Originary Temporality Research Articles

Retrieving Heidegger's temporal realism

AbstractEarly Heidegger argues that a “homogenous space of nature” can be revealed by stripping away the intelligibility of Dasein's everyday world, a process he calls “deworlding.” Given this, some interpreters have suggested that Heidegger, despite not having worked out the details himself, is also committed to a notion of deworlded time. Such a “natural time” would amount to an endogenous sequentiality in which events are ordered independently of Dasein and the stand it takes on its being. I show that Heidegger was indeed committed to such a temporal realism even though his treatment of these issues is somewhat scattered and pulled in different directions. In the course of my reconstruction, I renew an interpretation of Heidegger that stresses Dasein's thrownness into nature and I answer William Blattner's powerful interpretation of Heidegger as a failed temporal idealist who was unable to derive the sequentiality of ordinary time from Dasein's non‐sequential originary temporality. Heidegger did not attempt to derive sequentiality; instead, he understood it as a built‐in feature of the natural universe by which Dasein's activities are constrained. World‐time turns out to be a co‐production of Dasein's non‐sequential originary temporality and the endogenous sequentiality of events in nature.

La via patica alla cura

The phenomenological attitude allows us to grasp something that happens before (a priori) the distinction between subject and object. The application to groups of human beings in a clinical and therapeutic context of the phenomenological setting allows us, in spite of its descriptive-contemplative aura, the extreme richness of potentialities, applicative and transformative, of one of the greatest intuitions of modern thought: the disappearance of the fracture between the subject, the others and the world-of-life, in the evidence of meaning that the mutual experience of one's own presence or being-there (Dasein) opens up. The Mitsein (being-with) doesn’t represent the only existential structure that makes the Dasein able to exist with others, but the relationship between the ‘originary temporality’ of the Dasein and the other as ‘you’. Dasein is that entity that is structurally “with” others. And it is in this relationship dynamic that unfolds the theme of the care (Sorge). Care becomes for Heidegger the existential of the existentials, fundamental ontological structure, indicating the original opening of being. Being-with-in-loving could consist in the atmosphere (mood o Stimmung), a kind of well-being which these flow-experiences, relatively rare in everyday life, are immersed in.

Temporality and existential mood in Heideggerian phenomenology.

The philosophical perspective of a research methodology should explicitly underpin the decisions the researcher makes throughout the research. It is therefore important to understand the philosophical background and origins of Heideggerian phenomenology when using it as a research methodology. To discuss in detail the main philosophical ideas underpinning Heideggerian phenomenology. Anxiety and boredom are two significant existential moods in Heideggerian phenomenology. Time is the basis of these moods and is an 'originary temporality'. Originary temporality consists of a unified structure that includes the past, present and future. The experience of being human ('dasein') and its care/worry structure are significant features of originary temporality and consequently existential mood. Existential anxiety discloses the threefold characteristics of temporality to the individual, while existential boredom disrupts its unified structure. Both moods highlight the limits of existence to the individual and may culminate in additional distressing moods. It is essential for nurse researchers using Heideggerian phenomenology to understand the philosophical ideas underlining it. The depiction of originary temporality and existential mood illustrated in this article could help nurse researchers embarking on a Heideggerian phenomenological study. The article could also inform researchers new to Heideggerian phenomenological research of the methodology's philosophical background.

The concept of time in Bion's “A Theory of Thinking”

ABSTRACTA complex and subtle theory of time is at the heart of Bion’s 1962 text “A Theory of Thinking.” The central point is the differentiation of “conception” and “thought,” psychic elements that in the infant are born respectively from experiences of satisfaction and frustration. These mnestic inscriptions should be understood as in dialectic relation with each other. From this matrix, within which originary temporality is established, lived time derives, but only when it is inserted in the symbolic order through the function of language, which gives access to the “concept.” Our feeling of time is therefore based on the rhythm of presentation of the breast and thus on the primary relationship with the object, as well as on a broader symbolic network. The meeting of a preconception of the breast with the mere absence of the breast is not able to generate a “thought” and establish time. That is why Bion distinguishes between absence of breast or non-breast and nothing (noughtness), a state of nameless dread. Bion’s concept of time provides an empirical idea, i.e. based on clinical cases where the destruction of time is observed, both of the origin of time and of what Heidegger called—as opposed to “linear” or objective conceptions of time—the ontological structure of temporality. An accurate and orderly critical reading of Bion’s article is essential to reach these conclusions.

Time, temporality and cultural rhythmics: An anthropological case study

This article presents the introduction and the update of an ethnographic research on temporality among indigenous groups, published in 2011 in its full version as a book in Spanish. It seeks to prove the usefulness of the conceptual distinction between time, defined as the phenomenon of becoming in itself, and temporality, defined as the human apprehension of becoming in a cultural context. Furthermore, the existence of non-hegemonic temporalities is exemplified by a case study of originary temporality with Mocoví indigenous societies in Argentina’s Chaco region. The methodology built for studying temporality in different social groups, termed here as cultural rhythmics, is also introduced. By studying different rhythmic experiences integrated in the participant observation, the rhythmic method enables us to interpret social facts that are implicit in the everyday practices of organisation, in the economic–political relations, and in the group’s worldviews.

