Partisan Voting Research Articles

Tackling transparency in UK politics: application of large language models to clustering and classification of UK parliamentary divisions

For a healthier democracy in the UK, novel methods of visualising political data are key to improving transparency, and encouraging engagement. The paper proposes a visualisation tool, using Large language models (LLMs), such as GPT3.5 and GPT4, to conduct Natural Language Processing (NLP) in a novel methodology. We investigate partisan voting profiles, specifically of the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat parties along 11 predetermined dimensions, ranging from Immigration and Borders, over Welfare and Social Housing, to European Union and Foreign Affairs. Higher order dimensions reveals shifts in party preference over time, while clear trends of more extreme voting behaviour can be seen across parties between 2016 and 2023. The novel visualisation methodology reveals that voting behaviour has become more polarised along party lines, with Labour becoming more left-wing and Conservatives becoming more right-wing regarding most political topics. Liberal Democrats voting behaviour has typically been those of an opposition party, albeit becoming somewhat more extreme.

Whitewashing Women Voters: Intersectionality and Partisan Vote Choice in the 2020 US Presidential Election

Whitewashing Women Voters: Intersectionality and Partisan Vote Choice in the 2020 US Presidential Election

Rural but not radical right: The rural‐urban cleavage in Norway

AbstractConventional wisdom claims that rural voters are politically mobilized by right‐wing and culturally conservative forces, while urban voters are left‐leaning and have progressive cultural views. Leveraging original survey data from Norway, our work challenges this dichotomy. We build on cleavage theory and recent research on place identitiesto develop a latent measure of rural attachment. Using regression analysis, we investigate how well this measure maps onto five different cultural attitudes, left‐ right ideology, and partisan voting. The findings show that people with rural identities are not more right‐wing, reluctant towards immigration, or anti‐environmental than their urban counterparts. Instead, the geographic cleavage relates to dissatisfaction with the way the central government treats rural areas, resistance to the EU, and voting for the agrarian Center Party. The findings from Norway therefore show that it is possible to mobilize rural identifiers without disparaging immigrants or adopting other radical‐right stances. Our work suggests that the supply of political parties plays a decisive role in how rural identities are activated and contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the urban‐rural divide in advanced, multi‐party democracies.

The Partisan Vote: Shared Partisanship and Constituent Service in the U.S. Congress

The theory of the “personal vote” assumes that constituent service, or the process by which members of Congress help their constituents navigate the federal bureaucracy, is a component of representation that transcends partisanship. However, recent research suggests that affective polarization and negative partisanship may discourage constituents from reaching out to ask for help from cross-partisan legislators. Using a conjoint experiment, I show that shared partisanship has a strong effect on constituents’ decisions about which of their legislators to contact for assistance. However, positive in-party affect is unrelated to these preferences, suggesting that negative partisanship is responsible for this result. Gender and seniority also matter for constituents’ preferences even when accounting for shared partisanship. The results suggest that legislators’ ability to build a “personal vote” by performing constituent service may be weakened in an era of strong partisanship.

Inflation in 2022 did not affect congressional voting, but abortion did

This study examines voting in the 2022 United States congressional elections, contests that were widely expected to produce a sizable defeat for Democratic candidates for largely economic reasons. Based on a representative national probability sample of voters interviewed in both 2020 and 2022, individuals who changed their vote from one party's congressional candidate to another party's candidate did not do so in response to the salience of inflation or declining economic conditions. Instead, we find strong evidence that views on abortion were central to shifting votes in the midterm elections. Americans who favored (opposed) legal abortions were more likely to shift from voting for Republican (Democratic) candidates in 2020 to Democratic (Republican) candidates in 2022. Since a larger number of Americans supported than opposed legal abortions, the combination of these shifts ultimately improved the electoral prospects of Democratic candidates. New voters were especially likely to weigh abortion views heavily in their vote-shifting calculus. Likewise, those respondents whose confidence in the US Supreme Court declined from 2020 to 2022 were more likely to shift from voting for Republican to Democratic congressional candidates. We provide direct empirical evidence that changes in support for the Supreme Court, a nonpartisan branch of the federal government, are implicated in partisan voting behavior in another branch of government. We explore the implications of these findings for prevalent assumptions about how economic conditions influence voting, as well as for the relationship between the judiciary and electoral politics.

