Partisan Differences Research Articles

Partisan belief in new misinformation is resistant to accuracy incentives

Abstract One explanation for why people accept ideologically welcome misinformation is that they are insincere. Consistent with the insincerity hypothesis, past experiments have demonstrated that bias in the veracity assessment of publicly reported statistics and debunked news headlines often diminishes considerably when accuracy is incentivized. Many statements encountered online, however, constitute previously unseen claims that are difficult to evaluate the veracity of. We hypothesize that when confronted with unfamiliar content, unsure partisans will form sincere beliefs that are ideologically aligned. Across three experimental studies, 1,344 conservative and liberal US participants assessed the veracity of 20 politically sensitive statements that either confirmed or contradicted social science evidence only known to experts. As hypothesized, analyses show that incentives failed to correct most ideological differences in the perceived veracity of statements. 66 to 78\% of partisan differences in accuracy assessment persisted even when monetary stakes were raised beyond levels in prior studies. Participants displayed a surprising degree of confidence in their erroneous beliefs, as bias was not reduced when participants could safely avoid rating statements they were unsure about, without monetary loss. These findings suggest limits to the ability of disciplining interventions to reduce the expression of false statements, because many of the targeted individuals sincerely believe them to be true.

Study of U.S. Democratic and Republican Senators' Political Framing Strategies on Abortion Rights Based on Social Identity Theory and Framing Effect

Political framing significantly shapes public opinions and legislative outcomes in the United States, making the understanding of Democratic and Republican senators' strategies concerning abortion rights necessary. This study employs Social Identity Theory and Framing Effect to analyze cognitive and affective language patterns, as well as frequent references to specific word count in senators' speeches, using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program. The findings reveal distinct partisan differences: Democrats frequently emphasize women's rights and personal freedoms, while Republicans focus on morality and the sanctity of unborn life. These divergent framing strategies highlight how party affiliation influences the discourse on this contentious issue. The research, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches, underscores the complexity of political communication and the need for nuanced studies to explore how language reflects and shapes political identities and ideologies.

Explaining Public Demands for Border Militarization

The militarization of border control is a defining feature of contemporary international politics. Why do states flock toward these policies despite their questionable efficacy? We theorize that border militarization stems in part from public reactions to the threat of international and domestic decline. We test this argument with two conjoint experiments that randomize the implementing agency, strategy, costs, and effectiveness of different policies. First, we evaluate whether the public has a baseline preference for militarization, holding constant the material costs and consequences of the border policy. Second, we prime threats of decline—in terms of either America’s dominant status in the world or the majority position of white-identifying Americans within the U.S.—and track changes in preferences for militarized border policies. The results indicate that both threats of decline can increase support for border militarization, with important partisan differences. Border militarization plausibly stems from the reactionary politics of domestic audiences.

Public responses and parasocial relationships following senator John Fetterman's depression disclosure.

Research has found that when a public figure discloses an illness, it can motivate members of the public to reconsider their own health behaviors, particularly when they have a parasocial relationship with the public figure. When the public figure is a politician, it is possible that partisan differences may also influence emotional, attentional, and behavioral responses to health news. We empirically examined public responses to Democrat John Fetterman's disclosure of his treatment for depression shortly after he was inducted into the United States Senate as the junior senator from Pennsylvania in 2023. Using a survey of adult Pennsylvania residents who identified as eligible voters in April 2023, we found that 204 respondents were aware of the news of Fetterman's diagnosis of and treatment for depression. Our data revealed that differences in demographics and parasocial relationships-both positive and negative-with Fetterman predicted different patterns of emotional responses to the news. In addition, age, anger, a negative parasocial relationship, and a positive parasocial relationship were associated with additional outcomes, including attention to news about the disclosure and depression-related information seeking. Mental health advocates could use politicians' depression disclosures to provide information at a time when people are paying more attention to the condition; however, they may need to find other public figures to counteract negative responses to partisan officials. Policymakers could also consider funding mental health campaigns, which could be launched alongside public figure disclosures.

