Pauline Kleingeld Research Articles

Кантианский патриотизм

The article considers a paradoxical, at first glance, question – does the social and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant allow patriotism as a duty. The fact is that Kant is widely considered an icon of cosmopolitanism. His “cosmopolitan­ism” was reflected in such works as “Idea for a Universal History from a Cos­mopolitan Purpose” (1784), and later, with adjustments, in “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1795) and “Metaphysics of Morals” (1797). Considering that many philosophers reject patriotism on ethical grounds, believing that it cannot be a virtue, even more strange it may seem to pose the problem of “Kantian patriot­ism”. Nevertheless, modern researchers of Kant’s philosophy are trying to under­stand how his views can be combined with patriotism. In particular, this topic was raised several times (in 2000 and in 2003) by Pauline Kleingeld, a re­searcher of ethics and philosophy of Kant. To answer the question of whether patriotism is obligatory, permissible, or even harmful for Kant’s philosophy, she first described three types of patriotism – civic, nationalist, and patriotism based on the unique characteristics of the country, Kleingeld has done a lot of philo­sophical work, because now Kant’s social and philosophical concept can among other things be considered patriotic

Kant's Racial and Moral Theories

In the field of study of Immaneul Kant, it has become apparent that scholars must reassess his seemingly universalist moral theory in the context of his racist and otherwise bigoted thought. In particular, many of these analyses revolve around one particular instance of anti-colonial sentiment found in Kant’s essay “Toward Perpetual Peace”. In this paper, I engage with two attempts by Pauline Kleingeld and Lucy Allais, which argue for a primarily-universalist and primarily-racist Kant respectively. Ultimately, I argue that Kleingeld and Allais’ analyses both fail because they prioritize philosophical motivations for Kant other than his teleology in his conceptions of morality and human nature. I first present an analysis of Kant’s work focused around his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” that demonstrates the primacy of teleology to Kant’s system of thought, including his moral theory. I then argue that it is the nature of a teleological system such as Kant’s to establish a hierarchy, and I show how this is apparent in Kant’s work, including “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”. Under this lens, it becomes clear that Kant’s exclusionary epistemology of human nature is not inconsistent with his ethics, and is easily recontextualized through his teleological perspective of human life and behavior.

The Principle of Autonomy’s Enduring Validity

Pauline Kleingeld has argued persuasively that Kant’s Principle of Autonomy draws an analogy between two relationships: 1) that between an individual agent and their maxim, and 2) that between a legislator and their legislation. She also suggests that Kant’s evolving views on the normative significance of popular elections made his analogy inapt, which explains its disappearance from his later writings. This comment concurs with Sorin Baiasu that the merits of Kant’s analogy were untouched by his evolving political views. The analogy presupposes that when lawmakers legislate, they do so as representatives of the people, but even Kant’s mature writings posit that unelected lawmakers are representatives of the people in the necessary sense. Facts about whether a lawmaker acquired legislative authority by election, heredity, or conquest do have normative implications in the larger context of Kant’s political theory, but such facts are necessarily temporally upstream of the relation between legislator and legislation, just as facts about how an agent became rational are upstream of the relation between individual agent and maxim. Because the analogy focuses exclusively on these two relationships, it cannot be damaged by such upstream facts. Moreover, we should consider the possibility that Kant’s Principle of Autonomy compares a human will to the united general will of the people itself rather than to the will of a fallible public official or institution. On this alternative reading, it is even more clear that Kant’s evolving views on the significance of elections could have no possible relevance to the Principle of Autonomy.

Once More unto the Breach: Kant and Race

AbstractThe last thirty years has seen an explosion of literature on Kant and race. Once overlooked essays and notes in which Kant expresses contempt for nonwhite people and support for slavery have been brought to light, and many scholars have wrestled with the question of how a philosopher who stressed the equal dignity of all human beings could hold such views. This article tries to reframe the debate over these issues. It begins by reviewing the racist texts in Kant's corpus and the responses to them proposed by scholars like Charles Mills (to whom the paper is dedicated), Robert Bernasconi, and Pauline Kleingeld. It then introduces elements of Kant's philosophical development that gave Kant reason to renounce his racism—whether or not he actually did so—from about the time of the Groundwork onward. Finally, it turns to the question of what Kant's racism can tell us about his moral philosophy—and perhaps about moral philosophy in general.

