Particularistic Parties Research Articles

Parties for hire

I argue that political parties oriented towards particularistic goods affect coalition government in presidential systems. Particularistic parties hire out their support on some item(s) of the presidential agenda in exchange for locally targeted policies or resources under the control of presidents. They are relatively cheap coalition partners for presidents in policy terms and their representation in the legislature provides presidents with coalitional flexibility. My empirical analysis of cabinets in 10 Latin American countries shows that when particularistic parties hold a larger share of the legislative seats minority presidents are less likely to form majority governments and more likely to change the party composition of their cabinets.

Parties in chains: Do ethnic party bans in Africa promote peace?

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced legal provisions to ban ethnic or other identity-based particularistic parties. Altogether, 12 countries have actually banned political parties on these grounds. In theoretical terms, such bans can exclude particularism from politics but — contrary to public discourse — also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to violent means or of becoming an object of conflict themselves. Empirically speaking, hardly any general patterns in the effects of bans can be detected. A closer look at 12 politically relevant bans in six countries reveals an initially stabilizing impact in one case (Rwanda in 1994). A ban on a religious party in Kenya in 1993 triggered violent conflict. In cases such as Equatorial Guinea (1994) and Rwanda (2001, 2003), this regulatory measure, allegedly designed to promote peace, seems to be part of the ‘menu of manipulation’ and is abused to suppress the opposition.

An effective measure of institutional engineering? Ethnic party bans in Africa

Following the introduction of multiparty systems, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced wide-ranging measures of party regulation, particularly bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties, in order, it is claimed, to prevent intercommunal conflict and to promote democracy. While this restrictive type of party regulation has become a dominant political feature in Africa, little is known about the efficacy of such measures. This article engages in an analysis of the possible effects on democracy and peace of different types of party regulation and implemented party bans and shows that party bans are apparently less suited to alleviating conflict than has been claimed. It also finds that implemented bans seem to be negatively related to democracy as ethnic bans are frequently abused to suppress the political opposition or to silence ethnic or religious minorities.

Ethnic party bans in Africa: an introduction

During the 1990s the number of African states allowing multiparty elections increased dramatically. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied in the majority of countries by legal bans on ethnic and other particularistic parties. The main official reason has been the aim of preventing the politicization of ethnicity as this is feared to lead to ethnic conflict and political instability. Despite the resurgent interest in institutional engineering, this phenomenon has received little scholarly attention. This contribution outlines the main research questions and preliminary answers of a collaborative research project which combines large and small N comparisons and case studies. Bans are relatively rarely enforced and the decision actually to ban parties is best explained by the interaction of an experience of ethnic violence in the past and hybrid regimes using these measures to restrict political party competition. Positive effects on democracy and conflict management seem generally limited and are context dependent.

Comparing ethnic party regulation in East Africa

Since 1990 the banning of ethnic and other identity-based parties has become the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. This article focuses on three East-African countries – Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – which opted for different ways of dealing with such parties. The analysis shows that the laws have actually been enforced by the responsible regulatory institutions. However, they have only marginally influenced the character of the political parties in the three countries: a comparison of regional voting patterns suggests that bans on particularistic parties have not ensured the emergence of aggregative parties with a national following in Tanzania and Uganda. In Kenya on the other hand, where such a ban has been absent until 2008, parties proved not to be more regionally based. In all three countries governing parties were clearly more nationalized than opposition parties, while the overall level of party nationalization is lower than in other world regions.

Party bans in Africa – an empirical overview

With the re-introduction of multiparty politics at the beginning of the 1990s most African countries started to regulate political parties extensively, especially ethnic and other particularistic parties. This article presents a new database on particularistic and other party bans in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on a comprehensive collection of African party regulations and records of their implementation since 1990. After demonstrating the magnitude and complexity of party bans in Africa the article deals in depth with enforcement institutions and legal procedures. It shows that party bans are especially pervasive in less democratic countries and have often targeted politically relevant parties.

Political party bans in Rwanda 1994–2003: three narratives of justification

This article discusses the public justifications brought forward for three waves of bans on political parties in Rwanda after the regime change of 1994. While the standard narrative of protecting democracy from its enemies (‘militant democracy’) was not invoked, two alternative narratives carried the burden of justification. The first is that of banning strongly particularistic parties, i.e. parties that discriminate or incite hatred and violence along ethnic or similar lines. The second is that of banning the former ruling party, responsible for mass atrocities, and its successor organizations. While both justification narratives have strong initial plausibility against Rwanda's history of ethnic conflict and genocide, and mirror analogous justifications for banning parties elsewhere, a detailed discussion of the evidence suggests that Rwanda's bans mainly served the purpose of repressing political opposition. The justifications brought forward in the later waves of bans remain unconvincing and cannot claim political legitimacy.

Promoting Peace and Democracy Through Party Regulation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty system s in the early 1990s almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper engages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the dependent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation.