Colin Peile's article, Research Paradigms in Social Work: From Stalemate to Creative Synthesis (Social Service Review 62 [March 1988]: 1-19), has the worthwhile goal of providing a synthesis of conflicting or partial views of the research paradigm of choice for social work. Peile endorses three distinct paradigms but favors what he terms the creative paradigm.' Unfortunately, Peile rests his argument on a conceptual analysis whose categories are inherently flawed. The problem lies with the unexamined and problematic ontology that regulates his conceptual analysis. Peile attempts to reach a useful synthesis by relating and synthesizing terms that he says represent the two sides of the current social work debate about research paradigms. However, Peile does not recognize that the terms he attributes to each side are ontologically distinct rather than ontologically isomorphic. Therefore, by definition, he cannot achieve a true synthesis but is limited to a syncretistic mixture that is misleading and, ultimately, divisive. Peile's stated purpose in presenting the categories that are supposed to represent the empirical and normative alternatives to research is to exemplify the deadlocked nature of the dispute about optimal research paradigms.2 Nevertheless, Peile goes on to make these two categories the basis for his synthesis, in spite of the fact that they rest on mutually exclusive ontologies. For example, to the extent that Peile identifies the normative alternative with the heuristic paradigm that I have advocated, his dichotomous categories are invalid, and I would like to correct this central misconception. First, the heuristic paradigm actually includes many of the characteristics Peile attributes to the other, empiricist view. Examples are prediction, observation, quantitative methods, measurement and testing, and the focus on content. Second, many of the characteristics Peile ascribes to the normative paradigm are in direct conflict with the tenets of the heuristic paradigm in that they arise from what the heuristic paradigm would consider to be spurious dichotomies. Examples of these untenable dichotomies are: (1) Bias limitation (value free) / Bias incorporation (value ladenness); (2) Separation of / Integration of knowledge and values; (3) Objective / Subjective; (4) Detachment / Involvement; and (4) Aim for certainty / Reliance on faith.3 In summary, Peile's assertion that the heuristic paradigm I have advanced corresponds even roughly to his normative model is entirely unfounded. The heuristic paradigm does not advocate replacing one restrictive paradigm of research with another. For example, as I have repeatedly emphasized, there is ample room in the heuristic paradigm for the experimental model and quantitative data.4 The heuristic paradigm propounds a flexible, inclusive, open approach to research, which, however, is not equivalent to a paradigm of absolute relativism. The philosophical justification for the breadth of the heuristic paradigm is that there are no sound epistemological or ontological grounds for a more restrictive paradigm of research.
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