Pacific Settlement Of International Disputes Research Articles

Third Party Intervention at the International Court of Justice: Challenges and Prospects

Respect for the rights of third parties in international adjudication is necessary if the ideal of a warless world is to be realized. Hence, every affected party must be catered for in any international adjudicatory scheme. The term “intervention” in international procedure describes the mode through which a third State participates, for protection of its own interests, in an international proceeding already set in motion at the instance of two or more States . The Statute and the Rules of the International Court of Justice make provisions for third party intervention. The institution of third party intervention serves a paramount goal. It seeks to safeguard third party rights, thereby, making third parties a part of the process of pacific settlement of international disputes. Nevertheless, the unpalatable truth is that there is nothing satisfactory about the institution of third party intervention at the International Court of Justice. Scholastic analysis of the subject is void of any modicum of praise in it and it is instead rich in criticism and disapproval. On the other hand, the decisions of both the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court on the subject are also not a good guide, they lack uniformity and consistency. This leaves the law of intervention too uncertain. Although the Court’s decisions are not binding on third parties, a third party who is unable to intervene cannot seek refuge in the shelter provided by the non-binding character of the Court’s decisions to third parties. The protection is only illusory. At the end, third parties are left in the lurch. One of the principal organs of the United Nations does not adequately safeguard their rights.

International Arbitration, The Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the French Security-Disarmament Dilemma (1919-1931)

International arbitration played an ambiguous role in French planning over national security during the years following the First World War, as policymakers faced the challenge of dealing with the powerful post-war movement in favour of international disarmament. It was a French-driven initiative in 1924 that accorded arbitration a central role as a means to ensure the pacific settlement of international disputes, yet policymakers in Paris remained for the most part convinced that arbitration on its own could never be certain enough to safeguard France. Though they would continue to support the cause of arbitration into the early 1930s, as a means to expand the powers available to the League Council, they rejected the idea that disarmament could follow from a mere increase of confidence or an ethos of goodwill. Disarmament could only follow from concrete measures to underpin security, namely commitments of military assistance against unprovoked aggression. These could be organized through the League or bilaterally, but they could not be substituted for by arbitration.

International adjudication and resolution of armed conflicts in the Africas great lakes: A focus on the DRC conflict

The duty of states to settle their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law is emphasized in a number of important provisions enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and state practices. Adjudication is one among a range of existing means of pacific settlement of disputes. This article analyses the role of international adjudication in conflict resolution. With the focus on the DRC conflict, the article critically examines the role of such international judicial bodies as the ICJ, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals-the ICTFY and ICTR, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and other judicial bodies involved in resolving armed conflicts. The ICJ decision in the Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo, the ongoing case of Thomas Lubanga before the ICC, and cases from other international judicial tribunals were taken as case studies, to argue that much as the adjudicatory role of international judicial bodies is a crucial method in pacific settlement of international disputes, it is unlikely to suit armed conflicts situations. The article points to the preclusion of the ICJ from adjudicating the other cases brought by the DRC against Rwanda and Burundi as an illustration of jurisdictional limitations of judicial bodies in adjudication of armed conflicts situations. It however, stresses that the very outcome of the 2005 ICJ decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Uganda case is another clear limb of such shortcomings. Without getting into detailed discussions of theories of compliance with international law, the article further discusses the question of compliance with decisions of international judicial bodies, in the light of previous state practices. Since there are no established enforcement mechanisms in the international system akin to those in national legal systems, the question whether such decisions are complied with, remains at the mercy of condemned states. In the final analyses, the author points to the current weaknesses and limitations of the international legal system as a whole, in the administration of justice generally, and in the adjudication of armed conflicts in particular. Key words: International adjudication, great lakes, democratic republic of Congo, armed conflict.

Resolution of International Disputes: The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration – Reflections on the Centenary of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

AbstractThe Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was established at the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899. During the past decade the PCA has progressed from a period of relative inactivity to a previously unsurpassed caseload. In this article the Secretary-General of the PCA reflects on the creation and early development of the PCA, before giving a detailed overview of recent arbitrations conducted under PCA auspices. The first part of this review, concerning treaty-based arbitration, analyses the role of the PCA in the resolution of disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, illustrated by the arbitrations conducted in the Guyana/Suriname, Barbados/Trinidad, Malaysia/Singapore, and Ireland/United Kingdom (MOX Plant) disputes. The second part, which focuses on ad hoc arbitration, outlines the recently concluded arbitrations in the Iron Rhine (Belgium/Netherlands) and Eritrea/Yemen cases, as well as the work of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission and Claims Commission.