The Impact of Online Competition on Local Newspapers: Evidence from the Introduction of Craigslist

Abstract How does competition from online platforms affect the organization, performance, and editorial choices of newspapers? What are the implications of these changes for the information voters are exposed to and for their political choices? We study these questions using the staggered introduction of Craigslist — the world’s largest online platform for classified advertising — across US counties between 1995 and 2009. This setting allows us to separate the effect of competition for classified advertising from other changes brought about by the Internet, and to compare newspapers that relied more or less heavily on classified ads ex ante. We find that, following the entry of Craigslist, local newspapers reliant on classified ads experienced a significant decline in the number of management and newsroom staff, including in the number of editors covering politics. These organizational changes led to a reduction in news coverage of politics and resulted in a decline in newspaper readership, particularly among readers with high political interest. Finally, we document that reduced exposure to local political news was associated with an increase in partisan voting and increased entry and success of ideologically extreme candidates in congressional elections. Taken together, our findings shed light on the determinants of the decline of print media and on its broader implications for democratic politics.

Modeling the Relationship Between Firearm Restrictions, Medicaid Expansion, and Political Partisanship with Pediatric Firearm Mortality Costs

IntroductionFirearms are now the leading cause of pediatric mortality in the U.S., but few studies have investigated the economic impact of these deaths. Thus, this study determined whether multiple different gun-related measures, political partisanship and Medicaid expansion were related to the costs of pediatric gun deaths. MethodsEach states’ medical costs, years of potential life lost (YPLL), and value of statistical life (VSL) lost due to pediatric gun deaths were extracted from the WISQARS database from 2015 to 2020. Seven firearm laws or restrictiveness measures (assault weapons bans, child access prevention laws, firearm registration and permit to purchase requirements, safe storage laws, Giffords Law Center ranking, and the number of firearm provisions), the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI), and Medicaid expansion status were determined across states. Unadjusted analyses compared each measure and (1) medical costs, (2) VSL, and (3) YPLL for each state. These were repeated using adjusted analyses, controlling for poverty, educational attainment, poor mental health, and race. ResultsOf the 9 variables assessed, unadjusted analyses revealed that 8 variables were significantly associated with increased medical costs, all 9 were associated with higher VSL and 8 were associated with higher YPLL due to pediatric firearm-related mortality. Multivariable analyses revealed that 7 variables were associated with medical costs, 7 were associated with VSL and 6 were associated with YPLL. ConclusionStates with fewer gun laws and those which have not adopted Medicaid expansion were more likely to experience a higher economic burden due to pediatric gun deaths. Quantifying the costs of these deaths can demonstrate the social toll of gun violence to policymakers and the general public. Level of EvidenceIII.

The 1990s party realignment of U.S. presidential elections: Geographic sorting of counties by blue or red

AbstractIntroductionThis paper addresses the issue of partisan polarization in the U.S. in presidential voting at the county level. The literature on the growing partisan sorting and/or polarization is extensive, and controversies are pervasive. This paper focuses on the timing and sequence of changes in partisan vote shares at the county level from 1952 through the 2020 election.MethodsWe apply confirmatory factor analysis to identify the structures of partisan competition in counties from 1952 to 2020, and multiscale geographically weighted regression (MGWR) to uncover the social processes that influence the growing partisan polarization in the U.S.ResultsWe find that the growing partisan segregation coincides with the beginning of a secular change in the structure of partisan competition at the presidential level among counties that has intensified over the past quarter century. Polarization, segregation of partisans in communities, and a rise in sectionalism are the predominant characteristics of this new alignment.ConclusionThis study confirms a secular realignment in the structure of party competition among counties in presidential elections starting in 1996 and solidifying in 2008 when Obama is elected. The segregation of counties by dark shades of red or blue is the unique fingerprint of this new alignment that we call the "Geographic Sort" alignment.