How Far Do We Self-legislate?

In his early writings, Kant regarded the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, as well as the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them. Nevertheless, this impressively sounding principle gradually disappeared from the later Kant’s texts, and there is not much in the literature to explain why. Pauline Kleingeld’s purpose, in the two articles I consider here, is to address this lacuna and to show that there are good philosophical reasons for this principle’s gradual disappearance from the Kantian framework. One of my aims, in this paper, is to formulate and argue for several reservations about Kleingeld’s argument; however, even if these reservations turn out to be apposite, my claim is not that Kant did not actually abandon the Principle of Autonomy; instead, I argue that, even if Kleingeld were right and Kant had abandoned the Principle of Autonomy, he would still not have needed to.

The Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: A Response to Kleingeld

In this paper I critically engage with Pauline Kleingeld’s ‘volitional self-contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. I make three remarks: first, I seek to clarify what it means for a contradiction to be volitional as opposed to logical; second, I suggest that her interpretation might need to be closer to Korsgaard’s ‘practical contradiction’ interpretation than she thinks; and third, I suggest that more work needs to be done to explain how a volitional self-contradiction generates both a ‘contradiction in conception’ and a ‘contradiction in will.’

Kant and Slavery—Or Why He Never Became a Racial Egalitarian

Abstract According to an oft-repeated narrative, while Kant maintained racist views through the 1780s, he changed his mind in the 1790s. Pauline Kleingeld introduced this narrative based on passages from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1795). On her reading, Kant categorically condemned chattel slavery (and colonialism) in those texts, which meant that he became more racially egalitarian. But the passages involving slavery, once contextualized, either do not concern modern, race-based chattel slavery or at best suggest that Kant mentioned it as a cautionary tale for labor practices in Europe. Overall, Kant never explicitly considered chattel slavery as a moral problem to be addressed on its own. Rather, he treated it primarily in terms of its function in human history. If he ended up expressing some qualms about its practices, it was likely because they threatened to deepen intra-European conflicts and undermine the prospect of perpetual peace. The humanity of the enslaved “Negroes” was never part of the reasoning. This was not a casual oversight on Kant’s part. It reflects the complexity of his philosophical system: everything he did or did not say about chattel slavery begins to make sense once we connect his philosophy of history and his depiction of “Negroes” as natural slaves.

The fate of autonomy in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

ABSTRACT The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent interpretation, I argue that this does not amount to a disappearance of the Principle of Autonomy, but to an important development of the notion of autonomy. I first show that Kant still advocated the Principle of Autonomy in the 1790s along with the thought of lawgiving through one’s maxims. I then argue that the role of autonomy in Kant’s later ethics has a different focus than in the previous works, which requires to connect autonomy with autocracy. Conversely, in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, autocracy, which Kant had employed before as an independent notion, is construed as a new layer of autonomy. What Kant there calls subjective autonomy is thereby considered as reason’s self-government in the maxims of each rational agent.

Defending the Traditional Interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature

In this article I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks levelled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the article is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, Kleingeld and Nyholm: these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely, but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I take a detailed look at Furner’s work, work in which he seeks to revise (rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his more modest aims, Furner’s revision is also ill-founded.

Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship by Pauline Kleingeld (review)

Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship by Pauline Kleingeld (review)

Patriotism, Poverty, and Global Justice: A Kantian Engagement with Pauline Kleingeld's Kant and Cosmopolitanism

AbstractIn this article I critically engage some of the philosophical ideas Kleingeld presents in Kant and Cosmopolitanism, namely patriotism, poverty and global justice. Against Kleingeld, I propose, first, that perhaps democracy is less important and affectionate love more so to both Kant himself as well as to an account that can successfully refute a Bernard Williams style ‘one-thought-too-many’ objection to Kantian patriotism; second, that guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief for all its citizens is constitutive of the minimally just state for Kant; and, third, that there seem to be more disanalogies between the domestic and the global public authorities in Kant's account of right than Kleingeld's interpretation allows for.