Illusory interparty disagreement: Partisans agree on what hate speech to censor but do not know it

Whether and when to censor hate speech are long-standing points of contention in the US. The latest iteration of these debates entails grappling with content regulation on social media in an age of intense partisan polarization. But do partisans disagree about what types of hate speech to censor on social media or do they merely differ on how much hate speech to censor? And do they understand out-party censorship preferences? We examine these questions in a nationally representative conjoint survey experiment (participant N = 3,357; decision N = 40,284). We find that, although Democrats support more censorship than Republicans, partisans generally agree on what types of hate speech are most deserving of censorship in terms of the speech's target, source, and severity. Despite this substantial cross-party agreement, partisans mistakenly believe that members of the other party prioritize protecting different targets of hate speech. For example, a major disconnect between the two parties is that Democrats overestimate and Republicans underestimate the other party's willingness to censor speech targeting Whites. We conclude that partisan differences on censoring hate speech are largely based on free speech values and misperceptions rather than identity-based social divisions.

Partisan differences in perceived levels of democracy across presidential administrations

Democracy in the United States is in decline. The current work examines to what degree U.S. Americans perceive this decline in the U.S., and how partisanship may shape those perceptions over time. Using cross-sectional archival data spanning three U.S. presidential administrations (Study 1), we find that perceived levels of democracy by U.S. Americans on both sides of the political spectrum were not attuned to objective democracy indices but instead followed a partisan gap where election winners perceived higher levels of democracy than election losers. Using a longitudinal quasi-experiment tracking the 2020 presidential election (Study 2), we find that the effect of partisanship on perceived levels of democracy kicked in right after the announcement of the election winner but was the strongest after the official inauguration. Moreover, Trump supporters showed heterogeneous responses to the Capitol attack, which highlights the possibility of bipartisan willingness to defend democracy after salient attacks on democratic principles. We discuss the implications of the effect of partisanship on perceptions of democracy.

The geography of partisan homophily in the 2020 US presidential election

Partisan segregation in the United States is often interpreted as evidence of limited social interaction among out-partisans, or partisan homophily. In this paper, I draw on 2020 US presidential election results and data on the pairwise density of social ties between the populations of 22,537 zip code tabulation areas (ZCTA) to examine how different areas are socially connected to politically similar others. Using the local Moran index, I first identify clusters of ZCTAs where there is evidence of partisan homophily or heterophily. In a series of multinomial logistic regressions, I then also examine differences in the probability of each cluster across different settlement types and regions, and across areas with differences in the relative connectedness and geographic distance to others. I find that partisan homophily is the norm across areas, broadly tracking partisan segregation along the urban-rural continuum. However, the populations of Democratic-leaning areas, which are most likely to be in cities and suburbs, are on average likely to have more of their co-partisan social ties in relatively distant areas when compared to the populations of Republican-leaning areas. This highlights the prospect of partisan differences in the role of non-local context in local political outcomes.

Does the Media’s Partisanship Influence News Coverage on Artificial Intelligence Issues? Media Coverage Analysis on Artificial Intelligence Issues

This study aims to analyze news coverage on artificial intelligence (AI) issues and highlight the characteristics and differences in reporting based on media partisanship. By examining AI-related news in the South Korean media, this study reveals how conservative and progressive outlets frame the issue differently. The analysis found that conservative media coverage predominantly focuses on positive aspects, emphasizing development value frames such as the benefits and societal progress brought by AI. In contrast, progressive media often highlight crisis value frames, focusing on issues like side effects, ethical concerns, and legislation surrounding AI. These partisan differences reflect fundamental societal priorities and influence public discourse and policy agendas. Understanding media framing is crucial for fostering informed public dialogue on the societal significance of AI and promoting evidence-based decision-making. By recognizing partisan biases and critically evaluating media coverage, citizens can engage in constructive discourse beyond ideological divides. This study underscores the role of the media in promoting interdisciplinary discussions about the future trajectory of AI and in preparing society for its impacts. Ultimately, evidence-based public discourse is essential for shaping responsible AI policies and mitigating potential risks in the digital age.

