After more than a quarter of a century since first third wave transition, democracies that resulted from different modes of transition have consolidated themselves, stagnated, or reversed themselves.1 Is it time to abandon idea that a country's mode of transi tion from authoritarian rule matters? While it is perhaps possible to discard monocausal arguments that posit a necessary relationship between mode of transition and demo cratic consolidation, there may be a probabilistic relationship, challenges of consoli dation may be distinct, and mode of transition may affect type and quality of democracy that is institutionalized. Studies of modes of transition focus primarily on four tasks. First, they seek to cap ture parsimoniously essential differences between transitions and categorize cases within these modes.2 Second, they explore effects of modes of transition on like lihood that democracy will emerge.3 Third, they investigate how different modes present distinct challenges and trade-offs during consolidation process4 and probability of consolidation or stability.5 Finally, they examine causal link between mode of transition and type of democracy,6 including political institutions,7 state-society relations,8 and interelite and interparty politics.9 This article focuses on effects of transitions by pact. O'Donnell and Schmitter define a pact as an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules govern ing exercise of power on basis of mutual guarantees for 'vital interests' of those entering into it.'1O Two general hypotheses predict effects of pacted transitions. Pacted transitions offer most viable path to democracy.1' However, they may have longer-term negative effects on type of democracy.12 These effects include limi tation of interelite and interparty contestation, a conservative substantive policy bias, and privileging (or exclusion) of certain political and social actors. This article focuses primarily on second hypothesis. According to Przeworski's definition, a political pact contains agreements among leaders of political parties (or proto-parties) to... .divide government offices among themselves independent of election results,.. .and... .exclude and, if need be, repress outsiders.'3 He argues that the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute benefits of