The Impact of COVID-19, Election Policies, and Partisanship on Voter Participation in the 2020 U.S. Election

The COVID-19 pandemic had the potential to wreak havoc on elections. Democracies initiated varied policies to minimize health risks to voters and election workers. This study assesses the impact of voting policies, personal exposure to COVID, and partisanship on voter behavior in the 2020 U.S. general election. Using a comparative state-politics approach and new data, we demonstrate that exposure to COVID substantially influenced voter turnout, and election policies had a major effect on whether a voter cast a ballot by mail, early in-person, or in-person on Election Day. Unique circumstances, including the emergence of voting policies as a polarizing issue, also spawned a new partisan voting gap that is especially prominent among heavy news consumers. Compared to 2018, many more Democrats than Republicans abandoned Election Day voting in favor of mail voting.

Exposure to Campaign and Partisan Voting: The Moderating Roles of Voters' Political Predispositions

How do partisan citizens respond to campaign information and make voting decisions? We theorise that the association between exposure to campaign information and partisan voting is moderated by citizens' political predispositions — strength of partisanship, political sophistication, and election interest. To test our expectations, we used Australian Election Studies data from 2013, 2016, and 2019. We found that partisans who are exposed to campaign information tend to follow their party preference when strength of partisanship is high. For political sophistication, we found that the influence of campaign information on partisan voting is not conditional on sophistication. For election interest, we found a moderating effect of election interest whereby partisan individuals who encountered campaign information were more inclined to choose their own party when interest was low and more inclined to support their opposing party when interest was high.

Narratives and counter-narratives of political strategy: revisiting Australia's carbon pollution reduction scheme

ABSTRACT In 2009, the Australian Senate rejected the government's ambitious Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. In the prevailing narrative surrounding these events, the Labor government, under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, made a series of strategic errors that led to the scheme's – and ultimately, Rudd's and the Labor Party's – downfall. However, by taking a closer look at of some aspects of Australia's parliamentary system, including the norms of partisan voting and the numbers game in parliament, a different story is apparent. A counter-narrative is that the Rudd Labor government's approach was reasonable at the time, but that institutional factors and election outcomes presented significant obstacles to passing climate legislation of any kind. Correcting this narrative will enable a better understanding of the political circumstances in which environmental policies are enacted in Australia, a country with the potential for regional policy leadership on climate change.

Revisiting the Lavender Vote

Existing research suggests that sexual minorities are more likely to vote for parties on the political left, arguably because these parties more closely align with the demands of LGB communities. We add nuance to the Lavender Vote in an analysis of partisan voting behavior in Western Europe. While the leftward pattern of voting holds, we show that sexual minorities are similar to heterosexuals in support for Far Left, Center Left, Liberal, Center Right, and Far Right parties. We find that Greens draw disproportionate levels of support from sexual minorities when compared to their competition on the left and right, suggestive of Greens’ appeals to LGB communities. Furthermore, comparable proportions of Far Left, Center Left, Liberal, Center Right, and Far Right voters are sexual minorities. Sexual minorities from across the political spectrum are coming out. Overall, our results raise important questions about the appeal of the political left among sexual minorities.

Models of inter-election change in partisan vote share

For a two-party electoral competition in a districted legislature, the change in mean vote share for party A from one election to the next is commonly referred to as swing. A key question, highly relevant to election forecasting and the measurement of partisan gerrymandering, is: “How do we expect the swing to be distributed across the districts as a function of previous vote share?”. The literature gives two main answers: uniform swing and proportional swing. Which is better has been unresolved for decades. Here we (a) provide an axiomatic foundation for desirable properties of a model of swing; (b) show axiomatically that using uniform swing or proportional swing is a bad idea, (c) provide a simple swing model that does satisfy the axioms, and (d) show how to integrate a reversion to the mean effect into models swing. We show that all the above models can be expected to work well when (a) elections are close, or (b) when we restrict to data where swing is low, or (c) when we eliminate the cases where the model is most likely to go wrong. We show on a large US Congressional dataset that in addition to its superior axiomatic properties, our new model provides an overall equal or better fit on five indicators: mistakes about directionality of change, mistakes in winner, estimates that are outside the [0..1] bounds, mean-square error, and correlation between actual and predicted values. We recommend replacing the uniform and proportional swing models with the new model.