Originary Temporality and Existential Commitment: A Defense of Heidegger's A Potiori Claim

AbstractBeing and Time's fundamental ontoogy and existentialism both rest on the A Potiori Claim, which states that originary temporality is, although non‐sequential, a genuine and basic concept of time from which we derive our more ordinary, sequential concept of time. In this paper, I develop a new reading and defense of this claim against the readings of William Blattner, which ties originary temporality too tightly to the particular roles and identities we live out and must therefore find Heidegger's project a failure, and Tony Fisher, who implies that our various roles and identities hang together in time in a merely accidental and non‐rational way. On my reading, originary temporality is the structure of Dasein's characteristic activity of existential commitment. Through this activity, we each work out, in our own case, what it takes to embody the capacity for sense‐making, at all. Here, the non‐sequentiality of originary temporality reflects the way in which commitments are revised and sustained through time, while the sequence of nows derives from our need to embody our commitment in a single life that negotiates among the practical demands that our various identities make of us.

The Way of Novalis. An Exposition on the Process of His Achievement by John O’Meara

John O'Meara. The Way of Novalis. An Exposition on Process of His Achievement. Ottawa: Heart's Core Publications, 2014. Pp. x+194. $14.95 paper. Since 1980s, literary achievement of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) has drawn increased attention in English-speaking world. This has unfolded to great extent 111 relation to reception of German Romanticism understood as decisive influence on postmodern aesthetics and literary theory. Within this context, Novalis gives considerable food for thought. In materialist perspective, he is read as a revolutionary poet and forerunner of globalism as theorized by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. In perspective of Christian universalism, he is seen as prophet of a multicultural religion of humanity. These two perspectives are in fact covertly allied. Novalis's genius lies in seeking root of seemingly most obdurate oppositions--matter and spirit, life and death, sickness and health--and synthesizing them in a higher unity. His focus on question of creative selfhood, which he took up from Fichte, becomes for Novalis hearth-fire of his life's work. The model of John O'Meara's book is that of a spiritual biography. Since this genre depends upon insight of author in evoking unity of life and thought of Novalis, O'Meara's success or lack of success in achieving this objective should be primary criterion of evaluation of The Way of Novalis. On these grounds book is to be appreciated as a welcome contribution to Novalis studies. O'Meara makes his argument forcefully and elegantly. The key stages of Novalis's life and work are vividly presented and amply supported by primary sources. The book follows chronology of Novalis's life, but this chronological presentation is pierced by insights into originary temporality and creativity of Novalis's spiritual development. The concept of development presupposes movement toward an inherent end, or purpose, and an autonomous origin of motion, as opposed to one imposed from without. O'Meara follows this model consistently. The book is divided into three parts: Part One essentially introduces Sophie von Kuhn and her significance for Novalis's life, along with his studies in Fichte's philosophy. Perhaps central idea to which O'Meara gives repeated reference is concept of freedom. The death of Sophie constitutes a great philosophical and spiritual test for Novalis because in suffering this loss he comes to confront finitude of freedom that is revealed by death. The point is not that death is end of freedom because it is end of life (which is not contended by anyone), but that in anticipation of death, thus to integrate it into one's life, uniqueness of one's death as one's own liberates one to be a self. In context of Fichte's idealism this calls for integration of death as absolute into finite self, and this is what death of Sophie demands of Novalis (38). In Part Two, O'Meara concentrates on Novalis's reunion and collaboration with Schlegel, especially in development of Fragment form. The significance of Logological Fragments, O'Meara writes, is that they articulate philosophical insight into the whole that unites self and (65). This Part also includes an important discussion of language, its symbolic and mystical power in opening-up (not just re-presenting) an original relation to world (66-69). The last section of Part Two offers an introduction to Novalis's understanding of universal, a concept that is perhaps key, not just to German Idealism, but to philosophy since Plato. On one hand, as author notes, concept of universal is a matter of knowledge of nature, and its literary form is encyclopedia. This is objective, scientific pole. On other hand, universal is a matter of introspective penetration of one's own self as uniquely one and whole with its world and as such Self becomes mirror of nature and all that is. …

