In his review of an edited volume on ‘neuroenhancement’, Boris Quednow raises the question whether we really need a debate on a technology that will probably never materialise (Quednow, 2010). In philosophy, it is not uncommon to discuss hypothetical questions in the absence of concrete applications, for example whether sophisticated robots should be granted civil rights (Putnam, 1975). Such hypothetical discussions ideally help us to probe our intuitions and to refine our understanding of underlying assumptions. In this respect, I welcome the debate on cognitive enhancement, as it addresses relevant issues, such as the potential of neuroscientific interventions to alter personality, the role of proper functioning and performance in competitive societies and, ultimately, what constitutes a good life. Many of these issues are relevant whether these interventions are primarily used for purposes of clinical treatment or cognitive enhancement. However, there is a sense in which I welcome Quednow’s critical remarks: in the competition for media attention and research funding, the exaggeration of a trend might actually play an important function and bias individual and policy decisions. I share Quednow’s perception that the prevalence of enhancement is indeed overstated, though I am afraid that this misrepresentation is more frequent than his single case study suggests. For example, an influential paradigmatic paper states that the use of prescription stimulants ‘as study aids [y] might include as many as 16 per cent of the students on some campuses’ (Farah et al, 2004, p. 421). The authors of the original study merely asked for recreational use of a number of drugs in their survey with questions such as ‘have you ever used methylphenidate for fun?’ (Babcock and Byrne, 2000). A similar error involving this particular study can be found in many other papers on enhancement (see Schleim, 2010). Another paradigmatic paper that fuelled the public discussion in many countries stated that ‘on some campuses, up to 25 per cent of students had used them in the past year’, referring to prescription drugs used as study aids (Greely et al, 2008, p. 702). Although there was indeed such an extreme outlier – one in 119 – in the detailed study investigating stimulant consumption, the authors did not ask the students for the motives of their consumption other than that they be ‘nonmedical’ (McCabe et al, 2005). This leaves room for other motives than cognitive enhancement, such as having fun, experiencing a ‘high’ or losing weight. The figures of this study thus cannot be interpreted with regard to the prevalence of cognitive enhancement. Again, this error is widespread (see Schleim, 2010). Such an overestimation carries the risk to suggest that the drugs are safe and effective – for why should so many people otherwise use them? Responses
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