The relations between phenomenology and psychopathology must be examined in an evolutionary perspective. Two distinct periods clearly stand out this way: a founding period and a contemporary period. The former period encompasses the works of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger and L. Binswanger. As for the contemporary period, it is characterized by a close connection and a convergence between the works of many phenomenologist psychiatrists and philosophers. This presentation will focus on the contemporary period and will aim at bringing to the fore a new trend in the relations between phenomenology and psychopathology, characterized by a closer, and thus more complex, reciprocity. Indeed, contemporary phenomenology takes into account and integrates the understanding of psychotic phenomena as far as to transform the sense of philosophy; it looks as if there were a break with the intentional phenomenology. According to Husserl, the consciousness is always consciousness of something, intentionality is a property of directedness towards an object. Not only do psychotic phenomena question the organisation of thinking, but also the constituent forms of experience, rooted in non intentional grounds. Three philosophers, Henri Maldiney, Marc Richir and Michel Henry, have renewed the non intentional approach of phenomenology. Recentering itself on the enigma of madness, philosophy makes it possible for psychiatry to reconsider mental illnesses which used to be dealt with only in terms of deficiencies. The reference to H. Maldiney will shed light on the human phenomenon seen at the crossing of the catastrophe and of the crisis. The issue of philosophical anthropology is then posed on the background, which is questioned and destabilized by the psychotic experience seen as an agonistic moment of derealisation and depersonalisation. The schizophrenic existence evades any constituent foundation of subjectivity and intentionality. The presentation of M. Richir's meditations will then lead us to redefine philosophy as a radical phenomenological epoche confronted with the abyss of the psychotic epoche. M. Richir re-enacts the Husserlian tradition, and in particular, the idea of genetic phenomenology, dealing with passive syntheses in which the body-of-flesh and the non intentional tonality come before the emergence of the consciousness. The last reference will be the work of M. Henry bases on philosophy of life and non intentional phenomenology; an opposed direction to Husserl will be taken by singling out pathos as an auto-affection of life. Pathos becomes the essential form of affect as condition for the actual existence, independent of intentionality. According to M. Henry, life never appears in the exteriority of the world, life's pure manifestation appears in its invisible interiority. The end-point of this phenomenology is the primitive suffering, thus the phenomenology of life concerns the qualitative aspects of psychopathological experiences bounded to a radical passivity. From the issue of psychosis, contemporary non intentional phenomenology carries out the theoretical, therapeutic and ethical consequences in the field of psychiatric research and practice.