Who thinks ideologically about welfare state reform? Partisanship and attitude consistency in politicians’ and mass public perceptions about the consequences of welfare service privatization in Sweden

When studying attitudes toward the welfare state or evaluations of welfare reforms, research has tended to focus on what people think rather than how they think about specific issues. Moreover, the effects of the mobilizing efforts of political parties on attitudes and belief systems are often theorized separately from the normative institutional feedback effects common to the welfare state literature. In this paper, I propose that elite political rhetoric and institutional norms may exert dual pressures leading to partisan differences in the propensity to think ideologically among the mass public, defined as a positive relationship between holding internally consistent attitudes and taking a partisan issue position. Drawing on the case of welfare service privatization in Sweden, I point out how the rhetoric of the right – emphasizing choice and private property – frequently contradicts norms about universality long espoused by the Swedish welfare state, while the rhetoric of the left – emphasizing equality of access and outcomes – is better aligned with such institutional norms. The analysis of survey data demonstrated that centre-right sympathizers, the prime receivers of conflicting elite versus institutional messages, frequently took a middling position, being neither positive nor negative, to the consequences of welfare service privatization, and that, unlike centre-right politicians and sympathizers and politicians of left parties, this position did not differ according to attitude consistency. Furthermore, political interest enhanced this relationship among right sympathizers but was of little consequence to left sympathizers, implying that in the case of a conflict between institutional norms and political rhetoric, only the most attentive sympathizers are likely to engage in ideological thinking on the basis of partisanship.

The Politics of Pandemic Emotions: How Trust in the Trump Administration and Distrust of the Media Affected the Psychological Toll of COVID-19

Initial studies of the COVID-19 pandemic’s emotional toll indicated different outcomes based on partisanship and media consumption. This study builds on prior research by utilizing a broad set of measures to test how (1) political party affiliation, (2) trust in President Trump, (3) news media sources, and (4) distrust in the media’s portrayal of the pandemic impacted self-ascribed increases in negative emotions during the later stages of the pandemic. Using original data from a national survey conducted in the early months of 2021, we confirm that news media and partisanship played a key role in Americans’ perceived increases in psychological distress. Specifically, we find that Democrats were more likely than Republicans to report increased worry and loneliness due to the pandemic. Viewers of CNN were also more likely to disclose increased worry, loneliness, and sadness than Fox News viewers. But both of these findings were related to and mitigated by issues of trust and distrust. In particular, trust that the Trump administration effectively responded to the pandemic was strongly associated with emotional stability above and beyond partisan differences. In addition, distrust of “mainstream media” coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic was linked with lower odds of increased negative emotions due to the pandemic.

The Influence of Partisanship on Assessments of Promise Fulfillment and Accountability

I draw together theories of partisan polarization and motivated reasoning, which suggest that partisanship shapes information processing, and theories of accountability, which argue voters hold elected officials accountable through promise fulfillment. Here, I ask how partisanship influences voter understanding of promise fulfillment and accountability and if voters assess promises through a partisan lens. Two original survey experiments test how respondents react to promise fulfillment on the issues of immigration and human trafficking. I demonstrate that co-partisans differentiate between kept and broken promises, but out-partisans do not. Despite partisan differences, respondents evaluate promise-keeping when asked about accountability but not when asked about approval. Thus, even when voters recognize broken promises, accountability is influenced by partisanship. Immigration, a more polarized issue, is more likely to prime a partisan response than human trafficking, a less polarized issue. Future work must account for partisanship in accountability and what this means for our understanding of fundamental democratic principles.

On the Internet, No One Knows You’re an Activist: Patterns of Participation and Response in an Online, Opt-in Survey Panel

Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in surveys of online respondents who participate absent random selection. Using an uncompensated, opt-in panel of 11,000 Pennsylvanians (2020–2022), we benchmark self-reports against vote histories, campaign contributions, election returns, and Census data. Ours is among the first such benchmarking exercises in more than a decade, a period when online survey research has transformed. It is also among the first analyzing a longitudinal panel. Our panelists are approximately balanced on partisanship; attrition is limited. Notably, respondents are very politically engaged, with high rates of turnout, campaign contributions, and rally attendance. Ethnic/racial minorities are under-represented. Political attitudes show high over-time stability, and an experiment uncovers few partisan differences in response rates. Such survey samples are cost-effective ways to track the views of highly engaged citizens over time, but less engaged citizens prove hard to recruit, even with supplemental efforts. Survey participation is itself a political behavior.

