Partisan Attachment Research Articles

The determinants of voting for Republican congressional candidates in the Texas borderlands

AbstractObjectiveA shift of Latino voters to Republican Party candidates has been observed in recent years. Past research on presidential elections supports the idea that borderlands counties vote differently than other counties in borderlands states and tend to favor Democratic Party candidates. This study explores congressional voting patterns in the Texas borderlands.MethodsUsing county‐level data for Texas counties in 2010 and 2022, this study examines Republican congressional voting as a function of (1) borderlands cultural and economic context, (2) economic conditions, (3) social contact, and (4) religious adherence. We contribute to existing scholarship by proposing that there are three district border subregions.ResultsOverall, this study finds increased levels of support for Republican congressional candidates in the borderlands region. However, when subregions are compared, those counties with economic linkages to Mexico and rural Tejano counties are more likely to vote for Democratic Party candidates in 2010 and 2022. The West Texas borderlands region, however, is no longer distinctive from other Texas counties in terms of voting patterns in 2022.ConclusionVoters in the predominantly Latino Texas borderlands are increasingly voting for Republican congressional candidates suggesting a change in partisan attachment. The effects of foreign‐born arrivals and rising economic optimism in the borderlands may lead to more voting for Republican candidates. However, current economic realities and linkages as well as past social and political marginalization may continue to make borderlands voters distinct.

The inequality roots of weak partisan attachment: Evidence from Denmark

Partisan attachment among the electorate is important for the stability of national party systems. This article argues that the level of inequality during a period of early party formation can have profound impact on political parties’ initial mobilization strategies and thus later levels of partisan attachment and electoral support among the population. An unequal distribution of agricultural land under a limited franchise decreases the incentive of parties representing rural interests to build strong local party organizations and partisan loyalty. Consequently, areas with high land inequality should show less electoral support for these parties after extension of the franchise. This theory is tested using data from early 20th century Denmark. In accordance with the theory, the Liberal Party, which represented rural interests, did poorer electorally in areas with historical high land inequality. The beneficiaries of the Liberal Party’s weakness were both centrist and far-left parties as well as the extreme right.

Putting partisan influence into political context: How initial policy popularity and party attachment shape the effect of party cues

Parties and their actions almost always shape the preferences, attitudes, and behaviour of their voters. However, does partisan influence over public opinion apply to all policy proposals regardless of their initial popularity and to all voters regardless of their degree of partisan attachment? This question is addressed in the real-world context of Finland, where the government enacted two reforms at the same time: an initially popular reform extending the age of compulsory education, and an initially unpopular removal of the ‘retirement tube’ for older laid-off workers. An original panel survey asked respondents about their attitudes before and after the government actions, finding that while voters of government parties increasingly tended to support the enacted policies, the magnitude of opinion change depended on voters’ initial policy preferences and party attachment. Strong party attachment led to government voters increasing their support for a reform that they initially opposed. In contrast, those with weaker partisan attachments tended to alter their preferences for an initially popular reform. These findings are relevant for understanding partisan influence over public opinion in a broader political context.

Yanna Krupnikov and John B. Ryan.The Other Divide: Polarization and Disengagement in American Politics

The divide between Democrats and Republicans (i.e., the main divide) may be the more popular topic for journalists, write Yanna Krupnikov and John B. Ryan, but the divide between the deeply involved and everyone else (i.e., the other divide) “is key to understanding modern American politics” (p. 3). The deeply involved are “those people who make politics a central part of their lives” (pp. 1–2) and are more formally conceptualized based on three characteristics: “spending time on politics, believing in the importance of political events, and engaging in expression related to politics” (p. 59). The deeply involved are not representative of the American electorate. They report higher levels, and different types, of affective polarization. They prioritize different issues. They are more certain about their policy positions. Their levels of internal efficacy are higher. They have different childhood and college experiences. They have different social networks. Their views about parenting are different. They evaluate those who post about politics on social media more positively. They tend to be more extreme in their partisan attachment and ideology. They are more educated. They are more likely to be men. They are more likely to answer political knowledge questions correctly. They vote at higher rates.

Turning a blind eye on the black sheep: when are voters loyal to corrupt politicians?

When do voters turn a blind eye on corrupt politicians? Recent research suggests that voters might be willing to support corrupt politicians due to a lack of a ‘viable and clean alternative,’ i.e., voters prefer supporting a corrupt politician when the alternative is to support a politician who takes a fundamentally different policy stance. Following this argument, it has also been argued that especially corrupt politicians from radical parties are less likely to be punished by their voters as these voters are more hostile toward other parties. In other words, voters of radical parties are more likely to lack viable alternatives. Based on a survey experiment conducted in Germany, we put these hypotheses to an empirical test. We find evidence for the expected patterns. Supporters of radical parties are indeed less likely to switch their vote to a different party. However, our experiment also shows that this is because voters of radical parties are more likely to lack a viable alternative. When supporters of radical parties evaluate a clean alternative favorable, they are just as likely as voters of mainstream parties to switch away from the corrupt candidate. Finally, we show how strengths of partisan attachment affect voting for corrupt candidates.

Deficit Attention Disorder: Partisanship, Issue Importance and Concern About Government Overspending.

Political action and electoral behavior often stem from a conviction that an issue is important. Yet despite a growing literature on partisan bias, it remains unclear whether partisan attachment also affects the perceived importance of various issues. We propose a theory of partisan-motivated issue attention (PMIA), wherein citizens satisfy partisan instincts by shifting the perceived importance of an issue. We apply our theory to an issue involving a fundamental tool of the federal government—the power to deficit-spend—and test the hypothesis that partisans’ concern about government overspending significantly changes depending on which party presides over deficit-spending. Leveraging pre-registered experimental and observational studies, we find strong support for this hypothesis among both Republicans and Democrats. Lastly, using text analytical methods, we also find evidence of PMIA in televised partisan media. Our study thus demonstrates that putative concern about deficit-spending contains a sizable partisan component and, more broadly, uncovers an additional means by which partisan bias guides citizens’ attitude formation on policy-relevant issues in the United States.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09783-5.

Own-Party Bias: How Voters Evaluate Electoral Outcomes

AbstractA voluminous literature documents that citizens' perceptions of democracy are shaped by electoral victories and defeats, but what reasoning do citizens use to evaluate parties as winners or losers? Drawing on research on partisan-motivated reasoning, I propose an own-party bias in winner–loser evaluations according to which voters evaluate the electoral fate of their party more favourably than that of other parties. Data gathered in the aftermath of the Danish parliamentary election in 2015 support this expectation. Citizens are more inclined to interpret the election outcome as successful for their preferred party, regardless of the actual election result. This is more pronounced the stronger their partisan attachment and among the less politically knowledgeable, who also assign less importance to objective indicators of electoral success. The findings have implications for our understanding of electoral winners and losers and of how electoral results shape party support and polarization.

Personality Goes a Long Way (for Some). An Experimental Investigation Into Candidate Personality Traits, Voters’ Profile, and Perceived Likeability

The personality traits of political candidates, and the way these are perceived by the public at large, matter for political representation and electoral behavior. Disentangling the effects of partisanship and perceived personality on candidate evaluations is however notoriously a tricky business, as voters tend to evaluate the personality of candidates based on their partisan preferences. In this article we tackle this issue via innovative experimental data. We present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that manipulates the personality traits of a candidate and assesses its subsequent effects. The design, embedded in an online survey distributed to a convenience sample of US respondents (MTurk, N = 1,971), exposed respondents randomly to one of eight different “vignettes” presenting personality cues for a fictive candidate - one vignette for each of the five general traits (Big Five) and the three “nefarious” traits of the Dark Triad. Our results show that 1) the public at large dislikes “dark” politicians, and rate them significantly and substantially lower in likeability; 2) voters that themselves score higher on “dark” personality traits (narcissism, psychopathy, Machiavellianism) tend to like dark candidates, in such a way that the detrimental effect observed in general is completely reversed for them; 3) the effects of candidates’ personality traits are, in some cases, stronger for respondents displaying a weaker partisan attachment.

