Penalty Scheme Research Articles

Multistage distribution substations planning considering reliability and growth of energy demand

The reliability of energy distribution is not usually considered in the planning of LV (low voltage) networks. However, the reliability cost has increased because of the appearance of the penalty schemes for the customer energy outage. In this paper, an approach is proposed for the planning of the LV distribution networks in which the distribution transformers are optimally organized. The size, number, and placement of the distribution transformers are optimally determined in order to improve the system reliability and to minimize the power and energy losses under the energy demand growth. An objective function is constituted, composed of the investment cost, maintenance cost, losses cost, and reliability cost. The proposed approach is applied to a test system consisting of 42 electric load points. It is observed that the appropriate placement of the distribution substation can reduce the interruption cost considerably, while the investment cost increased slightly. The total cost of the planning also decreased.

A posteriori error estimator for exponentially fitted Discontinuous Galerkin approximation of advection dominated problems

The paper deals with the weakly penalized exponentially fitted incomplete interior penalty (EF-IIPG0) scheme for advection-diffusion problems. In the first part of the paper, the $$M$$M-matrix property on conforming weakly-acute meshes is discussed. In the second part, an a posteriori error estimate is derived. The estimator, especially designed for the advection dominated case, controls the energy norm as well as a semi-norm associated with the advective derivative, taking full advantage of the formulation on non-matching grids. The paper is supplemented by numerical experiments, where the estimator is used as local error indicator for marking the triangles to be refined in an adaptive strategy.

Backward Penalty Schemes for Monotone Inclusion Problems

In this paper, we are concerned with solving monotone inclusion problems expressed by the sum of a set-valued maximally monotone operator with a single-valued maximally monotone one and the normal cone to the nonempty set of zeros of another set-valued maximally monotone operator. Depending on the nature of the single-valued operator, we propose two iterative penalty schemes, both addressing the set-valued operators via backward steps. The single-valued operator is evaluated via a single forward step if it is cocoercive, and via two forward steps if it is monotone and Lipschitz continuous. The latter situation represents the starting point for dealing with complexly structured monotone inclusion problems from algorithmic point of view.

Time-dependent Dirichlet conditions in finite element discretizations

Abstract For the modeling and numerical approximation of problems with time-dependent Dirichlet boundary conditions, one can call on several consistent and inconsistent approaches. We show that spatially discretized boundary control problems can be brought into a standard state space form accessible for standard optimization and model reduction techniques. We discuss several methods that base on standard finite element discretizations, propose a newly developed problem formulation, and investigate their performance in numerical examples. We illustrate that penalty schemes require a wise choice of the penalization parameters in particular for iterative solves of the algebraic equations. Incidentally, we confirm that standard finite element discretizations of higher order may not achieve the optimal order of convergence in the treatment of boundary forcing problems and that convergence estimates by the common method of manufactured solutions can be misleading.

Tax Aggressiveness of Taxpayers with Heterogeneous Income and Uncertainty about Taxable Income

We propose a tax aggressiveness game that deals with the strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax authorities. Although aware of their true income, taxpayers face uncertainty concerning their taxable income. We distinguish three settings where differences between reported income and taxable income are either not punished, punished symmetrically, or punished asymmetrically, respectively. We find that tax aggressiveness can be best reduced by introducing an asymmetric penalty scheme. In this case increasing tax uncertainty increases tax compliance further. The fiscal authority benefits from uncertainty to the detriment of the taxpayer. Taxpayers with low income suffer more from an increase in uncertainty than taxpayers with high income.

Risk-based maintenance scheduling in the presence of reward penalty scheme

In the recent years, the regulators employ various forms of reward/penalty schemes (RPS) in electric distribution networks to ensure the reliability of services. In the presence of RPS, distribution system operators (DSOs) would be exposed to financial penalty if they cannot provide reliable service to the customers. This means that the uncertainty in the reliability of services shows itself in financial risk faced by DSO. In such circumstance, DSOs are induced to reinforce the reliability of service through reliability reinforcement projects such as preventive maintenance (PM) projects. The maintenance projects should be managed in a way that the maximum profit can be obtained in the minimum risk. This study introduces risk-based maintenance management in the presence of RPS.Modeling the dependency of component failure rate on the preventive maintenance (PM) expenditure is the core of risk-based maintenance management, and this paper introduces the generalized proportional failure rate model (GPFM) for this purpose. This model together with the outage time generation algorithm (OTGA) help us to determine the financial risk faced by DSO.To verify the proposed method, it was implemented in the overhead line (OHL) feeders of a real distribution network.

