Password-authenticated Key Exchange Schemes Research Articles

Password authenticated key exchange-based on Kyber for mobile devices.

In this article, a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public-key encryption and key-establishment standard is constructed. We mainly focused on how the PAKE version of PQC standard Kyber with mobile compatibility can be obtained by using simple structured password components. In the design process, the conventional password-based authenticated key exchange (PAK) approach is updated under the module learning with errors (MLWE) assumptions to add password-based authentication. Thanks to the following PAK model, the proposed Kyber.PAKE provides explicit authentication and perfect forward secrecy (PFS). The resistance analysis against the password dictionary attack of Kyber.PAKE is examined by using random oracle model (ROM) assumptions. In the security analysis, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) Zipf (CDF-Zipf) model is also followed to provide realistic security examinations. According to the implementation results, Kyber.PAKE presents better run-time than lattice-based PAKE schemes with similar features, even if it contains complex key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) components. The comparison results show that the proposed PAKE scheme will come to the fore for the future security of mobile environments and other areas.

A new lattice-based password authenticated key exchange scheme with anonymity and reusable key.

In this article, we propose a novel bilateral generalization inhomogenous short integer solution (BiGISIS)-based password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) scheme for post-quantum era security. The hardness assumption of the constructed PAKE is based on newly proposed hard lattice problem, BiGISIS. The main aim of this article is to provide a solution for the post-quantum secure PAKE scheme, which is one of the open problems in the literature. The proposed PAKE is the first BiGISIS-based PAKE that satisfies anonymity and reusable key features. The bilateral-pasteurization (BiP) approach is used to obtain the reusable key, and anonymity is achieved thanks to the additional identity components and hash functions. The reusable key structure reduces the time in the key generation, and anonymity prevents illegal user login attempts. The security analysis is done by following the real-or-random (RoR) model assumptions. As a result of security examinations, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and integrity are satisfied, and the resistance against eavesdropping, manipulation-based attack (MBA), hash function simulation, impersonation, signal leakage attack (SLA), man-in-the-middle (MitM), known-key security (KKS), and offline password dictionary attack (PDA) is captured. According to the comparison analysis, the proposed PAKE is the first SLA-resistant lattice-based PAKE with reusable key and anonymity properties.

TtPAKE: Typo tolerance password-authenticated key exchange

Error tolerant password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows a user to authenticate to a server using a password and agree on a session key with the server, provided that the password for authentication and the registered one are “close enough”. Recently, an ingenious error tolerant PAKE scheme (faPAKE) for generalized passwords (e.g., fingerprints) emerged. In this paper, inspired by the mechanism of faPAKE, we propose a typo tolerance password-authenticated key exchange scheme, dubbed ttPAKE, for ordinary passwords. In ttPAKE, we introduce double-layered secret sharing (DLSS) that splits a main secret into shares and further splits the shares into sub-shares. DLSS can be considered homomorphic to typo tolerance of a password and would be an effective approach to achieve typo tolerance of the password without direct operations on the password for security requirements. A table is built to associate DLSS with typo tolerance of the password. The password is converted into position information for DLSS to store the sub-shares in the table. The table is scrambled with random numbers, and hence the information of the password is concealed. Using DLSS, our scheme implicitly determines whether typos in a password for authentication is no more than a threshold, which accomplishes typo tolerance while protecting passwords. We demonstrate that ttPAKE is secure under the Universal Composability model with security proofs. The performance evaluation shows that ttPAKE is efficient in terms of computation, communication, and storage costs.

Efficient module learning with errors‐based post‐quantum password‐authenticated key exchange

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is a cryptographic primitive that can establish secure remote communications between the client and the server, especially with the advantage of amplifying memorable passwords into strong session keys. However, the arrival of the quantum computing era has brought new challenges to traditional PAKE protocols. Thus, designing an efficient post-quantum PAKE scheme becomes an open research question. In this paper, the authors construct a quantum-safe PAKE protocol, which is a horizontal extension of the password-authenticated key (PAK) protocol in the field of module lattices. Subsequently, the authors accompany the proposed protocol with a rigorous security proof in the random oracle model with two adaptions: applying the CDF-Zipf model to characterise the ability of the adversary and using the pairing with errors assumption to simplify the proof. Taking the flexibility of the module learning with errors (MLWE) problem, the authors elaborately select three parameter sets to meet different application scenarios. Specifically, the authors’ Recommended-PAKE implementation achieves 177-bit post-quantum security with a generous margin to cope with later improvement in cryptanalysis. The performance results indicate that the authors’ MLWE-PAKE is quite practical: compared with the latest Yang-PAK, the authors’ Recommended-PAK reduces the communication cost and the running time by 36.8% and 13.8%, respectively.