Partisan in-group bias before and after elections

Partisan attachment is a major source of group identity in democracies, accounting for a strong in-group bias when citizens make judgments on trust, cooperation, and resource sharing. Yet what factors condition behavioural expressions of partisan in-group bias are not well-understood. Here, I explore the impact of one theoretically-critical factor - election cycles - in fueling partisan-based discrimination and favouritism. Using an experiment embedded in a panel study fielded immediately before and after the 2015 Canadian federal election, I find that pre-election in-group bias levels were cut by a full third within two days of election day. The bulk of the decline is explained by a decrease in willingness to discriminate against out-partisans, while co-partisan favouritism levels remain stable. Further, in-group bias substantially decreases post-election among supporters of gaining parties and among strategic voters, while losing party supporters and sincere voters continued to express it strongly. I discuss theoretical implications on our current, static understanding of partisan-based discriminatory behaviour.

Maoist Combatants’ Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Ten-year long war led by Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [hereafter CPN (M)] from February 1996 to November 2006 has been understood as one of the most violent times in Nepali history. The armed wing of CPN (M), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) formed in 2001, was the armed group combating in the war front. Prior to the formation of PLA, CPN(M) had set up its armed groups differently: they had three-tier structure in 1994 that comprised combatant group, security group and volunteer group, which was transformed in 1997 into Guerrilla Squad, and in 1997 into Guerrilla Platoon. Subsequent transformations were Guerrilla Company in 1999 and Guerilla Battalion in 2000. All these groups were involved in armed actions of various magnitudes including selected annihilation, sabotage, ambush, raids and attacks.When the peace truce, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was agreed, CPN (M) claimed that the party had 32,000 People’s Liberation Army members, around 20,000 of whom were verified by the United Nations (UN).

Maoist Combatants' Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Maoist Combatants' Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Maoist Combatants' Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Maoist Combatants' Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Who Owns What, and Why? The Origins of Issue Ownership Beliefs

Most research on issue ownership examines the topic as an independent variable that may shape campaign strategy or voter behavior. In contrast, our study looks at ownership as a dependent variable. Specifically, we employ a national Internet survey of registered U.S. voters to gauge the extent to which such judgments are influenced by individual‐level factors other than partisan identity. We find that while partisanship shapes ownership beliefs to a considerable degree, policy preferences and performance evaluations have significant effects across a range of valence and position issues. While feelings of ambivalence toward the in‐ or out‐party do not have a consistent effect on ownership beliefs, higher out‐party ambivalence reduces the probability that citizens will identify their own party as owning most issues. It is therefore premature, and probably incorrect, to assume that perceived ownership is little more than an expression of a person's partisan attachment or intended vote.Related ArticlesBernick, Ethan M., and Nathan Myers. 2012. “Issue Salience, Party Strength, and the Adoption of Health‐Care Expansion Efforts.” Politics & Policy 40 (1): 131‐159. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00340.xGrossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42 (6): 881‐904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102Kim, Eun Kyung. 2019. “Issue Ownership and Strategic Policy Choice in Multiparty Africa.” Politics & Policy 47 (5): 956‐983. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12327Related MediaBrenan, Megan. 2019. “Democrats Maintain Favorability Edge over Republicans.” September 30. https://news.gallup.com/poll/267122/democrats-maintain-favorability-edge-republicans.aspxHook, Janet. 2018. “Tax Overhaul Remains Unpopular, Poll Shows.” April 16. https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-overhaul-remains-unpopular-poll-shows-1523912555Pew Research Center. 2015. “GOP’s Favorability Rating Takes a Negative Turn.” July 23. https://www.people-press.org/2015/07/23/gops-favorability-rating-takes-a-negative-turn/

Factors That Affect Youth Political Participation in Ethiopia: Its Impacts on the Democratization Process

In the 21^st century, young people have become increasingly more organized, more engaged, and more influential in the political process. However, they are not meaning fully taking part in a formal political system which is vital to shape and transform Ethiopian democracy for a better life of a citizen. This study investigates factors that affect youth political participation in Ethiopia, focusing on its impacts on the democratization process. The comparative analysis research design and Qualitative research approach are employed to review different research papers and documents. The research analysis reveals that, lack of political knowledge and adequate education, youth political interest and apathy, economy, socio-centrism attitude and family’s pressure, fear, partisan attachment and the incumbent government performances, age and the existing institutional structures of Democracy are the major factors affecting the youth’s political participation in Ethiopia.

