Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Models Research Articles

Denotative and connotative management of uncertainty: A computational dual-process model

AbstractThe interplay between intuitive and deliberative processing is known to be important for human decision making. As independent modes, intuitive processes can take on many forms from associative to constructive, while deliberative processes often rely on some notion of decision theoretic rationality or pattern matching. Dual process models attempt to unify these two modes based on parallel constraint networks or on socially or emotionally oriented adjustments to utility functions. This paper presents a new kind of dual process model that unifies decision theoretic deliberative reasoning with intuitive reasoning based on shared cultural affective meanings in a single Bayesian sequential model. Agents constructed according to this unified model are motivated by a combination of affective alignment (intuitive) and decision theoretic reasoning (deliberative), trading the two off as a function of the uncertainty or unpredictability of the situation. The model also provides a theoretical bridge between decision-making research and sociological symbolic interactionism. Starting with a high-level view of existing models, we advance Bayesian Affect Control Theory (BayesACT) as a promising new type of dual process model that explicitly and optimally (in the Bayesian sense) trades off motivation, action, beliefs and utility. We demonstrate a key component of the model as being sufficient to account for some aspects of classic cognitive biases about fairness and dissonance, and outline how this new theory relates to parallel constraint satisfaction models.

Immediate online use of prosody reveals the ironic intentions of a speaker: neurophysiological evidence.

In social interactions, speakers often use their tone of voice ("prosody") to communicate their interpersonal stance to pragmatically mark an ironic intention (e.g., sarcasm). The neurocognitive effects of prosody as listeners process ironic statements in real time are still poorly understood. In this study, 30 participants judged the friendliness of literal and ironic criticisms and compliments in the absence of context while their electrical brain activity was recorded. Event-related potentials reflecting the uptake of prosodic information were tracked at two time points in the utterance. Prosody robustly modulated P200 and late positivity amplitudes from utterance onset. These early neural responses registered both the speaker's stance (positive/negative) and their intention (literal/ironic). At a later timepoint (You are such a great/horrible cook), P200, N400, and P600 amplitudes were all greater when the critical word valence was congruent with the speaker's vocal stance, suggesting that irony was contextually facilitated by early effects from prosody. Our results exemplify that rapid uptake of salient prosodic features allows listeners to make online predictions about the speaker's ironic intent. This process can constrain their representation of an utterance to uncover nonliteral meanings without violating contextual expectations held about the speaker, as described by parallel-constraint satisfaction models.

Eye Movements in Risky Choice.

We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple—people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see—and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

What is adaptive about adaptive decision making? A parallel constraint satisfaction account

There is broad consensus that human cognition is adaptive. However, the vital question of how exactly this adaptivity is achieved has remained largely open. Herein, we contrast two frameworks which account for adaptive decision making, namely broad and general single-mechanism accounts vs. multi-strategy accounts. We propose and fully specify a single-mechanism model for decision making based on parallel constraint satisfaction processes (PCS-DM) and contrast it theoretically and empirically against a multi-strategy account. To achieve sufficiently sensitive tests, we rely on a multiple-measure methodology including choice, reaction time, and confidence data as well as eye-tracking. Results show that manipulating the environmental structure produces clear adaptive shifts in choice patterns – as both frameworks would predict. However, results on the process level (reaction time, confidence), in information acquisition (eye-tracking), and from cross-predicting choice consistently corroborate single-mechanisms accounts in general, and the proposed parallel constraint satisfaction model for decision making in particular.

Cognitive integration of recognition information and additional cues in memory-based decisions

AbstractGlöckner and Bröder (2011) have shown that for 77.5% of their participants’ decision making behavior in decisions involving recognition information and explicitly provided additional cues could be better described by weighted-compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) Models than by non-compensatory strategies such as recognition heuristic (RH) or Take the Best (TTB). We investigate whether this predominance of PCS models also holds in memory-based decisions in which information retrieval is effortful and cognitively demanding. Decision strategies were analyzed using a maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. In contrast to the memory-based-RH hypothesis, results show that also in memory-based decisions for 62% of the participants behavior is best explained by a compensatory PCS model. There is, however, a slight increase in participants classified as users of the non-compensatory strategies RH and TTB (32%) compared to the previous study, mirroring other studies suggesting effects of costly retrieval.