Towards Isogeny-Based Password-Authenticated Key Establishment

Abstract Password authenticated key establishment (PAKE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows two parties who share a low-entropy secret (a password) to securely establish cryptographic keys in the absence of public key infrastructure. We propose the first quantum-resistant password-authenticated key exchange scheme based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. The scheme is built upon supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman [15], and uses the password to generate permutations which obscure the auxiliary points. We include elements of a security proof, and discuss roadblocks to obtaining a proof in the BPR model [1]. We also include some performance results.

A Provably Password Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme Based on Chaotic Maps in Different Realm

Until now, the overwhelming majority of password- authenticated key agreement protocols using chaotic maps are based on three architectures (client/server, two clients/server and multi-server) and four security models (heuristic security, random oracle, ideal cipher and standard model). However, with rapid changes in the modern communication environment such as wireless mesh net- works and cloud storing, it is necessary to put forward a kind more flexible and general architecture to adapt it. So, in our paper, we firstly propose a provable secure two-party in two-realm key agreement protocol using chaotic maps in the standard model. Our proposed protocol is more general and it is easy to expand to many other forms, such as three-party or N-party in different realms. The new protocol resists dictionary attacks mounted by either passive or active network intruders, allowing, in principle, even weak password phrases to be used safely. It also offers perfect forward secrecy, which protects past sessions and passwords against future compromises. Finally, we give the security proof in the standard model and the efficiency analysis of our proposed scheme.

Multi-party Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme with Privacy Preservation for Mobile Environment

Communications among multi-party must be fast, cost effective and secure. Today’s computing environments such as internet conference, multi-user games and many more applications involve multi-party. All participants together establish a common session key to enable multi-party and secure exchange of messages. Multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme allows users to communicate securely over an insecure network by using easy-to-remember password. Kwon et al. proposed a practical three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-PAKE) scheme to allow two users to establish a session key through a server without pre-sharing a password between users. However, Kwon et al.s scheme cannot meet the security requirements of key authentication, key confirmation and anonymity. In this paper, we present a novel, simple and efficient multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange (M-PAKE) scheme based on the elliptic curve cryptography for mobile environment. Our proposed scheme only requires two round-messages. Furthermore, the proposed scheme not only satisfies security requirements for PAKE scheme but also achieves efficient computation and communication.

Multi-party Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme with Privacy Preservation for Mobile Environment

Communications among multi-party must be fast, cost effective and secure. Today’s computing environments such as internet conference, multi-user games and many more applications involve multi-party. All participants together establish a common session key to enable multi-party and secure exchange of messages. Multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme allows users to communicate securely over an insecure network by using easy-to-remember password. Kwon et al. proposed a practical three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-PAKE) scheme to allow two users to establish a session key through a server without pre-sharing a password between users. However, Kwon et al."s scheme cannot meet the security requirements of key authentication, key confirmation and anonymity. In this paper, we present a novel, simple and efficient multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange (M-PAKE) scheme based on the elliptic curve cryptography for mobile environment. Our proposed scheme only requires two round-messages. Furthermore, the proposed scheme not only satisfies security requirements for PAKE scheme but also achieves efficient computation and communication.

Anonymous three-party password-authenticated key exchange scheme for Telecare Medical Information Systems.

Telecare Medical Information Systems (TMIS) provide an effective way to enhance the medical process between doctors, nurses and patients. For enhancing the security and privacy of TMIS, it is important while challenging to enhance the TMIS so that a patient and a doctor can perform mutual authentication and session key establishment using a third-party medical server while the privacy of the patient can be ensured. In this paper, we propose an anonymous three-party password-authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol for TMIS. The protocol is based on the efficient elliptic curve cryptosystem. For security, we apply the pi calculus based formal verification tool ProVerif to show that our 3PAKE protocol for TMIS can provide anonymity for patient and doctor while at the same time achieves mutual authentication and session key security. The proposed scheme is secure and efficient, and can be used in TMIS.

Cryptanalysis of some improved password-authenticated key exchange schemes

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow two parties to share common secret keys in an authentic manner based on a memorizable password. In 1999, a PAKE protocol called simple authenticated key agreement (SAKA) was presented, and since then until 2004, several improved variants were presented to resist known attacks. In this paper, we present attacks on variants proposed by Kim et al. and Ku-Wang that directly cause them to fail in achieving a mutually authenticated secret key between legitimate parties. These results are devastating since achieving this is the basic security criterion that any key exchange should provide. We also show dictionary attacks on the original SAKA and all its variants. These dictionary attacks invalidate the basic security goals of these protocols since a PAKE scheme must be secure against dictionary attacks due to the low entropy of human-memorizable passwords being used.