Persian Army Research Articles

Defining “Romans” in the Late Antique Near East: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the “Romans” in Sūrat al-Rūm

Abstract In the opening lines of the sūrah named after the “Romans,” Q Rūm 30, the qurʾānic preacher expresses his solidarity with the “Romans” who had then been defeated by the Persian army. In seeking to better understand these verses, one may start with the question: Who exactly are the “Romans” here? “Roman” was a broad, multifaceted term, as Yannis Stouraitis has lately pointed out, based mainly on sources written after the seventh century and stemming from the Greek-speaking “West” of the Byzantine Empire. In this study, using mainly Syriac sources but also some hitherto unnoticed Greek testimonies coming from the Near East, this semantic variability of the word “Roman” is shown to further expand when going East. Like in most Syriac sources, “Romans” in Q Rūm primarily means members of the Byzantine army (and state apparatus), be they ethnic Greeks, Syrians, or Arabs. At the same time, the “Romans” of this sūrah are all inhabitants, all “citizens” of the Byzantine Empire – not just its armies and magistrates. This latter sense corresponds to the broader sense in which “Romans” is used not only in Syriac, but also in Greek sources (and in other languages of the Late Antique Near East). That broader sense is one that we find in a definition by the Damascene Sophronios of Jerusalem, according to whom “Roman” is anyone “stemming from a city subject to the Romans.” Another qurʾānic passage that refers to the Byzantines (though without naming them), which has very much to do with the same geopolitical context of the Byzantine-Persian wars, Q Māʾidah 5:17, seems to criticize a “Byzantine” confidence in the invincibility of Christ and Mary. Why does the Qurʾān chose to name the Romans when expressing solidarity with them, yet leave them unnamed when criticizing them? Could it be the case that this difference between naming the “Romans” and leaving them unnamed is somehow meant to show that the solidarity with the “Romans,” as declared expressis verbis in the Sūrat al-Rūm, concerns the entire Byzantine world whereas the sharp criticism in al-Māʾidah is not general in the same sense?

A Meditation on Loss

A Meditation on Loss

A War Tactician: K̲h̲ālid b. al-Walīd

K̲h̲ālid was an extraordinary warrior and commander who lived in 7th century and led Muslim armies against Romans and Sassanids. He managed to fight against two great power of the day at the same time in an unusual way. Just flashing back to his childhood or youth to understand his military carrier is not sufficient. His membership to brave Arab tribes or his desert environment also does not give necessary information to explain his professional diplomatic attempts, detailed field plans, and elegant army order on the battlefields. We will try to make some inferences about his career by examining his tactics in the context of his military activities during the Caliph Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq period. The Caliph Abū Bakr had a clear vision and strategy for conquests, and he was trusting his commanders by giving them space to lead the armies, not interfering in all details. He had also analyzed the sociology of the region well. K̲h̲ālid b. al-Walīd portrays a successful commander who does not interfere with the general politics of the caliph but is very meticulous in applying his orders to the field. On the other hand, the Caliph 'Umar ibn-al-Khaṭṭâb unlike Abū Bakr, wanted to manage all the details on the battlefields. For this reason, although K̲h̲ālid had a successful period with Abū Bakr, he could not work with ‘Umar for a long time. K̲h̲ālid b. al-Walīd's originality is that each war is unlike the previous one and develops shocking tactics. He didn't have a standard tactic, and his moves were not familiar and predictable. He could even apply different methods in similar situations. The way he started and ended wars subverted the tactics of the enemy Arab, Roman, and Persian armies. In general, the battles he managed were lasting shorter than expected. He easily sensed the weak points of enemy commanders and soldiers such as pride or fear and could use these weaknesses well. In this article, we will revisit some examples and try to analyze the tactics K̲h̲ālid used during his military career caused the fall of the Sassanid Iraq and damaged the Roman Levant

