a control experiment without dynamic adaptation. We found large repulsive biases induced by 15° oriented surrounds, but no attractive biases were induced by 75° tilted surrounds. This result shows that attractive effects do require visual awareness and thereby provides robust evidence for the existence of two separate mechanisms mediating the phenomenology of the tilt illusions.

Why is "blindsight" blind? A new perspective on primary visual cortex, recurrent activity and visual awareness.

The neuropsychological phenomenon of blindsight has been taken to suggest that the primary visual cortex (V1) plays a unique role in visual awareness, and that extrastriate activation needs to be fed back to V1 in order for the content of that activation to be consciously perceived. The aim of this review is to evaluate this theoretical framework and to revisit its key tenets. Firstly, is blindsight truly a dissociation of awareness and visual detection? Secondly, is there sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that the loss of awareness resulting from a V1 lesion simply reflects reduced extrastriate responsiveness, rather than a unique role of V1 in conscious experience? Evaluation of these arguments and the empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the loss of phenomenal awareness in blindsight may not be due to feedback activity in V1 being the hallmark awareness. On the basis of existing literature, an alternative explanation of blindsight is proposed. In this view, visual awareness is a "global" cognitive function as its hallmark is the availability of information to a large number of perceptual and cognitive systems; this requires inter-areal long-range synchronous oscillatory activity. For these oscillations to arise, a specific temporal profile of neuronal activity is required, which is established through recurrent feedback activity involving V1 and the extrastriate cortex. When V1 is lesioned, the loss of recurrent activity prevents inter-areal networks on the basis of oscillatory activity. However, as limited amount of input can reach extrastriate cortex and some extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved, computations involving comparison of neural firing rates within a cortical area remain possible. This enables "local" read-out from specific brain regions, allowing for the detection and discrimination of basic visual attributes. Thus blindsight is blind due to lack of "global" long-range synchrony, and it functions via "local" neural readout from extrastriate areas.

DECODING CONSCIOUSNESS

Geraint Rees is a Professor of Cognitive Neurology at University College London, where he directs the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience. His research interests focus on understanding the neural basis of...

Phenomenal awareness can emerge without attention

Phenomenal awareness can emerge without attention

Purging of memories from conscious awareness tracked in the human brain.

Understanding the neural basis of conscious experience and its regulation are fundamental goals of science. While recent research has made substantial progress in identifying the neural correlates of conscious experiences, it remains unclear how individuals exert control over the contents of awareness. In particular, can a memory that has entered the aware state be purged from consciousness if it is not currently desired? Here we tracked the correlates of consciousness in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging and demonstrated the involvement of a downregulation mechanism that purges contents from conscious awareness. When individuals tried to prevent the retrieval of a memory in response to reminders, hippocampal activity was reduced, as previously established. Crucially, using trial-by-trial reports of phenomenal awareness, we found that this reduction of hippocampal activation was specifically associated with moments when a memory involuntarily intruded into conscious awareness and needed to be purged. This downregulation of activity during memory intrusions appears to disrupt momentary awareness of unwanted contents and, importantly, predicts impaired recall of the memory on later tests. These results tie the voluntary control of phenomenal awareness to observable changes in neural activity linked to awareness, and so provide a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into the physical foundations of control over consciousness.

How Auditory Information Influences Volitional Control in Binocular Rivalry: Modulation of a Top-Down Attentional Effect

Although multistable perception has long been studied, in recent years, paradigms involving ambiguous visual stimuli have been used to assess phenomenal awareness. Indeed, for such stimuli, although the sensory input is invariant, a perceptual decision occurs bringing to awareness only one of the possible interpretations. Moreover, the observer experiences inevitable oscillations between these percepts. Only few studies have tackled bistability for multimodal percepts. Conrad et al. [1] presented dot fields going in opposite direction to each eye, they found that lateral sound motion prolongs the dominance duration of the coherent visual motion percept and not the other. In this study, the volitional control—the capacity to promote a given percept—was not assessed. Van Ee et al. [2] tested how sensory congruency influences volitional control using looming motion stimuli that could be seen, heard or sensed on the hand. They found that attention to the additional modality (sound or touch) has to be engaged ...

Do working memory-driven attention shifts speed up visual awareness?

Previous research has shown that content representations in working memory (WM) can bias attention in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. Using a visual prior-entry procedure, we here investigate whether such WM-driven attention shifts can speed up the conscious awareness of memory-matching relative to memory-mismatching stimuli. Participants were asked to hold a color cue in WM and to subsequently perform a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task by reporting either of two different-colored circles (presented to the left and right of fixation with a variable temporal interval) as having the first onset. One of the two TOJ circles could match the memory cue in color. We found that awareness of the temporal order of the circle onsets was not affected by the contents of WM, even when participants were explicitly informed that one of the TOJ circles would always match the WM contents. The null effect of WM on TOJs was not due to an inability of the memory-matching item to capture attention, since response times to the target in a follow-up experiment were improved when it appeared at the location of the memory-matching item. The present findings suggest that WM-driven attention shifts cannot accelerate phenomenal awareness of matching stimuli in the visual field.