Ordinary Attributions Research Articles

Klasifikasi kualitas mutu susu pasteurisasi menggunakan metode klasifikasi k-Nearest Neighbor

Milk is a product that is often consumed because it has many good benefits for the body. One of the benefits of milk is that it contains calcium, which is useful for the growth of bones and teeth. However, many consumers still choose dairy products based only on their appearance, even though milk quality is not based on its appearance but is found during milk processing. Pasteurization is the process of heating whole milk at a specific temperature and for a certain period to increase the milk's shelf life and maintain the milk's quality. Two types of pasteurization processes are Long Temperature Long Time and High Temperature Short Time. k-Nearest Neighbor or k-NN is a data mining method used to classify objects from the data, using distance calculations or Euclidean Distance to look for similarities between neighbors. So, based on this problem, milk quality classification is carried out. The research was carried out by classifying milk quality using the K-NN method. The public data used to classify is 1,059 pasteurized milk data, with seven regular or ordinary attributes and one special or class attribute. The K values ​​that will be used in this research are k=3, k=5, and k=7. From the analysis of calculation results using the k-NN method, the accuracy values ​​obtained are k=3 is 97%, k=5 is 89%, and k=7 is 87%.

COVID 19 and Entrepreneurship: Time to Pivot?

Abstract I thank JMS for this invitation to explore how COVID 19, and its aftermath, leads us to question some of the fundamental assumptions of entrepreneurship research In this dialogue, I highlight five fundamental assumptions of the field that are challenged by COVID 19 that may require a research pivot, i e , that may require a change in research direction on specific topics

Kinds as Universals: A Neo-Aristotelian Approach

In his theory of categories, Aristotle introduces a distinction between two types of universals, i.e., kinds and attributes. While attributes determine how their subjects are, kinds determine what something is: kinds represent unified ways of being which account for the existence and identity of particular objects. Since its introduction into the philosophical discussion, the concept of a kind has attracted criticism. The most important objection argues that no separate category of kinds is needed because all kinds can be reduced to conjunctions of ordinary attributes. The present paper explores one possible response to this reductionist challenge on behalf of the Aristotelian—one which takes issue with the view that conjunctive properties license a reduction of kinds to attributes. The aim of this exploration is not only to defend an Aristotelian doctrine of kinds—i.e., to convey a better understanding of why we actually need an irreducible category of kinds—but also to define the Aristotelian position more precisely; i.e., to shed more light on the concept of kinds and the very the idea of kindhood.

Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences

Prior work on weakness of will has assumed that it is a thoroughly psychological phenomenon. At least, it has assumed that ordinary attributions of weakness of will are purely psychological attributions, keyed to the violation of practical commitments by the weak-willed agent. Debate has recently focused on which sort of practical commitment, intention or normative judgment, is more central to the ordinary concept of weakness of will. We report five experiments that significantly advance our understanding of weakness of will attributions by showing that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is less thoroughly psychological than the philosophical debate has assumed. We begin by showing that a sizable minority of people attribute weakness of will even in the absence of a violated commitment (Experiment 1). We then show that weakness of will attributions are sensitive to two important non-psychological factors. First, for actions stereotypically associated with weakness of will, the absence of certain commitments often triggers weakness of will attributions (Experiments 2–4). Second, the quality of an action’s outcome affects the extent to which an agent is viewed as weak-willed: actions with bad consequences are more likely to be viewed as weak-willed (Experiment 5). Our most important finding is that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is sensitive to two non-psychological factors and is thus much broader than philosophers have thus far imagined. We conclude by suggesting a two-tier model that unites our findings with traditional philosophical theorizing about weakness of will.

Function and feeling machines: a defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience

Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity to which those experiential states are attributed. In two experiments, we demonstrate that ordinary attributions of subjective experiences (of smell and felt emotions) to a simple robot are not sensitive to valence, but instead respond to functional assumptions about the entity to which the states are (or are not) attributed.

Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism

I seem to know that I won't experience spaceflight but also that if I win the lottery, then I will take a flight into space. Suppose I competently deduce from these propositions that I won't win the lottery. Competent deduction from known premises seems to yield knowledge of the deduced conclusion. So it seems that I know that I won't win the lottery; but it also seems clear that I don't know this, despite the minuscule probability of my winning (if I have a lottery ticket). So we have a puzzle. It seems to generalize, for analogues of the lottery-proposition threaten almost all ordinary knowledge attributions. For example, my apparent knowledge that my bike is parked outside seems threatened by the possibility that it's been stolen since I parked it, a proposition with a low but non-zero probability; and it seems that I don't know this proposition to be false. Familiar solutions to this family of puzzles incur unacceptable costs—either by rejecting deductive closure for knowledge, or by yielding untenable consequences for ordinary attributions of knowledge or of ignorance. After canvassing and criticizing these solutions, I offer a new solution free of these costs. Knowledge that p requires an explanatory link between the fact that p and the belief that p. This necessary but insufficient condition on knowledge distinguishes actual lottery cases from typical, apparently analogous ‘quasi-lottery’ cases. It does yield scepticism about my not winning the lottery and not experiencing spaceflight, but the scepticism doesn't generalize to quasi-lottery cases such as that involving my bike.

New Wine into Old Bottles: Ethical Appeals and Democratic Discourse

Australia has been a well-established representative democracy since the nineteenth century. This has meant a corresponding rhetorical tradition in which politicians and aspirants for public office must gain credibility with voters as upholders of democracy since ‘the people’ are the source of legitimacy in our political society. This appeal inheres in the evaluative–descriptive nature of the concept democracy and may extend to proposals for enhancing democracy and to the portrayal of ordinary attributes that place them outside ‘the establishment’ with ‘the people’. More importantly, this appeal is placed in a romantic narrative of renewal of democracy that relies on binary tropes of innocence and corruption and which promises a better time for the people through a denigration of political opponents and their client groups who have captured government largesse.

Contextualism and the Problem of the External World

A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context‐sensitive in their semantics.It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits. and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world.

On Bilgrami's Belief and Meaning

Like all topics that generate a fruitful philosophical debate, the issue of psychological content is very complex, while at the same time featuring reasonably clear desiderata for a successful theory. Akeel Bilgrami's book is a splendid response to the challenge that this issue provides, containing an especially lucid analysis of the requirements of a successful theory, a deep understanding of the crucial examples, and a creative development of a genuinely original view. I will develop three points of criticism: the first concerns Bilgrami's argument against Tyler Burge's externalism, the second his claims against internalism, and the third the contextualism of his own externalist position.' (1) Burge provides good reason to believe that ordinary attribution is often non-individualistic in the sense that our ordinary attributions of content are dependent on facts about a subject's physical and social environment. From this fact about ordinary attributions he concludes that belief contents themselves have externalist individuation-conditions. The claim that ordinary attributions are strongly evidential or determinative of the nature of content is essential to Burge's arguments. Bilgrami's attack on this claim is that ordinary attributions do not aim at philosophical precision, and hence should not be taken as strongly evidential or determinative of content: Why should we take facts about ordinary, everyday reports to be relevant to this theoretical notion?.... The common practice of reporting does not fine-tune its tracking of the states of mind of the person on whom it reports and whose behavior it has to explain (p. 74). But these remarks could easily be regarded as question-begging by Burge, for he might argue that it denies what he claims without giving a good reason to do so. Nevertheless, a stronger line of argument is available on Bilgrami's side. It would be more effective to appeal to the fact that belief attributions have various purposes, among them the purpose of communicating to others evidence about features of the world represented by a belief. Donald Davidson

