Origin Of Signs Research Articles

A History of the Radiation Warning Sign.

This paper provides a history of the radiation warning sign with a focus on the period from 1946 to 1948. It employs previously unpublished material from the University of California Radiation Laboratory's Health Chemistry Group, the memoirs of John Gifford, and an account by George Warlick. Also considered is an alternative version of the sign's origin described by Cyrill Orly.

Linguistic Data Model for Natural Languages and Artificial Intelligence. Part 2. Identification

Introduction. The article continues a series of publications on the linguistics of relations (hereinafter R-linguistics) and is devoted to the origin of signs, their independence and determination of the dimension of linguistic spaces.Methodology and sources. The article is devoted to the continuation of the axiomatic approach, but for the identification process. Research methods are to develop the necessary mathematical concepts for linguistics in the field of identification. Results and discussion. The concept of a sign is defined and its interrelation with decomposition of linguistic spaces is established. This radically changes the attitude to signs in linguistics, where the “external” origin of signs is assumed. It is shown that the decomposition of linguistic spaces into signs spaces entails the independence of signs and the possibility of decomposition of objects of identification. It is fundamentally distinguished by the signs on the parameters. On the basis of the independence of signs it is possible to formulate the notion of dimension of linguistic spaces, which is defined as the smallest number of signs describing the linguistic space. In the lattice of linguistic spaces there is a division operation, which allows to simplify the selection of signs.Conclusion. The main conclusions are as follows. Signs, on the basis of which the identification of objects in the category, are abstract mathematical objects associated with the decomposition of linguistic spaces. Signs are independent from each other and allow not only to make decomposition of spaces, but also to decompose on parts objects of identification. Their origin is not related to their presence in the “outside world”, so it, as will be shown later, creates the basis for the emergence of language.

Signs, Idols, and the Incarnation in Augustinian Metaphysics

Augustine had no theory of signs . Indeed, one might properly say that Augustine had no philosophy of representation, no critique of idolatry, and no theory of time. This is not to say that Augustine did not think about language, or that in doing so he did not incur debts to earlier essays on the nature and origin of signs. Rather, Augustine confronted signs and the failings of language, and sought to explain the referential capacity of religious art, in response to contingencies that were, for him, embedded in philosophical and theological debates. These debates are now the subject of discrete modern discourses whose presuppositions Augustine would reject. The objects of Augustine’s inquiry, and of modern inquiry into Augustine, are rarely the same. In the Ž rst years of the Ž fth century church and state moved with ever greater resolve against the remnants of Greco-Roman paganism, and Augustine as bishop cooperated in the policies of the institutions that ordered his world. That he did so should not, however, allow the philosophical basis of his critique of pagan idols and classical texts to remain unexplored. For Augustine, if pagan culture were to be wrong, it had to be wrong for a reason. Challenged in daily converse and by daily experience to explain his distinction between true and false religion and true and false religious practice, Augustine ultimately argued that signs served diVerent functions in pagan and Christian life because pagans and Christians sought access to aspects of creation that possessed diVerential ontological statuses and that had, therefore, diVerent places in late classical metaphysics. But by casting a religious debate in shared philosophical language, Augustine had somewhat uneasily to describe a problemof religious faith in intellectual terms. Again and again, the pursuit of signs and idols led him to a fact for which traditional metaphysics could not account and that traditional language could not describe, the fact of Christ. It was an impasse that Augustine broke by an argumentative sleight of hand: it was the truth of the incarnation, he insisted, that revealed the deŽ ciencies of classical metaphysics and the frailty of human language. If Augustine confronted the metaphysics of representation in order to solve a religious problem through reason, signs them-

Signs, Idols, and the Incarnation in Augustinian Metaphysics

Augustine had no theory of signs . Indeed, one might properly say that Augustine had no philosophy of representation, no critique of idolatry, and no theory of time. This is not to say that Augustine did not think about language, or that in doing so he did not incur debts to earlier essays on the nature and origin of signs. Rather, Augustine confronted signs and the failings of language, and sought to explain the referential capacity of religious art, in response to contingencies that were, for him, embedded in philosophical and theological debates. These debates are now the subject of discrete modern discourses whose presuppositions Augustine would reject. The objects of Augustine’s inquiry, and of modern inquiry into Augustine, are rarely the same. In the Ž rst years of the Ž fth century church and state moved with ever greater resolve against the remnants of Greco-Roman paganism, and Augustine as bishop cooperated in the policies of the institutions that ordered his world. That he did so should not, however, allow the philosophical basis of his critique of pagan idols and classical texts to remain unexplored. For Augustine, if pagan culture were to be wrong, it had to be wrong for a reason. Challenged in daily converse and by daily experience to explain his distinction between true and false religion and true and false religious practice, Augustine ultimately argued that signs served diVerent functions in pagan and Christian life because pagans and Christians sought access to aspects of creation that possessed diVerential ontological statuses and that had, therefore, diVerent places in late classical metaphysics. But by casting a religious debate in shared philosophical language, Augustine had somewhat uneasily to describe a problemof religious faith in intellectual terms. Again and again, the pursuit of signs and idols led him to a fact for which traditional metaphysics could not account and that traditional language could not describe, the fact of Christ. It was an impasse that Augustine broke by an argumentative sleight of hand: it was the truth of the incarnation, he insisted, that revealed the deŽ ciencies of classical metaphysics and the frailty of human language. If Augustine confronted the metaphysics of representation in order to solve a religious problem through reason, signs them-

A Violência na sua dimensão semiótica

Este trabalho pretende refletir alguns dos aparatos conceituais que permeiam parte da pesquisa transdisciplinar Criminalidade e Espaço Urbano, as Transversalidades da Violência, desenvolvida na Unisinos, que tem, entre os seus focos, os processos midiáticos. Postula-se que a violência possui uma dimensão semiótica que estaria vinculada à própria gênese dos signos na espécie humana e no desenvolvimento e conflitos de ordens no espaço da semiosfera. Procura-se entender a dinâmica destas semioses muitas vezes explosivas e verificar certas operações midiáticas na qual esta dimensão é atualizada e ritualizada. Busca-se maior compreensão das lógicas destas processualidades e as possibilidades de inserção afirmativa das comunidades mais vulneráveis