The Rise of Swedish Social Democracy

AbstractWe examine the rise and mobilizational dynamics of social democracy, employing data reported by the Swedish authorities on the distribution of voting eligibility, turnout and partisan vote in local elections during the 1910s at a high level of disaggregation (by narrow income segments and administrative units). In line with the existing literature, we show that electoral socialism depended on both the extension of the suffrage to its ‘natural’ electorate, that is, the urban working class, and the organizational capacity of trade unions and other civic associations. In addition, we show that socialist support was not uniform within the working class – even for a highly homogeneous society. Instead, the social-democratic vote was initially stronger among low- to middle-income workers, only expanding to poor voters later in time. We complement our local data with an interwar panel analysis of socialist vote and post-war survey data.

No Balance, No Problem: Evidence of Partisan Voting in the 2021 Georgia U.S. Senate Runoffs

Recent work on American presidential elections suggests that voters engage in anticipatory balancing, which occurs when voters split their ticket in order to moderate collective policy outcomes by forcing agreement among institutions controlled by opposing parties. We use the 2021 Georgia U.S. Senate runoffs, which determined whether Democrats would have unified control of the federal government given preceding November victories by President-elect Biden and House Democrats, to evaluate support for anticipatory balancing. Leveraging an original survey of Georgia voters, we find no evidence of balancing within the general electorate and among partisans across differing model specifications. We use qualitative content analysis of voter electoral runoff intentions to support our findings and contextualize the lack of evidence for balancing withan original analysis showing the unprecedented partisan nature of contemporary Senate elections since direct-election began in 1914.

Priming Ideology? Why Presidential Elections Affect U.S. Judges

U.S. Presidential elections polarize U.S. Courts of Appeals judges, doubling their dissents, partisan voting, and lawmaking along partisan lines and increasing their reversal of District Court decisions (Berdejo and Chen 2016). Dissents are elevated for ten months before the Presidential elections. I develop a theoretical model showing that the salience of partisan identities drives these behavioral patterns. The polarizing effects are larger in close elections, non-existent in landslide elections, and reversed in wartime elections. I link judges to their states of residence and exploit variation in the timing and importance of a state during the electoral season. Dissents are elevated in swing states and in states that count heavily to winning the election, when these states are competitive. U.S. Senate elections, the timing of which also varies by state, further elevate dissents. I link administrative data on case progression and frequency of campaign advertisements in judges’ states of residence to proxy for a state’s importance during Presidential primaries. Dissents occur shortly before publication, increase with monthly increases in campaign ads, and appear for cases whose legal topic, economic activity, is most heavily covered by campaign ads. Finally, I link the cases to their potential resolution in the Supreme Court. Dissents before elections appear on more marginal cases that cite discretionary miscellaneous issues and procedural (rather than substantive) arguments, which the Supreme Court appears to recognize and only partly remedy. The behavioral changes of unelected Courts of Appeals judges are larger than the behavioral changes of elected judges running for re-election.

State-level political partisanship strongly correlates with health outcomes for US children.

The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) determines how strongly a state leans toward the Democratic or Republican Party in US presidential elections compared to the nation. We set out to determine the correlation between childhood health outcomes and state-level partisanship using PVI. Sixteen measures of childhood health were obtained from several US governmental agencies for 2003-2017. The median PVI for every state was calculated for the same time period. Pearson's rho determined the correlation between PVI and each health outcome. Multiple regression was also conducted, adjusting for educational attainment and percentage of non-White residents. We also compared childhood health in moderately Democratic and Republican states (5-9.9% more Democratic/Republican than the national mean) and, similarly, for extremely Democratic and Republican states (10% or more Democratic/Republican than the national mean), using Wilcoxon tests. For all 16 health measures, the median values in Democratic-leaning states represented better outcomes than Republican-leaning states (9/16 had a beta value for linear regression associated with P < 0.05). When compared to Republican states, the median values in moderately Democratic states represented better outcomes for 14 of 16 health measures (9/14 associated with P < 0.05). Similarly, the median values for extremely Democratic states represented better outcomes with regard to all 16 health measures, when compared to Republican-leaning states (8/16 associated with P < 0.05).Conclusions: Democratic-leaning states displayed superior outcomes for multiple childhood health measures when compared to Republican counterpart states. Future research should investigate the significance of these findings and attempt to determine which state-level policies may have contributed to such disparate health outcomes. What is Known: • In the United States, many health disparities exist among children along racial, economic and geographic lines. • Many US states lean strongly towards either the Democratic or Republican political parties in federal elections. What is New: • Trends for multiple measures of childhood health vary in association with the political partisanship of the state being examined. • Multiple barometers of childhood health are superior in Democratic-leaning states, while no measures are better in Republican-leaning states.

Impact of political partisanship on public interest in infection prevention measures in the United States: An infodemiological study

There has been conflicting public messaging from government and state officials about recommended health behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic. We examined whether differences in political affiliation influences the public’s interest in infection prevention measures in the United States. State-specific data on public search interest in four key infection prevention measures (Quarantine, Social distancing, Hand washing and Masks) were obtained from Google Trends for the period 1 January 2020 to 12 December 2020. Political affiliation was ascertained based on the 2020 U.S. Presidential election results and 2017 Cook Partisan Voting Index. Spearman’s rank, partial correlation, and multiple regression analyses were conducted to compare political partisanship with public interest in infection prevention measures and overall case rate per 100 000 population. Statistical analysis was performed in R version 4.0.3.The COVID-19 pandemic has led to significantly increased public interest in infection prevention measures. The greater the support for the Democratic Party, the greater the search interest in all four measures analysed. Political partisanship was most highly correlated with searches relating to Quarantine (ρ = 0.79, p < 0.001), followed by Social distancing (ρ = 0.71, p < 0.001), Hand washing (ρ = 0.69, p < 0.001), and Masks (ρ = 0.66, p < 0.001). These findings were robust to using two different partisanship measures, controlling for state-level demographic variables, different pandemic onset dates, and using exact rather than Topic search methods. This partisan divide among the American people has important health implications that must be better addressed. We call for clear, bipartisan support of simple public health advice to combat the continued SARS-CoV-2 spread across the USA.

County-level association of COVID-19 mortality with 2020 United States presidential voting

ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to assess the association between United States county-level COVID-19 mortality and changes in presidential voting between 2016 and 2020. Study designThe study design is a county-level ecological study. MethodsWe analysed county-level population-weighted differences in partisan vote change, voter turnout and sociodemographic and health status characteristics across pre-election COVID-19 mortality quartiles. We estimated a population-weighted linear regression of the 2020–2016 Democratic vote change testing the significance of differences between quartiles of COVID-19 mortality, controlling for other county characteristics. ResultsThe overall change in the 2020–2016 Democratic vote was +2.9% but ranged from a +4.3% increase in the lowest mortality quartile counties to +0.9% in the highest mortality quartile counties. Change in turnout ranged from +9.1% in the lowest mortality counties to only +6.2% in highest mortality counties. In regression estimates, the highest mortality quartile was associated with a −1.26% change in the Democratic 2020–2016 vote compared with the lowest quartile (P < 0.001). ConclusionsHigher county-level COVID-19 mortality was associated with smaller increases in Democratic vote share in 2020 compared with 2016. Possible explanations to be explored in future research could include fear of in-person voting in heavily Democratic, high-mortality counties, fear of the economic effects of perceived Democratic support for tighter lockdowns and stay-at-home orders and general exhaustion that lowered political participation in hard-hit counties.

Partisan Politics and Public Education: Finding the Formula for (Electoral) Success

AbstractDo state politicians reward school districts that vote in favor of the party in power more than school districts that vote in favor of the opposing party? With large shares of money at the state level to transfer to local governments and the ability to target core voters, it would seem likely that politicians would take advantage of the ability to distribute education funds. However, in understanding how states distribute education funds, little emphasis is given to partisan influences, particularly the congruence between local school districts and the state level. To test this, I collected data at the precinct level within each state and, using mapping software, spatially joined precinct boundaries to school district boundaries. Once this relationship was established, I aggregated precinct-level information to school districts to understand the partisan voting patterns within each school district for elections from 2000 to 2010. This article finds evidence that funding formulas are susceptible to political influence and that parties are able to influence the geographic distribution of education funds to core voters.