On What's In the Head

account, by itself, gives no guidance about how to answer this question.'0 There are several disanalogies between Kaplan's notion of character and Fodor's proposed account of narrow contentdisanalogies that suggest that Fodor's project is much more ambitious, and much more speculative. First, Kaplan's notion of context is not designed to include everything external to the individual, and the character of an utterance is not something determined by the purely internal properties of the speaker. As a result, characters are not required to have the counterfactual power that narrow contents must have. That the pronoun I has the character it has is a fact about a social practice-the practice of speaking English. The functions from context to content that Kaplan calls characters are not intended to tell us speakers would be saying if they were speaking some other language. Kaplan's notion need not tell us this since the aim of his theory is not to isolate the purely internal component of determines the content of speech acts, but simply to explain how some languages in fact work. The practice of speech is more efficient if speakers can exploit information about the environmentinformation available to all the participants in a conversation-in communicating. So languages make this possible by including rules that make is said a function of that kind of information. That a language contains such rules (rather than, say, just lots of unsystematic ambiguity) is a substantive hypothesis, though in this case an obviously correct one. That our minds contain much more general systematic procedures for determining content as a function of context in a more general sense is a much more ambitious and speculative hypothesis. Second, because Kaplan's theory is a theory of speech rather than a theory of thought we can identify, more or less independently of theory, the objects that the theory is interpreting: the objects that have character and content. A speech act can be described in terms of its content (O'Leary said that salt is soluble in water), but it also may be described in more neutral ways (O'Leary uttered the sentence, or the sounds, Salt is soluble in water) But in the case of thought it is much less clear it is that has a particular conThis content downloaded from 157.55.39.45 on Thu, 01 Sep 2016 06:01:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 298 / Robert Stalnaker tent, or narrow content. As with a speech act, we can describe a particular belief in terms of its content (O'Leary believes that salt is soluble in water), but in this case there is no easily identifiable mental state, describable independently of its content, that constitutes that person's having that belief. Of course a psychological theory might turn up such a mental state or object. It might be that it is to believe that salt is soluble in water is to be storing in a certain location a mental sentence that says that salt is soluble in water. If this were true, then we could identify the thing that has the content independently of the content that it has. But it also might be that states of belief are more holistic. Suppose a total belief state were a complex cluster of dispositions to behave in various ways under various conditions. One might be able to use particular belief contents such as the belief that salt is soluble in water to describe such a state without it being possible to match up those contents with particular dispositions in the cluster. On this kind of account, the question what makes it true (given the facts about the external context) that O'Leary believes that salt is soluble in water? will be answered by describing how O'Leary is disposed to behave under various conditions. But the same behavioral dispositions that constitute O'Leary's total belief state will also make it true that he believes various other nonequivalent propositions. Compare: the question what makes it true (given the facts about the external context) that O'Leary is three miles from a burning barn? will be answered by describing O'Leary's location. But this same location will also make it true that O'Leary has various other nonequivalent relational properties (being more than two thousand miles from Los Angeles, being closer to Istanbul than to New Delhi, etc.). Even if we could find a narrow, purely internal characterization of the belief state as a whole, it wouldn't follow that we could find narrow analogues of the (relational) facts about the belief state that are expressed by ordinary attributions of

Race Prejudice in the Administration of Justice

It would be denying to the judge the ordinary attributes of human nature to assume that he could render justice free from all preconceptions. The marked influence of race and nationality prejudice in the administration of justice is revealed through a study of the average length of sentences, definite and indeterminate, of foreign born, Negro, and white male prisoners received from courts in 1931 and commited to state and federal prisons and reformatories for adults in the United States. The great and relatively constant variations observed must be largely attributed to the human equation in judicial administration and as evidence that equality before the law is a social fiction.

Dr. Pascal. Zola.

This is a novel written “for a purpose,” the purpose being the exposition of heredity. We are suspicious of such productions for the reason that it is impossible to blend dry scientific facts with the ordinary attributes of popular reading in such a way as to prevent imagination overcoming accuracy. This work, though interesting in many ways, cannot be said to successfully dress science in a popular garb, while it contains many elements of danger to ordinary novelreaders. As to technique, we need hardly say that word structure and word painting are masterly. The plot may be described as a weaving of horrors, psychological, moral, and physical, into a tale of rural and domestic life, the latter being just of that easy and natural character which does so much to promote, whether for good or evil, the intaking of the more active incidents.