Partisan Incentives Research Articles

The Persistence of Latin America’s Violent Democracies: Reviewing the Research Agenda on Policing, Militarization, and Security Across the Region

This review examines Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Authoritarian Police in Democracy, Resisting Extortion, as well as Democracy and Security in Latin America to outline the latest scholarly developments on how the region has dealt with the challenges posed by violent, militarized state and non-state actors. Leveraging distinct cases and methods, these four recently published books discuss the political rationale behind the military and institutional responses that have shaped public security in Latin America over the last three decades. Beyond unpacking their contributions, common themes, tensions, and shortcomings, we argue that by focusing on the political dynamics behind state interventions, these volumes highlight the persistence of a democratic paradox: rather than curtailing militarism and violence, or facilitating their containment via reforms, electoral dynamics and partisan incentives—part and parcel of democratic politics—have enabled the endurance of state and non-state militarization and violence. Relatedly, as Eduardo Moncada’s new title underscores, ordinary Latin American citizens have had to adopt civilian militarization as a bottom-up resistance strategy to navigate the uncertainty this worrying paradox presents. By examining work by scholars including Guillermo Trejo, Sandra Ley, Brian Fonseca, and Yanilda María González this review helps to delineate future research as well as policy interventions.

Keeping tabs on the executive

AbstractCongress has long exercised its power to oversee the executive branch. Important research has examined empirical patterns in congressional investigations, finding institutional, individual, policy, and partisan incentives motivate legislative inquiry. Yet, scholars largely have overlooked one fundamental question: what is oversight? We use new quantitative and qualitative data to highlight the importance of considering oversight as a series of actions designed to serve both as a symbol and signal in the American separation of powers system. Our exploratory analysis suggests that Congress oversees the executive branch much more frequently and in more ways than previously considered by scholars.

Steady Habits in the Constitution State: Connecticut's Inequitable System of Representation, 1639–1965

Steady Habits in the Constitution State: Connecticut's Inequitable System of Representation, 1639–1965

Political business cycles and construction licensing

AbstractWe analyze the effects of opportunistic and partisan politics on the licensing of construction activities, which in turn determines the level of housing supply. In line with Political Business Cycle theory, we hypothesize that the municipal incumbent may manipulate the supply of construction permits before (general and local) elections in order to boost economic activity and voter satisfaction, or to accommodate special‐interest groups. Our findings, based on time‐series data from post‐socialist Tirana (Albania), are consistent with opportunistic and partisan incentives’ creating cycle effects in the licensing of construction permits. However, we find that the direction of opportunistic election cycles depends critically on the interaction between the municipal incumbent and the central‐level government. Our paper raises important questions about the effects of transition politics on spatial development in post‐socialist cities.

The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection

Using a data set capturing the ideological positioning of nearly half a million US judges and lawyers, we present evidence showing how ideology affects the selection of judges across federal and state judiciaries. We document that the higher the court, the more it deviates ideologically from the ideology of attorneys, which suggests that ideology plays a strong role in judicial selection. We also show that ideology plays stronger roles in jurisdictions where judges are selected via political appointments or partisan elections. Our findings suggest that ideology is an important component of judicial selection primarily when using ideology leads to expected benefits to politicians, when the jurisdiction’s selection process allows ideology to be used, and when it concerns the most important courts. This study is the first to provide a direct ideological comparison across judicial tiers and between judges and lawyers and to explain how and why American courts become politicized.

The opposition deficit in EU accountability: Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states

AbstractDebates about the European Union's democratic legitimacy put national parliaments into the spotlight. Do they enhance democratic accountability by offering visible debates and electoral choice about multilevel governance? To support such accountability, saliency of EU affairs in the plenary ought to be responsive to developments in EU governance, has to be linked to decision‐making moments and should feature a balance between government and opposition. The recent literature discusses various partisan incentives that support or undermine these criteria, but analyses integrating these arguments are rare. This article provides a novel comparative perspective by studying the patterns of public EU emphasis in more than 2.5 million plenary speeches from the German Bundestag, the British House of Commons, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados over a prolonged period from 1991 to 2015. It documents that parliamentary actors are by and large responsive to EU authority and its exercise where especially intergovernmental moments of decision making spark plenary EU salience. But the salience of EU issues is mainly driven by government parties, decreases in election time and is negatively related to public Euroscepticism. The article concludes that national parliaments have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability and suffer from an opposition deficit in particular.

Strategic Retirement in Comparative Perspective: Supreme Court Justices in Presidential Regimes

AbstractStudents of judicial behavior debate whether justices time their retirement to allow for the nomination of like-minded judges. We formalize the assumptions of strategic retirement theory and derive precise hypotheses about the conditions that moderate the effect of partisan incentives on judicial retirements. The empirical implications are tested with evidence for Supreme Court members under democracies and dictatorships in six presidential regimes between 1900 and 2004. The theory of strategic retirement finds limited support in the United States and elsewhere. We conclude that researchers should emphasize “sincere” motivations for retirement, progressive political ambitions, and—crucial in weakly institutionalized legal systems—political pressures.

