Parliamentary Electoral System Research Articles

Implementation of Ideal Democracy in The General Election System in 2024 in Indonesia

Some countries have adopted a parliamentary system and some have adopted a presidential system to build democracy. Meanwhile, Indonesia initially practiced democracy with a parliamentary system but was considered a failure, until finally Indonesia practiced democracy with a presidential system. The implementation of the parliamentary and presidential electoral systems is still being debated today, this is reinforced by the option to hold elections in 2024 with a closed proportional electoral system, which closed proportional system will return Indonesia to the New Order era which adheres to the parliamentary electoral system. The purpose of this study is to understand whether the presidential system is the ideal electoral system of government in the 2024 elections. The method in writing is to use the literature method and use analytical techniques to collect data from various data obtained. The result of this research is that the presidential system is the ideal electoral system for the upcoming 2024 elections, reinforced by reasons that argue that the parliamentary electoral system is not convincing for Indonesia now.

정당 중심 민주주의의 재고: 개정 공직선거법과 독일 선거제도 비교를 중심으로

지난 4월 개정 공직선거법에 따라 도입된 이른바 ‘준연동형 비례대표제’에 따른 첫 총선이 실시되었다. 위성정당등의 출현으로 당초 기대된 비례성 제고의 효과조차 제대로 달성되지 아니하였다는 비판이 거세고, 이에 뒤따라 우리 국회의원 선거 제도의 성격을 독일의 그것과 같이 근본적으로 비례선거로 바꾸지 아니하는 한, 낮은 비례성이라는 고질적인 문제를 해결하기 어려우리라는 전망도 이어진다.<BR> 그러나 개정 공직선거법의 모델이 된 독일의 ‘연동형 비례대표제’와 우리의 선거법제를 비교하여 보면 과연 ‘준연동형 비례대표제’를 도입하는 것부터가 올바른 결정이었는지 의문이 생긴다. 연동형 비례대표제에서 의석 배분의 근간을 이루는 것은 정당이다. 정당은 항상 선거에서 국민의 의사를 대표할 수 있는 단위로서 자격이 있는가? 정치 공동체의 의사결정 과정은 공동체 내부의 ‘균열’을 표현하여 공동체의 의사를 대표하여야 한다. 그런데 한국의 정치현실과 제도를 고려하여 볼 때 정당이 한국 공동체 내부의 ‘균열’을 제대로 대표할 여건이 갖추어졌다고 보기 어렵다. 이러한 점에서 초과의석을 해결하기 위하여 보정의석을 부여한다거나, 권역별 비례대표제를 시행한다거나, 중복입후보를 허용하여 석패율제를 도입한다는 방안은 모두 정당을 대표성 확보의 중심 주체로 두고 있는 이상 그중 어느 것도 현행 국회의원 선거 제도의 바람직한 개선안이 되기 어렵다.

Support for electoral system reform among voters and politicians: Studying information effects through survey experiments

Does information about the consequences of proposals to change the Norwegian parliamentary electoral system influence voters' and politicians' attitudes towards the system? Is the willingness to accept change greater among voters/politicians who “lose” under the present electoral system? These questions are illuminated using empirical data from two identical survey experiments, with responses from both voters and politicians about 1) increased proportionality between parties (more seats for smaller parties) and 2) increased geographical proportionality (stronger representation for the more populous counties). The results show that being informed about the consequences of the proposals has a major effect on voters' and politicians' attitudes. This applies especially to the question of increased proportionality between parties, where feedback was particularly negative from respondents who were told that the proposal might weaken the larger parties’ representation and make it more difficult to establish viable governments. The responses to the question about increased proportionality between parties were also influenced by partisanship; politicians who belonged to or voters who voted for one of the smaller parties favour increased proportionality. We also find that there is limited support for the proposal to distribute parliamentary seats according to the number of inhabitants in the counties, and this support is further reduced when the respondents are informed that the measure will increase representation from the more populous parts of the country.

Richard Jones: reforming the New South Wales colonial parliamentary electoral system in Australia

ABSTRACT The 1840s in New South Wales, in Australia, was a time of unsettled citizen unrest about the governance of their colony articulated in debates between liberalist and conservative newspapers whilst the Governor looked on. The tone of these debates included reforms to the electoral system, trade tariff, land settlement, and increasing antipathy to the governance administration of the colony. Caught in the middle, the Governor took instructions from London, tried to mediate the situation, before being directed to facilitate the establishment of colonial self-governance for 1856. While considerable aspirational weight by both the Governor and the community was placed on the new Legislative Assembly, the system floundered due to political maturity, its desire to quickly effect change and create reformation, and inconsistency voting allegiances in absence of political parties. The situation was exacerbated by a political gerrymander in favour of pastoralists and squatters to the chagrin of urban Sydney residents and businesses. Within this period of the 1850s, the inaugural Legislative Assembly members like Parkes, Cooper, Cowper, Robertson and Forster honed their debating and oratory skills, and sought to navigate within this new political environment. Within this unsettled period was a seasoned compositor and newspaper journalist, Richard Jones.

SYURA DAN DEMOKRASI BARAT: KRITIK DAN SOLUSI MENUJU DEMOKRASI ISLAM

Western scholars require democracy to meet the elements of tolerance, consultation, elections, balance, evaluation, separation of powers and political participation. However, in practice democracy is often equated with the experience and political traditions of Western Europe and the United States. Western countries often adopt a double standard in the conduct of democracy, this is evident from their democratic attitudes while in the country, and not democratic outside of the country. Another example of the multiparty and parliamentary electoral systems that prevail in Britain and France is not universally accepted as a single model of democracy. The Islamic democracy sometimes identified with shura is not an end in itself, but a way to arrive at the noblest goal of applying the Islamic Shari’ah. The Islamic government is a mixture of presidential and parliamentary systems. It has four organs: the presidential institution, the ahl al-Hall wa al-’Aqd council, the shura council, and the judiciary. The first three institutions are the selected institutions, therefore are directly accountable to the people. Members of judicial institutions are appointed by the President, but the President has no constitutional right to intervene in their work. The judiciary is immune from any influence, unless its decision is against the Shari’a. Thus, shura is the backbone of the Islamic political system, as the process by which it is produced and generated decisions on binding public affairs.

THE CONCEPT OF DEGRESSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE APPLICATIONS

Abstract The article discusses the concept of progressive and degressive proportionality of the distribution of parliamentary seats. In the first part are presented axiological sources of the principles of proportionality and progressive and degressive proportionality and the history of degressively proportional apportionments of seats in the European Parliament. The main part of the article is devoted to the formulation of proposals for strict formal definition of degressive and progressive proportionality, and a description of the method of apportionment of seats in the European Parliament based on the strict definition of degressive proportionality and maintaining maximum compatibility with former apportionments adopted in multilateral negotiations. The last part of the article consists of a discussion of the possibilities of adopting the concept of progressive proportionality in the analysis of the functioning of parliamentary electoral systems.

The Northern Ireland parliamentary electoral system: The 1929 reapportionment

Electoral geography is a growing branch of research in human geography. The study of the spatial organisation of elections constitutes one of the main strands in this field. In this paper the transition in 1929 from a proportional representation (single transferable vote) system to a plurality electoral system for Northern Ireland parliamentary elections is the focus of attention. The motives for the alteration and the method of reapportionment are assessed and the new spatial framework tested for malapportionment and gerrymandering. Finally, the politico‐geographic consequences of the reapportionment are examined.

Seat-vote elasticity and the provincial distribution of government spending in Turkey

The main question to be explored in this paper is, whether results of parliamentary elections have an impact on the provincial per-capita government spending. A firmly related question to which the literature has sought an answer and which also assists the effort to answer the question at the center of this study is how a government, interested in maximizing its electoral support, allocates government spending across administrative units (i.e. provinces for Turkey, states for the US). A possible answer to be given to this question relies in the seat-vote elasticities in provinces. The term stands for a coefficient that shows the relation between changes in percentage of seats in response to changes in the percentages of votes. It has been argued that electoral systems, with predominantly majoritarian characteristics, tend to display higher levels of seat-vote elasticity whereas systems mainly revealing proportional traits are characterized by lower levels of seat-vote elasticity. Turkish parliamentary electoral system is proportional election. Yet, levels of seat-vote elasticities may still be a determinant in the allocation of government spending across provinces in Turkey. With regards to the relation between seat-vote elasticity and per capita government spending, it is a widely held belief that the administrative units with a high level of seat-vote elasticity should benefit more from government spending, and those with low level of seat-vote elasticity should benefit less. The paper begins with the calculation of the seat-vote elasticities for 67 provinces for the six general elections held between 1990 and 2013. Then these seat-vote elasticity figures are used as explanatory variables in a fixed effects regression in which the dependent variable is the shares of per capita government spending across provinces. Results will be compared with the findings of the literature that conclude as highly elastic seat-vote relation demands more per capita government spending.