Heidegger and the Essence ofDasein

AbstractBeing and Timeargues that we, asDasein, are defined not bywhatwe are, but by ourwayof existing, our “existentiell possibilities.” I diagnose and respond to an interpretive dilemma that arises from Heidegger's ambiguous use of this latter term. Most readings stress its specific sense, holding thatDaseinhas no general essence and is instead determined by some historically contingent way of understanding itself and the meaning of being at large. But this fails to explain the sense in whichBeing and Timeis a work of fundamental ontology, concluding in Heidegger's claim to have found the meaning ofDasein's being in the concept of originary temporality. On the other hand, readings that stress the general sense of “existentiell possibilities” find Heidegger on a fruitless quest forthetranscendental conditions necessary forDasein's existence, which seems to founder on the claims thatDaseinis constitutively thrown, factical, and “in‐each‐case‐mine” [jemeinig]. Both readings are problematic and, I contend, result from a failure to disambiguate and explain the ontologically uniquerelationship betweenthe specific and general aspects ofDasein's essence. I argue that we can better explain this relationship, Heidegger's method for investigating it, and the sense in whichDaseinhas an essence that is open to philosophical investigation, if we readBeing and Time's ontology ofDaseinin terms of what Anton Ford calls “categorial” genus‐species relationships.

Sharing the ‘now’: Heidegger and the temporal co-constitution of world

In this paper I respond to the view that Heidegger is unable to account for the possibility of immediately experiencing others in their concrete particularity. Critics have argued that since Mitsein characterizes Dasein’s mode of being regardless of the presence or absence of others, Heidegger has essentially granted it the status of an a priori category. In doing so, they argue, Heidegger reduces the other to a mere interchangeable token whose uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category. In contrast, I argue that the Heideggerian ‘a priori’ must be understood as a living responsiveness to particularity, not a top-down imposition of abstract categoriality. The argument further shows that this responsiveness must be understood in terms of temporal particularity. The bulk of the paper then demonstrates the nature of such responsiveness when it is the temporal particularity of the other Dasein that is being encountered. I show that such encounters are a necessary condition for the possibility of world time and the worldly space of shared significance. Because my encounter with the other Dasein is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category. They are, rather, a temporal responsiveness to the unique mode of intuitive givenness characterizing other Dasein.

Phenomenological Ontology or the Explanation of Social Norms?: A Confrontation with William Blattner's Heidegger's Temporal Idealism

Some of the most important contributions over the past two decades to understanding Heidegger's thought have been made by philosophers writing in English and sharing the broad perspective of analytic – or, perhaps better, “post-analytic” – philosophy. With Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, William Blattner has moved this approach several important steps forward. Like others in this recent movement, he interprets Heidegger not so much in the terms of existentialism or post-structuralism, as in those of the later Wittgenstein, classical American pragmatism, and neo-pragmatism. Also like other Anglo-American interpretations of Heidegger, Blattner's (1.) focuses primarily on the Sein und Zeit era; (2.) tends to steer away from Heidegger's analysis of authenticity and toward his analysis of Dasein's everydayness; (3.) accords an especially large role to Being-with (Mitsein) and the They (das Man) in the constitution of everyday meaning; and (4.) is particularly concerned with developing a view of the foundation of “mind” and scientific knowledge in the practical abilities of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Given the obvious centrality of time in SZ, it is surprising that there have been relatively few concerted attempts to critically explicate Heidegger's view of it. Blattner's book fills this gap by focusing on Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's “originary temporality”, as explicated in Division Two of SZ.

Systematicity and Temporality in Being and Time

Introduction In the late 1920s Heidegger interprets a broad variety of phenomena as temporal. He explains how humans experience everyday objects in a temporally extended context,' and he hints at the temporal structure of agency and personal identity over time. In a few passages he claims that temporality makes laws of logic hold in the ephemeral phenomena of the physical world. He links these analyses in attempting to articulate a deeper notion of temporality, which, he claims, underlies the manifestations of temporality outlined in each particular case. In this deeper, more sense is Heidegger's fundamental ontological term. The project of Being and Time is to establish that being as such only makes sense on a temporal basis. William Blattner calls this overarching claim the of the temporality of Being.' Prima facie it is doubtful that a clock and a hammer, personal identity, and the laws of logic share some kind of temporality. Temporal cannot mean exists in time that would be obviously false in many cases. Heidegger is vague about originary temporality and much of his interpretation never gets beyond promissory notes. His commentators have not fared better. But without a concrete explanation temporality threatens to be an empty notion. I do not have such an interpretation of temporality either. But I will suggest some external criteria that should guide any interpretation of it. These criteria derive from the role temporality plays in Heidegger's projected system of philosophy. Specifically, I will highlight the systematic structure of Being and Time by comparing it to the structure of neo-Kantian philosophical systems, which decisively influenced the architecture of Heidegger' s magnum opus. Temporality plays a role as the origin of Heidegger's system. Analyzing this role explains why Heidegger attempts the thesis of the temporality of being. This paper, then, has three parts. First, I survey the salient features of neoKantian philosophical systems. Second, I compare these features to the structure of Being and Time. Third, I apply the results of the comparison to the thesis of the temporality of being. I conclude by reflecting on the twin demise of systematicity and temporality in Heidegger's philosophical development after Being and Time.