To Yoder or Not to Yoder? How the Spending Clause Holding in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius Can Be Used to Challenge the No Child Left Behind Act

States such as California, Texas, Montana, Nebraska and Pennsylvania all have either declined to apply for waivers out of the testing, accountability, and penalty schemes of No Child Left Behind; or, have had their applications rejected by the Department of Education. This Article argues that these states would have a legitimate challenge to NCLB as unconstitutionally coercive based on the precedent of Sebelius. As discussed more in the sections that follow, not only is NCLB and Title I the largest federal funding program behind Medicaid, it also shares many of the characteristics that the opinions in Sebelius found to be coercive.

Design of Low Power Factor Financial Penalties for Bulk Customers in Electrical Distribution Networks

The negative impact of low power factors on power networks is significant and profound particularly at the distribution level. Inadequate voltage profiles, increased network losses, and the overheating of machines and equipment are some of the well-known side effects. Regulations, financial penalties and incentives, and technical solutions have all been used to improve low power factor levels. In this paper, studies and comparisons among several low power factor penalty schemes are considered leading to the most convenient method to be applied in practice. The study helps with highlighting the factors that highly to be considered when designing such penalties in order to eliminate the wide difference in the adopted low power factor regulations among utilities. The use of excessive reactive power/energy tariff to be the penalty for low power factor customers seems to be the favorable choice for utilities due to its consistency and reliability. This study forms the bases on which the new applied low power factor financial penalties in Saudi Arabia are designed.

Resource allocation within a budgeting game: truthful reporting as the dominant strategy under collusion

Both the Groves scheme and profit-sharing can lead to truthful reports produced by the better informed divisional manager for the benefit of the less well informed headquarters in charge of intra-firm resource allocation. However, both schemes have certain shortcomings: while the Groves scheme is susceptible to collusion among divisional managers, profit-sharing does not strictly ensure that truthful reporting is the dominant strategy in the case of each divisional manager. Both shortcomings can be remedied by combining the Groves scheme with an additional penalty scheme related to the Weitzman scheme. Using a game-theoretic approach, this paper introduces a new success indicator that establishes truthful reporting as the dominant strategy and prevents collusion or contractual agreements among divisional managers. In sum, this paper’s theoretical results predict that applying the new success indicator leads to a higher level of truthful reporting, and therefore to more efficient resource allocation, than applying either the Groves scheme or profit-sharing alone.

A vendor-managed inventory scheme as a supply chain coordination mechanism

In this paper, we have considered a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) arrangement in a supply chain (SC), where the buyer imposes a penalty for shipments exceeding an upper limit. We have shown as how the industry practice of VMI under penalty can be used as a SC coordination mechanism. The vendor can influence the buyer to increase the batch size without making the buyer worse off. We also discuss how such a penalty scheme may be derived. Further, we have established the equivalence of VMI under deterministic demand with that of quantity discount models, thus highlighting the need to incorporate both cooperation and coordination perspectives while analysing SC collaboration mechanisms.

Iterative penalty methods for the steady Navier–Stokes equations

This paper presents one-level and two-level iterative penalty finite element methods to approximate the solutions of steady Navier–Stokes equations. First, one-level iterative penalty finite element method is applied to solve the steady Navier–Stokes equations numerically, and its H1 and L2 error estimates are derived. Then, two-level iterative penalty scheme is given and its error estimates are obtained for velocity and pressure. Finally, the numerical results are displayed to verify the theoretical analysis.