Simulating the 2011 Referendum in New Zealand

On 26 November 2011, an indicative referendum was held in New Zealand with the aim of gauging public support for a change from the current parliamentary electoral system (mixed member proportional) to one of four alternatives. To understand the consequences (in terms of the seat distribution of parties in Parliament) of a change in electoral system, we created an online simulator several months before the referendum date. Several interesting research issues arose in this work, which in our opinion deserve greater analysis. We describe the assumptions made in order to create such a simulator, and their consequences.

Simulating the 2011 Referendum in New Zealand

On 26 November 2011, an indicative referendum was held in New Zealand with the aim of gauging public support for a change from the current parliamentary electoral system (Mixed Member Proportional) to one of four alternatives. In order to understand the consequences (in terms of the seat distribution of parties in Parliament) of a change in electoral system, we created an online simulator several months before the referendum date. Several interesting research issues arose in this work, which in our opinion deserve greater analysis. We describe the assumptions made in order to create such a simulator, and their consequences.

The relationship between electoral systems and political marketing: Israel 1988–2003

This study explores the effects of changes in electoral systems on political marketing, and, more particularly, the impact of the shift from the parliamentary electoral system which has been in operation in Israel since 1948, to the presidentary (combined of elements from the parliamentary system, and the presidential system) on the two largest Israeli parties' marketing strategies. Out of 670 political broadcasts by Likud and Labour, 207 were examined for five out of the six electoral campaigns that took place since 1988: the 1988 and 1992 campaigns, before the switch to the presidentary system, the 1996 and 1999 campaigns after the establishment of the combined system and the 2003 campaign, after Israel changed back to the parliamentary electoral system. The findings supported the study's main arguments regarding the extent and direction of the impact of the change in the electoral system on the developments in political marketing. Beginning in 1996, there was a decrease in broadcasts presenting political issues and a sharp increase in broadcasts that focus on personality alone. Equivalently, the percentage of broadcasts addressing the centre of the political map, rather than distinct publics, grew significantly. In 2003, with the return to the parliamentary system, the marketing strategy of the two parties, and more particularly of the Labour Party, changed back to the pre-1992 pattern: a large percentage of the broadcasts focused on issues and not on the candidates' personalities, and addressed distinct target audiences rather than the centre.

Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia's Regions by Bryon Moraski (review)

reviews 587 Deputies pushed the nationalists and party conservatives towards a belief that the dangers to Russia and to 'socialism' were one and the same. This is then followed by an analysis of the formation of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) and its activities, and the part played by nationalists associated with it in the final endgame of Soviet disintegration. The style adopted in these chapters does not help to extend analysis of themovement from international ism to nationalism. Many of the chapters, which are quite often long, do not have clear conclusions. The narrative moves on from one chapter to another as the impact of an event has worked out and the next big event is introduced. This makes following the themes of the book hard and focuses attention on events to the detriment of any larger argument. As a result, what O'Connor presents is a freshand very detailed reading of nationalist concerns and what they understood to be the problems faced by theUSSR during perestroika. This in itselfhas some value since itamounts to a history of the end of the USSR presented from the right rather than as is usual from the left,and for that reason O'Connor's book is a useful addition to the literature on the end of theUSSR. Department of Politics andPublic AdministrationNeil Robinson UniversityofLimerick Moraski, Bryon. Elections by Design: Parties andPatronage in Russia's Regions.North ern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, IL, 2006. xii 4- 164 pp. Tables. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $36.00. Russian 'asymmetric' federalism constitutes a bewildering array of institu tional arrangements among its eighty-nine federal components. Vast diver gences between regions have made cross-regional generalizations below the gubernatorial level relatively rare. This volume is a notable exception, aiming to explain the variety of parliamentary electoral systems chosen across Rus sia.What accounts for differences in proportionality and the size of electoral districts? What motivated decision-makers to adopt different systems? The role of parties and elites and their interrelationship is to the fore: can par ties shape electoral systems or electoral systems shape parties, particularly in contexts where parties need institutional incentives to coalesce, but the existing elites themselves face few incentives to help them do so? Chapters one and two analyse the importance of institutional choice in settling the 'rules of the game' for new democracies, and of electoral sys tem choice for impact on party systems, voting behaviour and ultimately democratization itself. Unlike many, Moraski does not focus on the strict dif ferences between plurality (SMD) and proportional representation systems, but argues that there is a spectrum of options available to decision makers, with electoral district magnitude being the factor with most influence on the proportionality of PR and single-mandate systems alike. This sensitivity to context is a key strength of thiswork and is illustrated in chapter two, when the author blends rational choice institutionalism and historical insti tutionalism to parse the 'multiplemotives' (p. 27). The four factorsMoraski 588 SEER, 86, 3, JULY 2008 emphasizes as affecting institutional choice are elite position (such as legislative-executive relations), elite political orientation, their relationship with Boris El'tsin, and theirown expectations about the effectsof different electoral rules. However, elite self-interest is the common thread. Overall, the volume skilfully integrates a number of methodologies that provide comprehensive and convincing answers to these questions. Chapter threeundertakes an exhaustive statistical analysis of the four independent vari ables affecting electoral system choice (alongside other potential factors such as ethnic composition, party development and constitutional status).Moraski argues that the federal government played a crucial role in influencing elec toral system choice: El'tsin sacked many regional figureswho opposed him inOctober 1993 and prescribed a system of SMD-plurality for new legisla tures.However, areas with elected executives and a high degree of political competition were significantly likely to deviate from federal prescriptions in favour of more proportional systems,whilst the timing of electoral system adoption was also relevant: the later the adoption of an electoral system, the more likely to deviate from El'tsin's decree, since decision makers were more aware of the consequences of electoral design and more confident about their own autonomy. Mindful of...

Electoral System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone: Lessons from Putin's Russia

AbstractBesides seat maximization, what factors motivate an incumbent regime in the grey zone between democracy and dictatorship to alter a relatively institutionalized parliamentary electoral system? To answer this question, this article seeks to uncover the rationale guiding the 2005 changes to Russia's electoral system. It presents evidence to suggest that the same strategies that allowed Russia's current party of power to use the existing electoral system to its advantage in the 2003 Duma election, threatened to spoil the fruits of that advantage in the years to come. Yet it also points out that moving from a mixed electoral system to a purely proportional system could be good for Russian democracy in the future. As a result, the work contends that seemingly authoritarian incumbents will promote reforms that aid the future cause of democracy when these same reforms serve their more immediate interests.

Analysis and Comparison of Greek Parliamentary Electoral Systems of the Period 1974-1999

An important topic, in electoral studies, is the choice of the electoral system, which will be applied in parliamentary elections, because parliamentary seats distributed to political parties differ when a different system is applied. In this paper we focus on the five latest electoral systems applied in Greek Parliamentary Elections. Each one of them is described and analysed, in detail. Different measures of disproportionality are used in order to evaluate and compare these systems. We provide implementation details and illustrations using the data set of the latest parliamentary elections of 1996 and various data sets generated by introducing noise to the initial data set.

Electoral System Design in Russian Oblasti and Republics: A Four Case Comparison

DIFERENT INSTITUTIONS CAN PRODUCE different incentives for similar political actors and these incentives may have a substantial impact on how politicans work with one another, which policies they address, and how they seek to resolve political conflict. One important institutional decision for a developing democracy is the selection of the parliamentary electoral system, which translates votes into seats and helps determine the strength of political parties in parliament. The choice of an electoral system entails important implications for the future of a new regime. Indeed, political scientists agree that the decisions of institutional engineers can have significant and long-lasting consequences.1 Many scholars have investigated the relationship between electoral rules and the development of party systems.2 Likewise, scholars have debated the comparative advantages of plurality and PR systems for representative democracy in general as well as in ethnically divided societies.3 Although a significant literature examines the political consequences of different electoral systems, the politics behind the initial selection of these democratic institutions has received less attention.

A Second Republic for Italy?