Attention and choice: A review on eye movements in decision making

This paper reviews studies on eye movements in decision making, and compares their observations to theoretical predictions concerning the role of attention in decision making. Four decision theories are examined: rational models, bounded rationality, evidence accumulation, and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Although most theories were confirmed with regard to certain predictions, none of the theories adequately accounted for the role of attention during decision making. Several observations emerged concerning the drivers and down-stream effects of attention on choice, suggesting that attention processes plays an active role in constructing decisions. So far, decision theories have largely ignored the constructive role of attention by assuming that it is entirely determined by heuristics, or that it consists of stochastic information sampling. The empirical observations reveal that these assumptions are implausible, and that more accurate assumptions could have been made based on prior attention and eye movement research. Future decision making research would benefit from greater integration with attention research.

Role‐Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis

AbstractCriminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or a prosecutor leads to role‐induced bias even if participants are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role and if they expect a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if participants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role‐induced bias is driven by coherence effects, that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the importance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Interplay of Experience-Based Affective and Probabilistic Cues in Decision Making

In a study using behavioral and physiological measures we induced experience-based affective cues (i.e., differential anticipatory arousal) toward a risky and a safe option by letting participants repeatedly select between two decks of cards with feedback. In later test decisions we presented choice tasks between these trained and new pairs of decks. In some of the trials a low-valid probabilistic cue was provided after stimulus onset but before the decision. Although we were successful in inducing experience-based affective cues these did not influence participants' choices. In decisions without any further cues available people choose the safe and the risky option about equally often. If an additional low-valid probabilistic cue was available people followed this cue. Although experience had no effect on choices it influenced arousal. Anticipatory physiological arousal increased if the probabilistic cue and experience were conflicting. Our results are in line with recent findings indicating diminished loss aversion in experience-based decision making. They are also consistent with parallel constraint satisfaction models and shed light on the interrelation between experience, probabilistic cues, and arousal in decision making.

An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

AbstractMany everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

On the theoretical precision and strategy selection problem of a single‐strategy approach: A comment on Glöckner, Betsch, and Schindler (2010)

AbstractAccording to the fast and frugal heuristics (FFH) program, humans make decisions by selecting from a repertoire of strategies. Glöckner, Betsch, and Schindler criticize such multi‐strategy frameworks for not explaining how people select between the different strategies. As an alternative, they propose a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model that assumes a single strategy for all tasks. However, contrary to Glöckner et al.'s assertions, the FFH and other multi‐strategy frameworks have developed a number of approaches to strategy selection, tackling a difficult modeling problem that the PCS model disguises but cannot solve itself. Moreover, in contrast to the PCS model, which has not been completely spelled out, the repertoire of strategies assumed by the FFH framework is precisely defined, enabling researchers to make quantitative predictions about behavior. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Accounting for critical evidence while being precise and avoiding the strategy selection problem in a parallel constraint satisfaction approach: A reply to Marewski (2010)

AbstractIn Glöckner, Betsch and Schindler (2010) we observed predecisional information distortions (coherence shifts) in probabilistic inferences that indicate bidirectional reasoning. In response to Marewski's (2010) critique, we explain why coherence shifts cannot be explained by currently specified fast and frugal heuristics (FFH). In contrast, parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) models can easily account for such effects. We show that the PCS model used in the target paper is sufficiently well specified with respect to predicting the observed effects and demonstrate that it circumvents the problem of strategy selection by using a single‐strategy approach. Taking a broader perspective, we argue that empirical and theoretical challenges to the FFH approach have become so substantial that a mere extension of the suggested toolbox might not sufficiently solve the problem. We suggest that further theoretical work in the field of judgment and decision making should be more responsive to well‐established findings and insights from other fields of cognition such as memory and perception. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Role Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis

Criminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or prosecutor leads to role induced bias even if participants are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role, and if they expect a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if participants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role induced bias is driven by coherence effects (Simon, 2004), that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the importance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed.