Maoist Combatants’ Narratives: Partisan Attachment to Post-truce Politics

Ten-year long war in Nepal (February 1996 to November 2006) was the source of nearly six dozen book length nonfictions. Of these writings, around one and half dozen were written by the Maoist combatants who had first-hand experience of the armed encounter with the state force. The writings, however, have yet not drawn ample interest of researchers and thus very limited studies have been carried out. This paper tries to fill the gap through close reading of 15 texts written by the combatants; it provides a summative and analytical reading of the nonfictions that render combatants’ experience during the armed combat. These writings are observed to present various facets related to the war including experience during armed encounter, tribute to the deceased, intra-party conflict and betrayal, experience of the distress, and perception of post-peace politics. It is anticipated that this article will draw further attention to literary representations of the war.

Does Health Affect Party Identification? Evidence from German Panel Data

ABSTRACTRecent research has shown the effect of health on voter turnout, arguing that attenuated health depresses voting. However, we know little about how health is connected to the psychological factors, such as party identification, that precede actual political participation. Employing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we show that when a person’s health deteriorates, the degree of partisan attachment declines, whereas health improvement does not automatically restore the level of party identification to previous levels.

The puzzle of high political partisanship among ethnic minority young people in Great Britain

ABSTRACTPrevious studies have found that ethnic minorities in Britain have similar levels of partisan attachment as white UK respondents. However, we find that this hides substantial ethnic differences in levels of partisanship within age groups (minorities are younger on average) and that there is a substantial minority party attachment premium that is greatest for the youngest respondents. Our paper examines the factors that account for the substantial partisanship gap between minority and white UK respondents by the time they enter the electorate. Using waves 3, 5 and 7 (2011–2016) of the Understanding Society youth panel, which follows 10–15 year olds in the UK, we model both the early attainment of party attachment among respondents (the first time we observe them as part of the youth panel) and the subsequent retention of this party attachment up to age 15, or acquisition of party attachment among young people who had no partisanship at the time of first observation. We find that differences in levels of parental partisanship and political engagement are the key factors in explaining the difference in minority and white UK acquisition and retention of party attachment during this critical period of political development.

Partisan Ambivalence, Partisan Intensity, and Racial Attitudes: The Impact of Shifting Policy Positions on Partisan Evaluations in the 1960s

The concept of ambivalence is important to the study of political psychology and behavior. We examine the causes of partisan ambivalence following the passage of major civil rights legislation to test our argument that the correlates of ambivalence will change following the alteration of long-standing party positions on a highly salient issue. We find support for this hypothesis for White Southerners during this time period—Indeed, our results demonstrate that the strength of one’s partisan attachment is unrelated to partisan evaluations for such individuals immediately following the passage of major civil rights legislation, but is again a predictor by the early 1970s.

Unfinished Trials and Sentences

Unfinished Trials and Sentences

The Puzzle of High Partisanship Among Ethnic Minority Young People in Great Britain

Previous studies have found that ethnic minorities in the Britain have similar levels of partisan attachment as white respondents. However, we find that this hides substantial ethnic differences in levels of partisanship within age groups (minorities are younger on average) and that there is a substantial minority party attachment premium after accounting for age that is widest for the youngest respondents. Our paper therefore examines the factors that account for the substantial partisanship gap between minority and white respondents by the time they enter the electorate. To examine this question, we make use of waves 3, 5 and 7 of the Understanding Society youth panel, which follows 10-15 year olds in the UK from 2011 to 2016.We model both the early attainment of party attachment among respondents (the first time we observe them as part of the youth panel) and the subsequent retention of this party attachment up to age 15, or acquisition of party attachment among young people who had not attained partisanship at the time of first observation. We find that parental partisanship and political engagement are the key factors differentiating minority and white acquisition and retention of party attachment during this critical period of political development.