People’s understanding of inflation

This paper studies people’s understanding of inflation—their perceived causes, consequences, trade-offs-and the policies supported to mitigate its effects. We design a new, detailed online survey based on the rich existing literature in economics with two experimental components — a conjoint experiment and an information experiment — to examine how well public views align with established economic theories. Our key findings show that the major perceived causes of inflation include government actions, such as increased foreign aid and war-related expenditures, alongside rises in production costs attributed to recent events like the COVID-19 pandemic, oil price fluctuations, and supply chain disruptions. Respondents anticipate many negative consequences of inflation but the most noted one is the increased complexity and difficulty in household decision-making. Partisan differences emerge distinctly, with Republicans more likely to attribute inflation to government policies and foresee broader negative outcomes, whereas Democrats anticipate greater inequality effects. Inflation is perceived as an unambiguously negative phenomenon without any potential positive economic correlates. Notably, there is a widespread belief that managing inflation can be achieved without significant trade-offs, such as reducing economic activity or increasing unemployment. These perceptions are hard to move experimentally. In terms of policy responses, there is resistance to monetary tightening, consistent with the perceived absence of trade-offs and the belief that it is unnecessary to reduce economic activity to fight inflation. The widespread misconception that inflation rises following increases in interest rates even leads to support for rate cuts to reduce inflation. There is a clear preference for policies that are perceived to have other benefits, such as reducing government debt in progressive ways or increasing corporate taxes, and for support for vulnerable households, despite potential inflationary effects.

Partisan Differences in Voters’ Desire for Punishment in Response to Politicians’ Moral Transgressions

Research shows that politicians are often not electorally punished for immoral behavior. Yet, voters may still desire to see politicians punished outside of the election context for committing moral transgressions. Moreover, these desires may be conditioned by the partisanship of the voter, the transgressor, and voters’ perceptions of moral violation severity. To examine such effects, we conduct a vignette study asking 2997 U. S. respondents to consider politicians’ moral violations. We randomly varied the moral principle violated (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity, and a social norm violation) and the partisanship of the politician (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). When voters perceive the severity of a moral violation to be low, Republicans express a stronger desire to punish than do Democrats. Republicans’ desire for punishment depends on the group of the transgressor, with higher levels of punitiveness desired for out-party transgressors than in-party. However, when voters perceive severity to be moderate or high, Democrats have the stronger desire to punish the politician involved, but they show no in-party bias. Across the moral violations presented, Republicans and Democrats differ in perceptions of severity of politicians’ immoral behavior. Results show partisan voters’ heterogeneity in punitiveness, with the relationship strongly mediated by perceived severity of the moral violation.

Second-level agenda-setting effects of news media and public policy on social media discourse across platforms: immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S.

ABSTRACT Integrating intermedia, second-level agenda-setting, and cross-platform research, this study examines the role of news media attention and public policy decisions in driving the salience of issue attributes on multiple social media platforms. We collected three immigration-related datasets (i.e., social media posts, news media headlines, and policy documents covering the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic that also marked the last year of the Trump presidency) and applied manual coding, automated text analysis, and time series modeling to analyze the relationships. The results show that news media set the public agenda across Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube at the second level, with conservative media elevating travel-related discussion and liberal media driving border- and court-rulings-related discussion on those platforms. Compared to news media, the second-level agenda-setting effect of policy announcements was small and platform-specific. Among the three platforms, public discourse on YouTube was the most responsive to media and policy agendas. These findings advance second-level agenda-setting research, demonstrate partisan differences in news media’s impact, reveal the limited role of public policy, and provide a nuanced portrayal of cross-platform public discourse dynamics.