The Rights of States, the Rule of Law, and Coercion: Reflections on Pauline Kleingeld's Kant and Cosmopolitanism

AbstractPauline Kleingeld argues that according to Kant it would be wrong to coerce a state into an international federation, due to the wrongness of paternalism. Although I agree that Kant opposes the waging of war as a means to peace, I disagree with Kleingeld's account of the reasons why he would oppose coercing a state into a federation. Since she does not address the broader question of the permissibility of interstate coercion, she does not properly address the narrower question of whether coercion to compel a state to join a federation can be permissible. I revise and supplement her arguments.

Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy

This article examines the controversy that has arisen concerning the interpretation of Immanuel Kant's account of European colonialism. One the one hand there are those interpreters such as Robert Bernasconi who see Kant's account as all of a piece with his earlier views on race which demonstrate a certain narrow mindedness in relation to black and coloured people and, on the other hand, there are those such as Pauline Kleingeld and Allen Wood who argue that the earlier writings on race are not wholly typical of Kant's approach and suggest that Kant's later discussions of colonialism in Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals provide a better indication of Kant's progressive views on the treatment of non-European societies. The article draws attention to the very strong evidence of Kant's dislike for the pattern of European expansion to other parts of the globe and indicates that within Kant's writings there are the seeds of a wholly unconventional critical understanding of western colonialism that have yet to be developed fully. The article suggests that this critical understanding surpasses the unsystematic objections made to colonialism in post - modernist thought and also the critique proffered by the determinist Marxist account.

Kant and cosmopolitanism: the philosophical ideal of world citizenship

This is the first comprehensive account of Kant's cosmopolitanism, highlighting its moral, political, legal, economic, cultural and psychological aspects. Contrasting Kant's views with those of his German contemporaries and relating them to current debates, Pauline Kleingeld sheds new light on texts that have been hitherto neglected or underestimated. In clear and carefully argued discussions, she shows that Kant's philosophical cosmopolitanism underwent a radical transformation in the mid 1790s and that the resulting theory is philosophically stronger than is usually thought. Using the work of figures such as Fichte, Cloots, Forster, Hegewisch, Wieland and Novalis, Kleingeld analyses Kant's arguments regarding the relationship between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, the importance of states, the ideal of an international federation, cultural pluralism, race, global economic justice and the psychological feasibility of the cosmopolitan ideal. In doing so, she reveals a broad spectrum of positions in cosmopolitan theory that are relevant to current discussions of cosmopolitanism.

Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship"

Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship"

Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 18, Issue 4 p. 469-493 Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis Katrin Flikschuh, Katrin Flikschuh Government, London School of Economics The article was written whilst I was in receipt of a Leverhulme Trust research grant to work on Kant's political philosophy. I gratefully acknowledge the Trust's generous support. Earlier versions of the article were presented at the Oxford conference on Global Justice (May 2008), as well as political theory and philosophy seminars at LSE, the University of Fribourg, the University of Stirling, and the University of Frankfurt. A very early version was given at the Perpetual Peace conference in Copenhagen (August 2005). My thanks to organizers and audiences of all these events. Many colleagues have read all or portions of successive drafts and have offered generous comments and advice throughout. My particular thanks to Sharon Byrd, Patrick Capps, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Rainer Forst, Stefan Gosepath, Simon Hope, Joachim Hruschka, Kent Hurtig, Mogens Chrom Jacobsen, Bernd Ludwig, Pauline Kleingeld, Nico Krisch, Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Eiko Thielemann, Ines Valdes, Howard Williams, Lea Ypi, and Simone Zurbuchen. Finally, my thanks to the journal's two referees for their very helpful suggestions on how to improve the penultimate draft.Search for more papers by this author Katrin Flikschuh, Katrin Flikschuh Government, London School of Economics The article was written whilst I was in receipt of a Leverhulme Trust research grant to work on Kant's political philosophy. I gratefully acknowledge the Trust's generous support. Earlier versions of the article were presented at the Oxford conference on Global Justice (May 2008), as well as political theory and philosophy seminars at LSE, the University of Fribourg, the University of Stirling, and the University of Frankfurt. A very early version was given at the Perpetual Peace conference in Copenhagen (August 2005). My thanks to organizers and audiences of all these events. Many colleagues have read all or portions of successive drafts and have offered generous comments and advice throughout. My particular thanks to Sharon Byrd, Patrick Capps, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Rainer Forst, Stefan Gosepath, Simon Hope, Joachim Hruschka, Kent Hurtig, Mogens Chrom Jacobsen, Bernd Ludwig, Pauline Kleingeld, Nico Krisch, Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Eiko Thielemann, Ines Valdes, Howard Williams, Lea Ypi, and Simone Zurbuchen. Finally, my thanks to the journal's two referees for their very helpful suggestions on how to improve the penultimate draft.Search for more papers by this author First published: 10 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00361.xCitations: 39 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume18, Issue4December 2010Pages 469-493 RelatedInformation

