In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army, by Andrew B. Godefroy. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2014. 292 pp. $95.00 Cdn (cloth), $32.95 Cdn (paper). Doctrine within a military context relates to what is taught in terms of strategy, tactics, and operations. It impacts how an army is organized, moves, sustains itself, and solves particular battlefield problems like how to attack or defend a particular type of terrain. The standard interpretation held by Canadian military historians, who have written about Canada's army during the Cold War era, is that it lacked an institutional approach to conceiving, designing, and building modern land forces and therefore was not capable of the innovation and adaptation required to develop its own doctrine. The author of In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army, Andrew Godefroy, counters that image, arguing that the evidence available shows there was organized conceptual and doctrinal development, which as much as political and operational influences shaped the army during this era. In the first chapter of In Peace Prepared, Godefroy demonstrates the existence of Canadian strategic thought and military intellectual debate from confederation to the end of World War II. The following five chapters detail the various organizations within the Canadian Army that were responsible for innovation, adaptation, and transformation of doctrine up to unification in 1968. Throughout, the subject of Canadian military innovation and adaptation is placed within the context of domestic and international political developments, budgetary concerns, changing technology, military operations, and the evolving strategic environment. We are also introduced to the biases and prejudices of the personalities who coloured the public and institutional discourse on army doctrine. Emerging from World War II, the Canadian Army was a large, highly professional force, which had to adapt to budget cuts and downsizing as part of the peace dividend. The perceived security threat posed by the Soviet Union meant the army prepared for the defence of the Canadian North and Western Europe primarily. This was done within the context of collective security and multilateral alliances with traditional allies like the United States, Great Britain, and Australia in the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) armies association and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of necessity the Canadian Army needed to be interoperable with these allies in both equipment and doctrine. Consequently the agencies responsible for developing Canadian doctrine studied the potential adversary's methods, especially Soviet winter operations, such as the campaigns against Finland from 1939 to 1944. …