Generational differences in economic perceptions

Historical institutionalists have long argued that major events can shape long-term economic perceptions, but the identification of birth-cohort differences has been stymied by methodological difficulties, notably the APC problem. Taking advantage of unique Japanese data and tailored Bayesian modeling, we identify cohort effects in economic perceptions and show that they follow objective macroeconomic trends countercyclically. Cohorts whose formative ages (16–20) overlap with high GDP growth have more pessimistic views about the current and future economy, even in later years. We argue that a strong economy during one's youth raises baseline expectations and makes later, weaker growth appear disappointing. We further find partisan differences in cohort effects, particularly on prospective economic expectations, with greater pessimism among independents and supporters of opposition parties.

Party Politics in Austria: From Proporz to Populism?

Abstract Party politics in Austria has two distinctive features: institutionalized power sharing between the two main parties, known as Proporz, and a longstanding tradition of far-right populism. I examine whether these two phenomena are connected: Does reduced political competition correlate with vote shares for the far right? The results do not support the hypothesis that populist parties are stronger in places with reduced political competition and with Proporz institutions. Instead, the results show that Austrian populism has very deep historical roots. Historical party preferences in the 1930s explain a substantial part of the variation in far-right populist vote shares across Austrian regions today. Populism may also have economic consequences. Descriptive evidence shows that economic growth was 2 percentage points lower in Austria when far-right populists were in the national government, whereas no partisan differences can be found for the two main parties.

Political accountability and legislative behavior in Africa: evidence from the 2019 Kenyan Sugar Bill in the context of the political economy of sectoral policy

ABSTRACT Recent research on African legislatures, once considered rarely autonomous, has found that some broad-scale mass movements, including pro-poor campaigns, hold legislators accountable. This article meanwhile examines the conditions under which narrow local constituency issues, shaping partisan differences, can hold relevant representatives and parties accountable while prioritizing over executive pressures and clientelist personal gains. I argue that this sort of political accountability in legislatures can be observed concerning sectoral policy interests, which, in Africa, are often geographically concentrated along ethnicity and party support lines. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches including interviews, news coverage reviews, and a statistical analysis of legislative debates on the 2019 Sugar Bill in Kenya, I show that the growing and collective efforts of sugar farmers to influence their local representatives and parties to support the legislation, tying them to the same electoral fate, prompt legislators to speak in favor of their local interests. This implies that sector-based policy concerns, when addressed by organized policy backers, are used as an effective mechanism for maintaining party unity and accountability in the legislature.

The Selling of Experience in the 2022 Congressional Elections

Past experience in elective office has always been the best predictor of congressional candidate success in elections. These “quality” candidates come into elections with experience fundraising, name recognition, and general knowledge about how to run a successful campaign. Yet, recent congressional elections have seen an increase in the electoral success of inexperienced candidates. As past experience in office may no longer be valued as it once was, how are these experienced candidates marketing themselves to voters? Are they still leaning into their past experience in elected office or are they more likely to emphasize other occupations and experiences? We expect candidates brand themselves, emphasizing different experiences, based on the type of election they are in and who they are running against. In order to test these expectations, this paper examines all available biography pages of experienced candidates who ran in congressional primaries in 2022. We find clear partisan differences in what candidates past occupational backgrounds they highlight. We find mixed evidence that decisions about what occupations to emphasize vary based on electoral dynamics.

The Politics of the Gender Gap in COVID-19: Partisanship, Health Behavior, and Policy Preferences in the United States

Several studies demonstrate gender and partisan differences among Americans in COVID-19 socioeconomic consequences, attitudes, and behaviors. The authors of this study use six waves of panel survey data to explore the intersection of gender and party across COVID-19 mitigation behaviors, concerns, and policy preferences. The authors observe small gender gaps on several measures; however, partisan differences are larger than gender differences when considering the interaction between gender and partisanship. Democratic women are more similar to Democratic men on these measures than to Republican women. On virtually all measures, Republican women report lower levels of mitigation behaviors, worries, and support for expansive government policies compared to Democratic women and men. Analyzing the interaction of gender and partisanship illuminates how individuals navigated the pandemic with respect to identity factors that often pull in different directions. These findings suggest that one's partisan identity is more consequential than gender when it comes to COVID behaviors, concerns, and policy preferences.