Elephantine

Abstract Elephantine. On Judeans in fifth century bce Southern Egypt In the fifth century bce a group of Judaeans lived as mercenaries in the Persian army on and around the island of Elephantine, as guardians of the southern border of the Persian empire and to shield the Persian trade interests. Documents show that these Judaeans had their own form of Yahwism. For almost 100 years they lived in peaceful coexistence with the Persian administration, the local Egyptian population, and with a dozen other ethnic groups settled on the island. From around 425 this pax persica was disrupted by local discords and the destruction by the priests of Khnum of vital elements of the Persian administration as well as the temple of Yahô. This contribution argues that the increasing urge of Egypt to abandon the Persian yoke and the influx of an extra group of Judeans – with a different form of Yahwism – around 420 created increasing tension between the different groups leading to the breakup of the peaceful cohabitation.

Some reflections on the legend of the Marathon runner (hdt. 6.105, Aristoph. nub. 63–67, Plut. de glor. ath. 347c, Lucian. laps. 3 and the Roman Tradition)

A well-known tradition has it that after the victory of the Greeks over the Persian army at the battle of Marathon (490 B.C.E.) one of the Athenians ran forty kilometres from Marathon to Athens and died soon after his arrival in the city, after giving the good news. However, the story is more complicated than it seems, and several issues have claimed the attention of scholars, such as what the Marathon runner’s name was, what form of greeting he used and whether the episode really happened or not. The first part of my paper offers a reconsideration of the extant sources in order to express my point of view on the abovementioned issues. The second part aims at showing a selection of parallel passages which could possibly prove useful in trying to illustrate how the legend of the Marathon runner evolved into the shape it assumed in the Lucianean account, which is still considered as the ‘official’ version of the story.

Using a multi-proxy approach to locate the elusive Phoenician/Persian anchorage of Tel Akko (Israel)

Previous geoarchaeological research on the Akko coastal plain have contributed to the understanding of the ancient coastal interface and added evidence as to the location/shift of the ancient anchorages dating from the Middle Bronze Age (beginning of the 2nd Millennium BC) to the Early Hellenistic period (mid of the 2nd century BC) of the ancient site of Tel Akko. The present research provides new insights into the environmental changes and likely anchorage sites along the western edge of Tel Akko in the 1st Millennium BC (Iron Age II and III, periods associated with the Phoenician mariners and Persian army incursion). Our approach for locating the anchorage is based on a detailed investigation of subsurface sediments combining sedimentological and faunal analysis and radiocarbon dating of cores as well as identification of ceramic sherds found in the cores, and ground penetrating radar (GPR) and electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) surveys. Paleoenvironmental changes are compared and contrasted with the results of the archaeological investigations on the tell and in its vicinity. Our new data demonstrates that the Phoenician/Persian maritime interface of Tel Akko was mainly oriented toward the southwestern area of the tell where a natural anchorage was likely to have been located. At that time, the water depth in this area was ca. 2m, allowing for the anchorage of seagoing vessels. Increasing sediment deposition lead to the deterioration of direct, and eventual loss of access, to the sea. These conditions initiated the abandonment of the tell in the Early Hellenistic period as well as the westward shift to habitation on the peninsula, now the ‘Old city of Akko’, the Crusaders' Saint Jean d’Acre.

Persia’s Victory

A large Persian army consisting of archers, siege equipment, and fearless Immortals is wedged in a narrow strip between the sea and the mountains. Beyond this pass lies the Greek heartland and the ...

Airway management in COVID-19 : time to start thinking outside the box?

Faced with limited time, severely constrained resources and a lack of manpower in the face of the overwhelming numbers in Xerxes’ invading Persian Army, the Greeks strategised to halt their foe using two natural barriers which restricted movement: the Straits of Atremisium, and the narrow pass at Thermopylae. King Leonidas of Sparta led 7 000 mettlesome troops to engage at the Hot Gates, preparing to face a force today believed to have exceeded 150 000 fighters. When told that the Persians were so multitudinous that each volley of their arrows would block out the sun, Herodotus writes that the plucky Spartan soldier, Dienekes, replied laconically: “In the shade, then, we will fight!” The Battle of Thermopylae is history interwoven with legend, but speaks of the power of strategic interventions applied at the right place, at the right time, by the right people, even in the face of overwhelming odds.