Physiological arousal in processing recognition information: Ignoring or integrating cognitive cues?

AbstractThe recognition heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) suggests that, when applicable, probabilistic inferences are based on a noncompensatory examination of whether an object is recognized or not. The overall findings on the processes that underlie this fast and frugal heuristic are somewhat mixed, and many studies have expressed the need for considering a more compensatory integration of recognition information. Regardless of the mechanism involved, it is clear that recognition has a strong influence on choices, and this finding might be explained by the fact that recognition cues arouse affect and thus receive more attention than cognitive cues. To test this assumption, we investigated whether recognition results in a direct affective signal by measuring physiological arousal (i.e., peripheral arterial tone) in the established city-size task. We found that recognition of cities does not directly result in increased physiological arousal. Moreover, the results show that physiological arousal increased with increasing inconsistency between recognition information and additional cue information. These findings support predictions derived by a compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model rather than predictions of noncompensatory models. Additional results concerning confidence ratings, response times, and choice proportions further demonstrated that recognition information and other cognitive cues are integrated in a compensatory manner.

Role Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis

Criminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or prosecutor leads to role induced bias even if participants are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role, and if they expect a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if participants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role induced bias is driven by coherence effects (Simon, 2004), that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the importance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed.

Experts and Decision Making: First Steps towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts

Expertise research shows quite ambiguous results on the abilities of experts in judgment and decision making (JDM) classic models cannot account for. This problem becomes even more accentuated if different levels of expertise are considered. We argue that parallel constraint satisfaction models (PCS) might be a useful base to understand the processes underlying expert JDM and the hitherto existing, differentiated results from expertise research. It is outlined how expertise might influence model parameters and mental representations according to PCS. It is discussed how this differential impact of expertise on model parameters relates to empirical results showing quite different courses in the development of expertise; allowing, for example, to predict under which conditions intermediates might outperform experts. Methodological requirements for testing the proposed unifying theory under complex real-world conditions are discussed.

Base-Rate Respect by Intuition: Approximating Rational Choices in Base-Rate Tasks with Multiple Cues

Although intuitive-automatic processes sometimes lead to systematic biases in judgment and choice, in many situations especially this kind of processes enables people to approximate rational choices. In complex base-rate tasks with repeated outcome feedback we observed choices which were in line with the Bayes' solution in 86% of the cases and which were made within a relatively short time (i.e., 2.2 seconds). The results indicate reliance on extremely well-calibrated intuition. This view is supported by the findings that choice proportions are almost perfectly predicted by posterior probabilities (r = .93), and that error rates, response times and confidence ratings are highly correlated with inconsistency in the provided information. Our results support the hypothesis that parallel constraint satisfaction models may account for the processes underlying intuition and make the application of simple heuristics and deliberate strategies very unlikely. Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, implications for economic and psychological modeling are outlined.

Information Processing in Decisions Under Risk: Evidence for Compensatory Strategies Based on Automatic Processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed forty decision tasks of two gambles with two non-negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye-tracking technology. Results for all dependent measures conflict with the prediction of the non-compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well predicted by a cumulative prospect theory. Process measures, however, indicate that individuals do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models.

Shifting Standards and Contextual Variation in Stereotyping

This chapter provides an overview of some 10 years of research on the “Shifting Standards Model” (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991). This model suggests that stereotypes lead perceivers to evaluate individual group members relative to within-category standards. One result of this process is that subjective evaluations (e.g., judgments on semantic-differential scales) may “mask” the operation of stereotypes. For example, a man and a woman may both be described as equally “competent”, even when more “objective” evaluations reveal substantial stereotyping effects (e.g., the man is assumed to score higher on standardized tests of competency). This review focuses on the role of context in moderating the tendency to shift judgment standards, and provides a critical comparison of the shifting standards model with two other theories emphasizing contextual variation in stereotyping, Social Identity/Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Model of impression formation (Kunda & Thagard, 1996).