Radical change in the representative dimension of Italy's political system was expected to bring a transition to a ‘Second Republic’ in Italy. That has not happened. Nevertheless, after three consultations using the new parliamentary electoral system, studies focusing on the ‘input’ side of Italian politics are beginning to agree that substantial change has occurred. It is, however, too early to identify the extent of change in public administration and centre–local government relations, whilst even in parliament it is argued that consensual decision-making continued at least into the late 1990s. The impact of party system change on policy-making has thus been shown to be less direct than many expected, providing rich material for research into the relationship between institutional and policy change. Nevertheless, institutional change continues, particularly with regard to the decentralisation of government, and some studies suggest that this is the key to Italy's political transformation, rather than electoral reform or even change in the form of government. Still, the election of Italy's first right-wing majority government in 2001 may yet bring change in parliamentary practice and policy-making more generally.

The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections

The political consequences of Chile's two member district (binominal) parliamentary electoral system have been the subject of much academic and political debate.' Most analyses of the electoral formula have focused on its consequences for the country's party system.2 Nonetheless, little has been written on how the system affects parliamentary candidate selection and electoral list composition. The process of candidate selection is little understood by Chileans and students of Chilean politics alike. Very little has been written on internal party processes in Chile or in Latin America generally. In addition, most studies of candidate selection focus on European parliamentary governments or the United States and are less relevant to Latin America's predominantly multiparty, presidential systems. This article makes some preliminary generalizations concerning the process of parliamentary candidate selection in Chile. It sets out the context of electoral reform and its connection to candidate selection and goes on to suggest some of the impediments to understanding the process in Chile. It then explores the actual mechanisms of candidate selection for legislative elections on three interrelated, yet analytically distinct, levels. First, it suggests what makes candidates attractive to political parties and analyzes how parties choose candidates. Second, it explores the rationale of party elites in forming pacts and coalitions and discusses the most important variables that determine which of the subpacts' constituent parties are awarded candidacies in which districts. Third, it analyzes the incentives that shape candidate selection within major coalitions and the way these coalitions determine the composition of national lists. It establishes generally applicable rules that govern candidate selection within coalitions and provides a schematic diagram of these rules. The final section provides evidence of these rules through empirical discussion of the candidate selection process, underscoring some of the paradoxes in candidate choice produced by this unique electoral system. Contrary to simplistic assumptions concerning the desire of parties and coalitions to maximize votes, a much more complex constellation of variables influences where and with which coalition partners candidates run. Leaders attempt to achieve a series of discrete objectives, many of which are contradictory and some of which are not particularly well thought out in terms of their political consequences. Maximizing

Consolidation and Stabilization of the Party System in the Czech Republic

The current Czech party system is the result of a process of gradual transformation which has been taking place since the breakdown of the communist regime, or, in the case of the Czech Republic as such, since the split of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992. The Constitution of the Czech Republic, as adopted in December 1992, established a parliamentary form of government. In other words, political parties became the major instruments of government. This means that the Czech parliamentary system of government is also one of party government. Parliament is now conceived of as a moderate arena in which political parties compete. Parties have the responsibility to stand for particular policy programmes and to attempt to implement those programmes if elected. The transformation of the political and economic systems was not a straightforward and simple process. The aim of this paper is to give a definition and brief description of the main periods of development of the party system: from a one-party state system to a more mature and stabilized party pluralism. The latter stages of this development have seen a considerably fragmented party system transformed via a process of concentration into a system of moderate pluralism. The level of the individual political parties will be examined from an evolutionary viewpoint. Parties will also be scaled along a left-right axis. The internal organizational structure of the parties is analysed as well as the role of the parliamentary party (oAcially referred to as the deputy club) in the organization and functioning of the Czech Parliament. Other important factors to be analysed in this paper are the influence of parliamentary electoral systems on the formation of the party system, and, last but not least, the phenomenon of cartelization which is currently manifesting itself in the Czech party system.

The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia

(1997). The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs: Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 284-302.

Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy

Advocates of the 1993 reform of the Italian parliamentary electoral system intended it profoundly to alter the structure of the party system and the relationships among parties, interests and voters. The content of the reform is summarized and the expectations raised by its advocates are reviewed and tested against the outcome of the 1994 parliamentary election. While Italian politics has changed dramatically on the surface, analysis of events before and since the election raises questions about the degree to which these developments can be attributed to the electoral reform, and about whether they really signal a fundamental change in the nature of Italian party politics.