Relief images of the archaic Lycian «pillar tombs»: the problem of stylistic analysis and semantic interpretation

The article examines the earliest burial monuments of the archaic Lycian kings. Particular attention is paid to the transition from kurgan to pillar burials, which took place immediately after the conquest of Lycia by the Persian army in the middle of the VI century BC. The Lycian kings tried to display the main landmarks of political biography, visualizing them through funeral reliefs. The main motives should be considered the scenes of the hunt, the palace audience, military victory and public celebration. The plot of «theriomachy» was required by the rulers of Lycia for a hint of a political connection with the Persian crown and their own legitimation as the first pro-Achaemenidean king. During the study of the historiography, was established a direct relationship between the genesis of a dynastic form of political power and the appearance of the first type of monumental burial grounds. Comparative analysis of Lycian funerary reliefs demonstrates syncretism of Anatolian, Greek and Persian visual elements.

Salamis After Twenty-Five Centuries

Salamis After Twenty-Five Centuries John Psaropoulos (bio) 1. What Salamis Achieved The marble doorway leading in and out of the Acropolis offers the departing guest a framed view of the Salamis Strait, thirteen kilometers away. The University of California archaeologist John Papadopoulos, who made this observation, believes that is deliberate. The Battle of Salamis, which took place twenty-five hundred years ago in that strait, successfully pitted an Athenian-led navy of three hundred ships against a Persian-led one of twelve hundred. It was perhaps the unlikeliest Athenian military victory of all time but gave Athens mastery of the Aegean. She used it to build a maritime empire offering Greek city-states Athenian-style democracies and security guarantees against Persia. The doorway itself is part of the Propylaia, or foregate, of the Acropolis: a grand, colonnaded passage built, like the temples behind it, with the proceeds of that empire. It also happens to stand [End Page 297] on the spot where an aristocratic-led party of landlubbers who, having refused to give up the city and entrust their fate to the navy, erected a wooden palisade against the invading Persian army and were killed beside it. It is irresistible to imagine that Perikles, the Athenian general who commissioned the Propylaia, meant to create a permanent pointer to the city's greatest victory upon the site of its greatest miscalculation. The Greeks at the Battle of Salamis were nominally led by Sparta. In reality, Athens was the source of Greek strategy and strength. It provided two-thirds of the Greek fleet. The battle's winning strategy came from an Athenian general, Themistokles. Athens was the extraordinary component of the Greek forces for other reasons, too. Its punishment was the ultimate goal of the Persian expedition under Xerxes. Athens had sent twenty ships to assist her colonies in Asia Minor in a revolt against the Persian Empire fourteen years earlier. On a fennel-rich plain called Marathon, she had had the temerity to defeat the first Persian expeditionary force Xerxes's father, Darius, sent to punish her in 490 BC. When that failed, Darius issued orders for a larger-scale invasion he did not live to lead. "All Asia was in uproar for three years, with the best men being enrolled in the army for the invasion of Greece, and with the preparations," the Greek father of journalism, Herodotos, tells us at the beginning of Book VII of The Histories. There were also political transformations afoot in Athens, which defeat at Salamis might well have quashed. Its experiment of constitutional democracy was not yet thirty years old. Persia, certainly, did not look kindly upon rule by the people; but neither did Sparta, whose king Kleomenes had marched on Athens no fewer than four times in the previous century to restore tyranny—one-man rule—under Hippias. Even now, on the eve of Salamis, the eightyyear-old Hippias and his family were waiting to return to power, this time under the sponsorship of the Persian Empire. [End Page 298] The contest was not only highly uneven in military terms—it was politically asymmetrical, too. For Persia, these were largely wars of prestige, shoring up discipline in other parts of the empire that might be entertaining thoughts of revolt. For Athens they were existential. Every able-bodied man was conscripted to hold an oar or a spear. Women and children were evacuated to the Peloponnese and the island of Salamis. Temples, ancestral homes, and productive fields were abandoned to the invader's torch. It would be no exaggeration to say that these Persian Wars were the driver of all subsequent Greek history until the Roman occupation four-and-a-half centuries later. They confirmed the irreversibility of democracy in Athens; they established the primacy of the Athenian thalassocracy throughout the Greek world; they stanched Persia's expansion into Europe and established a European power on the world stage for the first time; they incited the jealousy of Sparta and helped trigger the twenty-seven-year-long Peloponnesian War, through which she defeated Athens with the help of Persian gold and briefly restored her title as leader of Greece; and they engendered the...

