Perfect Credibility Research Articles

The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

AbstractThis paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

This paper examines the effectiveness of guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. Forward guidance and the credibility of the central bank are uniquely modeled by utilizing a game-theoretic evolutionary framework. We estimate credibility for the U.S. Federal Reserve with Bayesian methods exploiting survey data on interest rate expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimate of Federal Reserve credibility in terms of guidance announcements is relatively high, which indicates a degree of guidance effectiveness, but still one that is below the fully credible case. (2) If a central bank is perceived as less credible, anticipation effects are attenuated and, accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably to guidance announcements. (3) Imperfect credibility and guidance are an important aspect to resolve the so-called forward guidance puzzle, which the literature shows arises from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to guidance statements in structural models with perfect credibility. (4) Imperfect central bank credibility can also explain the evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, accounting for imperfect credibility is important to model the formation of expectations in the economy and to understand the transmission mechanism of guidance announcements.

ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICIES UNDER KEYNESIAN ANIMAL SPIRITS

In this paper, we make the case that an argument for price-level targeting over inflation targeting need not to be based on some overly restrictive assumptions. We adopt a theoretical framework that deviates from the assumption of rational expectation, and that takes into account the cognitive limitations and a “trial and error” learning mechanism of the agents. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict consumer price index (CPI) inflation targeting, exchange rate peg, and domestic price-level and CPI-level targeting) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxing the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy planning. We find that price-level targeting prevails over inflation targeting even under different expectation formation and even when the announced inflation target is not fully credible. The counterfactual analysis and sensitivity test confirm that CPI-level targeting is the most effective for improving social welfare and stability in an open economy. The business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting.

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.

The Role Of Regulatory Credibility In Effective Bank Regulation

This paper develops a model of regulated Brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system. We show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless, the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity. In fact, perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly. However, when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation, such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention, both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired. Importantly, we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s level of absolute risk aversion. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Monetary Policy Rules in an Open Economy with Heuristics: Which Model Is Best?

ABSTRACTThe choices of policy targets and the formation of agents’ expectation have been critical issues for reconsidering monetary policy management since 2008. The purpose of this article is to evaluate macroeconomic stability in a New Keynesian open economy in which agents experience cognitive limitations. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy designs. Our simulations confirm that the business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a Taylor-type (CPI or domestic inflation) rule or a credible exchange rate pegging system can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy.

Fiscal Consolidation Under Imperfect Credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.

Fiscal consolidation under imperfect credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.

Fiscal Consolidation Under Imperfect Credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.

Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets–Wouters model as the central bank׳s approximating model, the paper׳s main findings are as follows. First, a central bank׳s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can benefit from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Fourth, the risk premium shock represents an important potential source of model misspecification. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.

The role of regulatory credibility in effective bank regulation

This paper develops a model of regulated Brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system. We show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless, the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity. In fact, perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly. However, when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation, such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention, both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired. Importantly, we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s level of absolute risk aversion.

Imperfect Credibility and Robust Monetary Policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank’s approximating model, the paper’s main findings are as follows. First, a central bank’s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can benefit from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.

Imperfect Credibility and Robust Monetary Policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank’s approximating model, the paper’s main findings are as follows. First, a central bank’s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can benefit from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policy maker that seeks robustness.

INFLATION TARGETING UNDER IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY BASED ON ARIMBI (Aggregate Rational Inflation - Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia); LESSONS FROM INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE

This paper try to assess role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target.Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its long-term inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline).JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E61Keywords: Disinflation, Monetary Policy, Imperfect Credibility, Sacrifice Ratio

INFLATION TARGETING UNDER IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY: LESSONS FROM INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE

This paper try to assess role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target. Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its long-term inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline). JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E61Keywords: Disinflation, Monetary Policy, Imperfect Credibility, Sacrifice Ratio

The Output Effect of a Transition to Price Stability When Velocity Is Time Varying

This paper explores the effect of time‐varying velocity on output responses to policies for reducing/stopping inflation. We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices in which we introduce time‐varying velocity. Specifically, we endogenize time‐varying velocity into the model developed by Ireland (1997) for analyzing optimal disinflation. The nonlinear solution method reveals that, depending on velocity, the “disinflationary boom” found by Ball (1994) may disappear even under perfect credibility and that early output losses may be much larger than previously thought. Indeed, we find that a gradual disinflation from a low inflation may even be undesirable.

Trends in Teamwork

The consumer is sensitive to quality issues, so ITS particularly prompt response to quality is. Quality of products aimed at energy, especially biological value and hygienic That cannot be directly value perceived by the consumer. Therefore economic activity is based on profit, professionalism, upstream and downstream perfect credibility of the Undertakings Involved. Free movement of goods within the European Single Market opens a new food business sector perspective, but at the same time raises many new issues of quality, especially in terms of hygiene and health. Quality assurance of supply chain supposes numerous checkpoints with proving how it is performed and meet quality standards.

Are speed limit policies robust?

Both price level targeting and speed limit policies have been suggested as alternatives to inflation targeting that may confer benefits when a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss function is specified in terms of inflation volatility. Here we show that price level targeting dominates a speed limit policy under perfect credibility and rational expectations. However, a speed limit policy is more robust than a price level target. Even for small deviations from either rational expectations or perfect credibility, a speed limit policy dominates a price level target.

Are Speed Limit Policies Robust?

Both price level targeting and speed limit policies have been suggested as alternatives to inflation targeting that may confer benefits when a central bank operates under discretion, even if society's loss function is specified in terms of inflation (instead of price level) volatility. Here we show that price level targeting dominates a speed limit policy under perfect credibility and rational expectations. However, a speed limit policy is more robust than a price level target. Even for small deviations from either rational expectations or perfect credibility, a speed limit policy dominates a price level target.

The Credibility of the Monetary Policy 'Free Lunch'

Price level targeting has been proposed as an alternative to inflation targeting that may confer benefits if a central bank sets policy under discretion, even if society's loss function is specified in terms of inflation (instead of price level) volatility. This paper demonstrates the sensitivity of this argument. If even a small portion of agents use a rule-of-thumb to form inflation expectations, or does not fully understand the nature of the target, price level targeting may in fact impose costs on society rather than benefits. While rational expectations and perfect credibility are generally beneficial with either a price level or an inflation target, an inflation target is more robust to alternative assumptions. These results suggest that caution should be exercised in considering a price level target as the basis for monetary policy, unless society has preferences specified in terms of price level, rather than inflation, volatility. JEL Classification: E52