Unreasonable Doubt: Warren Hill, AEDPA, and Georgia's Unconstitutional Burden of Proof

A Georgia state court — and seven experts — held that defendant Warren Hill was intellectually disabled under a preponderance of the evidence standard, yet still sentenced Hill to death. Indeed, Hill’s recent execution was due in substantial part to Georgia’s “preposterous burden of proof” which requires that intellectual disability be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard experts have said is nearly impossible to satisfy. Georgia’s law “effectively limits the constitutional right protected in Atkins [v. Virginia],” and creates a conditional, not categorical, ban, on the execution of intellectually disabled defendants. Neither Atkins nor the Constitution countenance this result, which is antithetical to the “fundamental fairness [that is] essential to the very concept of justice.”Some of the Supreme Court’s current and former members agree. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor acknowledged that, if “statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.'' Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart stated that the death penalty was “wantonly and freakishly imposed,” while Justice William Brennan famously vowed that he would never affirm a death sentence. Justice Ginsburg flatly stated that “[p]eople who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty.”Ultimately, Warren Hill’s case is not just about the injustice of executing those who are intellectually disabled. It is a microcosm of the arbitrariness that time has proven to be neither fixable nor consistent with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Georgia’s death penalty scheme has already been found unconstitutional once, and its reasonable doubt standard should likewise meet its constitutional demise. If intellectually disabled individuals like Warren Hill continue to be executed, “the reverberations of injustice [will not be] so easily confined,” because the resulting unfairness will be impossible to ignore. As time has proven, the only way to ensure that “death is different” is to bury the death penalty, as the Court once said, “in the graveyard of the forgotten past.”

Forward-Backward and Tseng’s Type Penalty Schemes for Monotone Inclusion Problems

We deal with monotone inclusion problems of the form 0 ∈ A x + D x + N C (x) in real Hilbert spaces, where A is a maximally monotone operator, D a cocoercive operator and C the nonempty set of zeros of another cocoercive operator. We propose a forward-backward penalty algorithm for solving this problem which extends the one proposed by Attouch et al. (SIAM J. Optim. 21(4): 1251-1274, 2011). The condition which guarantees the weak ergodic convergence of the sequence of iterates generated by the proposed scheme is formulated by means of the Fitzpatrick function associated to the maximally monotone operator that describes the set C. In the second part we introduce a forward-backward-forward algorithm for monotone inclusion problems having the same structure, but this time by replacing the cocoercivity hypotheses with Lipschitz continuity conditions. The latter penalty type algorithm opens the gate to handle monotone inclusion problems with more complicated structures, for instance, involving compositions of maximally monotone operators with linear continuous ones.

Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance: A Contract Theory Analysis

We use a Contract Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone Financial Governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers, and European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but it will increase inflation and the euro value will fall. Since these effects are shared equally by euro countries (cost sharing), there exists an incentive to free-ride on other countries. We then analyze a solution to the free-rider problem through the penalty scheme, and derive a second best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. Lastly, we derive the parameter conditions for optimizing the EU’s current allocation of authority, “divided authority structure,” which consists of Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization. We find that what is effective is “contingency dependent governance” based on “relative sovereignty,” where there is a division of authority as the basic structure and the main body governs with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency.

Performance-based ship management contracts using the Shipping KPI standard

Abstract An important benefit of performance-based contracts is a better risk and profit-sharing mechanism and by that a means to overcome the “split incentive” problem in current shipping contracts. “Split incentive” means that the risk or cost of implementing beneficial measures does not fall on the same party that gets the benefits. However, performance-based contracts do not come without challenges. These are related to defining commonly agreed performance measurements and an incentive scheme that can counteract problems like allocative efficiency and information asymmetry. This paper gives an example of how these challenges can be addressed by using the Shipping KPI standard. The purpose of the paper is to show how a standard set of key performance indicator definitions and corresponding benchmark values can greatly simplify the design of a performance-based contracts scheme by providing well-defined references for both owner and manager. This is done by creating a bonus and penalty scheme where the payment is related to a single variable (budget performance), while a number of quality indicators control whether a bonus will be paid at all. The paper will discuss this principle in relationship to problems identified in literature on performance-based contracting and ship management and provide an overview of possible strengths and weaknesses.