Greek Military Service in the Ancient Near East, 401–330 by Jeffrey Rop

Reviewed by: Greek Military Service in the Ancient Near East, 401–330 by Jeffrey Rop Matthew A. Sears Jeffrey Rop. Greek Military Service in the Ancient Near East, 401–330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xxviii, 265. $99.99. ISBN 978-1-108-49950-7. Writing a revisionist history is a difficult task, especially for ancient historians. Almost always, the literary sources, such as we have, are entirely in the favor of the orthodox view of things, and old opinions die hard. In the volume under review, Rop sets himself just such a daunting job, to dismantle the notion that the Achaemenid Persian Empire ran into trouble in the 4th century largely because of its lack of heavy infantry and a related reliance on Greek mercenaries. Rop chalks this idea, which he calls "the Greek Thesis," up to self-serving Greek sources, who, through literary devices such as focalization, and motifs including the "Tragic Advisor" and the "Dynamic Subordinate," wildly overstate the importance of Greek soldiers to Persian (and Egyptian) armies, and understate the influence of Persia and other powers in the Greek world. Where Rop succeeds most is in forcing us anew to read the surviving Greek literary sources as they are: one-sided and biased. Rather than reassess the 4th-century history of Greco-Persian interactions by turning to sources such as Achaemenid literary and epigraphic records or the results of archaeological excavations of Achaemenid and Achaemenid-related sites, Rop takes a new look at the same Greek literary works on which ancient historians have traditionally relied. For example, to provide a new take on the Battle of Cunaxa in 401, in which the Ten Thousand Greeks fought for the rebel Persian prince Cyrus the Younger against his brother, King Artaxerxes II, Rop examines only the account of Xenophon's Anabasis. By reading between the lines, Rop suggests, we can spot where Xenophon distorts events in such a way as to make the Greeks appear more tactically dominant than they were, and the Persian infantry more vulnerable to hoplites than was really the case. Rop argues that, rather than the Greek hoplites in Cyrus' army causing the Persians arrayed against them so much fear that the Persians ran away, the Greeks were fooled by a well-executed feigned retreat that removed them from the battle's main action, in which Cyrus was killed. Artaxerxes is thus rehabilitated as a subtle tactician, and Cyrus' Greeks are revealed as hardly the decisive shock troops most students of history have thought them to be. Rop argues that Cyrus hired the Ten Thousand not because Greek hoplites were invincible on the battlefield, but because his Greek xenoi could be trusted far more than his Persian troops, all of whom quickly defected to Artaxerxes after the battle. Rop gives the rest of 4th-century Greco-Persian history, up to the death of Darius III, the same treatment. Diodorus Siculus is especially scrutinized as a biased source who focuses so much on the actions of Greeks in the armies of Persians and Egyptians that the far greater number of Persian and Egyptian troops, and their far more consequential actions, are virtually ignored. The reader of Diodorus and other ancient sources is therefore left with the impression that battles and entire campaigns were won and lost because of the actions and advice of Greek soldiers and generals. Rop concludes that 4th-century history does not show that Greek mercenaries were essential to the Persians, much to the latter's detriment, but rather that the Persian Empire continued to have tremendous influence in mainland Greece. Despite having very little to say about Persian and other non-Greek and non-literary sources, Rop adds many important arguments to the growing trend [End Page 240] of scrutinizing the biased—and sometimes deceptive—nature of ancient Greek historical writers. The Greeks were not uniformly strategic and tactical geniuses any more than the Persians were merely hubristic blunderers, and the interaction between the two peoples was far more nuanced than the most-read sources indicate. However, by analyzing just these same sources, Rop can offer only speculative alternative reconstructions of events and motivations. Rop's...