Presidential Particularism in Disaster Declarations and Military Base Closures

In The Particularistic President we challenge the dominant paradigm asserting presidential universalism. Instead, we argue that presidents possess strong electoral and partisan incentives to pursue policies that prioritize the needs of some Americans over those of others. In this article, we review our larger argument and expand upon our analyses of two policy areas where presidents have unilateral authority over distributive outcomes: natural disaster declarations and military base closures. In the former, we find strong evidence that President Barack Obama favored both swing and core states in the 2012 election year. In the latter, we find evidence of both electoral and partisan particularism.

The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize the Judiciary

The American judiciary has increasingly come under attack as polarized and politicized. Using a newly collected dataset that captures the ideological positioning of nearly half a million judges and lawyers who have made campaign contributions, we present empirical evidence showing politicization through various tiers of the judicial hierarchy. We show that the higher the court, the more conservative and more polarized it becomes, in contrast with the broader population of attorneys, who tend to be liberal. These findings suggest that political actors not only appear to rely on ideology in the selection of judges, but that they strategically prioritize higher courts. To our knowledge, our study is the first to provide a direct ideological comparison across tiers of the judiciary and between judges and lawyers, and also the first to document how — and why — American courts are politicized.

‘It Isn’t What We Don’t Know that Gives Us Trouble, It’s What We Know that Ain’t So’: Misinformation and Democratic Politics

This article explores the dangers to the quality of democratic governance of those who are informed but disengaged and, especially, those who are engaged but use false ‘knowledge’. Poll data show the extent of Americans’ misinformation about, or disengagement with, climate change. The main responsibility for these problems lies with politicians, who have partisan incentives to help the disengaged become active, but also partisan incentives to keep the misinformed politically involved. Activity in accord with false ‘knowledge’ can slow needed responses to global warming and lead to concrete harm to individuals, communities and nations.

Presidents and Personal Goals: The Speaker of the House as Nonmajoritarian Leader

Existing theories of congressional politics emphasize partisan incentives for the behavior of formal party leaders in Congress. However, these theories do not persuasively explain important cases in which Speakers of the House have sought to influence legislative outcomes contrary to the policy preferences of their party. I argue that the majority party in the House allows the Speaker to act on behalf of several expectations for leadership that are unrelated or even contrary to partisan goals, including ones related to the agenda of the institutional presidency and the Speaker's personal preferences. As evidence for this claim, I introduce a data set of significant acts of legislative leadership by the Speaker since the 1940s, analyzing several cases from the data set. The findings suggest that our understanding of leadership in Congress may be improved by identifying the formal and informal duties and responsibilities of individual leaders and the broader contextual environment in which such leaders operate.

To Devalue or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy

Speculative currency attacks are a regular feature of the international political economy. Nevertheless, not all speculative attacks result in a devalued currency. In many cases, politicians were willing and able to defend the exchange rate peg. I develop a model of strategic interaction between speculators in currency markets and policymakers in governments. This model indicates that speculative attacks occur when economic fundamentals are weak or when there is uncertainty about the capability and/or willingness of governments to defend the currency peg. I show that the government’s decision to defend the peg reflects institutional, electoral, and partisan incentives. I test hypotheses from this model on a sample of 90 developing countries between 1985 and 1998 using a strategic probit model.

Why government succeeds and why it fails

Acknowledgments Introduction: Public Policy-Limits and Possibilities How Economics Interacts with Politics Structure of Analysis Conceptual Apparatus: Economic Constraints What Makes Problems Soluble? 1. Macroeconomics: Can Government Control the Economy? Managing the Economy: Partisan Incentives and Political Cycles Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations Fiscal Policy-Is It Just Crowding Out? Exhortation: Persuasion and the Art of Equilibrium Selection Spending, Taxes, and Expectations: Budget Deficits as Policy Instruments Can Government Control the Economy? 2. Redistribution: A Success Story? Economic Constraints and Redistribution Uncertainty and Redistribution: Data Government Commitment to Future Redistribution Implications for Redistribution Effectiveness of Redistributive Policy Why Not Taxes? Conclusions: Redistributive Possibilities 3. When Can Government Regulate? The Scope of Regulation Regulating Firms: Possibilities and Pitfalls Regulating Consumer Behavior Conditions for Regulatory Success 4. Producing Goods and Services: Getting the Right Mix What Is Production? Crowding Out Private Provision Credibility as an Obstacle to Inducing Production Credibility as an Obstacle to Restricting Production Production Is Difficult 5. Economic Constraints and Political Institutions Divided Government and the Politics of Gridlock Federalism and the Devolution of Authority Political and Policy Reform What Do Politicians Know? Institutional Design and Policy Effectiveness 6. Final Thoughts What Can Government Do? Five Lessons Conclusions: The Burden of Government Notes References Index

Opportunity Lost: Partisan Incentives and the 1997 Constitutional Revisions in Taiwan