Impact of Reward and Penalty Scheme on the Incentives for Distribution System Reliability

Performance-based regulations accompanied by quality regulations are gaining ground in the electricity distribution business. Several European countries apply quality regulations with reward and penalty schemes (RPSs), where the distribution system operator (DSO) is rewarded (or penalized) when fulfilling (or not fulfilling) an adequate level of reliability to its customers. This paper develops a method that the regulator can use before enforcing a regulation to get an understanding of the impact different RPS design solutions have on the DSO's financial risk and incentives to invest in reliability. The proposed method also includes a sensitivity analysis to identify which are the most important parameters in an RPS. The new method is applied to three regulatory challenges to evaluate their RPS design solutions. Results show that the choice of scheme design and cost model used to decide the incentive rate have a large impact on the DSO's financial risk and incentive to invest.

DETERIORATING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK BY RECOVERING ZOMBIES USING PENALTY SCHEME

Resource of victim impounded by DDoS attack leads the victim to series monetary loss apart from various other ill-effects. Already lot of solutions came up in technological aspects almost neglecting the economical aspects. Hence there is not yet a proper method to make the zombies accountable to the economical loss materialized as the effects of highly zombie oriented DDoS attacks. Therefore the need of the hour is to develop a prudential monetary based DDoS solution that serves as the economical defense as well as strives to bring heighted awareness among the zombies. Consequently in this study we discuss the techno-economical scheme termed as Penalty Scheme. This scheme is an idea of enforcing necessary means to evaluate the accountability of zombies which therefore serves as the economical defense towards the notorious DDoS attacks. This method notifies and makes the zombies aware of the loss incurred through their careless participation in DDoS attacks. The proposed scheme is analyzed using real time datasets, the results show the considerable improvement in the DDoS attack handling through integrating the Penalty Scheme with the cooperative filtering approach.

A Tseng’s Type Penalty Scheme for Solving Inclusion Problems Involving Linearly Composed and Parallel-Sum Type Monotone Operators

In this paper we consider the inclusion problem involving a maximally monotone operator, a monotone and Lipschitz continuous operator, linear compositions of parallel-sum type monotone operators as well as the normal cone to the set of zeros of another monotone and Lipschitz continuous operator. We propose a forward–backward–forward type algorithm for solving it that assumes an individual evaluation of each operator. Weak ergodic convergence of the sequence of iterates generated by the algorithmic scheme is guaranteed under a condition formulated in terms of the Fitzpatrick function associated to one of the monotone and Lipschitz continuous operators. We also discuss how the proposed penalty scheme can be applied to convex minimization problems and present some numerical experiments in TV-based image inpainting.

Real-time container storage location assignment at an RTG-based seaport container transshipment terminal: problem description, control system, simulation model, and penalty scheme experimentation

We show how the overall productivity of an RTG-based seaport container terminal depends on the system used for automatically selecting storage locations for export containers in real time as they enter the terminal. Several real-time container storage systems are proposed and evaluated by a fully-integrated, discrete event simulation model of a vessel-to-vessel transshipment terminal. In this study, we introduce the problem; present a system for making real-time container storage decisions; describe the simulation model used for experimentation; and describe an experiment that illustrates some of the main trade-offs involved in container storage decisions.

Optimal biofuel supply chain design under consumption mandates with renewable identification numbers

The Renewable Identification Number (RIN) system is a tracking mechanism that enforces the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard by monitoring obligated parties’ compliance with the biofuel consumption mandates. This paper incorporates the RIN system into the design of a biofuel supply chain that addresses independent decisions of non-cooperative farmers, biofuel manufacturers, and blenders. Game-theoretic models are developed to examine the impacts of the RIN system on individual stakeholders’ decisions (e.g., on farmland use, bio-refinery investment, biofuel production) and the competition between food and biofuel industries, in both a perfectly competitive scenario and a monopoly scenario. For the perfectly competitive scenario, Nash equilibrium can be obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. For the monopoly scenario, a bi-level Stackelberg leader–follower model is developed, from which we found that a rigid mandate on blenders may suppress the total biofuel production. To avoid such unintended consequences, a relaxed unit-RIN based penalty scheme is proposed and shown to improve the overall biofuel supply chain performance. Managerial insights are drawn from a numerical case study for the state of Illinois.