Monsters of Military Might: Elephants in Hellenistic History and Art

Elephants were first deployed in warfare by Indian and Persian armies. The Greco-Macedonian troops first encountered these fearsome creatures in battle during the campaign of Alexander the Great. Subsequently, the Successors and later Hellenistic rulers similarly used elephants in battle. From this time, the animal began to appear in Greco-Roman art. Tracing the appearance of the elephant in Hellenistic history and art, I suggest that the elephant not only continued to be associated with its Asian and African origins and came to symbolize military triumph over exotic foes, it retained religious and mythic proportions as a fearsome, fabulous monster connected with the martichora and unicorn, griffon and sphinx, dragon and hippocampus. In particular, I re-examined the posthumous portrait of Alexander the Great in which he wears an elephant scalp as a headdress, similar to Heracles’ lion scalp. This deified portraiture not only depicts Alexander as descendant of Heracles and Dionysus, both sons of Zeus, but also—through connections with Ammon and Indra—as the legitimate ruler of the three continents of the known world, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

SAKAS IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSIA (ACHAEMENID)

Bu çalışmanın amacı Pers (Akhaimenid) döneminde Saka-Pers münasebetlerini incelemektir. Bu hususta öncelikle Sakaların başta Akhaimenid yazılı ve arkeolojik kaynaklarında, Yunan yazarların eserlerinde nasıl tasvir edildiğini açıklamaya çalıştık. Bunu yaparken Akhaimenid dönemine ait olan ve Sakaları tasvir eden en eski Saka görsellerini sunmaya çalıştık. Şimdiye kadar genellikle Saka-Pers savaşları üzerine birçok kıymetli çalışma yapılmıştı. Biz bu makalede Saka-Pers savaşlarının yanında Sakaların Perslerle olan “müttefiklik” ilişkilerini de göstermeyi amaçladık. Yöntem olarak Akhaimenid kitabeleri, bazı Assur vesikaları ve antik Yunan metinleri ile Sakaları betimleyen Akhaimenid rölyeflerini, mezarlar üzerindeki figürleri ve kurganlardan çıkarılan bazı arkeolojik malzemeleri kullandık. Çalışmamızda Sakaları temsil eden birçok grubun olduğunu, Sakaların Akhaimenidlerden önceki dönemlerde İran coğrafyası ile temasa geçtiğini, erken Akhaimenid döneminde Perslerle düşmanca münasebetleri olduğunu, Kserkses ile birlikte Sakalarla Perslerin omuz omuza çarpıştığını belirledik. Son olarak Perslerin gerek Yunan savaşlarında gerek Büyük İskender ile yaptığı savaşlarda mağlup olmasına rağmen Pers ordusundaki Sakaların rakiplerine karşı daima üstünlük sağladığını tespit ettik.

A bottleneck combat model: an application to the Battle of Thermopylae

This paper proposes a Lanchester-type combat model to simulate battles in which one or two of the opposing sides cannot use all the forces simultaneously due to some physical restriction (i.e., topographic constraints, transforming the battlefield into a bottleneck). We show that this model, when the bottleneck restriction applies to both sides, leads to the Lanchester’s linear law for both aimed- and unaimed-fire, but the rate of change over time is a constant. The main characteristics of the bottleneck combat model are the following: (1) the topographic constraint makes the quality (fighting effectiveness) and size of the restriction the more relevant factors for the outcome of the battle, reducing the relative importance of quantity; (2) the bottleneck transforms the Lanchester’s square law into the linear law under direct-fire; and (3) if quality is similar among foes, the topographic bottleneck restriction is irrelevant for victory. The model is used to simulate the Battle of Thermopylae and shows that if the bottleneck restriction had persisted and was not removed, the Persian army would have been defeated.