Previous articleNext article No AccessOpportunity Lost: Partisan Incentives and the 1997 Constitutional Revisions in TaiwanGregory W. NobleGregory W. Noble Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 41Jan., 1999 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2667588 Views: 21Total views on this site Citations: 4Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Shelley Rigger Studies on Taiwan’s Democracy and Democratisation, International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1, no.11 (Feb 2018): 141–160.https://doi.org/10.1163/24688800-00101008Jih-wen Lin How are the powers of the president decided? Vote trading in the making of Taiwan’s semi-presidential constitution, International Political Science Review 38, no.55 (Jun 2016): 659–672.https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116631340Christian Göbel The Impact of Electoral System Reform on Taiwan's Local Factions, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41, no.33 (Sep 2012): 69–92.https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100304Matthew Søberg Shugart Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns, French Politics 3, no.33 (Nov 2005): 323–351.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087

How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure

Scholarship criticizing the legal profession generally blames partisanship for attorney excesses on behalf of clients. Moral philosophers argue that attorney partisanship on behalf of clients is inherently unethical, as it leads attorneys often to ignore the interests of third parties and to advance whatever outcomes benefit their clients, without pausing to consider whether a desired outcome is best for the law or society. Other scholars concede that partisan attorneys might, in theory, serve the law at the same time they serve their clients, but argue that changes in law practice have intensified partisanship and thereby have led attorneys to stray from this ideal role. These scholars attribute a perceived decline in the ethical stature and social utility of the legal profession to social changes that provide attorneys with ever greater incentives to put aside their scruples and do their clients' bidding. Neither set of scholarship provides a complete account of attorney excesses on behalf of clients because both overlook the constraining force of the judicial perspective. To succeed in a partisan role -- i.e., to be an effective adviser or advocate -- an attorney must consider his client's case not simply from the client's selfish perspective, but also from the perspective of the neutral judge who will decide the case after taking into account the interests of all concerned and trying to do what is best under the law. The prospect of a judge applying law to the client's factual scenario should (at least in theory) constrain attorney partisanship in transactional practice and litigation, ensuring that attorneys do not ignore the interests of third parties or stray too far from what is best for the law. If critics are correct that there has been a decline in the social utility of the legal profession, this decline is attributable not only to attorneys' partisan incentives, but also to a decline in the constraining force of the judicial perspective brought about by changes in civil procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended over the years, have diminished the importance of judicial evaluation of the merits of lawsuits in two related ways. First, liberal pleading and discovery under the Federal Rules have altered litigation dynamics by making lawsuits more expensive and inducing settlements based on this expense. Second, the expansion of issues associated with liberal pleading and discovery has increased litigation uncertainty, making it difficult for attorneys to factor judicial application of law to fact into the value of a case. Because changes in civil procedure and in the nature and force of the judicial perspective help to explain a perceived decline in the legal profession's social value, scholars concerned about the profession's decline should give serious consideration to procedural solutions. If the goal is to lead attorneys to pursue justice, procedural reform aimed at elevating judicial application of law would be more effective than merely revising ethical standards, and yet less daunting than revamping the social institutions that today appropriately lead attorneys to favor their clients' interests over others. Procedural reform could lead attorneys to consider the interests of justice not because it is the right thing to do, but rather because it is what a judge will do before deciding their clients' fates. Further consideration should be given to procedural reforms that would standardize judicial influence over the resolution of lawsuits and elevate the importance of judicial application of law to fact. Of the many avenues available toward achieving this goal, the Article offers three possibilities that may be worthy of further attention. First, in order to encourage judges consistently to utilize partial summary judgment as an issue-narrowing mechanism, Rule 56 could be amended to require judges to provide reasons whenever they deny summary judgment. A second reform might discourage weak claims and defenses by empowering judges to shift attorneys fees for positions that survive summary judgment but are contradicted by the weight of evidence disclosed during discovery. Finally, in order to ensure that excessive discovery expenses do not induce cost-based settlements prior to a judicial narrowing of issues, a third reform could require judges to identify at the outset issues that are candidates for summary judgment or fee shifting and to limit early discovery to those issues only. These three reforms would aim to eliminate, or at least mitigate, some of the tactical advantages that litigants today may gain from maintaining weak or meritless positions during pretrial.

Interest Groups, Representation and Conflict Management in the Standing Committees of the House of Commons

AbstractProposals to strengthen regional representation in national institutions are premised on the assumption that representation of (regional) interests and accommodation of conflicts between competing interests are compatible roles, and most likely when national decision makers represent all contending interests. The article argues that the two roles are not necessarily compatible. The behaviour of MPs on the agriculture and transport committees in debating three bills during the 32nd Parliament shows considerable efforts at representation but much less at conflict management. The emergence of specialist interest groups promotes representational efforts by MPs but often at the expense of conflict management. Other factors affecting the joint occurrence of interest representation and interest accommodation include the individual and collective characteristics of members, their partisan incentives, and the diversity of the goals of their client groups.