Judicial Settlement of Armed Conflicts in International Law: Reflecting the 2005 International Court of Justice Decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo

AbstractThe duty of states to settle their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law is emphasized in a number of important provisions enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and state practices. Adjudication is one among a range of existing means of pacific settlement of disputes. This article analyzes the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in pacific settlement of international disputes. It critically examines judicial settlement of armed conflicts, taking the ICJ decision in the Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) as a focal point. The main argument of the author is that while the adjudicatory role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN is a crucial method in the pacific settlement of international disputes, it is unlikely to suit armed conflicts situations. Jurisdictional limitations of the ICJ in adjudication of armed conflicts situations is pointed out. The article points to the preclusion of the Court from adjudicating the other cases brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) against Rwanda and Burundi as an illustration of such limitations. It, however, stresses that the very outcome of the 2005 ICJ decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case is another clear example of such shortcomings. Without getting into detailed discussions of theories of compliance with international law, the article further discusses the question of compliance with the current ICJ decision in the light of previous state practices. Since there are no established enforcement mechanisms in the international system akin to those in national legal systems, the question whether decisions of international judicial bodies (the ICJ in this case) are complied with remains at the mercy of condemned states. In the final analyses, the author points to the current weaknesses and limitations of the international legal system as a whole in the administration of justice.

International Law and the Use of Force: The Jus Ad Bellum

Until the twentieth century, no express prohibition against the use of force existed in international law. However, the legitimacy of armed conflict has been an issue of concern since ancient times. Most significantly, the just war doctrine, which was influenced heavily by the writings of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, characterized armed conflict in terms of right and wrong, morality and immorality. For Augustine, writing in the fifth century A.D., just wars were those that “avenge[d] injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it.”1 850 years later, Aquinas refined this standard by suggesting three criteria with which to assess the use of force. To be just, the use of armed force had to be authorized by the sovereign, be for a just cause (i.e., the other side must have committed a wrong), and the belligerent nation or city had to posses the “right intention,” specifically, “the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”2 Writers from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries built on the works of Augustine and Aquinas, but continued to address just war in its theological context. By the sixteenth century, however, the classic formulation of the doctrine was under challenge. Typical was Machiavelli’s celebrated pronouncement: “that war is just which is necessary.”3 With the end of the religious wars and advent of the modern nationstate system, marked historically by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the just war doctrine fell into desuetude. Positivism, an approach to norms based on the practices of states (including agreements between them), emerged to replace it. Its foundational principle, sovereignty, rejected external, non-consensual limits on a state’s prerogative to select the tools of international intercourse, including war, that it deemed best suited to achieve its national interests. Although positivism acknowledged that states should exhaust peaceful remedies before resorting to force, once that occurred, the right to use force was essentially unlimited. The sole exceptions were cased bound by bilateral treaties in which the parties had agreed not to settle disputes forcibly. By the turn of the twentieth century, the legal milieu began to change. The Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of

The United Nations International Law Commission

Those seeking information on the United Nations’ work in systematizing the rules of public international law may find it useful to examine the latest edition of The Work of the International Law Commission (4th ed., United Nations, 1988). According to this publication, (the primary source for this column), interest in the development and codification of the rules on international law may be traced back to the late 18th century and the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, author of Principles of International Law. From this time forward there were numerous attempts at the codification of international law, but intergovernmental regulation of general legal questions originated with the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). Thereafter, international legal rules on various subjects were developed by different diplomatic conferences. These included such subjects as the laws of war on land and sea, pacific settlement of international disputes and the regulation of postal services and telecommunications. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 stimulated the movement for codification. Efforts to promote the codification and development of international law were further advanced with the 1924 (September 22) resolution of the fifth session of the League of Nations Assembly which envisaged the establishment of a standing Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. After having consulted member governments and the Council, the League Assembly decided in 1927 to convene a Codification Conference which took place at The Hague in the Spring of 1930. Unfortunately, the international instruments resulting from the work of the conference were only in the one field of nationality. One further step, however, was the adoption by the League Assembly on September 25, 1931 of a major resolution on codification of international law emphasizing the need to strengthen the influence of governments at each stage in the codification process.

A Non-Aligned Crusade for International Law?