The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

The Tribal Kings in Pre-Islamic Arabia

Este artículo se ocupa de los reyes tribales en la Arabia pre-islámica. Estos reyes (en árabe, mulūk), eran en realidad jefes tribales que llevaban el título de malik y se tocaban con coronas. Algunos derivaban su poder del emperador sasánida, que eran quien les concedía las coronas. Su autoridad era principalmente local y limitada al territorio concreto de sus propias tribus; en algunos casos, a través de una confederación tribal, podía extenderse a otros territorios. Apoyados por guarniciones de la caballería persa, los reyes podían ejercer su poder sobre el territorio y la población, lo que se traducía en un tributo anual pagado por los habitantes de las áreas bajo control. Asimismo, los reyes controlaban los mercados estacionales que se celebraran en su territorio y las rutas comerciales que lo atravesaban. A cambio, eran responsables de las vidas de sus contríbulos y de la seguridad de sus propiedades.

Okoliczności kompozycji hymnu Akatyst ku czci Najświętszej Maryi Panny

The author of this article tries to situate the famous Greek Hymn Akathis­tos in its large context. He presents the Old Testament tradition, especially the Psalms, and the New Testament tradition: Christological hymns and the person of Mary in the Gospel. The Christians of the first centuries used to sing hymns during their meetings of prayer. The old Hellenic tradition in po­etry and music could also have influence on the Christian poetry and music, especially on the formal aspect of such compositions. It seems to be obvious that the Akathistos was inspired by the theological considerations on Mary as Christ’s Mother. This hymn is a great praise of Mary as Theotokos; this title was accepted officially in the Church by the Council of Ephesus (431). The exact date of the composition of the hymn is not known; it is only known that this hymn was sung in 626 in Constantinople as thanksgiving to Mary for the expelling of the aggressors (a regiment of the Persian army). The question of authorship of Akathistos is still discussed; most scholars attribute it to Roma­nos Melodus, but such an opinion is considered as probable. The aim of this article is to introduce the lector into the study on the theology of the Akathis­tos (Christology and Mariology). Surely, such a study can be precious for the Christian spirituality.

The Battle of Marathon and the Persian Navy

In the summer of 490 bc the Athenians secured their freedom and that of the European Greeks by defeating a Persian army in the battle of Marathon. Herodotus gives a sketchy description of the battle without any material information on the size of the respective armies but states that the Persians arrived at Marathon with 600 triremes and some hippagogoi, horse transports. Scholars have mostly rejected this figure for the size of the Achaemenid trireme fleet. The aim of this article is to re-examine the contemporary evidence and climactic factors to establish whether this figure can be considered accurate. The evidence does support Herodotus’ report that the Persians did indeed arrive at Marathon with 600 triremes and that they were deployed not as war galleys but as troop transports and that the Achaemenids did not sail with supporting merchantmen or sailing ships in this campaign.

