Palestine Conciliation Commission Research Articles

PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION AND TURKEY

<div><!--block-->Palestine Conciliation Commission was one of the most important initiatives under United Nations to resolve the conflict over Palestine. Embarking on an enormous effort to develop a solution in 1948 and being unable to obtain a favourable result in spite of its active endeavour until 1952, the Commission officially declared its inability to successfully carry out its missions and was abolished in the first half of the 1960s. This study aims to describe the works of the Commission, the importance of the role and activities of Turkey in the Commission together with other western countries for Turkish foreign policy, and the reasons for the Commission’s failure. Cite this article as: Baş, Arda, “Filistin Uzlaştırma Komisyonu ve Türkiye”, Turk J Hist sayı 69 (2019), s.135-168.</div>

‘A source of considerable annoyance’: an Israeli–Palestinian backchannel in the efforts to release the blocked Palestinian bank accounts

In addition to the great emotional toll that the Nakba inflicted on the Palestinian people, the 1948 exodus occasioned substantial material losses for the refugees as well. As the 1948 War ground to a halt, the international community had to decide how to deal with all of this, and in the early 1950s the matter of the so-called ‘blocked’—or frozen—Palestinian bank accounts became one of the main issues on the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission’s agenda. Initially, its effort included the government of Israel and the British-owned Barclays Bank. As things progressed, however, Israeli diplomats also engaged a group of Palestinian refugees in an informal backchannel. This article sheds light on this largely overlooked episode and shows how the channel was established, and how the Palestinian group faced nothing but strong international opposition, most notably from the British Foreign Office. Protecting the interests of its regional ally Jordan, as well as those of Barclays Bank, the Foreign Office did what it could in order to make sure that this particular Israeli–Palestinian backchannel was promptly closed.

Powerful State, Powerless Mediator: The United States and the Peace Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 1949–51

The Arab–Israeli War of 1948 produced complex questions that needed to be solved to obtain peace. Whereas the Arab states suffered humiliating defeats, Israel was the undisputed winner, expanding and solidifying its power. For the Palestinians, the outcome was catastrophic. Between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinians fled, becoming refugees on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in surrounding Arab states. Palestinian society collapsed and Palestine became divided between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, leaving the borders undecided. The Palestinians’ dreams of statehood were crushed. After the war, Israel used diplomacy to achieve its goals, defending the post-war status quo to preserve its expanded territory and resisting the return of Palestinian refugees. Through its membership in the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), established by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 to solve these problems, the United States was deeply involved in the negotiations. The United States became the informal, yet undisputed leader of the PCC, thus, it would seem, empowering it with the muscles of a superpower. After three years of struggling for peace the PCC had toadmit failure. Knowledge about these negotiations gives important insights into how mediators approached the conflict and shows that power asymmetry may explain why the belligerents could not obtain peace.

Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961–1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961–62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.

Israel and the Palestine conciliation commission

Israel and the Palestine conciliation commission

The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations ( 1949-51 ): King Abdallah's Lonely Effort

The story of the negotiations between King Abdallah of Jordan and the new State of Israel has not yet been told in full, although the previously classified diplomatic documents, Israeli, British and American, have been available to the public for several years now. Even those well-versed in the history of the region will find much that is new to them. It emerges clearly that King Abdallah conducted the talks throughout with complete sincerity but with a singular lack of sober appraisal as to the possible outcome of all the changes that took place in Jordan as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Abdallah's prolonged exertions in pursuit of peace with Israel make an intricate story that deserves a full-blown monograph, in which the interactions between the participants the Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis, British and Americans would be treated in extenso, supported by a full armoury of documentary references. This brief account will focus only on the salient points of the story. Abdallah was assassinated on 20 July 1951; on 27 June, just three weeks earlier, he had shown how very far he was from any accurate evaluation of the prospects for a settlement with Israel, when he unburdened himself to a US member of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission then visiting Amman, who recorded the talk in vivid detail. 'I am an old man', said Abdallah. [He was sixty-nine years old.] 'I know that my power is limited. I know that I am hated by my own son [Tallal]. I also know that my own people distrust me because of my peace efforts. I know I could get a peace settlement if only I had some encouragement.' A year earlier, the Arab League had passed two Resolutions (on 1 and 13 April 1950) to expel any member that made a separate peace with Israel. Abdallah was quite ready to defy this decision of the Arab League but not his own people, who, he was sure, would support him if only Israel were to offer Jordan what he termed 'reasonable concessions'. He concluded the conversation with

U.S. Policy on Jerusalem

Maps Preface From Sykes-Picot (1916) to Morrison-Grady (1946) Corpus Separatum, September-November 1947 The Failure to Protect Jerusalem, December 1947-May 1948 America Declines to Assist Bernadotte, May-August 1948 The Search for an Alternative to Corpus Separatum, August-December 1948 The Palestine Conciliation Commission, January-August 1949 Volte-Face: The Ostensible Triumph of Corpus Separatum, September-December 1949 A Stalemate Develops at the United Nations, 1950 The United States Taboo on Jerusalem, 1950-1967 1967 and After: The Israeli Triumph Conclusion Selected Bibliography Index

Arab League

During the period under review the attention of the member countries of the Arab League was focused on the meetings of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission in Lausanne, Switzerland. The British proclamation of self-rule for Cyrenaica on June 2 did, however, call for comment from the League. The move was interpreted as an attempt to create a British protectorate on Egypt's frontier and an attempt to further weaken the Arab countries through partition of one of them. Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, in a formal statement of protest, stated, “It is indeed regrettable that British policy in Libyan questions is based solely on Britain's own interests. Britain has not tried to reach an understanding concerning a policy that would satisfy the Arab people.”

Arab League

During the period under review the activities of the Arab League and of its member states were concentrated on the Palestine dispute. Conversations were held in Cairo on February 14, 1949 between the Palestine Conciliation Commission and Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the League who later conferred with the Prime Minister of Egypt.

International Refugee Organization

A special meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Refugee Organization, scheduled to meet at Ottawa, was held instead at Geneva from January 25 to 29, 1949. The committee resolved, against determined British opposition, to lift the restriction of financial aid to immigrants to Palestine in effect since May 18, 1947, and authorized Director General William Hallam Tuck to re-imburse Jewish agencies, up to a maximum of $4,000,000 – the expenditure anticipated for Palestine migration in the 1948–1949 budget – for movements of refugees to Israel carried out between May 18, 1947 and January 1, 1949. The Director General was also authorized to support future Jewish refugee movements after consultation with the Palestine Conciliation Commission, to insure that IRO did nothing which would interfere with the commission's mandate to bring about the peaceful solution of the Palestine conflict. IRO support of future migration to Palestine depended on the availability of funds within the $4,000,000 limit after reimbursement of the agencies and on the result of negotiations with the Conciliation Commission. The resolution represented a compromise between those who felt that no limits should be placed on sponsorship of migration of eligible refugees to Palestine and those who argued that conditions in Palestine were too unstable and further complicated by an Arab refugee problem to justify IRO sponsorship. On January 26, 1949 the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) and Stanton Griffis, director of United Nations relief for Palestine refugees, made a joint appeal to the governments for funds and supplies for the aid of more than 500,000 Palestine refugees, mostly Arabs, who had lost their homes during the fighting in Palestine.