From 26 to 29 June the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries convened at the premisses of the Peace Palace in The Hague to discuss the issue of peace and the rule of law in international affairs. This meeting was the start of a campaign for aDecade of International Law. This was the first occasion that an extraordinary ministerial conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was not held in one of its member countries. The Hague was chosen to underline the historic ties between this city and the (early) development of international law. This year it will be 90 years ago that the First Hague Peace Conference was held on the initiative of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia. This conference (together with the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907) became a landmark in the history of the codification of international law and especially the development of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes between states. The two most important conventions that were adopted at that conference were the Convention with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land and the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

The International Court of Justice and the General Act Of 1928

The 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was the creation of the ninth session of the League of Nations. Containing important provisions on judicial settlement, as well as on conciliation and arbitration, the Act provided the Permanent Court of International Justice with an indisputable basis of jurisdiction. Whether the Act survived the demise of the League and is equally effective today is, however, a matter of some disagreement.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Election of Members of the International Court of Justice

The Hague Conference of 1899 was the first to address the need for a permanent body for the settlement of differences between states. The ensuing Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes entered into force in 1900. At the second Hague Conference in 1907 the provisions of the 1899 Convention were expanded in a new convention of the same title which entered into force in 1910. These conventions established the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which in reality is neither “permanent” nor a “court” but rather a panel of persons, up to four being named by each participating state, from which arbitrators can be selected.

The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the International Court of Justice

The Rules of Court which the International Court of Justice adopted in 1946, on the commencement of its existence, were essentially a reproduction of the Rules of Court adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice on March 11, 1936 with such alterations as became necessary after the changes incorporated in the new Court's Statute, in comparison with that of the Permanent Court. When the Court adopted those Rules it did so with the intention of undertaking a more thorough revision after more experience of the judicial function had been acquired. Since then, the Court has had the matter under review, but for over twenty years nothing concrete has emerged.The Court has had a rough passage in this period. This is demonstrated by insufficient judicial business, bitter debates on its role in the United Nations both in connection with advisory opinions and in connection with the inclusion of jurisdictional clauses in multilateral treaties drawn up in United Nations meetings, widespread mistrust of the Court as an institution and of judicial settlement as a mode for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and a general malaise attending everything to do with the Court.

The International Court of Justice: Amendment of the Statute and New International Law

The International Court of Justice, in accordance with its statutory authority,' has for first time submitted to SecretaryGeneral of United Nations a proposal to amend its statute. The supporting memorandum2 explains Court's proposed amendment to article 22, which now provides that seat of Court shall be established at The Hague. Since 1966 Government of Netherlands has had under consideration a proposal that a new building be erected for Court, and Court does not want to confine choice of location to The itself. Even another location in Netherlands outside municipal limits of The could not be contemplated unless statute of Court is amended. It is clear that proposed change is not entirely due to town planning situation at The Hague. The memorandum sets forth reasons and in particular that an amendment is desirable because particularity of provision that the Seat of Court shall be established at The Hague is invidious. No other principal organ of U.N. and none of Specialized Agencies, or IAEA, is compelled by its basic instrument to maintain its seat in a designated place. The reason for this particular designation in basic instrument of Court is primarily historical. The Court's predecessor, Permanent Court of International Justice, was subject to same restriction.3 The location of Permanent Court at The in 1922 is understandable. The had become associated with judicial settlement of international disputes through work of Permanent Court of Arbitration established there by The Conventions for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. Also, emotive association of The with peace since Conferences of 1899 and 1907 was a potent factor in post

International Law: The Old and the New

The Hague Conference of 1907 is over and the delegates return to their respective countries. Aspirations for the pacific settlement of international disputes have been voiced and a list of possible arbitrators has been drawn up described by the formal name of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Well and good! No obligation was accepted to have recourse to the Court, but at least the Conference went so far as to declare its acceptance of “the principle of compulsory arbitration” and its applicability to international agreements. At the same time the Conference declared that the divergencies of opinion in respect to compulsory arbitration “have not exceeded the bounds of judicial controversy,” and that the delegates, in the course of their long collaboration, had succeeded “in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity.”

Lighthouses Arbitration between France and Greece.

Treaties — Interpretation of — Principles and Rules of — Intention of the PartiesArbitration — In General — The Arbitration Treaty — Interpretation of — Implied Exclusion of Award of Costs — Intention of the Parties.Arbitration — Procedure — Practice — Award of Costs — Exclusion by Rules of Procedure in Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907 — Implied Exclusion by Terms of Compromis — Intention of the Parties.