The cryptographic cartouche of Nectanebo II from the great temple of pr-BAstt

Rosenow refers to unusual cartouches discovered in the II temple at Tell Basta were written in cryptographic form,and suggests these cartouches may be for 's name Nxt-Hr-Hbt-mry-In-Hr-sA-BAstt ,but the deities into these cartouches not the same ,this notice attracted my attention to study these cartouches and other fragments that were found in the same area and compares them with others for the same king. so this paper introduces the cryptography system that used in reading these cartouches, also it interprets the religious and political reasons that caused the king's name be written by this way.Also this research reveals How the first cryptographic cartouche of includes The Bubastis triad,and, and How The second cartouches mixed the Memphite triad with Bubastis triad.these cartouches shows The existence of among the deities as a potent and magician god, suggests he established for himself a special royal cult for his statues and a new royal cult for his royal name. probably he devoted for this latter cult a priesthood doing the cult rituals for his name whither in its cryptographic form or in its usual form.Also this paper refers that II also utilised cryptography on his cult statues that were found in Memphis and Heliopolis. These can now be found in the Metropolitan Museum of Art under No. 34.2.1. and in the Musee du Louvre under No.E III52. These statues show the king as a small figure standing between the claws of the falcon god Horus. This corresponds to the fact that II had a royal cult that included priests who served his statues that bore the name of Nxt-1r-Hbyt-pA-bik, Nectanebo the falcon.Nectanebo cult statues show that his name consists of three elements: The falcon has the phonetic value 1r and embodied the protection and legitimacy for the king at the same time.The sword that is in his left hand called nxt,power,and in his right hand Hb(t) sign.So, it seems that had established another special cult for himself in Bubastis, which was the cult of his royal cartouche Nxt-1r-Hbyt-mry-in-Hr-sA-BAstt, and had a priesthood attend to this cartouche and carry out the rituals for his own sacred name. Therefore, Bubastis was a site with this unique sort of worshipping.so created for himself a special divine magical personality, Through it Egypt enjoyed with a few peaceful years, which helped him to carry out a lot of his buildings projects, he finished six temples in Delta at least and in Middle and Upper Egypt he achieved more buildings whether new or renew, in addition to numerous chapels, obelisks and naoi, in the attempt to bring back the glory of the previous periods.the two cartouches reflect some important events, as well as some features of Nectanebo’s personality. was the nephew of Tachos (Teos),a king who had been defeated by a Persian army in Phoenicia, so returned back to Egypt and seized the throne in the stead of the legitimate king.it is evident that was not a legitimate king but a usurper, so some army leaders opposed him and chose a prince descended from the royal house in Mendes to become king, but put an end to this rebellion against his authority and defeated the prince of Mendes, thus becoming the sole ruler of Egypt. أشارتRosenow إلى خراطيش غير معتادة أکتشفت في معبد نختانبو الثاني في تل بسطة, وقد کتبت بطريقة الکتابة المعماة, ورجحت أن هذه الخراطيش ربما تشير إلى اسم الملک نختانبو الثانيNxt-Hr-Hbt-mry-In-Hr-sA-BAstt, لکن المعبودات المصورة داخل تلک الخراطيش غير متماثلة جذبت تلک الملحوظة اهتمامي لدراسة تلک الخراطيش والبقايا المشابهة لها التي عثر عليها بنفس المنطقة, ومقارنتها بخراطيش أخرى للملک نختانبو وبالتالي يهدف هذا البحث إلى تقديم نظام القراءة المعماة (الغامضة) المستخدم في کتابة هذه الخراطيش الفريدة المميزة, ومن خلاله يفسر البحث الأسباب الدينية والسياسية التي جعلت اسم الملک يکتب بهذه الطريقة, ويکشف البحث أيضا عن ثالوث تل بسطة الذي حواه الخرطوش الأول, ذاک الخرطوش الذي يتضمن في نفس الوقت الانجازات المعمارية الأکثر أهمية للملک, مثل معبد أنوريس في سمنود, ومعبد حور في بهبيت الحجارة, ومعبد باستت في تل باسطة, بينما يمزج الخرطوش الثاني بين ثالوث منف وثالوث تل بسطة.

Paul Stephenson. The Serpent Column: A Cultural Biography.

The Serpent Column is the victory monument set up at Delphi after the defeat of the Persian army at the Battle of Plataia in 479 b.c.e. that marked the end of the Persian invasion of Greece. It originally consisted of a tall, hollow bronze pillar in the form of three entwined serpents terminating in three projecting necks and heads that formed the tripod for a gold cauldron. The cauldron was removed quite early in the monument’s history, but the rest of the tripod remained standing on the east terrace of the sanctuary at Delphi for eight centuries. It was then taken, probably on the orders of the emperor Constantine I, to adorn the newly built hippodrome of Constantinople. Having lost its heads and necks in 1700, the truncated shaft still stands in the At meydanı of Istanbul between the two obelisks. Along with these obelisks, the Serpent Column is all that is left of the crowd of sculptured monuments that occupied the central plinth dividing the racetracks of the greatest entertainment venue of the Byzantine imperial capital.