Immanuel Kant (International Library of Essays in the History of Social and Political Thought). Edited by Arthur Ripstein

Immanuel Kant (International Library of Essays in the History of Social and Political Thought). Edited by Arthur Ripstein

Book ReviewsImmanuel Kant, . Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Edited and with an introduction by Pauline Kleingeld. Translated by David Colclasure. With essays by Jeremy Waldron, Michael W. Doyle, and Allen W. Wood.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Pp. 304. $45.00 (cloth); $17.00 (paper).

Book ReviewsImmanuel Kant, . <i>Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History</i>. Edited and with an introduction by Pauline Kleingeld. Translated by David Colclasure. With essays by Jeremy Waldron, Michael W. Doyle, and Allen W. Wood.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Pp. 304. $45.00 (cloth); $17.00 (paper).

Cultural Cosmopolitanism and Civic Education

In the last fifteen years, there has been a renewed interest among philosophers in exploring cosmopolitan ideals. In part, this is a response to theories that stress the value of a sense of belonging and the role of deep attachments to a national community as a source of moral and political obligations. Cosmopolitan views have a number of educational implications that are worth discussing, since they provide valuable insights relevant to the design of policy in an increasingly interconnected world. In general terms, cosmopolitanism can be described as a form of universalism that builds on the metaphor that all human beings are “citizens of the world.” As Pauline Kleingeld has pointed out, cosmopolitans agree that “all human beings share certain essential features that unite them or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders.” But beyond this very general description, there does not seem to be a precise set of normative claims that unify all cosmopolitan positions. Some cosmopolitans are concerned with defending the view that all human beings belong to the same moral community, which grounds obligations of justice that transcend national origins. Others are interested in supporting the creation and development of common political or juridical institutions that would unite all human beings in a single political or juridical order. Still others cherish the existence of a rich variety of cultural forms in the world, seeing them as a common heritage for all humanity.

Kantian Patriotism

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 29, Issue 4 p. 313-341 Kantian Patriotism PAULINE KLEINGELD, PAULINE KLEINGELD PAULINE KLEINGELD is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Her research interests focus on Kant and on cosmopolitanism. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft, on Kant's philosophy of history (Konigshausen und Neumann, 1995). Her recent articles include “Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason,”Review of Metaphysics (1998), and “Six Varieties of Cosmo-politanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany,”Journal of the History of Ideas (1999). This is her first contribution to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author PAULINE KLEINGELD, PAULINE KLEINGELD PAULINE KLEINGELD is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Her research interests focus on Kant and on cosmopolitanism. She is the author of Fortschritt und Vernunft, on Kant's philosophy of history (Konigshausen und Neumann, 1995). Her recent articles include “Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason,”Review of Metaphysics (1998), and “Six Varieties of Cosmo-politanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany,”Journal of the History of Ideas (1999). This is her first contribution to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 January 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00313.xCitations: 26 I would like to thank especially Bernard Boxill for his helpful comments on a previous version of this paper, presented at the Eastern Division meeting of the APA, December 1999. I also thank Thomas Hill Jr., Sidney Axinn, Mike Meyer, Rainer Forst, Bert van den Brink, two anonymous referees for this journal, and the members of the Washington University philosophy department, especially Joel Anderson, Eric Brown, Marilyn Friedman, and Larry May, for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume29, Issue4October 2000Pages 313-341 RelatedInformation