The International Court and the United Nations: Reflections on the Period 1946–1954

This article is devoted to a consideration of the role (during the period 1946–54) of the International Court of Justice within the general context of international institutions existing to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes. For the development of international judicial techniques, this period is dominated by a novel, and unwelcome, phenomenon, that of the non-implementation of several of the Court's decisions. In this respect the position of the Court, as a principal organ of the United Nations, is not unique, for, in all its work, the United Nations has had to face the problem of the non-implementation of the resolutions of the principal organs. In making the following observations, the possibility that a decision will be taken in 1955 to convene a General Review Conference, in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 3, of the Charter and Article 69 of the Statute is kept in mind. However, it is not our intention to put forward any specific suggestions for amending either Chapter XIV of the Charter or the Statute. Until a careful and comprehensive review has been made of the working of the provisions of the Charter relating to the Court, and of the Statute, it would be premature to do so.

Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928-1948

Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928-1948

Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928–1948

Journal Article Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928–1948 Get access Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928–1948. London, H.M.S.O. for United Nations, 1949. ix + 1201 pp. Tables. 912′​′×614′​′$ 10.00. 50s. D. P. E. D. P. E. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 4, October 1949, Page 508, https://doi.org/10.2307/3018461 Published: 01 October 1949

REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:Dicky's Conflict of Laws. Sixth edition under the general editorship of J. H. C. MorrisTextbook of the English Conflict of Laws. By Clive M. Schmitthoff, ll.m.Property, Wealth, Land. By Myres Smith McDougal and David Haber.The Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence. By George W. Keeton.Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence. By Alf Ross, Professor of Law, jur.d.World Revolution in the Cause of Peace. By Lionel Curtis.The Gozawa Trial. Edited by C. Sleeman. War Crimes Trials Series. Vol. 3.Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928–1948.One Legal Aspect of the Polish Regained Territories. By M. Muszkat and others.Les Problèmes de la Sauvegarde de la Paix et de la Liquidation des Suites de Guerre au Point de Vue du Droit Polonais. By A. Badkowski and others.MacGillivray on Insurance Law. Third edition. By the Author and Denis BrowneA Study of Hospital Administration. By F. Hart and A. J. Waldegrave.The Principles of Company Law. By J. CharlesworthA Treatise of Contemporary Religious Jurisprudence. By I. H. Rubinstein, of the Illinois Bar.The Law of Smoke Nuisances. By W. R. Hornby SteerHousing Subsidies and Rents. By J. R. Jarmain, m.a.(Admin.).Compulsory Purchase and Compensation. By R. D. Stewart Brown.Town and Country Planning Law. By J. Kekwick and Robert S. W. Pollard.Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. By R. L. Doble, m.a., and H. Mann, m.b.e.The Story or the Lynskey Tribunal. By Wilfrid March.

Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: Recent Trends

Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: Recent Trends

Political Arbitration under the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at Geneva, September 26, 1928, is intended to provide for the final settlement of every dispute, of whatever nature it may be. Chapter II is evoted to legal disputes, while Chapter III, Articles 21-28, lays down rules concerning the settlement of non-legal disputes. This idea of a recourse to arbitration for the settlement of purely political conflicts, which Chapter III puts forward, may appear to be inconsistent with a long evolution which has tended to emphasize the judicial character of arbitration. It is true that occasionally states have submitted such conflicts to an arbitral tribunal, but it is for the first time that a provision to this effect has been inserted in a multipartitetreaty. A treaty of this kind has a legislative character and exercises a great influence upon the development of international law. The importance of the General Act is all the greater since some twenty states, including three great Powers, have already ratified it. This treaty, which may be compared only to the Hague Convention,could largely contribute to a revision of the common conception of arbitration. Does it attempt to do so, or is it rather intended to leave this conception unchanged and to create a new method of pacific settlement? In either case, how should the new conception of arbitration be defined? Since purely political disputes cannot be settled by the application of a rule of law, are the powers of the tribunal unlimited? These questions deserve closer consideration, especially since the relevant provisions of Chapter III of the General Act have already inspired certain opinions which, it is believed, are not only contrary to the true meaning of this treaty, but also,if generally adopted, would destroy the very foundations of international arbitration. Now, one of the essential ideas underlying the General Act is not to impair in the least what has already proved useful, but to develop the existing means for the pacific settlement of disputes. Chapter III constitutes an important step forward. Its evolutionary character and its exact meaning can best be realized in the light of the practice of statesand of the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals.