Partisan Opinion Research Articles

The fluid voter: Exploring independent voting patterns over time

AbstractIndependents remain hard to categorize because they are, by their choice of self‐identification, resisting the standard categories of political classification. Despite the growth in independent voter identity, many political strategists still view independents as partisans. In this article, we contribute to the academic literature on independent voting behavior by exploring whether those who identify as politically independent function as true independents by accounting for their voting patterns over time. We do this by analyzing data produced by the American National Election Studies (ANES) on political identification and voting choices from 1972 to 2020 on each of the three ANES measures of party affiliation. Our findings show when tracking independent voting behavior over more than one election, there is a significant volatility in voting loyalty and independents as a group are distinct from partisans. This volatility was observed in all three measures of party affiliation used by the ANES survey data. The research also finds evidence that a sizeable number of independents move in and out of independent status from one election to another.Related ArticlesGrossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42(6): 881–904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102.Reilly, Thom, and E. C. Hedberg. 2022. “Social Networks of Independents and Partisans: Are Independents a Moderating Forcer?” Politics & Policy 50(2): 225–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12460.Saeki, Manabu. 2019. “Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching.” Politics & Policy 47(4): 699–747. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12318.

Legal and critical review of unconventional salaries and benefits of Iranian civil servants

Due to paying of some unfair and unconventional salaries to some civil servants in our country which have been revealed recently, arise some different views about the reasons and causes of the issue that they are mostly influenced by political and partisan opinions. Thus, regarding the importance of the issue and concerning of the public opinions, we’ve examined the topic in a legal and critical approach based on an analytical method away from any political or partisan bias. We’ve concluded that there are a wide range of factors that caused the issue so we can’t focused on a single factor. At the end, we’ve proposed several solutions to solving the problem and to prevent of such cases.

Gay Politics Goes Mainstream: Democrats, Republicans and Same‐sex Relationships

Attitudes towards same‐sex relationships in the USA have changed radically over a relatively short period of time. After remaining fairly constant for over two decades, opinions became more favourable starting in 1992—a presidential election year in which the Democratic and Republican Parties took opposing stands over the status of gay people in society. What roles did political parties and their leaders play in this process of cultural change? Using a variety of techniques, including machine learning, we show that the partisan opinion gap emerged substantially prior to 1992—in the mid to late 1980s—and did not increase as a result of the political debates in 1992–3. Furthermore, we identify people with a college‐and‐above education as the potential ‘leaders’ of the process of partisan divergence.

Gay Politics Goes Mainstream: Democrats, Republicans, and Same-Sex Relationships

Attitudes towards same-sex relationships in the US have changed radically over a relatively short period of time. After remaining fairly constant for over two decades, opinions became more favorable starting in 1992 - a presidential election year in which the Democratic and Republican parties took opposing stands over the status of gay people in society. What roles did political parties and their play in this process of cultural change? Using a variety of techniques including machine learning, we show that the partisan opinion gap emerged substantially prior to 1992 -- in the mid 1980s -- and did not increase as a result of the political debates in 1992-'93. Furthermore, we identify people with a college-and-above education as the potential leaders of the process of partisan divergence.

Who Owns What, and Why? The Origins of Issue Ownership Beliefs

Most research on issue ownership examines the topic as an independent variable that may shape campaign strategy or voter behavior. In contrast, our study looks at ownership as a dependent variable. Specifically, we employ a national Internet survey of registered U.S. voters to gauge the extent to which such judgments are influenced by individual‐level factors other than partisan identity. We find that while partisanship shapes ownership beliefs to a considerable degree, policy preferences and performance evaluations have significant effects across a range of valence and position issues. While feelings of ambivalence toward the in‐ or out‐party do not have a consistent effect on ownership beliefs, higher out‐party ambivalence reduces the probability that citizens will identify their own party as owning most issues. It is therefore premature, and probably incorrect, to assume that perceived ownership is little more than an expression of a person's partisan attachment or intended vote.Related ArticlesBernick, Ethan M., and Nathan Myers. 2012. “Issue Salience, Party Strength, and the Adoption of Health‐Care Expansion Efforts.” Politics & Policy 40 (1): 131‐159. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00340.xGrossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42 (6): 881‐904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102Kim, Eun Kyung. 2019. “Issue Ownership and Strategic Policy Choice in Multiparty Africa.” Politics & Policy 47 (5): 956‐983. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12327Related MediaBrenan, Megan. 2019. “Democrats Maintain Favorability Edge over Republicans.” September 30. https://news.gallup.com/poll/267122/democrats-maintain-favorability-edge-republicans.aspxHook, Janet. 2018. “Tax Overhaul Remains Unpopular, Poll Shows.” April 16. https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-overhaul-remains-unpopular-poll-shows-1523912555Pew Research Center. 2015. “GOP’s Favorability Rating Takes a Negative Turn.” July 23. https://www.people-press.org/2015/07/23/gops-favorability-rating-takes-a-negative-turn/

Political consequences of conspiratorial thinking: evidence from 2016 Italian constitutional referendum

Recently, the literature has devoted increasing attention to beliefs in conspiracy theories. Among various aspects of the phenomenon, it was found that conspiratorial attitudes are associated with political behaviour. In Italy, previous research found that Five Star Movement and right-wing parties' voters tend to show higher levels of conspiratorial thinking than other voters. However, the relationship between conspiracism and vote choice remains obscure. By analysing an Italian panel survey data collected before and after 2016 constitutional referendum, we show that the belief in conspiracy theories is associated with referendum vote choices, even when controlling for partisan opinions, leaders’ evaluations, and perceived economic wealth. Moreover, the effect of conspiracism on referendum vote choice proves to be stronger among the supporters of the government, which promoted the referendum. This paper aims at shedding light on the processes of opinion formation and how these are affected by external attitudes, such as conspiratorial ones.

Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching

Scholars explain that the ideological divide among the political elites has heightened the homogeneity in voters' ideology within parties, thereby resulting in the appearance of ideological polarization in the American electorate today. This article postulates and tests four modes of party sorting in the United States based upon: (1) if partisan voters adjust their ideology to the preference of their party elites or switch to the ideologically proximate part; and (2) whether partisan voters respond to the ideological shifts of their own party or opposition party. The empirical results suggest that the conservative voters in the Democratic Party switched to the Republican Party in favorable response to the conservative shift of the Republican Party members in Congress in past decades, whereas the liberal voters in the Republican Party changed their partisanship to Democratic in negative reaction to the rightward shift of Republican elites.Related ArticlesGershtenson, Joseph, Brian W. Smith, and William R. Mangun. 2006. “Friends of the Earth? Partisanship, Party Control of Congress, and Environmental Legislation in Congress.” Politics & Policy 34 (1): 66‐92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00004.xGrossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42 (6): 881‐904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102Knuckey, Jonathan. 2009. “Explaining Partisan Change among Northeastern Whites.” Politics & Policy 37 (6): 1331‐1355. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00222.x

Polarization and the Politics of Education: What Moves Partisan Opinion?

This study explores the conditions under which polarization and depolarization occur with respect to public opinion on education issues. I analyze experimental and nonexperimental survey data to gauge the effects of informational and experiential stimuli on education policy preferences. I focus on heterogeneous effects by political party identification that result in increased or decreased polarization. I find evidence that the provision of education spending data has depolarizing consequences, but the effects of ideologically moderate policy endorsements vary by issue and year. I also find tentative evidence in favor of a link between having children in the household and reduced polarization.

Air pollution success stories in the United States: The value of long-term observations

We summarize past examples of the use of science to document the effectiveness of policy in air quality management. Our goal is to inform public discourse amidst attempts to negate the relevance and value of scientific data and fact-based analysis in favor of partisan opinion and ideology. Although air quality is fundamental to environmental and human health, air pollution has degraded natural systems and reduced economic and cultural benefits and services. The quality of air and fresh water across much of the United States vastly improved in recent decades in response to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts and other rules and policies. We point to recently observed decreases in air pollution and its effects attributable to policy that have been informed by environmental monitoring and research. Examples include decreased environmental lead contamination due to the elimination of tetraethyl lead from gasoline, decreases in tropospheric ozone, improved visibility from reduced airborne particulate matter, declines in atmospheric sulfur and nitrogen deposition that acidify the environment and declines in atmospheric mercury and subsequent bioaccumulation of toxic methyl mercury. Pollutant reductions have provided environmental, social, and economic benefits, highlighting the urgency to apply these lessons to address current critical environmental issues such as emissions of greenhouse gases. These examples underscore the important role of data from long-term research and monitoring as part of fact-based decision-making in environmental policy.

Growing Apart? Partisan Sorting in Canada, 1992–2015

AbstractRecent decades have been marked by increasingly divided partisan opinion in the US. This study investigates whether a similar trend might be occurring in Canada. It does so by examining redistributive preferences, using Canadian Election Studies data from every election since 1992. Results suggest that Canada has experienced a surge in partisan sorting that is comparable to that in the US. Over time, like-minded citizens have increasingly clustered into parties, with increasingly stark divisions between partisans.

The Consequences of Social Pressures on Partisan Opinion Dynamics

We simulate an agent-based model of opinion dynamics in a two-party framework to analyze party- and polity-wide consequences of social pressures that compel individuals to publicly conform to their party line. The model indicates that opinions polarize over time despite being initialized uniformly across most members of both parties. Further, the socially acceptable range of opinions in each party and the level of partisanship prevalent in the polity play an important role in determining the membership sizes of both parties, the median opinions of both parties and the polity, and the level of polarization within and across parties.

The effects of traditional news, partisan talk, and political satire programs on perceptions of presidential candidate viability and electability

ABSTRACTThis study examines how exposure to network news, partisan opinion talk, and political satire programs during the 2012 Iowa presidential caucuses affected viewers’ perceptions of candidate viability (likelihood of capturing the party nomination) and electability (likelihood of winning the general election). Programs representing these genres—ABC World News, Fox News’s Hannity, and The Daily Show with Jon Stewart—all framed the same candidate as the front-runner for the nomination, though each framed this candidate’s general election prospects in distinctive ways. A randomized field experiment assigned respondents to view one (or none) of the three programs as they aired. Assessments of the front-runner were significantly shaped by assignment to view television coverage, hence demonstrating the potential importance of all three media genres for the presidential nomination process.

The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions

Although citizens often arrive at the same views as their political party's leaders, they also respond to information about policy targets and effects. Accounting for political context, even in the United States, encourages a variable view of how partisanship shapes opinions in policy debates. In three survey experiments associated with policies supported by both Democrats and Republicans, I find that both aspects of policy argumentation and the actors making the arguments can enable partisanship to affect public opinion. This process is highly conditional, however: sometimes polarization occurs only with the presence of a single politician; in other areas, polarization is likely following presentation of evidence by either partisan side. The effect of policy information on partisan polarization is variable across political and policy contexts.

Partisans and Controversial News Online: Comparing Perceptions of Bias and Credibility in News Content From Blogs and Mainstream Media

Based on the hostile media effect (HME), this 2 (partisan opinion) × 2 (news source) × 2 (content valence) factorial experiment investigated how partisans (N = 132), in terms of perceived bias and credibility, assess same-sex marriage coverage by either an online mainstream news source or a citizen blog. Partisans who disagreed with the content's valence evaluated both mainstream online news and the blog posting as more biased and less credible than did partisans who agreed with the content's valence. The perceived reach of blog postings appears to generate a relative HME similar to that triggered by mainstream news. In particular, this study suggests that user-generated content—specifically blog postings—might generate a stronger relative HME than that observed with mainstream news.

Public and Partisan Opinions of the Speaker of the House

Using polling data from 1982 to 2009, I develop a model of public opinion toward the Speaker of the House. I show that, in addition to economic and institutional factors, the speaker's ideology and events associated with the speaker's responsibilities in office affect the public's opinion toward this congressional leader. I also examine the partisan differences in the formation of public opinions about the speaker. I find that minority party partisans are more likely to have negative evaluations of the speaker when the speaker has more ideologically extreme views which lead to higher levels of polarization. In addition, members of different parties weigh economic and institutional factors differently in their evaluations of the speaker.

The political consequences of uninformed voters

Americans fail to meet the democratic ideal of an informed electorate, and the consequences of this political ignorance are a topic of significant scholarly debate. In two independent settings, we experimentally test the effect of political information on citizens' attitudes toward the major parties in the U.S. When uninformed citizens receive political information, they systematically shift their political preferences away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats. A lack of knowledge on the policy positions of the parties significantly hinders the ability of low-socioeconomic-status citizens to translate their preferences into partisan opinions and vote choices. As a result, American public opinion—and potentially election results and public policy as a result—is significantly different from the counterfactual world in which all voters are informed.

Presidential Position Taking and the Puzzle of Representation

A significant debate rages in the literature. Although going public success is a function of mass public support for a policy, presidents respond to partisan liberalism in their public rhetoric. This presents a puzzle: how do presidents reconcile their need to target policies that are popular with the mass public to go public successfully, when they respond primarily to partisan opinion in their speeches? Our comparison of the president's policy proposals from 1989 through 2008 with both centrist and partisan public opinion reveals that presidents are more partisan than centrist in their policy priorities, which adds weight to the partisan representation side of this debate.

Frederick Edward Smith: 1920–2012

Frederick Edward Smith: 1920–2012

Polarizing Cues

People categorize themselves and others, creating ingroup and outgroup distinctions. In American politics, parties constitute the in‐ and outgroups, and party leaders hold sway in articulating party positions. A party leader's endorsement of a policy can be persuasive, inducing co‐partisans to take the same position. In contrast, a party leader's endorsement may polarize opinion, inducing out‐party identifiers to take a contrary position. Using survey experiments from the 2008 presidential election, I examine whether in‐ and out‐party candidate cues—John McCain and Barack Obama—affected partisan opinion. The results indicate that in‐party leader cues do not persuade but that out‐party leader cues polarize. This finding holds in an experiment featuring President Bush in which his endorsement did not persuade Republicans but it polarized Democrats. Lastly, I compare the effect of party leader cues to party label cues. The results suggest that politicians, not parties, function as polarizing cues.

Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1941: The American State Department and Propaganda on the Sino–Japanese Conflict

From 1931 to 1941, when China and Japan were at undeclared war, China's propaganda was fairly well-circulated in America through her American friends who played a leading role in shaping American opinions on the Far Eastern crisis. But the United States State Department maintained a neutral stance toward the Sino–Japanese conflict until after 1939 and considered the pro-Chinese opinion not so much a national consensus for policy consideration as a partisan view propped up by propaganda groups. Thus, the State Department guarded its Asian policy from the pressure of propaganda activities and partisan opinions on the Asian conflict, whilst utilising them occasionally as tools of diplomacy toward China and Japan. This article examines the State Department's attitude toward public opinion and propaganda on the Far Eastern conflict from 1931 to 1941 to illustrate how American officials handled partisan opinions on a foreign crisis when most of the information on foreign policy was privately initiated and circulated.